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PETITIONER: THE CONSUMER ACTION GROUP & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.!The Consumer Action GroupVs.State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/08/2000

BENCH: B.N. Kirpal J. & A. P. Misra J.

JUDGMENT:

MISRA, J.

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   The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of Section 113 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act,@@         JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ 1971  (hereinafter  referred  to as the Act) as  it  being@@ JJJJ ultra  vires  of Articles 14 and 21 of the  Constitution  of India  and also the validity of the orders passed under  it, granting   exemptions   by  respondent   no.1,   viz.,   the Government.   We  are  drawn  to  consider  an  issue,  more appropriately  expressed in the words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. the  perennial,  nagging problem of delegated  legislation and  the so-called Henry VIII clause have again come up  for decision...   The  petitioner - the consumer action  group which  is a trust registered under the Indian Trust Act, has raised similar issue before us.

   The petitioner through this petition under Article 32 of the  Constitution of India has brought to the notice of this Court,  impunity with which the executive power of State  of Tamil  Nadu is being exercised indiscriminately in  granting exemptions  to  the  violators violating  every  conceivable control,  check including approved plan, in violation of the public policy as laid down under the Act and the Development Control Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).  The submission  is,  granting of such exemptions is against  the public  interest,  safety, health and the  environment.   To bring  home this indiscriminate exercise of power, reference is  made  to  about  sixty two such  orders  passed  by  the Government  between  the period 1.7.1987 to 29.1.1988  which have  been  annexed  compositely  as   Annexure  II  to  the petition.  Submission is, it is this indiscriminate exercise of   power  which  results  in   the  shortage   of   water, electricity,  choked roads and ecological and  environmental imbalances.   Mr.   Dayan Krishnan, learned counsel for  the petitioner  submits, such exercise of power is because there are  no  guidelines or control under the Act.  This  is  the main  plank  of attack, for declaring Section 113  as  ultra vires  as  it can do or undo anything under the Act to  wipe out  any development without any check which amounts to  the delegation  by the Legislature of its essential  legislative power.

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   Mr.  R.  Mohan, learned senior counsel for the State has denounced  with  vehemence these submissions.  The power  is neither  uncanalised nor without any guideline.  This  power is  controlled  through  the   guidelines,  which  could  be gathered  from the preamble, Objects and Reasons,  including various  provisions  of  the  Act and  the  Rules.   So  far challenge  to  the  orders  passed under  it  by  the  State Government, it is open for the Court to examine the same and in  case  they are found to have been passed arbitrarily  or illegally the court may quash the same, but such exercise of power would not lend support to a declaration of Section 113 as ultra vires.

   In order to appreciate the submissions and to adjudicate the  issues  involved,  it  is proper to  scan  through  the periphery,  scope  and object of the aforesaid Act  and  the Rules.   The preamble of the Act picturises that the Act  is for  the planning the development of use of rural and  urban land  in  the  State  of Tamil Nadu  and  for  the  purposes connected therewith.  Section 2(13) defines development to mean carrying out of all or any of the works contemplated in a regional plan, master plan, detailed development plan or a new  town  development plan prepared under this  Act,  which includes  the carrying out of building, engineering,  mining or  other operations in, or over or under the land and  also includes  making  of any material change in the use  of  any building  or  land.   Sub-section 15 of  Section  2  defines development  plan  to  mean  for the  development  or  re- development   or   improvement  of   the  area  within   the jurisdiction of a planning authority and includes a regional plan,  master plan, detailed development plan and a new town development plan prepared under this Act.  This Act consists of  XIV  Chapters containing 125 Sections.  It provides  for the  creation of the Metropolitan Development Authority  for the  Metropolitan  area.   Under Chapter  II-A,  the  Madras Metropolitan  Development Authority (MMDA) was formed.   The control and development plan of the Madras Metropolitan area is  listed  with MMDA.  Chapter III deals with the  planning authorities  and its plan, Chapter IV deals with acquisition and  disposal of land, Chapter V contains special provisions regarding  new  town  development authority and  Chapter  VI refers  to the control of development and use of land.  This Chapter   gives   clear  guidelines   to   the   appropriate authorities  under  which  it has to perform  its  statutory functions.   Sub-section (2) of Section 49 gives  guidelines to  enable  the appropriate planning authority to  grant  or refuse  permission  in respect of an application made  under Section  49(1)  by  any person intending to  carry  out  any development  on  any land or building.  Thus,  this  Section empowers  MMDA  to revoke or modify any  permission  already granted.   This also provides as to when such an application for  modification could be made.  This Act also provides for the  constitution  of  a  tribunal   under  Chapter  IX  and provisions  under  Chapter  X  for an  appeal,  revision  or review.   It is under Chapter XII, the impugned Section  113 is  placed.   This confers delegation of power on the  State Government  and  delegation of power to the  Director  under Section  91 and to the appropriate planning authority  under Section  91-A.   It  is true both these later  Sections  are hedged  with  restrictions contained therein.  It  is  under this  setting,  when there is no check, or  restrictions  in Section  113 its vires is challenged.  This contrast between Section  91  and  91-A  with Section 113  is  submitted,  is indicative  that  the power with the Government is  unguided and uncontrolled.  In Chapter XIII, Section 122 empowers the

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Government  to make rules to carry out the purposes of  this Act.   Section  123  obligates the Government to  place  its rules  before  the  Legislature.  Section 124  empowers  the planning  authority  with  the   previous  approval  of  the Government    to   make     regulations   prospectively   or retrospectively  not  inconsistent  with this  Act  and  the Rules.   Significantly sub-section (3) of Section 124  gives power to the Government to rescind any regulation made under this section through notification.  Similarly, rule 3 guides and  controls the authorities to exercise its powers  within the  limitations of each such zone.  The said rules  further guide  the  authorities  to exercise its  power  within  the limitation as tabulated specifying the requirements relating to  floor  space  index, maximum height,  minimum  set-back, front  set  back,  side set back, rear set  back  etc.   For commercial zones further restrictions are in relation to the horsepower  rating of electric motors and steps to be  taken to  regulate  storage of explosives, to regulate  effluents, smoke, gas or other items likely to cause danger or nuisance to public health.  These rules sets out norms on which basis specific standards are to be worked out, keeping in mind the public  interest,  public  health and their safety  as  well development  of  that  area,  to cater to the  need  of  its citizens.

