11 August 1987
Supreme Court
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CONAL BIHIMAPPA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

Bench: MISRA RANGNATH
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 811 of 1986


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PETITIONER: CONAL BIHIMAPPA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1987

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2359            1987 SCR  (3) 885  1987 SCC  Supl.  207     JT 1987 (3)   321  1987 SCALE  (2)323  CITATOR INFO :  F          1991 SC 235  (6)  RF         1991 SC1244  (9)

ACT:     Inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees amongst  the officers of the Karnataka Administrative  Serv- ice--Dispute relating to.

HEADNOTE:     Under the relevant Recruitment Rules relating to Class I junior scale posts, there was a quota system--two-thirds  of the vacancies had to be filled up by promotion by  selection from Class II officers and the remaining one-third by direct recruitment by competitive examination to be held by  Public Service Commission.     When direct recruitment was not made timely as envisaged by  the  scheme in the Rules,  officiating  promotions  were given in respect of the posts covered by the direct  recruit quota.  Such temporary promotions remained effective  for  a number  of  years and later when the  vacancies  within  the direct  recruitment quota were filled up,  the  appointments made  in the later years were deemed to carry weightage  for seniority  on  the  footing of deemed filling  up  when  the vacancies  had  arisen. Thus, the dispute  as  to  seniority inter se between those who had manned the promotional  posts beyond  2/3rds  limit and the direct  recruits  subsequently appointed,  arose for judicial determination. This Court  in V.P. Badami, etc. v. State of Mysore and Ors., [1976] 1  SCR 313 had dealt with a similar situation with reference to the same set of rules, and with a view to implementing the  rule of  this  Court in Badami’s case, the State  government  had issued an official memorandum on 5.7.75, laying down  guide- lines for determination of the seniority between the  direct recruits  and promotees, and accordingly, gradation list  of the  junior scale officers as on 30.6.73 was drawn  up,  and notified on 10.8.75. By a later notification dated 2.2.77, a further gradation list was published. Then, on a representa- tion by the 1974 batch of direct recruits for refixation  of inter se seniority in the gradation list taking into account the carried forward vacancies, the State Government made  an order on 22.5.80 to the effect that the 1974 batch of direct

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recruits should be shown immediately below serial number  64 and  above  serial number 65 in the  continuation  gradation list published on 2.2.77. 886     Aggrieved  by this government direction, some  promotees moved  the High Court under Article 226 of the  Constitution for  protection  of their seniority, and  aggrieved  by  the decision  of the High Court, both, the direct  recruits  and promotees moved this Court for relief by appeals by  special leave  and  writ  petitions. The  promotees  challenged  the propriety  of the direction of the High Court to modify  the gradation list by applying the quota rule, while the  direct recruits  sought to have full application of the quota  rule instead of the limitation of three years, and the consequen- tial benefits.     Allowing  the  appeals  and the writ  petitions  of  the direct recruits and dismissing the appeals by the promotees, the Court,     HELD:  The  rule of this court in V.P. Badami,  etc.  v. State of Mysore and others, [1976] 1 SCR 313 has to be given full  effect. The appeals and writ petitions of  the  direct recruits have to succeed and those by the promotees have  to fail. The Court hopes the State of Karnataka will not demote anyone who has been in a promotional post for several  years in  the Class II service as a consequence of this  decision, but  the gradation list has got to be adjusted to  fit  into the  principles indicated in the judgment. No  justification was shown as to why the State of Karnataka failed to  comply with  its  obligation of making recruitments  in  accordance with  the  quota system. Once the State  frames  rules,  the rules  are binding on the State, and like  individuals,  the State has got to resulate its conduct in accordance with the rules; in fact, the State has to observe them all the  more. The  Court  hopes that the State of Karnataka in  the  years ahead  will  comply with the quota rule with  regularity  so that a litigation of this type may not arise again. [907D-F]     Upon a suggestion of the Court, counsel for the  parties filed charts, containing recast gradation list on the  basis of the claims advanced before the Court---showing (1) how it would  be when the full claim of the promotees  was  granted and (2) how different it would look when the total claim  of the direct recruits was allowed, and the Court notices  that the process of pushing up and down would be inevitable,  but would be within reasonable limits and no irreparable  preju- dice was apparent. [907H; 908A-B]     OBSERVATION:  The  Court was struck by  the  innumerable rules framed within a period of about thirty years to  cover the  field relating to constitution, recruitment and  provi- sion  for  other conditions of service. It  is  proper  that service rules should be simple, making              887 reasonable  provision for necessary aspects.  While  framing such rules, the relevant provisions of the Constitution  and the  laws in force hove to be kept in view. There should  be no  frequent alteration of the service rules. Exigencies  of circumstances  and  unforeseen  situations  will   certainly justify  alterations. Those would be indeed rare  occations. [905H; 906A-B]     Experience shows that legal battles are fought in  court between  Government servants--whether an individual  pitched against  an  individual  or a group against  a  group;  this embitters  relationship  inter  se and often  results  in  a switch-over of attention from public duty to personal cause. Frequent litigations against the State or the higher author- ities  in the hierarchies of administration wipe out  rever-

