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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PATIALA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/s.  SHAHZADA NAND & SONS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/01/1966

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1342            1966 SCR  (3) 379  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC 718  (10)

ACT: Indian Income-tax Act,1922  (11 of 1922), s.  34,  sub-s. 34(1)  (a)  as  amended  by the  Finance  Act  1956;  sub-s. 34(1A),--Field of operation of the two sub-sections  whether overlapping in respect of war years--Whether s. 34(1)(A)  as a  special provision over-rides s. 34(1) (a) in  respect  of the war years.

HEADNOTE: On March 26, 1954 the Income-tax authorities issued a notice to the respondents under s. 34(1) (a) of the Indian  Income- tax  Act, 1922 in respect of assessment year  1945-46.   The assessment made pursuant to the notice was set aside by  the appellate authorities on the ground that the notice under s. 34(1)  (a)  was time barred because the assessment  year  in question  was  beyond the period of 8 years  covered  by  s. 34(1)(a).   Sub-ss. (1A) to (ID) were inserted in s.  34  by the  Income-tax (Amendment) Act 1954.  By sub-s. (1A)  power was  given to the Income-tax authorities to issue notice  in respect  of escaped income of the previous years within  the period September 1, 1939 to March 31, 1946.  By the, Finance Act  1956  with effect from April 1, 1956 s. 34(1)  (a)  was amended  so that notices in respect of escaped income  could be  issued ’at any time’ subject to certain conditions.   On July  25, 1958 the Income-tax Officer again issued a  notice to  the respondents calling upon them to file a  return  for the assessment year 1945-46.  An appeal to the Central Board of  Revenue by some of respondents failed.   Thereupon  they filed  a  petition  under  Art.  226  of  the   Constitution challenging  the  notice  on various  grounds.   Their  main contention  was that no notice under s. 34(1) (a)  could  be issued in respect of the war years as the escaped income  of the  said  war years was governed by s.  34(1A),  whereunder notices could be issued only up to March 31, 1956.  The High Court having taken a view favourable to the respondents, the Revenue appealed to this Court by special leave. It  was contended on behalf of the appellant that the  terms of  s. 34(1) (a) after its amendment in 1956 were clear  and unambiguous  and the scope of the expression ’at  any  time’

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could  not be curtailed by construction and that  s.  34(lA) did not operate to restrict the operation of s. 34(1) (a) in respect  of the war years.  On behalf of the respondents  it was contended that s. 34(lA) was a species of which s. 34(1) (a)  was genus that in respect of the war years there was  a conflict  between the two subsections, and that in  view  of the  maxim,  generalia specialibus non derogant,  s.  34(1A) should prevail. HELD:(i) It would not be appropriate to describe sub-s. (1A)  as  one carved out of sub-s. (1) (a) or to call  it  a species  of  which  sub-s. (1) (a) is the  genus.   When  s. 34(lA)  was  enacted s. 34(1)(a) had practically  ceased  to function  in  respect  of  the war  years.   Again  when  s. 34(1)(a)  was  amended  with effect from April  1,  1956  s. 34(1A) had practically ceased to operate as no notices under it  could  be  issued after-March 31,  1956.   There  is  no conflict between the two sub-sections after that date.   The wide phraseology of the amended s. 34(1)(a) takes 380 in  all the escaped concealed incomes during all  the  years commencing  from  1941 and confers power on  the  Income-tax Officer  to  give notice thereunder in respect of  the  said income without any bar of limitation. [390 C-F] (ii)Sub-Section  (1A) does not really prescribe any  period of  limitation.  It enables the Income-tax Officer  to  take proceedings  within a particular time, though the period  of limitation had expired.  It conferred a special power on the Income-tax Officer which expired on April 1, 1956.  The non- obstante clause in sub-s. (1A) indicates that it was enacted to  operate notwithstanding that the period of 8  years  had expired.  The said sub-section served its purpose only  when the  period  of 8 years governed a notice under  sub-s.  (1) (a).   But when that bar of limitation was ,removed,  sub-s. (1A) had become otiose. [390 G-391 A] Further  sub-s. (1B) as amended by the Finance Act  of  1956 and sub-s. 4 added by the Indian Income-tax Act  (Amendment) Act 1959, also reinforces the construction that sub-s. 34(1) (a)  as  amended in 1956 was applicable to,  the  war  years despite sub-s. 34(1A). [391 B., D-E] (iii)The  reason  why sub-s. (1A) was retained  in  the statute  even after the Finance Act of 1956 was that  though no new notices could be issued under that sub-section  after April 1, 1956, notices already issued before that date  were pending.  They could be disposed of in the manner prescribed by sub-ss. (1A), (1B), (1C), and (1D) of s. 34.  All the aid sub-sections  formed  an integral  code.   The  legislature, presumably,   intended   to  keep  the   said   sub-sections whereunder  proceedings had already been initiated and  make available  to the said proceedings the procedure  prescribed under the said provisions.  It may also be that sub-s.  (1A) was  kept in super abundant caution.  Whatever that may  be, it  cannot,  in the circumstances, detract  from  the  clear provisions of sub-s. (1) (,a). [391 F, G] Case law referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  494  and 495 of 1964. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated September  26, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in  Civil  Writ No. 801 of 1959. S.T. Desai, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.