   It  is in this background we now proceed to consider the challenge  to Section 113.  For ready reference, the same is quoted hereunder:-

   113.   Exemptions:- Notwithstanding anything  contained in  this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as  they  deem  fit,  by notification, exempt  any  land  or building  or  class of land or buildings from all or any  of the  provisions  of  this Act or rules or  regulations  made thereunder."

   It  cannot  be  doubted,   mere  reading  literally  its language,  the first impression is that power conferred upon the  Government  displays one to be of the widest  amplitude with  no  in  built check revealed from this  Section.   The petitioners  case  is,  such wide powers have  led  to  its exercise  unscrupulously without consideration of its effect on  the public at large.  On the other hand learned  counsel for the State denying this submits, the power is bridled and controlled  through  the Preamble, Objects and  Reasons  and various provisions of the Act and the Rules.

   Challenging  the vires of this section, counsel for  the petitioner  referred to Premium Granites and Anr.  V.  State@@             JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ of  T.N.  and Ors.  1994 (2) SCC 691.  In this case, Rule of@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ granting  exemption from other provisions of the statute  of the   Tamil  Nadu  Minerals   Concession  Rules,  1959   was challenged  as  being arbitrary and without any  guidelines. Same  submission was made, as in the present case that  this gives wide discretionary power to the authority uncanalised. This decision held:-

   ..In  our  view,  in  interpreting the  validity  of  a provision  containing  relaxation  or exemption  of  another provision  of a statute, the purpose of such relaxation  and the  scope and the effect of the same in the context of  the purpose  of  the statute should be taken into  consideration and  if  it  appears  that   such  exemption  or  relaxation

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basically  and intrinsically does not violate the purpose of the  statute,  there will be no occasion to hold  that  such provision  of relaxation or exemption is illegal or the same ultra  vires other provisions of the statute.  The  question of  exemption  or  relaxation  ex  hypothesi  indicates  the existence  of  some provisions in the statute in respect  of which  exemption or relaxation is intended for some  obvious purpose.

   This  holds  such  a   provision  of  regularisation  or exemption  cannot be held to be illegal, if it is consistent with the purpose of the statute.  It further held:-

   But we do not think that in the facts and circumstances of  the case, and the purpose sought to be achieved by  Rule 39,  such  reading  down  is necessary so as  to  limit  the application  of  Rule  39 only for varying  some  terms  and conditions  of  a  lease.  If the State  Government  has  an authority  to  follow a particular policy in the  matter  of quarrying of granite and it can change the provisions in the Mineral  Concession  Rules  from  time  to  time  either  by incorporating  a  particular  rule  or  amending  the   same according  to its perception of the exigencies, it will  not be correct to hold that on each and every occasion when such perception  requires  a  change in the matter of  policy  of quarrying a minor mineral in the State, particular provision of the Mineral Concession Rules has got to be amended.

   So,  this  Court upheld the validity of Rule 39  of  the Tamil  Nadu Mineral Concession Rules, 1959.  Strong reliance is   placed  for  the  petitioner  in  the  case   of   A.N. Parasuraman  and Ors.  V.  State of Tamil Nadu, 1989 (4) SCC 683,  Section  22  of  the Tamil  Nadu  Private  Educational Institutions  (Regulation)  Act, 1966 was challenged.   This conferred  wide  exemption power on the State Government  to exempt  any private educational institution from all or  any provisions of the Act.  This Court held:-

   The  provisions  of  the Act indicate  that  the  State Government  has been vested with unrestricted discretion  in the  matter  of the choice of the competent authority  under Section   2(c)  as  also  in   picking  and   choosing   the institutions  for  exemption from the Act under Section  22. Such  an unguided power bestowed on the State Government was struck  down  as offending.  Article 14 in the case  of  the State  of  West  Bengal  v.  Anwar Ali  Sarkar.   A  similar situation  arose  in K.T.  Moopil Nair v.  State  of  Kerala where,  under  Section 4 of the Travancore-Cochin  Land  Tax Act,  1955, all lands were subjected to the burden of a  tax and  Section  7  gave  power  to  the  government  to  grant exemption  from  the operation of the Act.  The section  was declared ultra vires on the ground that it gave uncanalised, unlimited  and arbitrary power, as the Act did not lay  down any  principle or policy for the guidance of exercise of the discretion  in  respect  of the  selection  contemplated  by Section 7.

   Section 22 was held to be ultra vires as the Act did not lay  down  any principle or policy for the guidance  to  the delegatee for exercising its discretion.

   In Mahe Beach Trading Co.  and Ors.  V.  Union Territory of  Pondicherry  and Ors., 1996 (3) SCC 741,  the  Municipal

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Council  decided to levy a municipal tax of 5 paise on  each litre  of  petrol  and diesel oil sold at the  petrol  pump. This  levy  was  challenged  which was struck  down  by  the learned  Single Judge.  During the pendency of this  appeal, the  Administrator  of Pondicherry, promulgated  Pondicherry Municipal  Decree  (Levy  and Validation of  Taxes,  Duties, Cesses and Fees) Ordinance, 1973 and this was later replaced by  an  Act.   Sections 3 and 4 of the Validation  Act  were challenged  on  the  ground of excessive delegation  of  the essential legislative power.  This Court held:

   The  principle  which  emanates   from  the   aforesaid decisions  relied  upon  by  the appellants  is  very  clear namely:  that if there is abdication of legislative power or there  is  excessive  delegation  or if  there  is  a  total surrender  or transfer by the legislature of its legislative functions  to  another  body then that is  not  permissible. There  is, however, no abdication, surrender of  legislative functions or excessive delegation so long as the legislature has  expressed  its  will on  a  particular  subject-matter, indicated its policy and left the effectuation of the policy to subordinate or subsidiary or ancillary legislation.

   However, the Court holds, the question of these Sections being  ultra vires would have been relevant if any delegatee was to take any decision, which was not in that case.

