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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3988-3989 of 2001

PETITIONER: Common Cause                                                     

RESPONDENT: Union of India & Ors.                                            

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/2003

BENCH: R.C. Lahoti & Ashok Bhan.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

BHAN, J.

       Keeping in view the National Housing Policy and for  rationalisation of rent laws to give incentive to the growth of the  housing in general and rental housing, in particular, and the  observation made by this Court in Prabhakaran Nair and others vs.  State of Tamil Nadu and others [1987 (4) SCC 238] to the following  effect:

"The laws of landlord and tenant must be  made rational, humane, certain and capable  of being quickly implemented.  Those  landlords who have having premises in their   control should be induced and encouraged to  part with available accommodation for  limited periods on certain safeguards which  will strictly ensure their recovery when  wanted.  Men with money should be given  proper and meaningful incentives as in some  European countries to build houses, tax  holidays for new houses can be encouraged.   The tenants should also be given protection  and security and certain amount of  reasonableness in the rent.  Escalation of  prices in the urban properties, land,  materials and houses must be rationally  checked.  This country very vitally and very  urgently requires a National Housing Policy  if we want to prevent a major breakdown of  law and order and gradual disillusionment of  people.  After all shelter is one of our  fundamental rights.  New national housing  policy must attract new buildings, encourage  new buildings, make available new spaces,  rationalise the rent structure and rationalise  the rent provisions and bring certain amount  of uniformity though leaving scope for  sufficient flexibility among the States to  adjust such legislation according to its  needs.  This Court and the High Court  should also be relieved of the heavy burdens  of this rent litigations.  Tier of appeals  should be curtailed.  Laws must be simple,  rational and clear.  Tenants are in all cases  not the weaker sections.  There are those

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who are weak both among the landlords as  well as the tenants.  Litigations must come  to end quickly.  Such new Housing Policy  must comprehend the present and anticipate  the future.  The idea of a National Rent  Tribunal on an All India basis with quicker  procedure should be examined.  This has  become an urgent imperative of  today’s  revolution.  A fast changing society cannot  operate with unchanging law and  preconceived judicial attitude."

       Delhi Rent Act, 1995 (for short ’the Act’) was enacted by the  Parliament.  It was meant to be the Model Rent Control Legislation  formulated by the Central Government and sent to the States to enable  them to carry out necessary amendments to the prevalent rent  control  laws in the States.

       The Delhi Rent Bill, 1994 (for short ’the Bill’) was introduced  in the Rajya Sabha on 26th August, 1994.  It was passed unanimously  in the Rajya Sabha on 29th May, 1995.  Thereafter it was tabled in the  Lok Sabha.  Lok Sabha unanimously passed the same on 3rd June,  1995.  Presidential assent was given to the Bill on 23rd August, 1995  and the same was accordingly enacted as the Delhi Rent Act, 1995  (Act 33 of 1995)  and notified on 23rd August, 1995, as enacted.  The  Parliament did not fix the date w.e.f which the Act would come into  operation.  It was left to the discretion of the Central Government to  notify the date w.e.f. which the Act would come into operation.  Section 1(3) of the Act reads:

"(3) It shall come into force on such date as  the Central Government may, by notification  in the Official Gazette, appoint."

       As the Central Government did not notify the date, appellant  filed writ petition No.1495 of 1997 in the High Court of Delhi in  public interest seeking a writ or order in the nature of mandamus  directing the Union of India to forthwith and without delay issue a  notification in the Official Gazette, as contemplated under Section  1(3) of the Act notifying the date on which the said Act shall come  into force in its present form.

       In the written statement filed by the Union of India, it was  stated that a section of people, particularly trader tenants, launched an  agitation demanding changes in some of the provisions of the Act.  In  the wake of this agitation, the then Chief Minister, Government of  NCT of Delhi appointed an All Party Committee to examine the Act  and make recommendations for changes which could address the  grievances of the agitating groups.  These primarily related to  provisions of the Act concerning deemed rent, registration of  tenancies, inheritability of tenancies, eviction, etc.  Following the  receipt of numerous representations and the All Party Committee  Report, the entire issue was re-examined to decide whether the Act  should be notified as assented to by the President, or it should be  amended in the light of the representations that had been received.   After detailed examination, it was finally decided to carry out the  amendments to the Act before notifying it.  Accordingly the Delhi  Rent (Amendment) Bill, 1997 was drafted and introduced in the Rajya  Sabha on 28th July, 1997.  The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary  Standing Committee which examined the amendments suggested in  depth.  The Parliamentary Standing Committee finalised its Report in  December, 2000. The Government considered the Report and  accepted all the recommendations of the Committee on 3rd April, 2001