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ence,  loyalty and the sense of discipline,  and  substitute these  by  anger, disrespect and ram:our.  In  the  process, fellow-feeling is lost and the sense of brotherhood  vanish- es.  The  net result of all this is the deprivation  of  the efficiency of the bureaucratic community to serve the socie- ty.  The undue growth of service litigation within the  four decades  of  independence clearly calls for  these  observa- tions.  As and when the occasion has arisen, the  Court  has sought to draw the attention of the State as the ’  employer as  also the government servants to this aspect of the  mat- ter.  This has been done not with a view to  subjecting  any litigant  to undue criticism but with the fond hope that  it would  help the problem to receive adequate  attention.  The Court is surprised that the words spelt out in the different judgments have fallen on deaf ears. Thereby the most  power- ful  wing in the administrative set up is  gradually  moving away  from its designated path. There have been cases  where officers  have been in court, litigating over  service  dis- putes for about twenty-five to thirty years of their career, which would mean almost three-fourth of their service  peri- od.  What would be the contribution of such officers to  the public  service, can be well imagined. Very often  a  public officer is forced into litigation as he gets no justice from his  superior.  There are also several  instances  where  an officer  drags the employee into litigation without a  cause of  action. These are matters which must be taken  into  ac- count  without  further loss of time and with  fortitude  so that the most effective wing of the administration does  not further lose its service ability. [906B-G]     A public servant is in the position of a trustee. Social power  vests in him for rendering service to the  community. Every public servant has to be cognizant to that obligation. Once  the  level of that consciousness grows  up,  there  is bound to be a corresponding fail in the attitude 888 to  litigate  over small issues. It is  for  the  privileged public  servant as also his employer to share this  philoso- phy. [906H; 907C]      V.P.  Badami, etc. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1976]  1 SCR 313; M.G. Kadali v. State of Karnataka & Ors., [1982]  2 K.L.J. 453; N.C. Sharma v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi  & Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 372; S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors.,  [1967] 2 SCR 703; Bishan Sarup’s case,  [1973]  Suppl SCR  491;  Bachan  Singh & Anr. v. Union of  India  &  Ors., [1972]  3 SCR 390; Sabraman’s case, [1972] 2 SCR  979;  Col. A.S. Iyer & Ors. v. V. Balasubramanyam & Ors., [1980] 1  SCR 1036; P.S. Sahal & Ors. v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165; A.  Janardhana v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 2  SCR  165; S.S. Lamba and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1985] 3 SCR 431;  G.P. Doval and Ors. v. Chief Secretary, Government  of UP and Ors., [1983] 1 SCR 70; O.P. Singla and Anr., etc.  v. Union  of India and Ors., [1985] 1 SCR 351; D.S. Nakara  and Ors.  v.  Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165; N.K.  Chandan  & Ors.  v. State of Gujarat, [1977] 1 SCR 1037; Karam  Pal  v. Union of India, [1985] 3 SCR 271 and Dr. T.C. Siddapparadhya JUDGMENT:

&      ORIGINAL/APPELLATE    JURISDICTION:   Writ     Petition (Civil) No. 811 of 1986 etc. etc. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).      F.S.  Nariman, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker, R.C.  Kaushik, D.K.  Garg,  Mohan Katarki, S.S. Javali, Ravi  P.  Wadhwani,

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C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Mohan, S. Ravindra Bhatt, P.  Chowd- hry,  S.R. Setia and Mukul Mudgal for the  Petitioner/Appel- lant.      G.  Ramaswamy,  Additional  Solicitor  General,  B.R.L. Iyengar, M. Veerappa and Ashok Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATH  MISRA, J. The obstinate problem of  inter  se seniority,  this  time  amongst officers  in  the  Karnataka Administrative Service has fallen for determination in  this group  of appeals by special leave and writ petitions  under Article  32  of  the Constitution at the  instance  of  both direct recruits and promotees.      It is not disputed that under the relevant  Recruitment Rules of 1957 in regard to Class I Junior Scale posts  there was a quota system--          889 two-thirds of the vacancies had to be filled up by promotion by  selection from Class II Officers and the remaining  one- third by direct recruitment by competitive examination to be held by the Public Service Commission. When direct  recruit- ment had not been made timely as envisaged by the scheme  in the  Rules officiating promotions were given in  respect  of posts  covered by the direct recruit quota.  Such  temporary promotions  remained effective for a number of  years  some- times varying between 5 and 8--and later when the  vacancies within  the  direct recruitment quota were  filled  up,  the appointments  made  in  latter years were  deemed  to  carry weightage for seniority on the footing of deemed filling  up when vacancies had arisen. Thus the dispute as to  seniority inter se between those who had manned the promotional  posts beyond the 2 3rds limit and the direct recruits subsequently appointed has come for judicial determination.     A three-Judge Bench of this Court in V.P. Badami etc. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 315 dealt with a situa- tion of this type with reference to the same set of Rules. A similar  dispute came before the Karnataka High Court  in  a bunch  of writ petitions filed both by promotees and  direct recruits  and  in view of common questions of fact  and  law involved  therein, the High Court disposed them by a  common leading  judgment  in the case of M.G. Kadali  v.  State  of Karnataka  & Ors., [1982] 2 KLJ 453. The High Court  noticed the  ratio  in Badami’s case and found that with a  view  to implementing the rule in Badami’s case, the State Government issued  an  official  memorandum on  5.7.1976.  laying  down guidelines for determination of seniority between the direct recruits  and promotees. The Gradation List of Junior  Scale officers as on 30.6.1973 was drawn up following such  guide- line  and was notified on 10.8.1976 with the  following  ex- planatory cover note:               (i)  Between  2.12.1957  and  10.9.1959,   the               number  of substantive vacancies were  thirty-               nine and of those, twenty-six were promotional               and  thirteen  were the share  of  direct  re-               cruits.  The first fifteen of the  promotional               posts were given to allottees and the  remain-               ing  eleven  to promotees. In the  absence  of               direct recruitment, these thirteen posts  were               carried forward;               (ii)  Between 11.9.1959 and  26.10.1964  (when               1962   direct   recruits   became   due    for               promotion), the vacancies were seventy-six, of               which  fiftyone  were  available  for   direct               recruits and twentyfive for promotees in  view               of  the change in the proportion in  the  1959               Rules. Twentythree substantive vacancies  were