   In  State  of Kerala and Ors.  V.  Travancore  Chemicals and  Manufacturing  Co.   and Anr.  1998 (8)  SCC  188,  the validity of Section 59-A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act was  challenged which was held to be violative of Article 14 and  was  thus  struck down.  Section 59-A of  this  Act  is quoted hereunder:

   59-A.   Power of Government to determine rate of tax.-If any  question arises to the rate of tax leviable under  this Act  on  the  sale or purchase of any goods,  such  question shall  be  referred to the Government for decision  and  the decision  of  the Government thereon shall,  notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, be final.

               Court held:

   Section   59-A  enables  the   Government  to  pass  an administrative  order  which has the effect of negating  the statutory  provisions of appeal, revision etc.  contained in Chapter  VII  of  the  Act  which  would  have  enabled  the appellate  or revisional authority to decide upon  questions in  relation to which an order under Section 59-A is passed. Quasi-judicial  or judicial determination stands replaced by the  power  to  take an administrative decision.   There  is nothing  in  Section 59-A which debars the  Government  from exercising  the power even after a dealer has succeeded on a question  relating  to the rate of tax before  an  appellate authority.   The  power  under Section 59-A is so  wide  and unbridled  that  it  can be exercised at any  time  and  the decision so rendered shall be final.

   In  Kunnathat  Thathunni  Moopil Nair V.  The  State  of Kerala  and  Anr.   1961  (3)  SCR  77,  the  constitutional validity  of  the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act  (Amendment Act 10 of 1957) was challenged as it contravenes Article 14, 19(1)(f)  and  31(1)  of  the Constitution  of  India.   The grounds  of  challenge  were (a) the Act did  not  have  any

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regard to the quality of the land or its productive capacity and  the  levy  of  tax  at  a  flat  rate  is  unreasonable restriction  on the right to hold property;  (b) the Act did not  lay  down any provision calling for a return  from  the assessee for an enquiry or investigation of facts before the assessment;   (c)  Section  7 gave arbitrary  power  to  the Government  to  pick  and choose in the matter of  grant  of total  or partial exemption from the provisions of the  Act; and  (d)  the  tax proposed to be levied had  absolutely  no relation to the production capacity of the land sought to be taxed  or to the income they could arrive.  This Court  with respect to Section 7 of the said Act held:-

   Furthermore,  Section  7  of  the  Act,  quoted  above, particularly  the  latter part, which vests  the  Government with  the power wholly or partially to exempt any land  from the  provisions of the Act, is clearly discriminatory in its effect   and,   therefore,  infringes   Art.   14   of   the Constitution.   The  Act does not lay down any principle  or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in respect of the selection contemplated by s.7. Section  7 was held to be ultra vires as the Act did not lay down any principle or policy for the guidance.

   For  the State reliance is placed in the State of Bombay and  Anr.   V.   F.N.  Balsara, 1951 SCR  682  (Constitution Bench).  With reference to the validity of Section 139(c) of the  Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949) the submission was that  power given to the Government to exempt any person  or institution  or  any class of persons or  institutions  from observing whole or any of the provisions of the Act, rule or regulation or order is too wide and unbridled.  This section is  similar in the width of discretion to the section we are considering.   This Court while setting aside the High Court decision upheld the provisions and held:-

   This  Court had to consider quite recently the question as  to how far delegated legislation is permissible, and a reference  to its final conclusion will show that delegation of  the character which these sections involve cannot on any view  be held to be invalid.  (See Special Reference No.1 of 1951:   In  re  The  Delhi  Laws  Act,  1912,  etc.   ).   A legislature while legislating cannot foresee and provide for all  future contingencies, and section 52 does no more  than enable the duly authorized officer to meet contingencies and deal  with  various  situations  as they  arise.   The  same considerations  will  apply to section 53 and  139(c).   The matter  however  need  not  be pursued further,  as  it  has already  been  dealt with elaborately in the  case  referred to.

   In  Harishankar Bagla and Anr.  V.  The State of  Madhya Pradesh 1995 SCR 380 (Constitution Bench) this Court held:-

   The  next contention of Mr.  Umrigar that section 3  of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers0 Act, 1946, amounts to  delegation of Legislative power outside the  permissible limits  is  again without any merit.  It was settled by  the majority  judgment in the Delhi Laws Act case that essential powers  of legislature cannot be delegated.  In other words, the  legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative  policy  in  respect  of   a  measure  and   its formulation  as  a  rule of conduct.  The  Legislature  must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which

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are  to control any given cases and must provide a  standard to  guide the officials or the body in power to execute  the law.   The  essential legislative function consists  in  the determination  or  choice of the legislative policy  and  of formally  enacting  that  policy  into  a  binding  rule  of conduct.   In the present case the legislature has laid down such  a  principle and that principle is the maintenance  or increase  in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable  distribution and availability at fair  prices.As already  pointed  out,  the  preamble and the  body  of  the sections  sufficiently formulate the legislative policy  and the  ambit and character of the Act is such that the details of  that policy can only be worked out by delegating them to a  subordinate  authority  within   the  framework  of  that policy.

   In  Sardar  Inder Singh V.  The State of Rajasthan  1957 SCR (Constitution Bench), this Court was considering Section 15 of the Rajasthan (Protection and Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 which,  with similar provision authorised the Government  to exempt any person from the operation of the Act.  This Court held:

   A  more  substantial contention is the one based on  s. 15,  which authorises the Government to exempt any person or class  of  persons  from the operation of the  Act.   It  is argued that that section does not lay down the principles on which  exemption could be granted, and that the decision  of the  matter  is  left  to  the  unfettered  and  uncanalised discretion  of the Government, and is therefore repugnant to Art.   14.   It  is true that that section does  not  itself indicate  the  grounds on which exemption could be  granted, but  the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with  sufficient clearness  the  policy  of  the Legislature;   and  as  that governs  s.   15  of  the Ordinance,  the  decision  of  the Government  thereunder cannot be said to be unguided.   Vide Harishanker Bagla v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh.

   P.J.   Irani  V.  The State of Madras 1962 (2)  SCR  169 (Constitution  Bench).   In this case Section 13  of  Madras Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 is similar  to the  provisions  we  are   considering  conferred  power  of exemption.  This Court held:

   It  was  not  possible  for   the  statute  itself   to contemplate  every  such  contingency   and  make   specific provision therefor in the enactment.  It was for this reason that  a power of exemption in general terms was conferred on the  State Government which, however, could be used not  for the purpose of discriminating between tenant and tenant, but in  order to further the policy and purpose of the Act which was,  in  the  context  of  the  present  case,  to  prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants.

