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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MADAN LAL DAN & SONS, BAREILLY

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1976

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ UNTWALIA, N.L. SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR  523            1977 SCR  (1) 683  1976 SCC  (4) 464

ACT:             Limitation  Act, 1963, S. 12(2), whether  applicable  to         revision  petitions filed under-section 10, U.P.  Sales  Tax         Act--Time  spent  in  obtaining  second  copy,  of  impugned         order, whether to be excluded in computing limitation period         for filing revision petitions.

HEADNOTE:             The Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax, Bareil-         ly,  disposed  of the respondents’ appeal  made  against  an         order  of  the Sales Tax Officer.  A copy of the  order  was         served  on  the respondent, but he lost it.  Later,  he  ob-         tained  another  copy and filed a revision  petition  under-         sectiOn 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.  The same was  opposed         as being time-barred, but the Judge (Revision) accepted  the         respondent’s  contention that under-section  12(2)  of   the         Limitation  Act, he was entitled to exclude the  time  spent         in  obtaining  the second copy of the order, while computing         the limitation period.  The question whether such  exclusion         was  permissible, was referred to the High Court  which  an-         swered in the affirmative.             The  appellant  contended that the U.P.  Sales  Tax  Act         itself  provided  for a specific period of  limitation;  and         therefore  the Limitation Act was not applicable,  and  also         that, a copy of the order was not required to be filed  with         the revision petition, and so the time spent in obtaining  a         second copy could not be excluded in computation of  limita-         tion.         Dismissing the appeal the Court,             HELD:  (1 ) Where the copy served upon a party  is  lost         and  there is  no alternative for that party except to apply         for a fresh copy in order to be in a position to file  revi-         sion  petition, the time spent in obtaining that copy  would         necessarily  have to be excluded under Section 12(2) of  the         Limitation  Act,  1963.  State of Uttar Pradesh  v.  Maharaj         Narain & Ors. [1968] 2  SCR.  842 followed. [688 B--C]             (2)  The provisions of Section 12(2) of  the  Limitation         Act would apply even though the copy mentioned in that  Sub-         section is not required to be filed alongwith the Memorandum         of  appeal.   The same position should hold good in case  of         revision  petitions ever since Limitation Act of  1963  came

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       into force. 1686 B, D--687 FI             J.N.  Surty  v.T.S.  Chettyar (55 IA  161),  The  Punjab         Co.operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. The Official  Liquidators,         the Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. (1941) ILR 22 Lahore Series         191,  MT.  Lalitkuari v. Mahaprasad N. Singh (1947)  ILR  26         Panta Series 157, Additional Collector of Customs,  Calcutta         &  Anr.  v. M/s. Best & Co. (AIR 1966 SC 1713) S.A.  Gaffoor         v.  Ayesha Beghum & Ors. (C.A. 2406/1969 decided  on   18-8-         1970  Unreported Judgment  of  Supreme Court, 1970  Vol.  2,         page 784) followed.         (3) For the purpose of determining any period of  limitation         prescribed for any application by any special or local  law,         the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia. shall         apply in so far as, and to the extent to which they are  not         expressly  excluded by such special or local law, and  there         is nothing in the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the         application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. [685  H,         686 A]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1726 of 1971.            (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the  Judgment  and  Order         dated  20-4-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Misc.  Sales         Tax Reference No. 137 of 1970).12--1234SCI/76         684             S.C.  Manchanda,  M.V. Goswami and O.P.  Rana,  for  the         Appellants.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KHANNA,  J. This is an appeal by special  leave  against         the judgment of Allahabad High Court whereby the High  Court         answered the following question referred to it under section         11 ( 3 ) of the UP Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as         the Act) in favour of the dealer-respondent and against  the         revenue:                        "Whether  the  time taken by  the  dealer  in                  obtaining  another copy of the  impugned  appellate                  order could be excluded for the purpose of  limita-                  tion  for filing revision under section 10 (1 )  of                  the UP Sales Tax Act when one copy of the appellate                  order  was served upon the dealer under the  provi-                  sions of the Act ?"         The  matter  relates  to the assessment  year  1960-61.   An         appeal  filed  by the respondent against the  order  of  the         Sales  Tax Officer was disposed of by the Assistant  Commis-         sioner  (Judicial)  Sales  Tax, Bareilly. The  copy  of  the         appellate  order  was  served on the  dealer  respondent  on         August 2, 1965. The respondent, it appears, lost the copy of         the appellate order which had been served upon him. On  June         15,  1966 the respondent made an application  for  obtaining         another  copy  of the above order.  The copy  was  ready  on         August  17, 1967 and was delivered to the respondent on  the         following day, i.e. August 18, 1967.  Revision under section         10 of the Act was thereafter filed by the respondent  before         the  Judge (Revision) Sales Tax on September 9,  1967.  Sub-         section (3B) of section 10 of the Act prescribes the  period         of limitation for filing such a revision. According to  that         sub-section,  such  a revision application  "shall  be  made         within  one year from the date of service of the order  com-         plained of but the Revising authority may on proof of suffi-         cient cause entertain an application within a further period         of six months." Question was then agitated before the  Judge         (Revision) as to whether the revision application was within         time.   The respondent claimed that under section  12(2)  of