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N.A.  Palkhivala, I. M. Nanavati, T. A. Ramachandran,  J. B.  Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder, Narain,  for  the respondents. N.   A.  Palkhivala,  J.  B. Dadachanji, O.  C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain,    for intervener Nos. 1 and 2. I.   M.  Nanavati,  J.  B.  Dadachanji,  O.  C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain,    for intervener No. 3. N.   A.  Palkhivala,  R. J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji,  O.  C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. 4. D.   N.  Mukherjee, for intervener No. 5. 381 The judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba  Rao, J. These two appeals, one by special  leave  and the other by certificate, raise the question whether  notice can  be  issued  at  any  time  for  reassessment  under  s. 34(1)(a), as amended by the Finance Act, 1956, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, in respect of a concealed income to which s. 34(1A) thereof applied. The  facts  may be briefly stated.   Messrs.   Shahzada  and Sons,  the  1st  respondent  in both  the  appeals,  was  an undivided  Hindu  Family firm and it was  assessed  in  that capacity  up to the assessment year 1945-46.  It is  alleged that subsequently there was a partition in the family and  a new  firm came into existence, which took over the  business of   the  family.   On  March  26,  1954,   the   income-tax authorities  issued a notice to the members of  the  defunct Hindu     undivided  family under s. 34(1)(a) of the Act  in respect  of the assessment year 1945-46 on the  ground  that certain income of the    said family had escaped assessment. Pursuant  to  the  proceedings so initiated, a  sum  of  Rs. 3,63,000/- was added to the original assessment of the  said family.   The assessee took up the matter on appeal  to  the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner, who held that  the  said notice was barred by time, though on the merits he confirmed the  order  of  the  Income-tax  Officer.   The   Income-tax Department  as well as the 1st respondent preferred  appeals against the said order to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The  Tribunal held that the notice was barred by  time  and, therefore, the income-tax authorities had no jurisdiction to give a finding on the merits.  Meanwhile s. 34(1)(a) of  the Act  was amended by the Finance Act, 1956, with effect  from April 1, 1956, whereunder, subject to certain conditions,  a notice  under  s.  34(1)(a) could be  issued  at  any  time. Thereafter, on July 25, 1958, the Income-tax Officer  issued a notice to the 1st respondent calling upon the members  who constituted  the undivided family to file a return  for  the assessment  year 1945-46.  Respondents 2 to 5, who were  the members of the said undivided Hindu family, appealed to  the Central  Board of Revenue for redress without  any  success. Thereafter,  they  filed a petition under Art.  226  of  the Constitution  in  the High Court of Punjab  challenging  the notice  on various grounds.  Their main contention was  that no  notice under s. 34(1)(a) could be issued in  respect  of the  war years, as the escaped income during the said  years was  governed  by s. 34(1A) of the Act whereunder  a  notice could  be  issued  only before March  31,  1956.   The  writ petition  came up before a single Judge of the  High  Court, who referred the following question to a larger Bench :               "Whether  or not in the circumstances  of  the               present  case  the  notice  under  section  34               issued on 25th July 1958 was barred by time." 382 The Division Bench, in its turn, referred the said  question to  a Full Bench.  The Full Bench, inter alia, held that  s. 34(1A)  was  a special provision whereas s. 34(1)(a)  was  a

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general  provision  and that, as the escaped income  of  the year 1945-46 was governed by s. 34(1A), no not-Ace under  s. 34(1)(a)  could be issued.  In the result, after  expressing that  view, the Full Bench sent back the case to the  single Judge  before whom it came in the first instance.  Dua,  J., who heard the petition, following the view expressed by  the Full   Bench,   allowed  the  petition.    The   appellants, thereafter,  preferred a Letters Patent appeal against  that order to a Division Bench, which dismissed the same.   