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             given to direct               890               recruits  of 1962. The net result,  therefore,               was  13  direct recruit posts of  the  earlier               period  and  twentyeight of this  period  were               carried forward;               (iii)  After October 1964, the vacancies  were               classified  on annual basis.  Upto  7.10.1971,               sixty  vacancies were filled up by  promotion.               As  noticed earlier fortyone  direct  recruits               vacancies had been carried forward and thirty-               five fresh vacancies were available to  direct               recruits.  Eleven vacancies were filled up  by               direct recruitment and sixtyfive were  carried               forward.                    By  a latter notification dated 2.2.  197               1,  when  a further gradation  list  was  pub-               lished,  the  following explanatory  note  was               added:               "(i)  During  the period 7.6.1974  to  15.7.76               (when  direct recruits of 1974  were  eligible               for  confirmation), eleven substantive  vacan-               cies were available on the basis of the perma-               nent strength of the cadre;                         (ii) Out of one hundred and  thirty-               three  temporary posts available  during  that               period,  eightynine  posts  were  assigned  to               promotees.  The direct  recruitment  vacancies               carried  forward from the earlier period.  The               recruits of the 1964 batch were assigned ranks               taking  into  account the  direct  recruitment               vacancies  carried  forward for  the  previous               period."      On  a  representation by the 1974 batch of  direct  re- cruits for refixation of inter se seniority in the Gradation List  taking  into account only the permanent posts  in  the cadre and by taking into account the carried forward  vacan- cies,  the State Government made an order on 22.5. 1980,  to the effect that the 1974 batch of direct recruits should  be shown  immediately below serial number 64 and  above  serial number  65 in the continuation Gradation List  published  on 2.2. 1977.      Certain promotees being aggrieved by this  Governmental direction  approached the High Court under Article  226  for relief  claiming  protection of their  seniority.  The  High Court classified their contentions into the following five:               (i) The only basis for determination of  inter               se  seniority of officers in a  cadre--whether               by  promotion or direct recruitment-should  be               the date of entry into the cadre and the quota               rule is                891               not  available  to be used for pushing  up  or               down officers of the cadre;               (ii)  Even if there be any ’carry forward’  it               should not extend beyond three years;               (iii) Quota rule should be applied taking into               account both substantive as well as  temporary               vacancies in the cadre;               (iv)  The quota rule did no longer operate  in               regard  to the junior scale officers when  the               1959  rules became operative; at any  rate  it               was  clearly so when the 1966 Rules came  into               force, and               (v) The impugned Government order of 1980  was

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             invalid  and liable to be quashed  on  several               grounds,  one of them being that it  was  made               without providing an opportunity to the promo-               tees who were adversely affected by it.               The  High Court analysed the judgment of  this               Court  in Badami’s case and also referred  to,               and  relied  upon, the  observations  in  Col.               Iyer’s  case and with reference to the  issues               catalogued  above  came to the  conclusion  as               stated below in its own words:               (i) "If promotions have taken place in  excess               of  the quota for promotion, pushing down  the               promotees promoted in excess of their quota or               if  direct recruitment was done in  excess  of               the quota for direct recruitment, pushing down               direct  recruits appointed in excess of  their               quota in a necessary concomitant of the  quota               rule.  Carrying forward of direct  recruitment               vacancies or promotional vacancies to the next               recruitment  period is merely the  consequence               of  such pushing down. (What was  perhaps  in-               tended  to be said was that pushing  down  was               the  direct  outcome of the mandate  to  carry               forward)  we are unable to accept the  conten-               tion of learned counsel for the  promoteepeti-               tioners  that there should be no such  pushing               down or such carry forward."               (ii) "In the light of the above ruling of  the               Supreme  Court,  it must be  held  that  carry               forward of direct recruitment vacancies cannot               extend  beyond  three  years.  However,   this               ruling  of the Supreme Court (In  A.S.  Iyer’s               case) does not affect the finality and binding               character  of  the  earlier  judgment  of  the               Supreme Court in Badami’s case which  specifi-               cally dealt with the Grada-               892               tion List of Junior Scale officers as on  1.1.               1972,  and  gave direction as to how  a  fresh               Gradation  List  should  be  prepared.   Those               directions  are bound to be obeyed while  pre-               paring  such  Gradation List of  officers  who               entered  that cadre upto 1.1.1972 without  any               limitation as to the period upto which  promo-               tional or direct recruitment vacancies  should               be  carried  forward to the  next  recruitment               period.  But such carry forward cannot  exceed               three years after 1.1.1972."               (iii)  "The above ruling of the Supreme  Court               (Badami’s case) is binding on all courts under               Article  141  of the Constitution. It  is  not               open  to us to speculate what would have  been               the conclusion of the Supreme Court if it  had               known  the correct factual position  that  the               cadre of Junior Scale officers consisted  both               of  permanent  and temporary posts.  That  the               promotee-petitioners   in  the  present   writ               petitions  were not parties to Badami’s  case,               in no way detracts from the binding  character               of the law declared by the Supreme Court."               (iv)  "Hence,  we reject the  contention  that               1959 Rules abrogated the quota rule in  regard               to  recruitment to the cadre of  Junior  Scale               officers   ......  We, therefore,  reject  the               contentions  of learned counsel for  promotee-

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             petitioners  that  after the 1966  Rules  came               into force, the quota rule ceased to apply  to               the  recruitment to the cadre of Junior  Scale               officers and that thereafter the date of entry               into the cadre, whether by direct  recruitment               or  by  promotion, became the only  basis  for               determining the seniority in that cadre."               (v)  "The High Court examined  the  individual               cases of both the groups and finally  directed               dismissal  of  Kadali’s  (or  promotee)   writ               application as also of the direct recruits  of               1976 and 1977. It further quashed the  Govern-               ment  order dated 22.5. 1980 by which  certain               modifications were made in the Gradation  List               of  1976 and called upon the State  Government               to make appropriate alterations in the  Grada-               tion  List of 10.8. 1976 and the  continuation               list of 2.2. 1977 on the basis that the  carry               forward  rule  should operate  for  a  maximum               period  of  three  years  subsequent  to  1.1.               1972." We  have before us a batch of appeals by special  leave  and two writ petitions under Article 32. Both the writ petitions are by direct recruits; Civil Appeal Nos. 2906 and 2910  and 2911 of 1984 are by         893 promotees  while Civil Appeal Nos. 2902 to 2905 to  2907  to 2909 of 1984 are by direct recruits. The promotees challenge the  propriety of the direction of the High Court to  modify the  Gradation  List by applying the quota  rule  while  the direct  recruits seek to have full application of the  quota rule instead of the limitation of three years and have asked for consequential benefits.     This  group of cases has been heard at great length  and learned  counsel  for  the parties have produced  a  lot  of papers. On looking into the matter objectively in the  back- drop  of  Badami’s decision we are of the view that  if  the following  aspects are answered all that arose for  judicial determination would be appropriately met. Those aspects are:               (i)  What is the effect of the quota  rule  in               the  matter of fixation of inter se  seniority               in the Gradation List so far as recruits  from               different sources are concerned?               (ii)  Though  admittedly  in  1957  under  the               relevant rule, a quota existed, was that basis               altered or given up during the relevant  peri-               od?               (iii)  What  is  the effect  of  this  Court’s               judgment in Badami’s case? Was the High  Court               correct in observing that this Court would not               have  come  to the conclusion that  quota  was               confined to substantive vacancies only if  the               true state of facts was known?               (iv) What is the effect of the observation  in               Iyer’s case and does it supersede the rule  in               Badami’s case?               (v)  Does  the situation highlighted  in  this               case require any other direction?     It is a well-settled position in law that where recruit- ment  is from two sources to a service, a quota rule can  be applied  fixing  the  limits of  recruitment  from  the  two sources.  (H.C. Sharma v. Municipal Corporation of  Delhi  & Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 372. FIRST ASPECT     In  S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors., [1987]  2