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       the Limitation Act, he was entitled to excluded in computing         the  period of limitation for filing the revision, the  time         spent  for  obtaining a copy of the appellate  order.   This         contention  was accepted by the Judge (Revision).   He  also         observed  that the fact that the said copy was not  required         to be filed along with the revision petition would not stand         in  the way of the respondent relying upon section 12(2)  of         the  Limitation Act.  The Judge (Revision) thereafter  dealt         with the merits of the case and partly allowed the  revision         petition. At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales  Tax,         the  question  reproduced  above was referred  to  the  High         Court.  The High Court, as stated above, answered the  ques-         tion  in  favour of the respondent and in  doing  so  placed         reliance upon the provision of section 12(2) of the  Limita-         tion Act,1963 (Act 36 of 1963) which reads as under:                        "(2)  In computing the period  of  limitation                  for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal                  or  for revision or for review of a  judgment,  the                  day on which the judgment complained                  685                  of  was pronounced and the time requisite  for  ob-                  taining  a  copy of the decree, sentence  or  order                  appealed  from or sought to be revised or  reviewed                  shall be excluded."                  It may be stated that the language of section 12(2)                  of  the  Act of 1963 is in variance  with  that  of                  section  12(2)  of the Indian  Limitation  Act,1908                  (Act  9  of 1908) so far as  the  applicability  of                  section 12(2) is concerned in computing the  period                  of  limitation  for  filing  revision  application.                  Section  12(2) of the Indian Limitation  Act,  1908                  read as under:                         "(2)  In computing the period of  limitation                  prescribed for an appeal, an application for  leave                  to appeal and an application for a review of  judg-                  ment,  the day on which the judgment complained  of                  was pronounced, and the time requisite for  obtain-                  ing  a  copy of the decree, sentence or  order  ap-                  pealed  from  or sought to be  reviewed,  shall  be                  excluded."                  Bare  perusal of sub-section (2) of section  12  of                  the  Act  of 1908 would show that it did  not  deal                  with  the  period of limitation prescribed  for  an                  application  for  revision. As  against  that,  the                  language  of sub-section (2) of section 12 of  .the                  Act  of 1963 makes it manifest that its  provisions                  would also apply in computing the period of limita-                  tion  for  application  for  revision.  There  can,                  therefore,  be  no manner of doubt that in  a  case                  like  the present which is governed by the  Act  of                  1963, the provisions of sub-section (2) of  section                  12  can  be  invoked for computing  the  period  of                  limitation for the application for revision if  the                  other necessary conditions are fulfilled.                      It is, however, contended by Mr. Manchanda that                  the UP Sales Tax Act constitutes a complete code in                  itself  and  as that Act prescribes the  period  of                  limitation  for  filing of revision  petition,  the                  High Court was in error in relying upon the  provi-                  sions  of  sub-section (2) of section 12  of    the                  Limitation Act, 1963.   This contention, in     our                  opinion, is wholly bereft of force.                      Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation                  Act, 1963 reads as under:                         "(2)  Where  any special or local  law  pre-