Civil Appeal  No.  494  of 1964 has been Sled by  the  Revenue  by special  leave  against the order of the  Full  Bench  dated September 8, 1961, and Civil Appeal No. 495 of 1964 has been filed,  by certificate, by the Revenue against the order  of the Division Bench confirming that of Dua, J. At  the  outset it will be convenient to read  the  material provisions  of  s. 34 of the Act as amended by  the  Finance Act, 1956, and by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959. Section 34. (1) If--               (a)   the  Income-tax  Officer has  reason  to               believe  that  by reason of  the  omission  or               failure  on the part of an assessee to make  a               return of his income under section 22 for  any               year  or  to  disclose  fully  and  truly  all               material  facts necessary for  his  assessment               for  that  year,  income,  profits  or   gains               chargeable   to   income-tax   have    escaped               assessment for that year, or have been  under-               assessed,  or assessed at too low a  rate,  or               have been made the subject of excessive relief               under   the   Act,  or   excessive   loss   or               depreciation allowance has been computed,               he  may in cases falling under clause  (a)  at               any   time  ................  serve   on   the               assessee................  a notice  containing               all  or any of the requirements which  may  be               included in a notice under sub-section (2)  of               section  22  and  may  proceed  to  assess  or               reassess  such  income, profits  or  gains  or               recompute the loss or depreciation  allowance;               and  the provisions of this Act shall, so  far               as may be, apply accordingly as if the  notice               were a notice issued under that sub-section : Provided  that  the  Income-tax Officer shall  not  issue  a notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1)-               (i)   for any year prior to the year ending on               the 31st day of March, 1941;               (ii)  for  any  year,  if  eight  years   have               elapsed after the expiry of that year,  unless               the income, profits or gains                                    383               chargeable  to income-tax which  have  escaped               assessment  or  have  been  under-assessed  or               assessed  at too low a rate or have been  made               the  subject  of excessive relief  under  this               Act,  or  the loss or  depreciation  allowance               which has been computed in excess, amount  to,               or likely to amount to, one lakh of rupees  or               more  in the aggregate, either for that  year,               or  for that year and any other year or  years               after which or after each of which eight years               have elapsed, not being a year or years ending               before the 31st day of March, 1941;               (iii) for any year, unless he has recorded his               reasons for doing so, and, in any case falling               under clause (ii), unless the Central Board of

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             Revenue,   and,   in  any  other   case,   the               Commissioner,  is  satisfied on  such  reasons               recorded  that it is a fit case for the  issue               of such notice               (1A).   If  in the case of any  assessee,  the               Income-tax Officer has reason to believe               (i)   that income, profits or gains chargeable               to income-tax have escaped assessment for  any               year in respect of which the relevant previous               year falls wholly or partly within the  period               beginning  on the 1st day of September,  1939,               -and  ending on the 31st day of  March,  1946,               and               (ii)  that the income, profits or gains  which               have  so escaped assessment for any such  year               or  years amount, or are likely to amount,  to               one lakh of rupees or more, he  may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years  or, as the case may be, four years specified in sub-section  (1) has    expired   in   respect   thereof,   serve   on    the assessee........................ a notice containing all  or any  of the requirements which may be included in  a  notice under  sub-section  (2) of section 22, and  may  proceed  to assess  or  re-assess the income, profits or  gains  of  the assessee  for all or any of the years referred to in  clause (i),  and  thereupon the provisions of  this  Act  excepting those  contained in clauses (i) and (iii) of the proviso  to sub-section  (1)  and  in subsections (2) and  (3)  of  this section], shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly : Provided  that  the  Income-tax Officer shall  not  issue  a notice  under  this sub-section unless he has  recorded  his reasons  for doing so, and the Central Board of  Revenue  is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice : Provided  further that no such notice shall be issued  after the 31st day of March, 1956. 