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SCR 703 a Constitution Bench of this Court observed:-               "The  Solicitor-General on behalf of  respond-               ents 1, 2                894               and 3 submitted that the quota rule was merely               an   administrative  direction  to   determine               recruitment from two different sources in  the               proportion stated in the rule and a breach  of               that  quota rule was not a justiciable  issue.               The  Solicitor-General  said that  there  was,               however, substantial compliance with the quota               rule   ............  We are unable  to  accept               the argument of the Solicitor-General that the               quota  rule  was not legally  binding  on  the               Government. It is not disputed that Rule 4  of               the  Income Tax Officers (Class I,  Grade  II)               Service Recruitment Rules is a statutory  rule               and  there  is a statutory duty  cast  on  the               Government  under this rule to  determine  the               method  or  methods  to be  employed  for  the               purpose  of  filling  the  vacancies  and  the               number  of candidates to be recruited by  each               method.  In  the letter of the  Government  of               India dated October 1951 there is no  specific               reference  to rule 4, but the quota  fixed  in               their letter must be deemed to have been fixed               by the Government of India in exercise of  the               statutory power given under rule 4, it is  not               now  open  to the Government of India  to  say               that it is not incumbent upon it to follow the               quota  for each year and it is open to  it  to               alter  the quota on account of the  particular               situation. We are of opinion that having fixed               the  quota  in exercise of their  power  under               rule 4 between the two sources of recruitment,               there  is no discretion left with the  Govern-               ment of India to alter that quota according to               the exigencies of the situation or to  deviate               from  the quota, in any particular  year,  act               its own will and pleasure. As we have  already               indicated,  the quota rule is linked  up  with               the  seniority rule and unless the quota  rule               is  strictly observed in practice, it will  be               difficult  to  hold that  the  seniority  rule               i.e.,  rule 1(f)(iii) and (iv), is not  unrea-               sonable and does not offend Article  16 of the               Constitution."               In  Badami’s  case  (supra)  this  aspect  was               examined  by  the  Court.  The  learned  Chief               Justice spoke for the three-Judge Bench thus:-                         "In  working  out  the  quota  rule,               these   principles  are  generally   followed.               First,  where  rules prescribe  quota  between               direct recruits and promotees, confirmation or               substantive appointment can only be in respect               of  clear vacancies in the permanent  strength               of  the cadre. Second, confirmed  persons  are               senior to those who are officiating.                       895               Third, as between persons appointed in offici-               ating capacity, seniority is to be counted  on               the  length  of  continuous  service.  Fourth,               direct recruitment is possible only by compet-               itive  examination  which  is  the  prescribed               procedure  under  the  rules.  In  promotional

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             vacancies,  the promotion is either by  selec-               tion or on the principle of  seniority-cummer-               it. A promotion could be made in respect of  a               temporary post or for a specified period but a               direct  recruitment has generally to  be  made               only  in  respect of clear  permanent  vacancy               either existing or anticipated to arise at  or               about  period of probation is expected  to  be               completed.  Fifth, if promotions are  made  to               vacancies in excess of the promotional  quota,               the promotions may not be totally illegal  but               would be irregular. The promotees cannot claim               any right to hold the promotional posts unless               the vacancies fall within their quota. If  the               promotees  occupy  any  vacancies  which   are               within  the  quota of  direct  recruits,  when               direct  recruitment  takes place,  the  direct               recruits  will  occupy  the  vacancies  within               their quota. Promotees who were occupying  the               vacancies within the quota of direct  recruits               will  either be reverted or they will  be  ab-               sorbed in the vacancies within their quota  in               the facts and circumstances of a case.                   The important principle is that as long as               the  quota rule remains neither promotees  can               be  allotted to any of the substantive  vacan-               cies  of  the  quota of  direct  recruits  nor               recruits can be allotted to promotional vacan-               cies.  The result is that  direct  recruitment               vacancies  between  11th September,  1959  and               26th  October, 1964 cannot be occupied by  any               promotees. The fact that direct recruits  were               confirmed  on 28th October, 1964 will not  rob               the  direct  recruits  of  their  quota  which               remained    unfilled   from   2nd    December,               1957   ............   In S.C.  Jaisinghani  v.               Union  of India (supra) it was said that  when               the  quota  was fixed for the two  sources  of               recruitments,  the quota could not be  altered               according  to exigencies of the situation.  It               was held there that the promotees who had been               promoted  in  excess of the  prescribed  quota               should be held to have been illegally  promot-               ed.  In Bishan Sarup’s case [1978] SCR  Suppl.               491  it was held that when it was  ascertained               that not more than 1/3rd of the vacancies were               to  go  to the promotees and the rest  to  the               direct recruits the ratio was not mere depend-               ant on whether any direct recruit was appoint-               ed in               896               any particular year or not. The promotees were               entitled  to  1/3rd of the  vacancies  in  any               particular  year,  whether or  not  there  was               direct recruitment by competitive  examination               in that year.                        Two principles are established in the               decision referred to. One is that quotas which               are  fixed are unalterable. according to  exi-               gencies  of situation. Quotas which are  fixed               can only be altered by fresh determination  of               quotas under the relevant rules. The other  is               that on the ground one group cannot claim  the               quota fixed for the other group either on  the               ground that the quotas are not filled up or on