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and notice for moving the official amendments in respect of Delhi  Rent (Amendment) Bill, 1997 was accordingly sent  to the Secretary  General, Rajya Sabha in July, 2001.  Because of the workload the Bill  could not be taken up for consideration in the Rajya Sabha and is  expected to be taken up shortly.  Since the Government wanted to  introduce the Amendments Bill of 1997, the Original Act was not  notified.

       It was further averred that the enforcement of the Act has been  delayed for the above stated reasons and not for any other reason.  It  was asserted that this Court could not issue a writ in the nature of   mandamus to the Central Government for the enforcement  of the Act.   That it was normal and legally valid for the Parliament to delegate the  authority to the Executive government to notify the date from which  the Act would come into force.

       The writ petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench.   One of the learned Judges was of the view that a mandamus could be  issued to the Union of India to bring the Act in force and accordingly  issued the following directions:

"In view of the above discussion, the writ  petition succeeds and the rule is made  absolute.  The respondent-Union of India is  directed to bring into force the Delhi Rent  Act, 1995 (Act No.33 of 1995) by issuing an  appropriate notification within six weeks  from today."

       The other learned Judge, however, did not agree with the above  directions and was of the view that such an absolute mandamus could  not be issued.   According to him the only mandamus which could be  issued to the Government was to consider whether the time to bring  into force the Act has arrived or not.  Accordingly the limited  mandamus was issued in the following terms:

"â\200¦In my opinion only a limited mandamus  in accordance with the Aeltmesh Rein’s  case(supra), can issue to the Central  Government to consider within 6 weeks  whether the time to enforce the Act has  arrived and in this view of the matter I  respectfully disagree with the ultimate  directions while agreeing with the rest of the  reasoning and discussion in the aforesaid  judgment of my esteemed Brother Anil Dev  Singh,J.

Ordered accordingly."

       Because of the difference of opinion between the two learned  Judges the matter was referred to the third Judge.  The third learned  Judge did not agree with the view taken by either of the Judges.  According to him, keeping in view the position of law as understood  by him it would not be appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus  directing the Central Government to bring the Act into force in its  present form.  That a limited mandamus could be issued, but, keeping  in view the position explained by the Union of India  that it does not  want to bring the Act into force in its present form and that it would  be brought in force with certain amendments which are pending  consideration by the Parliament, even a limited mandamus could not  be issued.  Accordingly, he passed the following order:

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"â\200¦Consequently. I am of the view that even  a writ of mandamus as postulated by  Aeltemesh Rein need not be issued, since  the response of the Central Government is  already  known.  Moreover, it is well settled  that the Courts do not issue infructuous writs  or writs which are of an academic nature.  However, since this is not an issue before  me, I leave it as that."

       The third Judge directed that the case be listed before the  Division Bench for appropriate orders, subject to the orders of  Hon’ble the Chief Justice.  Thereafter the matter was placed before  the Division Bench.

       Before the Division Bench, in response to the limited  mandamus which had been issued in accordance with the view of the  majority, the Central Government filed an affidavit  reporting  compliance therewith.  In view of the affidavit of compliance the writ  petition was ordered to be disposed of.  On an oral prayer made by the  counsel for the petitioner the Division Bench granted Certificate of  Fitness under Article 134(A) of the Constitution of India for filing  appeals to this Court.  Accordingly, the present appeals have been  filed.          Counsel for the appellant contended that legislative arena for  Parliament is exited once Article 111 of the Constitution is complied  with. On the President conveying his assent to the Bill, a Bill is  lawfully enacted and converts itself into an Act.  According to him,  Parliament has used different prescriptions to give effect to its  mandate.  The same are:

a)      When the enactment itself stipulates the date for  implementation;

b)      When the enactment delegates its power to the executive  to appoint the date of enforcement and different dates  may be appointed for different provisions of the Act;  

As per counsel submission when the enactment delegates  its power to the executive to appoint the date of  enforcement but does not permit different dates being  appointed for different provisions of the Act, then the  provisions of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897  govern such enactments and it comes into force as soon  as the President gives his assent to the Bill.