   In  Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trivandrum  and Anr.   V.   K.   Kunhambu and Ors.  1980 (2) SCR  260,  this Court  was considering Section 60 of the Madras  Cooperative Societies  Act 1932, which empowered the State Government to exempt  existing  society from any of the provisions of  the Act  or  to direct that such provisions shall apply to  such society with specified modifications.  This Court held:

   The  Legislature  may  guide the delegate  by  speaking through  the express provision empowering delegation or  the other provisions of the statute, the preamble, the scheme or

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even  the  very subject matter of the statute.  If  guidance there  is,  wherever  it  may be found,  the  delegation  is validSection 60 empowers the State Government to exempt a registered  society from any of the provisions of the Act or to  direct  that such provision shall apply to such  society with  specified  modifications.   The  power  given  to  the Government  under s.  60 of the Act is to be exercised so as to  advance the policy and objects of the Act, according  to the guidelines as may be gleaned from the preamble and other provisions which we have already pointed out, are clear.

   The  catena  of  decisions referred to  above  concludes unwaveringly  in spite of very wide power being conferred on delegatee  that  such  a section would still  not  be  ultra vires,  if  guideline could be gathered from  the  Preamble, Object  and  Reasons  and other provisions of the  Acts  and Rules.   In  testing validity of such provision, the  courts have  to  discover, whether there is any legislative  policy purpose  of  the  statute or indication of  any  clear  will through  its various provisions, if there be any, then  this by  itself would be a guiding factor to be exercised by  the delegatee.  In other words, then it cannot be held that such a  power is unbridled or uncanalised.  The exercise of power of such delegatee is controlled through such policy.  In the fast  changing  scenario  of  economic,  social  order  with scientific  development spawns innumerable situations  which Legislature  possibly  could  not foresee, so  delegatee  is entrusted  with power to meet such exigencies within the  in built check or guidance and in the present case to be within the  declared  policy.   So delegatee has  to  exercise  its powers  within  this controlled path to subserve the  policy and  to achieve the objectives of the Act.  A situation  may arise, in some cases where strict adherence to any provision of  the statute or rules may result in great hardship, in  a given  situation, where exercise of such power of  exemption is  to remove this hardship without materially effecting the policy  of  the Act, viz., development in the  present  case then  such exercise of power would be covered under it.  All situation  cannot be culled out which has to be  judiciously judged and exercised, to meet any such great hardship of any individual  or institution or conversely in the interest  of society  at  large.  Such power is meant rarely to be  used. So  far  decisions  relied  by  the  petitioner,  where  the provisions  were held to be ultra vires, they are not  cases in  which  court found that there was any policy  laid  down under  the Act.  In A.N.  Parasuraman & Ors.  (supra)  Court held  Section  22 to be ultra vires as the Act did  not  lay down  any  principle  or policy.   Similarly,  in  Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair (supra) Section 7 was held to be ultra vires as there was no principle or policy laid down.

   In  this background we find the preamble of the Act laid down:-

   An  Act to provide for planning the development and use of  rural and urban land in the State of Tamil Nadu and  for purposes connected therewith.

   The  preamble  clearly  spells out policy which  is  for planning  and development of the use of the rural and  urban land  in  the State.  The Statement of Objects  and  Reasons also  indicates  towards the same.  The relevant portion  of which is quoted hereunder:

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   The  Tamil Nadu Town Planning Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act VII  of 1920) which is based on the British Town and Country Planning  and  Housing Act, 1909, has been in force  in  the State  for  nearly five decades.  The said Act provides  for matters  relating  to the development of towns to secure  to their  present and future inhabitants, sanitary  conditions, amenity  and  convenience.   It was felt necessary  to  make comprehensive  amendments to the Act as the Act had  several shortcomings and defects.

   Not only preamble and Objects and reasons of the Act clearly  indicate its policy but it is also revealed through various  provisions  of the enactment.  Sub-section (13)  of Section  2 defines development for carrying out any of the works  contemplated  in the regional and master  plan  etc., Section 9-C defines functions and powers of the Metropolitan Development  Authority,  Section 12 refers to functions  and powers  of the Appropriate Planning Authorities, Section  15 refers  to regional planning.  Section 16 is for preparation of  land  and building map, Section 17 refers to the  Master plans,  Section  18  refers to new  town  development  plan, Section 19 refers to the declaration of intention to make or adopt  a detailed development plan, Section 20 refers to the contents  of detailed development plan, Section 47 refers to use  and  development  of  land to  be  in  conformity  with development  plan, Section 48 refers to the restrictions  on building  and  lands in the area of the planning  authority. Each  of  them contributes for subserving the policy of  the Act,  and  clearly declares the purpose of the  Act.   Hence Section  113  cannot be held to be unbridled, as  Government has  to exercise its power within this guideline.  Hence  we hold Section 113 to be valid.

   There  is a clear distinction between a provision to  be ultra  vires as delegation of power being excessive and  the exercise  of  power  by such delegatee to  be  arbitrary  or illegal.   Once the delegation of power is held to be  valid the  only  other  question left for  our  consideration  is, whether the power exercised by the Government in passing the impugned  sixty two G.Os under Section 113 could be said to be arbitrary or illegal.

   Submission  is  that the Government has  exercised  this power  of  exemption  indiscriminately,   contrary  to   the provisions  of the Act and Rules.  The fact that  Government issued  62  GOs  during the period 1.7.1987  till  29.1.1988 exempting  large number of buildings in total disregard  and in  contravention  of the provisions of the Act, speaks  for itself.   In  fact,  36  such GOs were issued  on  one  day, namely,  on  31.12.1987.  The submission is that  these  GOs further  override even the orders passed by the  development authority rejecting their plan as not being in conformity to the  Development  Control Rules.  In fact,  every  essential restriction  condition as laid down under the Act is in  the interest  of  public  at large, was set  at  naught  without assigning  any  reasons.   Even the  basic  requirements  of set-back,  alignments,  abutting road width, FSI, height  of building,   corridor   width,    fire   safety,   staircase, transformer  room,  provision of lift,  parking  requirement etc.  were all given a go by.