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             the  ground  that  because there  has  been  a               number  in excess of quota the same should  be               absorbed depriving the other group of quota.                        In  Bachan Singh & Anr. v.  Union  of               India & Ors., [1972] 3 SCR 390 the two  appel-               lants were promoted in the year 1958 and 1959.               The  respondents  were  appointed  by   direct               recruitment  in 1962, 1963 and 1964.  The  re-               spondents were confirmed in their posts before               the appellants. The appellants contended  that               the  respondents who were  directly  appointed               after  the appellants had been  promoted  were               not to be confirmed in permanent posts  before               the  appellants. It was held that  the  direct               recruits  were  confirmed  against   permanent               vacancies  within  their  quota.  The  earlier               confirmation  of  direct recruits  though  ap-               pointed  later was upheld on the  ground  that               they  fell  within their  quota  of  permanent               vacancies.                        Subraman’s  case [1975] 2 SCR 979  on               which  the  appellants relied also  held  that               each  quota would have to be worked  independ-               ently  on  its  own force. In  that  case  the               Assistant  Executive Engineers who  were  ini-               tially  entitled to 3/4th and subsequently  to               2/3rd  of the vacancies while Assistant  Engi-               neers who were entitled initially to 1/4th and               subsequently  to 1/3rd of such vacancies  were               held to be entitled to their respective quotas               independent  of  the  fact  that  whether  any               person from one class or the other was promot-               ed  or not. It was illustrated by saying  that               if  there were three vacancies in a  year  two               would go to the Assistant Executive  Engineers               and  one would go to the  Assistant  Engineers               and even if there were not eligible                897               Assistant  Executive  Engineers who  could  be               promoted to fill in two vacancies belonging to               their quota, one vacancy is to be filled up by               promotion  of an Assistant Engineer if he  was               eligible. Similarly, if two vacancies  belong-               ing to the quota of Assistant Executive  Engi-               neers are to be filled by Assistant  Engineers               for want of availability of eligible Assistant               Executive  Engineers, the appointment  of  As-               sistant Executive Engineers have to be  pushed               down  to  later years when  their  appointment               could be regularised as a result of absorption               in their lawful quota for those years."     Badami’s  case  referred to several authorities  of  the Court  and  clearly drew out the judicial consensus  on  the point  in issue by concluding that the quota rule had to  be strictly enforced and it was not open to the authorities  to meddle with it on the ground of administrative exigencies.     The scheme in force relating to the services for  fixing inter se seniority takes into account the filling-up of  the vacancies  in the service from the two sources on the  basis of the quota and, therefore, fixation of inter se  seniority in  the Gradation List has to be worked out on the basis  of quota. SECOND ASPECT     There  was  no dispute either before the High  Court  or before  us that in the 1957 Rules there existed a quota  for

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filling-up vacancies in the Class I Junior Scale posts.  The High Court found that the quota continued throughout  during the  relevant period. Before us Mr. Nariman  supported  that finding  while Mr. Kacker maintained that the quota  had  in later  years been given up. Rule 3 of Mysore Recruitment  of Gazetted Probationers Rules, 1959 made the following  provi- sions:               "(1)  The provisions of these rules  shall  be               applicable in respect of direct recruitment to               the cadres in State Civil Services Class I and               Class II specified in column 3 of the Schedule               to these rules relating to the Services speci-               fied in the corresponding entries of Column  2               of the said Schedule.               (2)  These  rules shall have  effect  notwith-               standing  anything contrary contained  (i)  in               the  Cadre and Recruitment Rules for the  time               being in force applicable to the Cadres in the               898               State  Civil Services referred to in  sub-rule               (i) and (ii) in the Mysore State Civil Service               (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957.               (3)  During the period of five years from  the               date of commencement of these rules, as nearly               as  may be two-thirds of the number of  vacan-               cies arising in the cadres in the State  Civil               Services referred in to in sub-rule (i)  shall               be filled by appointment of candidates herein-               after in these rules referred to as probation-               ers selected in accordance with the provisions               of these rules and the actual number of vacan-               cies  to be so filled shall be  determined  by               the Government." Admittedly  these rules related only to  direct  recruitment and  as  it appears, in sub-rule (3) remained in  force  for five  years (said to have been extended for one more  year); with the lapse of a total period of six years from the  date when these rules came into force, they cease to have effect. In  1966  rules were made under the proviso to  Article  309 known  as  the Karnataka  Government  Gazetted  Probationers Posts  (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Rules,  1966 and sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 thereof provided inter alia:               "That notwithstanding anything contrary in the               rules of recruitment to the Karnataka Adminis-               trative  Service  the number of  vacancies  as               determined  by the Government in that  service               should  be filled by direct recruitment  after               holding  a  competitive  examination  by   the               Commission."     On  the 11th of August, 1977, the Karnataka  Administra- tive Service (Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 came into force. Rule 2 thereof provided: "Amendment  to  Schedule:-In the Schedule to  the  Karnataka Administrative  Service  (Recruitment) Rules, 1957  for  the entries  at  the  Item (b) the following  entries  shall  be subsituted, namely:- ------------------------------------------------------- 1                     2                      3 -------------------------------------------------------- (b)All Class I (i)50%of vacancies to be Forpromotion;ClassII (Junior Scale)  filled by promotion      Officers must have  899 Posts.     from Class II Officers;   worked for at least a            and                       period of four years            (ii) 50% by Direct        including the period of