Section 5 of the General Clauses Act prescribes:

"5. Coming into operation of enactments  â\200\223 (1) Where any Central Act is not  expressed to come into operation on  particular day, then it shall come into  operation on the day on which it receives the  assent, --

(a)     in the case of a Central Act  made before the  commencement of the  Constitution, of the Governor- General, and

(b)     in the case of an Act of

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Parliament, of the President.    

(2)     omitted

(3)     Unless the contrary is expressed, a  Central Act or Regulation shall be construed  as coming into operation immediately on the  expiration of the day preceding its  commencement."

       According to the appellant, the Act was enacted as Act No.33  of 1995.  It was placed on the statute book by public notification in  terms of Article 366(18) of the Constitution on 23rd August, 1995.  By  this, the Act is now out of the legislative arena.  As neither a particular  date has been stipulated by the Parliament in its enforcement nor the  Parliament has expressed any contrary intention by the prescription of  permitting different dates being stipulated for enforcement of different  provisions of the Act, the Act would be deemed to have been come  into force in terms of provisions of Section 5 of the General Clauses  Act, 1897.

       Point in issue is not res-integra. This point was considered in  depth by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.K.Roy vs. Union of  India [1982 (1) SCC 271].  It was held that an Act cannot be said to  commence or put in force unless it is brought into operation by a  legislative enactment or by exercise of authority by the delegatee  empowered to bring the Act into operation by issuing the necessary  notification.  When enforcement of a statute or a provision therein is  left to the discretion of the government without laying down any  objective standards, no writ or mandamus can be issued to the  government to enforce the statute or any of the provisions of the  statute.         In A.K.Roy’s case(supra), this Court was examining the  Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1978 which was passed by both  Houses of Parliament and assented to by the President of India.   Section 1(2) of the Amending Act read as under:  

"It shall come into force on such date as the  Central Government may by notification in  the official Gazette appoint and different  dates may be appointed for different  provisions of the Act."

       This Court examined the point regarding the interpretation to be  put on Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act; the consequences of  the failure of the Central Government to issue a notification  under  Section 1(2) for bringing into force the provisions of 44th Amendment  Act within a reasonable time, and, the question, as to whether despite  the provisions contained in Section 1(2), the 44th Amendment  must be  deemed to have come into force on the date on which the President  gave his assent to it.  Another question examined was as to whether  Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act was severable from the rest  of the provisions or if that Section was bad for any other reason.

       The point was examined in depth from various angles including  the constitutional validity of Section 1(2); the power of the constituent  to delegate its power to bring into force the Act to the executive; as to  whether there was any internal contradiction between the provisions  of Article 368(2) and those of Section 1(2) of the Constitution 44th  Amendment Act, and, as to whether, since the Central Government  had failed to exercise its power within a reasonable time the Court  could issue a mandamus calling upon the Central Government to  discharge its duties without any further delay.

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       After due consideration, this Court by a majority of 3:2 upheld  the constitutional validity of Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act  and  the power of the Parliament to delegate its authority to an outside  agency.  It was held that no mandamus could be issued to the Central  Government to bring into force the Act. Drawing a distinction  between the Constitution standing  amended (in our case the  enactment of the Act) in accordance with the terms of the Bill  assented to by the President and the date of coming into force of the  amendment, thus, introduced in the Constitution, it was observed that  there was no internal contradiction between the provisions of Article  368(2) and those of Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act.  That  Article 368(2) lays down a general rule of application to a date from  which the Constitution would stand amended in accordance with the  Bill assented to by the President whereas Section 1(2) of the amended  Act specifies the manner in which the Act or any of its provisions  would be brought into force.  The distinction was pointed out in the  following words:

"The distinction is between the Constitution  standing amended in accordance with the  terms of the Bill assented to by the President  and the date of the coming into force of the  Amendment thus introduced into the  Constitution.  For determining the date with  effect from which the Constitution stands  amended in accordance with the terms of the  Bill, one has to turn to the date on which the  President gave, or was obliged to give, his  assent to the Amendment.  For determining  the date with effect from which the  Constitution, as amended, came or will  come into force, one has to turn to the  notification, if any, issued by the Central  Government under Section 1(2) of the  Amendment Act."

