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PETITIONER: "COMMON CAUSE", A REGISTERED SOCIETYTHROUGH ITS DIRECTOR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       28/11/1996

BENCH: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, S.B. MAJMUDAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           W I T H      [Letter Petn. dated 15.10.1996 of Mr. Sheo Raj Purohit, Advocate for  clarification and I.A. Nos. 3-6/98 in W.P. (C) No. 1128/86]                          O R D E R      We  have   heard  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the concerned parties  in the  present proceedings. Having given our anxious  consideration to  their contentions, we deem it fit to  clarify/modify our  judgment dated  1St May  1996 in Writ Petition (C) No. 1128 of 1986 as under :      The time  limit mentioned  regarding  the  pendency  of criminal cases  in paragraphs  from  2(a)  to  2(f)  of  our judgment shall  not apply  to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the directory tactics adopted by the concerned accused or on account of  any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for requisite period mentioned  in the  aforesaid clauses  of paragraph  2 despite full  cooperation by  the concerned  accused to  get these proceedings  disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these  cases is  not at all attributable to the concerned accused, nor such delay is caused on account of such accused getting stay  of criminal  proceedings from  higher  courts. Accused concerned  are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as  per paragraphs 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment if it is  demonstrated that  the accused concerned seek to take advantage of  their own  wrong or  any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials against them. II.  The  phrase   ’pendency  of   trials’  as  employed  in paragraphs  from   1(a)  to   1(c)  and   the  phrase  ’non- commencement of  trial’ as  employed in paragraphs from 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under :      (i) In cases of trials before Sessions Court the trials shall be  treated to  have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the concerned  cases. (ii)  In cases  of trials  of  warrant cases by magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the  trials shall  be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal

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Procedure,  1973   while  in  trials  of  warrant  cases  by magistrates when  cases are  instituted  otherwise  than  on police report  such  trials  shall  be  framed  against  the concerned accused under Section 246 of the Code of Criminal, Procedure 1973.      (iii) In  paragraph 4  of our  judgment in  the list of offence to  which directions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply, the following additions shall be made :      (n)  matrimonial  offence  under  Indian    Penal  Code including Section  498-A or under any other law for the time being in force : (o) offence under the Negotiable Instrument Act including  offence under   Section  138  thereof  ;  (p) offence relating to criminal misappropriation of property of the complainant  as well  as offence  relating  to  criminal breach of  trust under  Indian Penal Code or under any other law for  the time  being in force; (q) offence under Section 304-A of  the Indian Penal Code or any offence pertaining to rash and  negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law  for  the  time  being  in  force  ;  (r)  offence affecting the  public health,  safety, convenience,  decency and morals  as listed in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code or such  offence under  any other  law for the time being in force.      It  is   further  directed   that  in   criminal  cases pertaining to  offence mentioned  under the above additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted  pursuant to  our judgment  dated 1st  May  are liable to  be proceeded against for such offence pursuant to the present  order and  are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as  aforesaid, the  concerned criminal court shall suo motu  or  on  application  by  the  concerned  aggrieved parties shall  issue within  three months  of the receipt of this clarificatory  order at their end, summons or warrants, as the  case may be, to such discharged or acquitted accused and shall  restore the criminal cases against them for being proceeded further in accordance with law.      It is however made clear that in trials regarding other offence which are covered by the time limit specified in our earlier order  dated 1st  May  1996  wherein  the  concerned accused are  already acquitted or discharged pursuant to the said order,  such acquitted  or discharged accused shall not be liable  to be recalled for facing such trials pursuant to the present  clarificatory order which qua such offence will be treated  to be purely prospective and no such cases which are already  closed shall  be  reopened    pursuant  to  the present order. IV.  Copies of this clarficatory order shall be communicated by the  Office of  this Court  to all the High Courts, Chief Secretaries  of   all   the   States   and   the   concerned administrative  Heads   of  all   the   Union   Territories. Registrars of  the High  Courts shall  be requested  by  the Office to  communicate copies of this clarificatory order to all   the    criminal   courts   under   the   control   and superintendence of the respective High Courts with direction to send  Compliance Reports  to the  High  Courts  concerned within  three   months  from   the  date   of   receipt   of communication of this clarificatory order at their end. I.A. Nos 306 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in the light of this clarificatory order.