   We  may  record here the State Government has not  filed any  counter affidavit against all these allegations made in the writ petition which was filed in the year 1988.

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   The  petitioner has annexed each of the aforesaid 62 GOs compositely  as Annexure II and a chart showing the  details of  these  62  GOs as Annexure I to the  writ  petition.   A perusal  of the exercise of power in each one of them by the first   respondent-Government   shows   a   consistent   and mechanical pattern in granting the exemption, about which we shall be referring later.

   The  allegation  in the writ petition is that after  the death of Thiru M.G.  Ramachandra on 14th December, 1987, the Government, during the interim period passed large number of GOs under Section 113 recklessly and indiscriminately and as per  information of the petitioner about 73 GOs were  passed on  one  day,  viz., on 31st December, 1987.   However,  the petitioner could only obtain 36 GOs being passed on that day hence  annexed  only such G.Os.  The allegation is,  further batch  of  large  number  of GOs were  passed  on  the  29th January, 1988 by the successor Ministry.

   We have before us the chart of 62 such GOs issued by the Government  under  Section 113, which is between the  period 1.7.1987  to  29.1.1988.  We have examined each of these  62 GOs which is annexed compositely as Annexure II to this writ petition.   Through  each  of  such  G.O.   exemptions  were granted  to  all such buildings, which  admittedly  violated compliance  under the various rules.  The aforesaid Act  and the Rules have elaborately laid down the restrictions in the use  of  both  the  land and the building  to  regulate  the development of urban and rural land.  The various norms have been  laid  down  exhaustively keeping in  mind  the  public interest,  the  public health and public safety as  well  as interest  of the builders and the landowners.  Under Section 122  development  control  rules have been  framed  for  the Madras  Metropolitan Area.  For developing of various zones, Rule  7  lays down for primary residential zone, Rule 8  for mixed  residential  use zone and Rule 9 for  commercial  use zone in the Madras Metropolitan Area which is divided into 9 zones.   The  rules  provide with  elaborate  details  which buildings  are normally to be permitted for what purpose and what  not otherwise covered in that zone to what extent they are  permitted,  e.g.,  schools  and   petty  shops  in  the residential  area,  subject to the limitations in each  such zone.  Each zone sets out in a tabular form the requirements relating  to  the floor space index, (FS1)  maximum  height, minimum  set  back, front set back, side set back, rear  set back  etc.  Similarly, for commercial zones restrictions are imposed  in  relation to the horsepower rating  of  electric meters  and to regulate storage of explosives as well as the affluence  smoke, gas or other items likely to cause  danger or nuisance to public safety.

   In  this background we scrutinized each of these 62 GOs. We find the grant of exemptions to the persons concerned has been  in a set manner, almost identically except one or two. When  we  are saying mechanically it is because  except  for typing  different plot numbers and the rules which have been exempted  all  other words are identical.  Except  for  this little  difference rest of the words in these orders are the same, which is reproduced below:

   In  exercise of powers conferred by Section 113 of  the Tamil  Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (Tamil  Nadu Act  35 of 1972) the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby exempts the  construction  made atfrom the provisions of  Ruleof the  Development Control Rules relating to.(Front set back,

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FSI  etc..)  requirements  respectively  to  the  extend  of violations  as  per  plan refused by the  Member  Secretary, Madras Metropolitan Development."

   Each  of these orders reveals non-application of mind by giving total go-by to the rules relating to the restrictions and  control  in  construction of a building, to  the  floor space  index,  the  front set back, side set  back,  parking requirements  including  provision  of  stand  by  generate, transformer room and meter room and floor space requirements construction   abutting   road    width,   corridor   width, permissible  floor area, limits of nursing homes, height  of the   rear   construction  even   from  the  provisions   of prohibition  on the construction of multi storied  buildings etc.    Not  only  this,   while  granting  the   exemptions Government has not recorded any reasons as to why such power is  being exercised and further such power was exercised not only  to  regularise some irregularities but were passed  to over  reach  even  the  order  of  refusal  passed  by   the Member-Secretary, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority. In  other  words, power of exemptions was granted which  set aside the orders earlier passed by the statutory authorities in terms of the Act and the Rules.  The submission on behalf of the State for salvaging the validity of Section 113 being ultra  vires was, Government does not possess uncanalise  or unbridled  power  as it is controlled by the policy  of  the Act.   The question is, whether the impugned orders could be said  to have been passed for the furtherance of such policy or  for achieving the purpose for which it was enacted.   So even  as per submission it can only be exercised in the  aid of  such  policy  and not contrary to it.  We find,  in  the present  case, the Government while exercising its powers of exemption  has  given a go-by to all the norms as laid  down under  the  Act  and the Rules and has truly  exercised  its powers  arbitrarily  without following any  principle  which could be said to be in furtherance of the objective of that, nor learned counsel for the State could point out any.

   Whenever  any statute confers any power on any statutory authority  including  a  delegatee under  a  valid  statute, howsoever  wide  the discretion may be, the same has  to  be exercised  reasonably within the sphere that statute confers and  such exercise of power must stand the test to  judicial scrutiny.   This  judicial  scrutiny  is one  of  the  basic features  of  our Constitution.  The reason  recorded  truly discloses  the justifiability of the exercise of such power. The question whether the power has been exercised validly by the delegatee, in the present case, if yes, then it can only be for the furtherance of that policy.  What is that policy? The  policy  is the development and use of rural  and  urban land including construction of, colonies, buildings etc.  in accordance  with  the  policy of the planning as  laid  down under  the  Act  and the Rules.  When such a wide  power  is given  to any statutory authority including a delegatee then it  is  obligatory  on  the part of the  such  authority  to clearly  record  its  reasons  in   the  order  itself   for exercising  such  a  power.   Application of  mind  of  such authority  at that point of time could only be revealed when order  records its reason.  Even if Section is silent  about recording  of  reason,  it is obligatory on  the  Government while passing orders under Section 113 to record the reason. The  scheme of the Act reveals, the Government is  conferred with  wide  ranging  power, including power to  appoint  all important  statutory authorities;  appoints Director and its

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members  of  Town  and  Country Planning  under  Section  4; constitutes Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Board under Section  5;   Board to perform such functions as  Government assigns  under  Section  6;   appoints  Madras  Metropolitan Development   Authority  under   Section  9-A;    Government entrusted for making master plan or any other new plan;  any plant  or  modification  is  subject   to  the  approval  of Government.   In fact, every statutory Committee is  created by  the  Government  and  its planning  is  subject  to  the approval by the Government.  It is because of this that very wide  power  is given to it under Section 113.  In  a  given case,  where a new development in rural or urban area may be required  urgently  and provisions under the Act  and  Rules would  take  long  procedure,  it may  in  exercise  of  its exemption power exempt some of the provisions of the Act and Rules  to  achieve the development activity faster or  in  a given  case,  if any hardship arises by following or  having not  followed  the  procedure as prescribed,  the  power  of exemption  could be exercised but each of these cases  would be for furtherance of the development of that area.