       It was held that the 44th Amendment Act itself prescribes by  enacting  Section 1(2) a pre-condition which must be satisfied before  any of its provisions could come into force.  The pre-condition was  the issuance of a notification by the Central Government duly  published in the Official Gazette, appointing the date from which the  Act or any particular provision thereof will come into force.  None of  the  provisions of 44th Amendment Act could come into operation  until the Central Government issues a notification as contemplated by  Section 1(2).  It was held in para 47 as under:

"The Amendment Act may provide that the  amendment introduced by it shall come into  force immediately upon the President giving  his assent to the Bill or it may provide that  the amendment shall come into force on a  future date.  Indeed, no objection can be  taken to the constituent body itself  appointing a specific future date with effect  from which the Amendment Act will come  into force; and if that be so, different dates  can be appointed by it for bringing into force  different provisions of the Amendment Act.   The point of the matter is that the  Constitution standing amended in

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accordance with the terms of the Bill and the  amendment thus introduced into the  Constitution coming into force are two  distinct things.  Just as a law duly passed by  the legislature can have no effect unless it  comes or is brought into force, similarly, an  amendment of the Constitution can have no  effect unless it comes or is brought into  force.  The fact that the constituent body  may itself specify a future date or dates with  effect from which the Amendment Act or   any of its provisions will come into force  shows that there is no antithesis between  Article 368(2) of the Constitution and  Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act.  The expression of legislative or constituent  will as regards the date of enforcement of  the law or Constitution is an integral part  thereof.  That is why it is difficult to accept  the submission that,  contrary to the  expression of the constituent will, the  amendments introduced by the 44th  Amendment Act came into force on April  30, 1979 when the President gave his assent  to that Act.  The true position is that the  amendments introduced by the 44th  Amendment Act did not become a part of  the Constitution on April 30, 1979.  They  will acquire that status only when the  Central Government brings them into force  by issuing a notification under Section 1(2)  of the Amendment Act."

       The Bench also considered the Constitutional validity of  Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act.  Repelling the argument that  the constituent power must be exercised by the constituent body itself  and that it could not be delegated by it to the executive or any other  agency, it was observed in para 48 as follows:

"â\200¦For determining  this question, it is  necessary to bear in mind that by  ’constituent power’ is meant the power to  frame or amend the Constitution.  The  power of amendment is conferred upon the  Parliament by Article 368(1), which  provides that the Parliament may in exercise  of its constituent power amend by way of    addition, variation or repeal any provision of  the Constitution in accordance with the  procedure laid down in that article.  The  power thus conferred on the Parliament is  plenary subject to the limitation that it  cannot be exercised so as to alter the basic  structure or framework of the Constitution.  It is well settled that the power conferred  upon the Parliament by Article 245 to make  laws is plenary within the field of legislation  upon which that power can operate. That  power, by the terms of Article 245, is  subject only to the provisions of the  Constitution.  The constituent power, subject  to the limitation aforesaid, cannot be any the  less plenary than the legislative power,  especially when the power to amend the

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Constitution and the power to legislate are  conferred on one and the same organ of the  State, namely, the Parliament.  The  Parliament may have to follow a different  procedure while exercising its constituent  power under Article 368 than the procedure  which it has to follow while exercising its  legislative power under Article 245.  But the  obligation to follow different procedures  while exercising the two different kinds of  power cannot make any difference to the  width of the power.  In either event, it is  plenary, subject  in one case to the  constraints of the basic structure of the  Constitution and in the other, to the  provisions of the Constitution."

       Contention that after amendment of the Constitution, by virtue  of Article 368(2) of the Constitution, the Constitution stood amended  as enacted, it was held:

"â\200¦It is, therefore, permissible to the  Parliament to vest in an outside agency the  power to bring a constitutional amendment  into force.  In the instant case, that power is  conferred by the Parliament on another  organ of the State, namely, the executive,  which is responsible to the Parliament for all  its actions.  The Parliament does not  irretrievably lose its power to bring the  Amendment into force by reason of  the  empowerment in favour of the Central  Government to bring it into force.  If the  Central Government fails to do what,  according to the Parliament, it ought to have  done, it would be open to the Parliament to  delete Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment  Act by following the due procedure and to  bring into force that Act or any of its  provisions."