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          Recruitment in accor-   officiation or probation            dance with the Karnataka            Recruitment of Gazetted            Probationers (Appoint-            ment etc.) Rules, 1966. Unless  the  1957 Rules remained in force till  1977,  there would have been really no necessity to refer to them for the purpose  of  amendment;  Badami’s case did  proceed  on  the footing  that  the  quota system in  the  Recruitment  Rules continued  till  1971-72. It is not Mr. Kacker’s  case  that anything happened after 1972 which brought about dissolution of  the quota. We reject the contention of Mr.  Kacker  that the quota system had been abandoned and confirm the  finding of  the  High Court in that regard. It is, however,  a  fact that the ratio has been changed from time to time. THIRD ASPECT     As already pointed out, Badami’s case was concerned with these  very rules and a similar situation though for a  dif- ferent  period. It is a decision of a three-Judge Bench  and we proceed on the footing that it is binding on us. The High Court  has pointed out in the leading judgment  in  Kadali’s case:-               "There  are numerous Government  orders  sanc-               tioning, from time to time, temporary posts of               Assistant  Commissioner which are the same  as               the posts of Junior Scale Officers and extend-               ing  the tenure of those temporary posts  from               time   to   time    ..........................               Though  the Karnataka  Administrative  Service               Cadre  Rules mention of only  permanent  posts               and not temporary posts in the cadre of Junior               Scale  Officers, the material produced  before               us  clearly  establishes  that  the  cadre  of               Junior Scale Officers consisted of a consider-               able number of temporary posts at all material               times.  In para 6 of the statement  of  objec-               tions  filed on behalf of the State  in  these               petitions, the State has admitted thus:-               "The  cadre  strength of KAS  Class  I  Junior               Scale  Officers had itself undergone  revision               and figures                900               showed that 152 permanent posts and 133 tempo-               rary posts were available as is clear from the               notification  No.  GAD 590 SMC 74  dated  3.3.               1976."               However learned counsel for direct recruits on               the  following  observations  of  the  Supreme               Court  in  Badami’s case at page 1564  of  the               report:-               "In  E.P.  Royappa  v. State  of  Tamii  Nadu,               [1974]  2 SCR 348 this Court said on the  con-               struction  of  Rule 2 of  the  relevant  Cadre               Rules  in that case that the State  Government               might  add  for a period to the cadre  one  or               more posts. But, the posts so added could  not               become cadre posts. The temporary posts  which               are  created due to exigencies of the  service               are posts which are outside the Cadre."               From  the above observations, it would  appear               that  the  Supreme Court took  the  view  that               temporary  posts  which were  created  due  to               exigencies  of service, were posts which  were               outside the cadre. In other words, the Supreme               Court  seems  to have thought  that  temporary

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             posts added to the cadre were ex-cadre  posts.               The  attention of the Supreme Court  does  not               appear to have been drawn to Note 2 to R 49 of               the KCSR which classifies temporary posts into               two  categories,  namely,  posts  created   to               perform the ordinary work for which  permanent               posts already exist in the cadre, and isolated               posts  created for the performance of  special               task unconnected with the ordinary work  which               a service is called upon to perform."     The conclusion indicated in the decision of the  learned Chief  Justice of this Court in Badami’s case had been  sup- ported  by reasons. As it would appear at page 8 19  of  the Reports,  this  aspect was raised as the first  of  the  six contentions  formulated  for  consideration  of  the  Court. Keeping  the  facts  of the case in  the  background,  three reasons  were indicated in the judgment for  the  conclusion that  quota covered permanent posts. Reference was  made  to certain  decisions of this Court as also. to Rule 9  of  the Probation Rules of 1959. It was held that Rule 9 establishes the  exclusion of temporary posts from the cadre.  Royappa’s case  (supra)  was relied upon for the  same  conclusion  by saying that posts temporarily added to the cadre by exercise of  power  under a permissive rule would  not  become  cadre posts and temporary         901 posts  created  due to exigencies of the service  should  be treated  as posts outside the cadre. The High Court  in  the judgment  in Kadali’s case relied upon Note 2 of Rule 49  of the  KCSR and thought that this Court was not  properly  in- formed  of  the factual situation when in Badami’s  case  it said that temporary posts were not to be taken into  consid- eration  for the purpose of working out the quota. The  note to Rule 49 has indeed no bearing on the point and we are  of the  view  that there was really no  justification  for  the doubt indicated by the High Court. Apart from the fact  that the conclusion of this Court in Badami’s case on this  score is  a  binding authority on us, from an examination  of  the matter we also reiterate that conclusion to be correct. FOURTH ASPECT     The  High Court in these cases has taken the  view  that the  quota could be carried forward for a maximum period  of three  years and not beyond. This has been done  by  placing reliance on the Constitution bench judgment of this Court in the  case of Col. A.S. Iyer & Ors. v. V.  Balasubramanyam  & Ors.,  [1980] 1 SCR 1036. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for  the Court at page 1058 of the Reports stated:-                        "The total number of vacancies at the               DSS  level for each year shall be  divided  in               the  ratio of 2:1 (50% for the Army Corps  and               25% for direct recruits). The 50% reserved for               the army corps shall be available to be filled               by  those  candidates.  The 25%  seats  to  be               filled by direct recruits shall be filled only               by  such recruits. Even if enough  direct  re-               cruits  are  not available they  will  not  be               filled  by the army nominees but shah be  kept               vacant  to  be carried forward and  filled  in               later years by such direct recruits. A reason-               able period for the carry forward scheme  will               be  three years, not more. Likewise,  military               vacancies at the DSS level each year shall  be               filled  only by such nominees. If enough  such               hands  are not available, a similar  procedure               of carry forward will govern. For the SS posts