   When  such  a wide power is vested in the Government  it has to be exercised with greater circumspection.  Greater is the  power,  greater  should be the caution.   No  power  is absolute,  it is hedged by the checks in the statute itself. Existence  of  power does not mean to give one on  his  mere asking.   The entrustment of such power is neither to act in benevolence  nor in the extra statutory field.   Entrustment of  such  a  power is only for the public good and  for  the public  cause.  While exercising such a power the  authority has  to  keep in mind the purpose and the policy of the  Act and while granting relief has to equate the resultant effect of such a grant on both viz., the public and the individual. So  long it does not materially effect the public cause, the grant  would be to eliminate individual hardship which would be  within  the permissible limit of the exercise of  power. But  where it erodes the public safety, public  convenience, public  health etc., the exercise of power could not be  for the  furtherance of the purpose of the Act.  Minor  abrasion here  and  there to eliminate greater hardship, may be in  a given case, be justified but in no case effecting the public at  large.  So every time Government exercises its power  it has  to  examine and balance this before exercising  such  a power.   Even  otherwise  every individual  right  including fundamental  right  is  within reasonable limit  but  if  it inroads  public  rights leading to public inconveniences  it has  to be curtailed to that extent.  So no exemption should be  granted effecting public at large.  Various  development rules  and  restrictions  under  it are  made  to  ward  off possible  public  inconvenience and safety.  Thus,  whenever any  power is to be exercised, Government must keep in mind, whether  such  a grant would recoil on public or not and  to what  extent.   If it does then exemption is to be  refused. If  the  effect is marginal compared to the hardship  of  an individual  that  may be considered for granting.   Such  an application  of  mind  has  not been made in  any  of  these impugned orders.  Another significant fact which makes these impugned  orders illegal is that Section 113 empowers it  to exempt  but  it  obligates  it  to  grant  subject  to  such condition  as it deems fit.  In other words, if any power is exercised  then Government must put such condition so as  to keep  in  check  such  person.  We find  in  none  of  these sixty-two orders any condition is put by the Government.  If not  this then what else would be the exercise of  arbitrary power.

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   We  find in the present case, under the garb of its wide power,  it has exercised it illegally and arbitrarily beyond its  power vested under the said section without application of  mind.  We heard both learned counsels for the State  and other  affected respondents.  They could not submit anything for  us to draw inference contrary to the above.  Thus after examining  each of said GOs, in view of the finding recorded above,  all these 62 GOs are not sustainable in law and  are hereby quashed.

   This  brings  us to the next and the last  consideration which  is the matter of the connected writ petition.  During the pendency of this appeal in this Court, the State passed, Tamil   Nadu  Town  and   Planning  (Amendment)  Act,   1998 (hereinafter referred to as the amending Act) through which Section  113-A  was  introduced in the aforesaid  1971  Act, which is reproduced below:

   113-A.   Exemption in respect of development of certain lands or buildings

   (1)  Notwithstanding  anything contained in this Act  or any other law for the time being in force, the Government or any  officer  or authority authorised by the Government,  by notification,  in this behalf may, on application, by order, exempt  any land or building or class of lands or  buildings developed immediately before the date of commencement of the Tamil  Nadu Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act,  1998 (hereafter  in this section referred to as the said date) in the  Chennai Metropolitan Planning Area, from all or any  of the  provisions  of this Act or any rule or regulation  made thereunder,  by  collecting regularisation fee at such  rate not  exceeding  twenty thousand rupees per square metre,  as may  be  prescribed.  Different rates may be prescribed  for different  planning para- metres and for different parts  of the Chennai Metropolitan Planning Area.

   (2)  The application under sub-section (1) shall be made within  ninety  days  from  the   said  date  in  such  form containing such particulars and with such documents and such application fee, as may be prescribed.

   (3)  Upon the issue of the order under sub-section  (1), permission  shall be deemed to have been granted under  this Act for such development of land or building.

   (4)  Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any  application  made by any person who does not  have  any right  over the land or building referred to in  sub-section (1).

   (5)  Save  as  otherwise provided in this  section,  the provisions  of this Act, or other laws for the time being in force, and rules or regulations made thereunder, shall apply to  the  development  of  land or building  referred  to  in sub-section (1).

   (6)  Any  person  aggrieved by any  order  passed  under sub-section  (1)  by any Officer or authority may prefer  an appeal to the Government within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order.

   It  seems,  situation developed to such an extent,  that

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irregularity,   violation  became  order  of  the  day   and regularisation  through  power  of   exemption  may  not  be appropriate,  this amendment was brought in to overcome this situation.  By this, Government is empowered, on application being  made  by  person  affected, to  exempt  any  land  or building  developed  immediately  before  the  date  of  the commencement  of  this amending Act from all or any  of  the provisions  of the Act, rules and regulations by  collecting regularisation  fees at such rate not exceeding  Rs.20,000/- per  square meter.  The aforesaid 1982 amendment also  added clause  (cc)  to sub-section (2) of Section 122 of the  1971 Act.   The  Governor  in exercise of its  power  under  this clause  (cc) made Application, Assessment and Collection  of Regularisation Fees (Chennai Metropolitan Rural Area) Rules, 1999  which prescribe the rates of regularisation fees  with respect  to the various violation if one seeks to regularise it  under Section 113-A.  The petitioner has also challenged this  amending Act, through writ petition Civil No.  237  of 1999, which we have heard along with the main writ petition.