384               (1B)  Where any assessee to whom a notice  has               been  issued under clause (a)  of  sub-section               (1)  or under sub-section (IA) for any of  the               years ending on the 31 st day of March of  the               years  1941 to 1948 inclusive applies  to  the               Central  Board of Revenue at any  time  within               six months from the receipt of such notice  or               before the assessment or reassessment is made,               whichever  is  earlier, to  have  the  matters               relating   to  his  assessment  settled,   the               Central   Board   of   Revenue   may,    after               considering  the terms of settlement  proposed               and  subject to the previous approval  of  the               Central  Government, accept the terms of  such               settlement, and, if it does so, shall make  an               order  in  accordance with the terms  of  such               settlement  specifying among other things  the               sum of money payable by the assessee.               (1C) Any sum specified in a settlement arrived               at  in  pursuance of sub-section (1B)  may  be               recovered  and  any  penalty  for  default  in               making payment of any such sum may be  imposed               and  recovered  in  the  manner  provided   in               Chapter VI.               (ID)  Any  settlement arrived  at  under  this               section shall be conclusive as to the  matters               stated   therein;   and   no   person,   whose               assessments have been so settled, shall be en-

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             titled  to re-open in any proceeding  for  the               recovery  of any sum under this Act or in  any               subsequent    assessment    or    reassessment               proceeding  relating  to  any  tax  chargeable               under  this  Act or in  any  other  proceeding               whatsoever before any court or other authority               any   matter   which  forms   part   of   such               settlement.               (4)   A notice under clause (a) of sub-section               (1) may be issued at any time  notwithstanding               that  at the time of the issue of  the  notice               the  period of eight years specified  in  that               sub-section before its amendment by clause (a)               of section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956 (18  of               1956)  had expired in respect of the  year  to               which the notice relates. Sub-section  (IA)  was inserted in s. 34 of the Act  by  the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, and it came into force  on July  17,  1954.   Clause (a) of sub-s. (1)  of  s.  34  was amended by the Finance Act, 1956, with effect from April  1, 1956.  Sub-section (1B) of s. 34, which was inserted by  the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, was   also amended by  the Finance Act, 1956, whereunder the words "to  whom  a  notice has been issued under clause (a) of sub-section (1)    or under  sub-section (IA) for any of the years ending  on  the 31st day of March of the years 1941 to 1948 inclusive"  were substituted for the words "to whom a notice has been  issued under sub- 385 section  (1A)." Sub-section (4) was added by the  Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959. The gist of the relevant provisions may be stated thus: Under s. 34(1)(a), before it was amended by the Finance Act, 1956,  in  the  case of concealed income a  notice  for  re- assessment could be issued within 8 years of the end of  the relevant  year;  and  after the said  amendment,  notice  in respect of the said income could be issued at any time,  but it was subject to three conditions, namely, (i) it would not be issued for any year prior to the year ending on March 31, 1941,  (ii)  such concealed income amounted to one  lakh  of rupees  or more in the aggregate, and (iii)  the  Income-tax Officer  gave reasons for doing so and obtained the  consent of the Central Board of Revenue.  Sub-section (IA) of s.  34 did  not  undergo any change after the Finance  Act,  1-956. Escaped  assessment  for any year in respect  of  which  the relevant  previous year fell within the period beginning  on September  1, 1939, and ending on March 31, 1946,  could  be reached by issuing a notice thereunder: but, it was  subject to  the condition that the income which  escaped  assessment for  any year amounted to or was likely to amount to  rupees one lakh or more; it was subject to a further condition that no such notice should be issued after March 31, 1956.   Sub- section  (1B)  of  s. 34, as amended  in  1956,  enabled  an assessee  to whom a notice has been issued under cl. (a)  of sub-s.  (1)  or sub-s. (IA) for any of the years  ending  on March  31 of the years 1941 to 1948 inclusive, to  apply  to the Central Board of Revenue for a settlement of the  amount of  tax payable by him, Sub-section (4), which was  inserted in  1959, emphasized the fact that a notice could be  issued under s. 34(1)(a), notwithstanding that the time of 8  years had expired before the Finance Act, 1956, came into force. We may at this stage notice the arguments advanced by learn- ed counsel on the interpretation of the said provisions. The  arguments. of Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for  the Revenue, may be summarized thus : The terms of s.  34(1)(a),