       Coming to the next question as to whether legislature could  delegate its power to bring a law into force to the executive or an  outside agency, it was held that it could do so.  On a detailed  consideration, it was held in para 50 as follows:

"â\200¦.They read the Privy Council decisions  as laying down that conditional legislation is  permissible whereby the legislature entrusts  to an outside agency the discretionary power  to select the time or place to enforce the law.   As stated by Shri H.M.Seervai in his  Constitutional Law of India (2nd ed., p.1203)  : "The making of laws is not an end in itself,  but is a means to an end, which the  legislature desires to secure.  That end may  be secured directly by the law itself.  But  there are many subjects of legislation in  which the end is better secured by extensive  delegation of legislative power".  There are  practical difficulties in the enforcement of  law contemporaneously with their enactment  as also in their uniform extension to

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different areas.  Those difficulties cannot be  foreseen at the time when the laws are made.   It, therefore, becomes necessary to leave to  the judgment of an outside agency the  question as to when the law should be  brought into force and to which areas it  should be extended from time to time.  What  is permissible to the legislature by way of  conditional legislation cannot be considered  impermissible to the Parliament when, in the  exercise of its constituent power, it takes the  view that the question as regards the time of  enforcement of a constitutional amendment  should be left to the judgment of the  executive. We are, therefore, of the opinion  that Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act  is not ultra vires the power of amendment  conferred upon the Parliament by Article  368(1) of the Constitution."

In Para 51, it was observed:

"â\200¦..The executive is responsible to the  Parliament and if the Parliament considers  that the executive has betrayed its trust by  not bringing any provision of the  Amendment into force, it can censure the  executive.  It would be quite anomalous that  the inaction of the executive should have the  approval of the Parliament and yet we  should show our disapproval of it by issuing  a mandamusâ\200¦.."

       Rejecting the argument that Section 1(2) of the 44th  Amendment Act was bad because it vested an uncontrolled power in  the executive, it was observed that in similar and even more extensive  delegation of powers to the executive had been upheld by this Court  over the years.  Reference was made to a number of decisions such as  Sardar Inder Singh vs. State of Rajasthan [1957 SCR 605], Sita Ram  Bishambhar Dayat vs. State of U.P. [1972 (4) SCC 485] and Gwalior  Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Asstt. C.S.T. [1974 (4) SCC  98].

       Again this point was considered by this Court in Aeltemesh  Rein vs. Union of India [1988 (4) SCC 54].  There the government  had failed to issue a notification to bring into force Section 30 of the  Advocates Act, 1961 into operation for a period of 30 years.  A writ  petition was filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Central  Government to issue a notification to bring into force Section 30 of  the Advocates Act with immediate effect. Following the judgment in  A.K. Roy’s case (supra), it held that such a mandamus could not be  issued.  It was observed: "â\200¦.Dealing with a similar question a  Constitution Bench of this Court in A.K.Roy  vs. Union of India has taken the view that a  writ in the nature of mandamus directing the  Central Government to bring a statute or a  provision in a statute into force in exercise  of powers conferred by Parliament in that  statute cannot be issued.  Chandrachud, CJ.,  who spoke for the majority of the  Constitution Bench has observed at pages  314 to 316 of the Report thus : [SCC pp.  310-12 :SCC(Cri) pp.188-89, paras 51 and

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52]