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                scribes  for  any  suit, appeal  or  application  a                  period  of  limitation different  from  the  period                  prescribed  by  the Schedule,   the  provisions  of                  section  3 shall apply as if such period  were  the                  period  prescribed  by  the Schedule  and  for  the                  purpose  of  determining any period  of  limitation                  prescribed  for any suit; appeal or application  by                  any special or local law, the provisions  contained                  in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in                  so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not                  expressly excluded by such special or local law."         There  can be no manner of doubt that the UP Sales  Tax  Act         answers  to  the  description of a  special  or  local  law.         According to sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation         Act,  reproduced above, for the purpose of  determining  any         period  of limitation prescribed for any application by  any         special or local law, the provisions contained in section         686         12(2),  inter  alia,  shall apply in so far as  and  to  the         extent  to  which they are not expressly  excluded  by  such         special or local law.  There is nothing in the U.P Sales Tax         Act expressly excluding the application of section 12(2)  of         the Limitation Act for determining the period of  limitation         prescribed for revision application.  The conclusion  would,         therefore,  follow that the provisions of section  12(2)  of         the  Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in  computing         the  period of limitation prescribed for filing  a  revision         petition under section 10 of the UP Sales Tax Act.             It  has  been argued by Mr. Manchanda that  it  was  not         essential  for the dealer-respondent to file a copy  of  the         order of the Assistant Commissioner along with the  revision         petition.   As such, .according to the learned counsel,  the         dealer-respondent  could not exclude the time spent  in  ob-         taining  the  copy.  This contention is  equally  devoid  of         force. There is nothing in the language of section 12(2)  of         the  Limitation Act  to justify the inference that the  time         spent  for obtaining copy of the order sought to be  revised         can be excluded only if such a copy is required to be  filed         along with the revision application.  All that section 12(2)         states in this connection is that in computing the period of         limitation for a revision, the time requisite for  obtaining         a  copy of the order sought to be revised shah be  excluded.         It would be impermissible to read in section 12(2) a proviso         that  the time requisite for obtaining copy of  the  decree,         sentence  or order appealed from or sought to be revised  or         reviewed shall be excluded only if such copy has to be filed         alongwith the memorandum of appeal or application for  leave         to  appeal or for revision or for review of  judgment,  when         the legislature has not  inserted such a proviso in  section         12(2).  It is also plain that without procuring copy of  the         order  of the Assistant Commissioner the respondent and  his         legal adviser would not have been in a position to decide as         to  whether revision petition should be filed  against  that         order  and if so, what grounds should be taken in the  revi-         sion petition.             The  matter indeed is not res integra.   In the case  of         J.N.Surty  v.  T.S.  Chettyar(1),  the  Judicial   Committee         after  .noticing the conflict in the decisions of  the  High         Courts held that section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act,         1908  applies even when by a rule of the High Court a  memo-         randum  of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy  of  the         decree,  Lord Phillimore speaking on behalf of the  Judicial         Committee observed:                        "Their  Lordships have now to return  to  the                  grammatical construction of the Act, and they  find