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after its amendment by the Finance Act, 1956, are clear  and unambiguous  and the scope of the expression "at  any  time" cannot   be  curtailed  by  construction.    So   construed, proceedings  for re-assessment in respect of escaped  income contemplated by the said clause can be initiated without any restriction  of  time.   The  legislative  history  of   the fasciculus  of sub-sections, namely, sub-ss.  (1)(a),  (1A), (1B), (1C) and (1D) of s. 34, supports the said construction and  explains  the  relative scope of  s.  34(1)(a)  and  s. 34(1A)--the  former,  as amended by the Finance  Act,  1956, operated  after  s. 34(1A) ceased to operate so far  as  the escaped  concealed income of war years was  concerned.   The amendment of s. 34(1B) by the said Act and the  introduction of  s.  34(4)  by  the  Income-tax  (Amendment)  Act,  1959, reinforces the said construction, namely, 386 that  the amended s. 34(1)(a) lifted the ban  of  limitation also in respect of the escaped income of the war years.  The retention  of S. 34(1A) on the statute became  necessary  as proceedings  taken thereunder were pending at the  time  the Finance  Act,  1956, came into force and  the  consequential provisions,  such as, s. 34(1B) etc., with which  s.  34(1A) was integrally connected could not be applied if the  latter was  omitted.  Further, the said sub-sections still  applied to  incomes  falling  under s. 34(1)(b) in  respect  of  war years.   In  any  view,  it  must  have  been  retained   in superabundant  caution and that fact could not restrict  the scope of an otherwise clearly expressed provision, viz.,  s. 34(1)(a).   The construction accepted by the High Court  led to  the anomalous position of the Legislature prescribing  a shorter  period  of limitation in the  case  of  tax-evaders during the war years and no period of limitation for evaders of  such income during the prewar and post-war years.   This could not have been the intention of the Legislature, as the evasion  of tax during the war. years was  comparatively  of larger  amounts than during the other periods and  for  that very   reason   it  has  passed  the  Taxation   of   Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, which was declared  to be void by this Court.  This contention was accepted by  the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts in Laxminarayan R. Rathi  v. Income-tax  Officer,  Poona  (1) and  Mandanlal  Jajodia  v. Income-tax Officer, Dist. II(1), Calcutta (2) respectively. Mr.   Palkhivala,  learned  counsel  for  the   respondents, answered  this criticism thus.  In a taxing Act one  has  to look   merely   what   is  clearly  stated   and,   if   the interpretation  is  open  to doubt,  the  construction  most beneficial   to  the  subject  must  be  adopted.    Section 34(1)(a),  before it was amended in 1956, provided  for  the genus out of which, by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, the species of r..  34(1A)   was  carved  out.    While   s. 34(1)(a) was a general provision, s.    34(1A) was a special provision.   On the principle of generalia  specialibus  non derogant, the field covered by s. 34(1A) should be  excluded from  that  covered by s. 34(1)(a).  If that was  the  legal position before the 1956 amendment, the argument  proceeded, the  same position would continue thereafter, as  Parliament retained  s.  34(1A), along with its provisos, as  it  stood before  the  amendment and amended only  S.  34(1)(a).   The lifting of the ban of limitation, therefore, should, on  the basis of the said doctrine, be confined to the field covered by S. 34(1)(a) before the amendment.  If Parliament intended to  do away with the period of limitation in respect of  the escaped  incomes  during the war period, it would  not  have retained s. 34(1A) on the statute book; for, in that event,’ it would serve no purpose.  It would be wrong to say that it

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ceased  to be operative after April 1, 1956, for the  period of limitation would still apply to proceedings in respect of escaped incomes of the war years.  Sub-s. (4) added in s. 34 in the year 1959 and s. 34(1B), as amended (1) (1964) 52 I.T.R. 254. (2) (1965) 58 I.T.R. 693.                             387 in 1956, would not throw any light on the question, but in a way  would  support the view that they were  concerned  only with  the escaped incomes covered by s. 34(1)(a),  excluding thereform those covered by s. 34(1A).  The argument based on the alleged anomaly led nowhere and indeed the retention  of s. 34(1A) on the statute book was intentionally done, as the Parliament,  having  already placed a  particular  class  of assessees  under a special and heavy burden, did  not  think fit  to make any provision which was likely to  harass  them further.   The ambiguity in the section, if any,  should  go for  the benefit of the tax-payer and not the  tax-gatherer. This argument was accepted by the Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat High  Courts  in  Rustomji v.  