But we find ourselves unable to  intervene in a matter of this nature by  issuing a mandamus to the Central  Government obligating it to bring the  provisions of Section 3 into force.   The Parliament having left to the  unfettered judgment of the Central  Government the question as regards  the time for bringing the provisions of  the Forty-fourth Amendment into  force, it is not for the court to compel  the government to do that which,  according to the mandate of the  Parliament, lies in its discretion to do  when it considers it opportune to do  it.  The executive is responsible to the  Parliament and if the Parliament  considers that the executive has  betrayed its trust by not bringing any  provision of the amendment into  force, it can censure the executive.  It  would be quite anomalous that the  inaction of the executive should have  the approval of the Parliament and yet  we should show our disapproval of it  by issuing a mandamusâ\200¦.. . But, the  Parliament has left the matter to the  judgment of the Central Government  without prescribing any objective  norms.  That makes it difficult for us  to substitute our own judgment for  that of the government on the  question whether Section 3 of the  Amendment Act should be brought  into forceâ\200¦â\200¦.It is  for these reasons  that we are unable to accept the  submission that by issuing a  mandamus, the Central Government  must be compelled to bring the  provisions of Section 3 of the Forty- fourth Amendment into forceâ\200¦â\200¦"

It was further observed:

"â\200¦..As long as the majority view expressed  in the above decision holds the field it is not  open to this Court to issue a writ in the  nature of mandamus directing the Central  Government to bring Section 30 of the Act  into force.  But, we are of the view that this  decision does not come in the way of this  Court issuing a writ in the nature of  mandamus to the Central Government to  consider whether the time for bringing  Section 30 of the Act into force has arrived  or notâ\200¦.."

       This point was again considered by this Court in a recent case  in Union of India vs. Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan [ 2002 (5) SCC  44].  It was observed in para 7, as follows:

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"â\200¦.It, therefore, became necessary to leave  the judgment to the executive as to when the  law should be brought into force.  When  enforcement of a provision in a statute is left  to the discretion of the Government without  laying down any objective standards, no writ  of mandamus could be issued directing the  government to consider the question  whether the provision should be brought into  force and when it can do so.  Delay in  implementing the will of Parliament may  draw adverse criticism but on the data  placed before us, we cannot say that the  Government is not alive to the problem or is  desirous of ignoring the will of Parliament."

       In the present case, the Government received several  representations from tenant organisations demanding changes in some  of the provisions and the Government on receipt of numeral  representations constituted an All Party Committee to re-examine  as  to whether the Act should be notified or it should be amended in the  light of the representations received.  After detailed examination, it  was finally decided to carry out certain amendments to the Act.   Accordingly, Delhi Rent (amendment) Bill was drafted and  introduced in the Rajya Sabha.  The Amendment Bill was referred to  the Parliamentary Standing Committee which examined the  amendments suggested in depth.  The Parliamentary Standing  Committee finalised its reports in December, 2000.  The Government  after considering the Report accepted the recommendations of the  Committee on 3rd April, 2001 and thereafter the notice was sent to the  Secretary-General, Rajya Sabha to introduce the Amendment Bill.

       From the facts placed before us it cannot be said that  Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the  will of the Parliament.  When the legislature itself had vested the  power in the Central Government to notify the date from which the  Act would come into force, then, the Central Government is entitled  to take into consideration various facts including the facts set out  above while considering when the Act should be brought into force or  not.  No mandamus can be issued to the Central Government to issue  the notification contemplated under Section 1(3) of the Act to bring  the Act into force, keeping in view the facts brought on record and the   consistent view of this Court.

       The submission that by virtue of Section 5 of General Clauses  Act, the Act has come into force is misconceived.  Section 5 of the  General Clauses Act has no application.  Section 5 is applicable only  when the Act does not express any date with effect from which the  Act would come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is  no provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the 44th  Constitutional Amendment.  When the Legislature itself provides that  the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date to be notified  by the Central Government, Section 5 of the General Clauses Act will  have no application.  It is plain and evident from the language of the  provision.  Section 5(1) provides that ’where any Central Act is not  expressed to come into operation on particular day, then it shall come  into operation on the day on which it receives the assent’.  Sub-clause  (3) provides that ’unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or  Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately  on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement’.’ In simple  words it would mean that unless otherwise provided a Central Act  would come into operation on the date it receives Presidential assent  and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the date  preceding its commencement.  Thus, if a Central Act is assented by

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the President on 23.8.1995 then it would be construed to have come  into operation on the mid-night between 22nd  and 23rd August, 1995.   Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1).  Sub- section (1) provides that the Act would come into operation on the  date it receives the assent of the President  where a particular day  w.e.f. which the Act would come into force is not prescribed whereas  sub-section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when the Act  would come into force.  It would not apply to cases where the  legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force  the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official  Gazette.

       For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these  appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.