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             25%  belongs to promotees from Class II  offi-               cers.  The total number will be worked out  by               adding  all the posts of SS, Deputy  Directors               and Directors and Surveyor General and  allot-               ting  1/4th  of it as the quota for  Class               II  promotees for appointment as SS.  Such  is               the reasonable interpretation of the rule." The  Court in that case had been called upon to  decide  the dispute of 902 seniority  between the direct recruits and promotees  within the civilian quota in the Survey of India service. Survey of India (Recruitment) Corps of Engineer Officers, Rules,  1950 came  for consideration of the Court. The opinion  expressed by this Court in the extracted paragraph was with  reference to  the rules before the Court. The provisions as  indicated in the extracted paragraph were somewhat peculiar. After the quota was provided, there was a prohibition against  filling up  of  the vacancies in the respective  quotas  from  other categories even when suitable candidates were not  available from  within the reserved sphere. This meant that the  posts were allowed to go vacant even though in public interest the same should have been filled up on account of the bar in the rule.  It  is in that background that this  Court  indicated that a reasonable period for the carry-forward scheme  would be  three  years and at the end of the  paragraph  indicated that that would be a reasonable interpretation of that rule. Obviously nothing of general application was intended to  be said  and this Court did not certainly intend to lay down  a time  limit of general application. The Mysore  State  Civil Service  (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957 which  admittedly applied to the services in question by Rule 17 provided:               "Notwithstanding  anything contained in  these               rules or in the rules of recruitment specially               made  in respect of any service or  post,  the               appointing authority may--               (a)  recruit by direct recruitment to  a  post               reserved to be filled by promotion when it  is               satisfied  that  the  person  eligible  to  be               considered for appointment by promotion is not               fit to be also appointed, or               (b) fill up by promotion any vacancy  relating               to  a post which is required to be  filled  by               direct  recruitment when such vacancy  is  not               likely    to   last   for   more   than    one               year  ................  " In  exercised  of the powers conferred under this  rule  the appointments  in  excess of the quota limit appear  to  have been  made.  It is conceded that every  appointment  to  the promotional  post  made in excess of the quota  was  at  the commencement a temporary one. The 1957 Rules were substitut- ed in 1977 by the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruit- ment)  Rules, 1977. As far as relevant Rule 17 thereof  pro- vides:               "Notwithstanding  anything contained in  these               rules or in                        903               the  rules  of recruitment specially  made  in               respect of any service or post, the appointing               authority may--               (a)...............................................               (b)...............................................               (c) fill by promotion temporarily on the basis               of senioritycum-merit a vacancy required to be               filled  by direct recruitment where  selection

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             to  the  post has not been  finally  made  and               there is likelihood of delay in making  direct               recruitment.  No such promotion shall be  made               unless  a  requisition has been  sent  to  the               Commission  or to the  appropriate  recruiting               authority  for selection of a suitable  candi-               date.  A candidate temporarily promoted  under               this sub-rule shall not have any  preferential               claim for regular promotion and also shall not               count  the period of service in  the  promoted               post  for  seniority; he shall revert  to  his               original post on the expiry of one year or  on               the appointment of a direct recruit  whichever               is earlier  .........................  " The  scheme in the Rules of 1977 clearly indicates that  the transgression of the quota rule was a deviation of a  tempo- rary  nature and was intended to be balanced in  good  time. The  conclusion of Ray, C.J. is fortified by the  spirit  of Rule 17 of the 1957 Rules as clarified in clause (c) of that rule  in  1977.  The presence of such a rule  in  the  field excludes the application of the ratio of Col. Iyer’s case to the  facts hereof. We do not think the High Court was  right in  overlooking the binding judgment of this Court in  Bada- mi’s case and preferring to apply the observations of  Iyer, J in the latter decision made with reference to a  different set  of rules containing a different scheme of  implementing quota.  The rule on this aspect of Badami’s case was  quoted with  approval  by a two-Judge Bench of this Court  in  P.S. Mahal & Ors. v. Union of India, [1984] 3 SCR 847.     A  lot of argument was advanced at the Bar  particularly on  the  side of the promotees that  serious  prejudice  was being  caused to them by enforcing the quota rule.  Reliance was  placed on a number of authorities of this Court  begin- ning  with  the case of A. Janardhana v. Union  of  India  & Ors., [1983] 2 SCR 165; G.S. Lamba & Ors. v. Union of  India & Ors., [1985] 3 SCR 431; G.P. Doval & Ors. v. Chief  Secre- tary, Government of U.P. & Ors, [1985] 1 SCR70; O.P.  Singla &Anr.  etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1985] 1 SCR  351  and D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165. 904     In Lamba’s case (supra) the Court found that the  promo- tion  was not styled as temporary or ad hoc or stop-gap;  on the other hand, the Court at page 459 of the judgment in the Reports referred to the case of N.K. Chandan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [1977] 1 SCR 1037 where on the basis of a  power of relaxation the Court had held such promotion to be  regu- lar. The Court further held:               "Once the promotees were promoted regularly to               substantive vacancies even if temporary unless               there  was a chance of their demotion  to  the               lower   cadre  their  continuous   officiation               confers  on them an advantage of being  senior               to the later recruits under Rule 21(4). If  as               stated earlier by the enormous departure or by               the  power  to relax, the quota rule  was  not               adhered to, the rota rule for inter se senior-               ity as prescribed in Section 25(1)(ii)  cannot               be  given effect. In the absence of any  other               valid principle of seniority it is well-estab-               lished that the continuous officiation in  the               cadre  grade of service will provide  a  valid               principle of seniority................" This  principle appears to have been followed in this  Court in  some cases during the last two years or so.  The  excep- tional circumstances indicated in Lamba’s case for  support-

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ing  the  departure in the judicial opinion has  been  over- looked  in some of these cases and the resultant  benevolent approach to protect the promotees in their claim for senior- ity  has been accepted without considering the special  cir- cumstances  in which the ratio had been inducted in  support of the departure.     In a precedent-bound judicial system binding authorities have  got to be respected and the procedure  for  developing the law has to be one of evolution. It is not necessary  for disposal  of these matters before us to go into that  aspect except  noticing the existence of distortion in  the  field. The  rationalisation  of the view in a way known to  law  is perhaps  to be attempted some day in future. In the  present batch  of  cases the law being clear  and  particularly  the mandate in the rule being that when recruitment takes  place the promotee has to make room for the direct recruit,  every promotee in such a situation would not be entitled to  claim any further benefit than the advantage of being in a  promo- tional  post  not due to him but yet filled by  him  in  the absence  of a direct recruit. One aspect which  we  consider relevant  to bear in mind is that the promoted  officer  has got  the advantage of having been promoted before it  became his due and is not being made to lose his  905 promotional  position.  The dispute is confined  to  one  of seniority  only.  The  advantage received  by  the  promotee before  his  chance opened should be  balanced  against  his forfeiture of claim to seniority. If the matter is looked at from that angle there would be no scope for heartburning  or at any rate dissatisfaction is expected to be reduced so far as the promotees are concerned. LAST ASPECT     In  Karam  Pal  v. Union of India, [1985] 3  SCR  271  a three-Judge  Bench  of this Court to which one of us  was  a party indicated as follows:-               "In  a vast country such as ours,  strong  and               independent bureaucratic set up is  indispens-               able. At the same time it is equally necessary               that  the service from top to bottom  must  be               alive to the fact that it is its obligation to               maintain  proper  attitudes,  discipline   and               duty-oriented  working. While it is the  right               of  every  person  in the service  set  up  to               expect  just and fair treatment in  regard  to               his employment frequent litigation between him               and  the State involving countless  other  co-               employees  in the service in the battle  is  a               deviation from the right direction. It is true               that very often instances come to light  where               the  grievance  is genuine and  the  treatment               meted is unwarranted and uncalled for. Govern-               ment in a democratic polity runs on impersonal               basis  but on the cadinal code  that  everyone               shall perform his duty."               This Court further observed,               "There  has been a phenomenal rise in  service               disputes in the last three decades. It is time               that serious attention is devoted to  discover               the reason for it and take effective steps  to               ensure   curtailment  thereof.  Whether   such               litigations come before Courts or Tribunals is               of  no consequence here. Frequent  litigations               between the States and its employees ultimate-               ly affect the efficiency of service and  bring               about  indiscipline,  lack of loyalty  and  an