Income-tax  Officer,  Special Investigation Circle, Indore(1), and Mathurdas Govinddas  v. G.  N.  Gadgil, Income-tax  Officer,  Special  Investigation Office, Ahmedabad (2). Before  we  advert  to  the  said  arguments,  it  will   be convenient  to  notice the relevant rules  of  construction. The  classic  statement  of  Rowlatt,  J.,  in  Cape  Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. (3). still holds the field.  It reads :               "In  a  Taxing Act one has to look  merely  at               what  is clearly said.  There is no  room  for               any  intendment.  There is no equity  about  a               tax.   There  is no presumption as to  a  tax.               Nothing  is  to be read in, nothing is  to  be               implied.   One  can only look  fairly  at  the               language used." To  this  may  be added a rider’: in a  case  of  reasonable doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be   adopted.   But  even  so,  the  fundamental   rule   of construction is the same for all statutes, whether fiscal or otherwise.   "The underlying principle is that  the  meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the  plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what  is just  or expedient." The expressed intention must guide  the court.   Another rule of construction which is  relevant  to the  present  enquiry is expressed in the  maxim,  generalia specialibus  non derogant, which means that when there is  a conflict  between  a general and a  special  provision,  the latter shall prevail.  The said principle has been stated in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., at P. 205, thus               "The  rule  is,  that  whenever  there  is   a               particular  enactment and a general  enactment               in the same statute, and the latter, taken  in               its  most comprehensive sense, would  overrule               the  former, the particular enactment must  be               operative,  and the general enactment must  be               taken  to affect only the other parts  of  the               statute to which it may properly apply." (1)  [1964] 54 I.T.R. 461                     (2) [1965]  56 I.T.R. 621. (3)  [1921] 1 K.B. 64, 71. 388 But   this  rule  of  construction  is  not  of,   universal application.   It is subject to the condition that there  is nothing  in  the general provision,  expressed  or  implied, indicating  an  intention to the contrary : see  Maxwell  on

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Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., at pp. 168-169.  When the words of a section are clear, but its scope is sought to be curtailed by construction, the approach suggested by Lord Coke in Heydons case (1), yield better results :               "To  arrive at the real meaning, it is  always               necessary  to get an exact conception  of  the               aim,  scope, and object of the whole Act :  to               consider,  according to Lord Coke :  (1)  What               was  the  law before the Act was  passed;  (2)               What was the mischief or defect for which  the               law  had  not  provided  ;  (3)  What   remedy               Parliament has appointed ; and (4) The  reason               of the remedy." With these rules of construction in mind, let us now  tackle the-problem  raised in this case.  Under s. 34(1)(a),  after it was amended by the Finance Act, 1956, a notice in respect of an escaped concealed income could be issued at any  time. The  terms of cl. (a) and the expression "at any  time"  are clear  and unambiguous and, if there is nothing in  the  Act detracting  from  the width of the said terms, it  is  clear that  a notice can be issued at any time in respect  of  the concealed income of any year not being a year ending  before March  31,  1941.  But s. 34(1A) provides for the  issue  of notice  in respect of escaped income of the  previous  years within the period beginning on September 1, 1939, and ending on  March 31, 1946.  Does this sub-section detract from  the generality  of  s.  34(1)(a)  ?  The  history  of  the  said provision  may  usefully  be noticed.   As  we  have  stated earlier,  the  Parliament  passed  the  Taxation  of  Income (Investigation  Commission) Act, 1947, mainly to  catch  the escaped incomes of the war profiteers.  This Court in  Suraj Mall  Mohta  and  Co. v. A. V.  Viswanatha  Sastri  (2)  and Muthiah v. C.L.T. (3) held that s. 5(4) and 5(1) of the said Act  became void on the commencement of the Constitution  as offending  Art. 14 thereof.  The first decision led  to  the insertion of sub-ss. (IA) to (ID) in S. 34 by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, with effect from July 17, 1954.   The object of the Amending Act was to provide for the assessment or  re-assessment  of  persons who  had,  to  a  substantial extent, evaded payment of taxes during the war years and for matters  connected therewith.  But at the time  sub-s.  (IA) was inserted in s.34, the period of limitation provided with regard to issue of notices under s. 34(1)(a) was 8 years and for cases falling under s. 34(1)(b) it was 4 years; but,  as the  Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, came into force  only on July 17, 1954, the said periods of limitation  prescribed in  respect  of escaped concealed incomes  during  the  said period had run out except in respect (1)  [1584] 3 Rep. 7b.                         (2) [1955]  1 S.C.R. 448. (3)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247.                             389 of  one or two years.  So, with the twin object of  "tending the  time and expediting the assessment, the second  proviso was  introduced  therein to the effect that no  such  notice should be issued after March 31, 1956.  But, notwithstanding the said Act, presumably notices could not have been  issued against  all the evaders of tax with incomes of  rupees  one lakh or more during the said period.  Parliament also wanted to bring to tax escaped concealed incomes during the  period not covered by the said years.  With that object, in 1956 s. 34  was  amended by the Finance Act, 1956, by which  it  Was provided that notice under s. 34(1)(a) can be issued at  any time.   But sub-s. (IA) was retained, including  the  second proviso.   This amendment, along with the other  amendments,

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made  by the said Act came into force on April 1, 1956.   In 1959,  the  said  section was again amended  by  the  Indian Income-tax  (Amendment)  Act, 1959.  Under  sub-s.  (4),  as amended  by  the  1959 amendment Act,  notice  under  sub-s. (1)(a)  might be issued at any time notwithstanding that  at the  time  of  the issue of notice the  period  of  8  years specified  in that sub-section before its amendment  by  the Finance  Act,  1956, had expired in respect of the  year  to which  the notice related.  This amendment was  necessitated by  the judgments of the Bombay and calcutta High Courts  in Debi  Dutt v. T. Belan(1) and S. C. Prashar v.  Vasantsen(2) respectively  holding  that if the right of  the  Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment was barred under the law for the  time being in force, no subsequent enlargement  of  the time could revive such right in the absence of "press  words or necessary intendment.  Sub-section (4) was added to s. 34 to  make it abundantly clear that notice under  s.  34(1)(a) could  be issued at any time notwithstanding that  the  said right  was  barred before the Amendment Act of  1956.   This history of the legislation loaves no room for doubt that the intention  of  the  Legislature was  to  bring  the  escaped concealed income of rupees one lakh and more to tax  without any time limit.  Before the 1956 Act was passed, the  period of  limitation prescribed for proceeding  against  concealed incomes of rupees one lakh and more during the war years and the  earlier years had expired.  The Legislature stepped  in to  prevent evasion of taxes on such incomes and lifted  the ban  of  limitation in respect thereof, subject  to  certain conditions. But  the  crucial question is, whether  the  Legislature  by making  the relevant amendments has succeeded to  effectuate its  intention.   To state it differently,  do  the  amended provisions carry out its intention ? Section  34(1)(a),  as it now stands on  the  statute  book, expressly states that in cases falling under cl. (a) of sub- s. (1) notice can be served thereunder on an assessee at any time.  The terms of s. 34(a) read with the 2nd proviso, take in the concealed incomes of all the, (1) [1959] 35 I.T.R. 781. (2) [1956] 29 I.T.R. 857 390 years commencing from the year ending on March 31, 1941.  It does not exclude the incomes of the war years, but the  said incomes  are  sought  to be excludes  on  the  principle  of generalia specialibus non derogant.  As we have pointed  out earlier, the said doctrine embodies a rule of  construction, but  it  has no universal application.  To  invoke  it,  the general and special provisions shall occupy the same  field. In this case, both during the period between the  amendments of  1954  and 1956 and thereafter  they  occupied  different fields.   By July 17, 1954, when sub-s. (IA) was  introduced in  s.  34,  no  proceedings  under  s.  34(1)(a)  could  be initiated except for the assessment year 1946-47 in  respect of the previous years that fell within the period  beginning on September 1, 1939, and ending on March 31, 1946, for they were  barred under the unmended section.  Sub-section  (IA), therefore,  practically  governed a situation that  was  not governed by the provisions of s. 34(1)(a).  It was  intended to catch escaped incomes of the war years which were out  of the reach of s. 34(1)(a).  It is not, therefore, appropriate to  describe sub-s. (IA) as one carved out of sub-s.  (1)(a) or to call it a species of which sub-s. (a)(1) is the genus. Sub-section  (IA) operated where sub-s.  (1)(a)  practically ceased to function. Now,  coming to the period after the Finance Act, 1956,  was