   The petitioners challenge is that Section 113-A suffers from  the same vice of it being unconstitutional as  Section 113.   It is also not only against the policy of the statute but  it  does  not  subserve to the  public  interest.   The submission  is, Section 113-A is merely an extension of  the unbridled  exemption  power conferred by the  statute  under Section  113 except that under this newly introduced section Government could collect regularisation fees.

   This  amending Act seeks to legitimatize all  violations under  the  Act,  Rules  and Regulations  and  condones  all executive acts which is the cause of reaching this situation by  not  taking appropriate action as against  such  illegal construction  which  they were obliged to do under the  Act. When the Government and other statutory functionaries failed to  work, to promote planned development to this extent, the Legislature has to intervene to bring this amendment.

   The  submission  is  this   amending  Act  will  greatly prejudice  the public safety, security, fresh air and  light and convenience to the public at large.  Under Section 113-A the  Government  is  empowered to grant  exemption  to  such person  who makes any application for exempting any land  or building  developed prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act from applicability of any of the provisions of this Act and Rules by collecting the regularisation fees, as  prescribed.   So,  this  section not  only  infuses  the Government  with  power  to exempt but also  lays  down  the procedure and condition to grant exemption.  This covers all buildings  or land developed immediately before the date  of the   commencement   of  the   aforesaid  1998  Act.    Here Legislature  lays down everything and does not leave to  the absolute  direction  of  the delegatee.  So,  Section  113-A cannot  be  challenged that discretion of the  delegatee  is unbridled  or  uncanalised  as section itself  confers  full guidelines  in  this  regard.   It is  significant  also  to reproduce  the  Objects and Reasons for the introduction  of this section which is quoted below:

   The  Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment Act state that:

   As  to today in Chennai as well as in other metropolitan cities  of  India many aberrations in the urban  development are  noticed.  Huge disparities between peoples income  and

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property  value, together tempt the builders to violate  the rules  and the buyers to opt for such properties in the city of  Chennai.  A rough estimate of about three lakh buildings (approximately  50%  on total number of buildings)  will  be violative  of  Development  Control  Rules  or  unauthorised structures.   However, according to the Tamil Nadu Town  and Country  Planning Act, 1971 (Act 35 of 1972) the  demolition action  cannot  be  pursued on any of them unless  a  notice issued   within   3  years  of  completion.    The   Chennai Metropolitan  Development Authority has booked five thousand structures  on  which  demolition  action  could  be  taken. Number  of  such cases booked by the Chennai City  Municipal Corporation  within its jurisdiction is nearly one thousand. Administratively  also demolition of such a large number  of cases is neither feasible nor desirable as it will result in undue  hardship  to the owners and  occupants.   Considering this  and the practice followed in other metropolitan cities of  the  country  to deal with violated  constructions,  the State Government have taken a policy to exempt the lands and buildings   developed  immediately  before   the   date   of commencement  of  the  proposed  legislation  by  collecting regularisation  fee  provided that the development has  been made by a person who has right over such land or buildings.

                               (Emphasis supplied)

   The Statement of Objects and Reasons exhibits the change of  Legislative  policy to regularise all those building  or land developed in contravention of the various provisions of the  Act  and  the  Rules.   Section  113-A  read  with  the Statement   of  Objects  and   Reasons   clearly   indicates Legislatures  intent  and  policy, instead  of  demolishing illegal  constructions  to  regularise   them  by   charging regularisation  fees.   Thus  no similar  attributable  vice could  be attached to Section 113-A which was submitted  for Section  113.   Section 113-A Legislature, itself lays  down what  is  to do be done by the Government, while in  Section 113  Government is conferred with wide discretion though  to act  within  the  channel of the policy.  In  Section  113-A hardly  any  discretion is left on the Government  while  in Section  113  very large discretion is left.   Challenge  to Section  113  is unguided wide power to a delegatee, but  no such  challenge could be made against Legislature.   Section 113-A  is  mandate  of  the   Legislature  itself  to  grant exemption  and realise regularisation fees no discretion  on the  delegatee.   Hence we hold Section 113-A as a one  time measure  is valid piece of legislation and challenge to  its validity  has no merit.  It is interesting, though a  matter of concern, what is recorded in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.   It records;  (A) A Rough estimate of about  three lakh  buildings  (Approximately 50% of the total  number  of buildings) will be violative of Development Control Rules or unauthorised structure.  (B) Under the Act demolition action against such structure cannot be pursued against any of them unless a notice was issued within 3 years of its completion. (C)  Chennai  Metropolitan Development Authority could  book only   five  thousand  such   structures  and  Chennai  City Municipal  Corporation  could  book only one  thousand  such buildings  against  which demolition action could be  taken. (D)  Administratively also demolition of such a large number of  cases  are  neither feasible nor desirable, as  it  will result  in  undue hardship to the owners and the  occupants. (E)  Considering  practice  followed in  other  metropolitan cities  of  the country, the State Government took a  policy decision  to  exempt  buildings   and  lands  by  collecting

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regularisation fees.

   Mere  reading  of this reveals, administrative  failure, regulatory  inefficiency  and  laxity  on the  part  of  the concerned  authorities  being conceded which has led to  the result,  that  half of the city buildings are  unauthorised, violating  the  town planning legislation and  with  staring eyes Government feels helpless to let it pass, as the period of  limitation has gone, so no action could be taken.   This mess  is  the creation out of the inefficiency,  callousness and  the  failure of the statutory functionaries to  perform their obligation under the Act.  Because of the largeness of the illegalities it has placed the Government in a situation of helplessness as knowing illegalities, which is writ large no  administratively  action of demolition of such  a  large number  of  cases  is  feasible.   The  seriousness  of  the situation  does not stay here when it further records,  this is  the pattern in other metropolitan cities of India.  What is the reason?  Does the Act and Rules not clearly lay down, what  constructions are legal what not?  Are consequences of such  illegal constructions not laid down?  Does the statute not  provide for controlled development of cities and  rural lands  in the interest of the welfare of the people to cater to  public  conveniences,  safety, health  etc.?   Why  this inaction?   The  Government may have a gainful eye  in  this process  of  regularisation to gain affluence  by  enriching coffers   of   the  State  resources   but  this   gain   is insignificant  to  the  loss to the public, which  is  State concern  also as it waters down all preceding  developments. Before such pattern becoming cancerous to spread to all part of  this  country, it is high time that remedial measure  is taken  by  the  State  to check this  pattern.   Unless  the administration  is  toned  up,   the  persons  entrusted  to implement  the scheme of the Act are made answerable to  the latches   on  their  failure  to  perform  their   statutory obligations, it would continue to result with wrongful gains to  the  violators  of the law at the cost  of  public,  and instead of development bring back cities into the hazards of pollution,  disorderly traffic, security risks etc.  Such  a pattern  retards the development, jeopardises all purposeful plans  of any city, and liquidates the expenditure  incurred in such development process.