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             attitude of indifference.’’ We are struck by the innumerable rules that have been framed within  a  period of about thirty years to cover  the  field relating to constitution, 906 recruitment  and provision for other conditions of  service. It  is  proper that service rules should  be  simple  making reasonable  provision for necessary aspects.  While  framing such rules, the relevant provisions of the Constitution  and laws  in force have to be kept in view. There should  be  no frequent alteration of the service rules through. Exigencies of  circumstances and unforeseen situations  will  certainly justify alterations. Those will be indeed rare occasions.     Experience shows that legal battles are fought in  court between  government  servants--whether  individual   pitched against  individual or group against group;  this  embitters relationship inter se and often results in a switch over  of attention  from  public  duty to  personal  cause.  Frequent litigations  against the State or higher authorities in  the hierarchies  of administration, wipe out reverance,  loyalty and  the sense of discipline and substitute those by  anger, disrespect  and  rancour. In the process fellow  feeling  is lost,  the sense of brotherhood vanishes. The net  resultant of all is deprivation of the efficiency of the  bureaucratic community to serve the society. The undue growth of  service litigation within these four decades of independence clearly calls  for  these observations. As and  when,  occasion  has arisen  the  Court has sought to draw the attention  of  the State  as  the employer as also the Government  servants  to this  aspect  of the matter. This has been done not  with  a view to subjecting any litigant to undue criticism but  with the  fond  hope that it would help the  problem  to  receive adequate  attention. We are surprised that the  words  spelt out in the different judgments have fallen on deaf ears  and created  no  stir.  Thereby the most powerful  wing  in  the administrative  set  up is gradually moving  away  from  its designated  path. We have come across cases  where  officers have  been  in court litigating over  service  disputes  for about  twenty-five  to thirty years of  their  career  which would  mean  almost three-fourths of their  service  period. What  would  be  the contribution of such  officers  to  the public  service  can well be imagined. Very often  a  public officer  is forced into litigation as he gets no justice  in the hands of the superior. There are also several  instances where an officer drags the employer into litigation  without a  cause  of action. These are matters which must  be  taken into account without further loss of time and with fortitude so  that the most effective wing of the administration  does not further lose its serviceability.     A  public  servant--whatever his status  be--is  in  the position  of  a trustee. Social power vests in him  for  the purpose of rendering service to the community. Every  public servant  has  to be cognizant to that obligation.  Once  the level of that consciousness grows up there is  907 bound to be a corresponding fail in the attitude to litigate over  small issues. What this Court said in the case of  Dr. T.G. Siddapparadhya & Ors., [1971] 1 SCR 568 has to be borne in mind. These were the words then said:-               "The  canker of litigiousness has spread  even               to  a sphere of life where  discipline  should               check ambition concerning personal preferment.               A teacher is justified in taking legal  action               when  he feels that a stigma or punishment  is               undeserved  but  he is expected to  bear  with

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             fortitude  and  reconcile himself to  his  lot               suppressing  disappointment  when he  finds  a               co-worker  raised to a position which he  him-               self aspired after". What applies to a teacher may perhaps well apply to everyone in  positions  of  social trust. It is  for  the  privileged public  servant as also his employer to share this  philoso- phy.     The  net  result of the discussion above  requires  that rule  in  Badami’s  case has to be given  full  effect.  The appeals  and writ petitions of the direct recruits  have  to succeed and those by the promotees have to fail. We hope and trust that the State of Karnataka will not demote anyone who has  been  in a promotional post for several  years  to  the Class  II service as a consequence of this decision but  the Gradation List has got to be adjusted to fit into the  prin- ciples indicated in the judgment. No justification was shown to us as to why the State of Karnataka failed to comply with its obligation of making recruitments in terms of the quota. Once  the State frames rules they are binding on  the  State and  like  individuals  the State has got  to  regulate  its conduct in accordance with the rules--nay, the State has  to observe it all the more. We hope and trust that the State of Karnataka in the years ahead will comply with the quota rule with  regularity so that a litigation of this type  may  not arise again. If any party has to be directed for payment  of costs in this bunch of litigation it must be the State.  We, however, do not want to saddle the State with costs for  two reasons-firstly,  we  do not want the employees  to  have  a feeling that in the fight their employer has been vanquished and secondly we entertain a fond hope that there will be  no reoccurrence.     In  course  of  arguments we had  suggested  to  learned counsel for the parties to furnish recast Gradation List  on the basis of claims advanced before us---(1) showing how  it would be when full claim of the promotees is granted and (2) how different it would look when the  908 total  claim of the direct recruits is allowed. Such  charts have been prepared and furnished and we find that the  proc- ess of pushing up and down would be inevitable but would  be within  reasonable limits and no irreparable  prejudice  was apparent.     The  appeals and writ petitions of the  direct  recruits are allowed, and the appeals by the promotees are dismissed. There shall be no order for costs throughout. S.L.                             Appeals and Petitions  dis- posed of. 909