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passed,  i.e.,  after April 1, 1956, a  different  situation arose.   The extended period given under the second  proviso to sub-s. (IA) expired on March 31, 1956.  Thereafter,  sub- s.  (IA) ceased to be operative in the sense that no  notice could thereafter be given thereunder.  It worked itself out. The  Legislature  could have extended the period  under  the second proviso to sub-s. (IA), but it did not do so. It  did not  give a further lease of life to it; instead it  removed the period of limitation under sub-s. (1)(a), as sub-s. (IA) had  become  practically defunct.  The wide  phraseology  of sub-s.  (1)(a)  takes in all the escaped  concealed  incomes during  all  the years commencing from 1941  and  confers  a power  on the Income-tax ,Officer to give notice  thereunder in   respect  of  the  said  incomes  without  any  bar   of limitation.  There is, therefore, no conflict after April 1, 1956,  between sub-s. (])(a) and sub-s. (]A), as the  latter ceased to be operative., There is another way of looking at the problem.  Sub-section (IA) does not really prescribe any period of limitation.  It enables the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings within  a particular  time,  though  the  period  of  limitation   had expired.  In this view, no question of carving out a species out of a genus arises.  It conferred a special power on  the Income-tax  Officer and the said power expired on  April  1. 1956. There  is  yet another way of looking at the  problem.   The non-obstante  clause  in sub-s. (IA) indicates that  it  was enacted  to  operate notwithstanding that the  period  of  8 years had expired.  The said                             391 sub-section  served  its purpose only when the period  of  8 years governed a notice under sub-s. (1)(a).  But when  that bar  of  limitation  was removed,  sub-s.  (IA)  had  become otiose. Sub-section  (1B),  as amended by the Finance Act  of  1956, also  throws  some  light on the interpretation  of  s.  34. Before it was amended, an assessee to whom a notice had been issued under sub-s. (1)(a) could apply to the Central  Board of  Revenue for settlement of the amount of tax  payable  by him.  After the amendment, an assessee to whom a notice  was given  under sub-s. (1)(a) and under sub-s. (IA) for any  of the  years ending on March 31, 1941 to 1948 could apply  for such  a relief to the Central Board of Revenue.   The  years 1941   to  1948  are  the  war  years.   This   sub-section, therefore, assumes that notice could be issued in respect of the war years under sub-s. (1)(a).  The notice  contemplated by sub-s. (1B) could only be a notice after the amendment of 1956,  for  such notice could not have been  issued  earlier under  sub-s.  (1)(a)  in respect of the  said  years.   The notice  under  sub-s. (IA) obviously refers  to  the  notice issued before the amendment of 1956 and pending disposal. Sub-section  (4) added by the Indian Income-tax  (Amendment) Act,  1959,  also  reinforces  the  said  construction.   As indicated  earlier, that sub-section was added to  get  over the legal objection that proceedings barred before 1956 were not revived under the 1956 Act.  It is true that sub-s.  (4) refers  only to sub-s. (1)(a), but the subsection  indicates that  the  Legislature assumed that proceedings  after  1956 could only be taken under sub-s. (1)(a). It  was  asked, with some plausibility, if  the  Legislature assumed that sub-s. (IA) ceased to be operative, why it  was retained  along  with its proviso prescribing  a  period  of limitation  in the amended section.  Though no  new  notices could  be issued under that subsection after April 1,  1956. notices already issued before that date were pending.   They

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would  be  disposed of in the manner prescribed  by  sub-ss. (IA),  (1B),  (1C)  and (1D) of S. 34.  All  the  said  sub- sections  formed  an integral code.  The  Legislature,  pre- sumably,  intended to keep the said-sub-sections  whereunder proceedings had already been initiated and make available to the said proceedings the procedure prescribed under the said provisions.   It  may also be that sub-s. (1A) was  kept  in super-abundant caution.  Whatever that may be, it cannot, in the  circumstances mentioned by us, detract from  the  clear provisions of sub-s. (1)(a). We have carefully gone through the judgments of the  various High  Courts,  namely, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh,  Gujarat  and Calcutta,  cited at the Bar.  We received considerable  help from the seasonings contained in the said judgments.  As  we have   in  the  course  of  the  judgment  dealt  with   the conflicting reasons given by 10 Sup.  C. I./66-12. 392 the  High Courts, we do not think it necessary  to  consider each  of  the  four judgments in detail.   For  the  reasons mentioned  above we agree with the conclusion arrived at  by the  Bombay and Calcutta High Courts in preference to  those reached by the Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside  and the  petition  filed under Art. 226 of the  Constitution  is dismissed.   The appeals are allowed with costs one  hearing fee. Appeals allowed. 393