   We may shortly refer to the possible consequences of the grant  of  such exemption under Section 113-A by  collecting regularisation  fees.  Regularisation in many cases, for the violation  of,  front  set-back,  will not  make  it  easily feasible  for the corporation to widen the abutting road  in future  and bring the incumbent closer to the danger of  the road.   The  waiver  of requirements of side  set-back  will deprive  adjacent buildings and their occupants of light and air and also make it impossible for a fire engine to be used to  fight a fire in a high rise building.  The violation  of floor  space index will result in undue strain on the  civil amenities  such as water, electricity, sewage collection and disposal.   The  waiver  of   requirements  regarding   fire staircase  and  other  fire  prevention  and  fire  fighting measures would seriously endanger the occupants resulting in the building becoming a veritable death trap.  The waiver of car  parking  and  abutting road  width  requirements  would inevitably lead to congestion on public roads causing severe inconvenience  to  the  public  at  large.   Such  grant  of exemption  and the regularisation is likely to spell ruin of any  city  as  it  affects the  lives,  health,  safety  and convenience of all its citizens.  This provision, as we have

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said,  cannot  be  held to be invalid as it  is  within  the competence  of  State Legislature to legislate based on  its policy  decision,  but  it is a matter of  concern.   Unless check  at the nascent stage is made, for which it is for the State  to  consider  what  administrative scheme  is  to  be evolved,  it  may be difficult to control  this  progressive illegality.   If such illegalities stays for a long, wave of political,   humanitarian  regional   and  other  sympathies develop.   Then to break it may become difficult.  Thus this inflow  has to be checked at the very root.  State must  act effectively  not to permit such situation to develop in  the wider  interest  of  public  at large.  When  there  is  any provision  to  make illegal construction valid on ground  of limitation,  then it must mean Statutory Authority in  spite of  knowledge has not taken any action.  The functionary  of this  infrastructure has to report such illegalities  within shortest  period, if not, there should be stricter rules for their  non-compliance.  We leave the matter here by bringing this to the notice of the State Government to do the needful for  salvaging  the  cities and country from this  wrath  of these illegal colonies and construction.

   Another  attack  on  behalf of the petitioner  is,  when procedure for planned development takes place, the proposals are  notified for public to file any objection under the Act and  Rules which are considered before finalising the  plan. But  when  regularisation takes place, which may affect  the public, there is no provision for any notice to such public. We   feel   on  the  facts  of  the   present   case,   when regularisation covers all buildings made in contravention of the  Act and the Rules prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid Amending Act, the number being very large and this being  one time settlement, then giving of public notice, in each of such cases, before deciding, may not be practicable. However,  we  find under sub- section (6) of  Section  113-A there  is  provision for an appeal against such an order  of regularisation by any person aggrieved.  The appeal is to be filed  within  30 days from the date of the receipt  of  the order  which would normally be to the person who has applied for  regularisation.  It would be appropriate for the  State to  consider,  in future, not this one time  settlement,  to either provide for an opportunity to the public at the first stage  of consideration of the grant of exemption or at  the stage  of  appeal, if any, provided.  Where public right  is affected,  the  person from public will have a right to  get redress  of  his grievance by placing such objection  as  he deem  fit,  which may be considered only to the  extent  the public right is affected.

   As  we  have  held the 62 GOs by  the  State  Government granting  exemptions to various persons under Section 113 of the Act cannot be sustained, we quash each one of the 62 GOs annexed compositely as Annexure II to the writ petition.  In view  of this such land or building under each such GO would become  unauthorised.   In the absence of Section 113-A  the consequence  of demolition would have been the only  option. However, in view of Section 113-A, the person covered by the said  62  GOs,  as a consequence of quashing, would  be  the person  affected,  and  would also be persons  entitled  for regularisation under Section 113-A in terms of the aforesaid Rules 1999.  Though all the affected 62 persons are parties, some  of them have chosen not to appear in spite of service, hence  we feel it appropriate that the Government will issue public  notice  including  a notification  that  any  person desiring  regularisation of the unauthorised construction as

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a  consequence of the orders passed by this Court may  apply to  the  concerned  authorities  within   30  days  of  such publication and on such application being made the authority concerned will dispose it of in accordance with law treating them to be filed within time.

   In  view  of the aforesaid findings recorded, by  us  we conclude:-  (A)  Section  113  of the Tamil  Nadu  Town  and Country  Planning  Act, 1971 is valid.  It does  not  suffer from  the  vice  of excessive delegation  of  any  essential legislative function.  The preamble, Objects and Reasons and various  provisions of the Act give clear-cut policy and the guidelines  to  the  Government for  exercising  its  power. Hence it is neither unbridled nor without any guidelines.

   (B)  So far the impugned 62 GOs, each one of them, which has been annexed compositively under Annexure II to the writ petition,  cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed.

   (C)  Section  113-A  as a one time  measure  brought  in through  the  Tamil Nadu Town and Planning (Amendment)  Act, 1998 is valid piece of legislation and not ultra vires.

   (D)  The facts recorded in the Statement of Objects  and Reasons  of  the  Amending Act indicates matter  of  serious concern  which requires earnest consideration to salvage  in future  such recurring situation affecting public right with resultant hazard of traffic, public health, security etc.

   (E)  To  take effective measures, to check at  the  root level,  at  the  very  nascent   stage  and  see  that  such situations does not recur.

   In  view  of the aforesaid findings and our  conclusions both  the  writ petitions are partly allowed.  Costs on  the parties.