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                plain  words directing that the time requisite  for                  obtaining the two documents is to be excluded  from                  computation.   Sect. 12 makes no reference  to  the                  Code  of  Civil Procedure or to any other  Act.  It                  does  not say when the time is to be excluded,  but                  simply enacts it as a positive direction.                        If,  indeed, it could be shown that  in  some                  particular class of cases there could be no  object                  in  obtaining the two documents, an argument  might                  be offered that no time could                  (1) 55 I.A. 161.                  687                  be requisite for obtaining something not requisite.                  But this, is not so.  The decree may be  complicat-                  ed, and it may be open to draw it up in two differ-                  ent ways, and the practitioner may well want to see                  its  form before attacking it by his memorandum  of                  appeal.  As to the judgment, no doubt when the case                  does  not  come from up country,  the  practitioner                  will have heard it delivered, but he may not  carry                  all  the points of a long judgment in  his  memory,                  and as Sir John Edge says, the Legislature may  not                  wish  him to hurry to make a decision till  he  has                  well considered it."               Following  the above decision, it was held by  a  Full         Bench consisting of five Judges of the Lahore High Court  in         the case of The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. The         Official  Liquidators, The Punjab Cotton Press Co.  Ltd.  C)         that  even  though under the Rules and Orders  of  the  High         Court no copy of the judgment is required to be filed  along         with the memorandum of appeal preferred under section 202 of         the  Indian Companies Act from an order of a  single  Judge,         the  provisions of section 12 of the Indian  Limitation  Act         would be attracted.  The provisions of section 12 were  also         held to govern an appeal under Letters Patent.               A  Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the  case  of         Mt. Lalitkuari v. Mahaprasad N. Singh(2) also held that  the         provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act were applica-         ble to Letters Patent appeals under clause 10 of the Letters         Patent.               The  above  decision  of the  Judicial  Committee  was         followed  by this Court in the case of Additional  Collector         of Customs, Calcutta & Anr. v. M/s. Best & Co.(3)               Similar  view was expressed by this Court in the  case         of S. A. Gaffoor v. Ayesha Beghum & Ors.(4)               It is plain that since 1928 when the Judicial  Commit-         tee  decided the case of Surty (supra), the view  which  has         been consistently taken by the Courts in India is that  the:         provisions  of  section 12(2) of the  Limitation  Act  would         apply  even though the copy mentioned in that subsection  is         not  required to be filed along with the memorandum  of  ap-         peal. The same position should hold good in case of revision         petitions ever since Limitation Act of’1963 came into force.               Lastly, it has been argued that the copy of the  order         of  the Assistant Commissioner was served upon the  respond-         ent,  and as such,; was not necessary for the respondent  to         apply  for copy of the said order.  In this respect we  find         that the copy which was served upon the respondent was  lost         by  him.   The loss of that copy necessitated the filing  of         an  application for obtaining another copy of the  order  of         the Assistant Commissioner.                  (1) (1941) ILR 22 Lahore Series 191.                  (2) (1947) I.L.R. 26 Patna Series 157. A.I.R. 1966                  S.C. 1713.                  (4) CA No. 2406 of 1969 decided on August 18, 1970.

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       ( See Unreported judgements of Supreme Court. 1970. Vol.  2.         page 784).         688             In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj  Narain         &  Ors.(1) the appellant obtained three copies of the  order         appealed  against by applying on three different  dates  for         the copy.  The appellant filed along with the memorandum  of         appeal  that copy which had taken the maximum time  for  its         preparation  and  sought  to exclude such  maximum  time  in         computing  the period of limitation for filing  the  appeal,         This  Court,  while holding the appeal to  be  within  time,         observed that the expression time requisite in section 12(2)         of  the  Limitation  Act cannot be understood  as  the  time         absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order and         that  what  is  deductible under section 12(2)  is  not  the         minimum  time  within which a copy of  the  order   appealed         against could have been obtained. If that be the position of         law  in a case where there was no allegation of the loss  of         any  copy, a fortiori it would follow that where as  in  the         present ease the copy served upon a party is lost and  there         is no alternative for that party except to apply for a fresh         copy in order to be in a position to file revision petition,         the time spent in obtaining that copy would necessarily have         to  be excluded under section 12(2) of the  Limitation  Act,         1963.             The  High Court, in our opinion, correctly answered  the         question  referred to it in favour of the  dealer-respondent         and against the revenue.  The appeal fails and is dismissed.         As  no one appeared on behalf of the respondent, we make  no         order as to costs.         M.R.                                                  Appeal         dismissed.         (1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 842.         689