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PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER  OF INCOME-TAX, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,  HYDERABAD,

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V. JAGAN MOHAN RAO & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/07/1969

BENCH:

ACT:     Indian   Income-tax   Act,   1922,   s,   34   and    s. 10(2)(xv)--Decision   of   Privy  Council   settling   legal dispute--Whether  constitutes ’definite information’  within meaning  of  s. 34--Purchase of mill  by  assessee--Vendor’s sons  disputing  his right to sell--Assessee paying  sons  a consolidated  sum for release of their claims--Sum  so  paid whether   allowable   business expenditure  under  s.  10(2) (xv).

HEADNOTE:     The  assessee purchased a spinning mill in 1941  from  a vendor  claiming to be its sole proprietor. In a suit  filed by the vendor’s sons the trial court had held that the  suit property  including  the  aforesaid spinning  mill  was  the vendor’s   self-acquired   property.   When   the   assessee purchased  the  mill  an appeal against  the  trial  court’s judgment  was  pending  in the High Court  ’the  High  Court decided that the property was not the self-acquired property of the vendor but was coparcenary property in which the sons had two thirds interest.  The vendor filed an appeal  before the Privy Council. During its pendency the assessee  entered into  a  compromise  with  the vendor’s  sons  whereby  they agreed to release their two thirds interest in the mill  and its  profits for a sum of Rs. 1.15,000.  The compromise  was certified  by  the High Court.  In 1947  the  Privy  Council decided  that the property including the spinning  mill  was the self-acquired property of the vendor. On receipt of this decision  which  finally  determined   the   rights  of  the parties and assessee’s ownership of the mill, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under s. 34 of the Indian income-tax Act,  1922 for the assessment year 1944-45 and assessed  the income  from  the  mill  for  that  year  and  for  the  two subsequent  assessment years in the hands of  the  assessee. The  assessee’s  objection that the decision  of  the  Privy Council was not ’definite information’ within the meaning of s. 34 was rejected as also the assessee’s claim that the sum of  Rs. 1,15,000 paid to the vendor’s sons in  pursuance  of the  compromise should be set off as an expense against  the income  from  the  mill  for  the  year  in  question.   The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal upheld the Income-tax  Officer’s  order.  The High Court  in  reference held  that  the notice under s. 34 was valid  but  that  the payment of Rs. 1,15,000 was made partly  towards acquisition of  a capital asset and partly towards the discharge of  the claim  for  profits and the part apportionable  towards  the profits was allowable as revenue expenditure.  The  assessee as well as the Revenue appealed to this Court.     HELD:  (i)  In Maharaja Kumar Kamal  Singh’s  case  this

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Court  held that the word information s.  34(1)(b)  included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and so   would  cover  information  as  to   relevant   judicial decisions.  It was further held that even in a case where  a return  had  been submitted, if the Income-tax  Officer  had erroneously failed to tax  a part of the assessable  income, it  was  a  case when that part of the  income  had  escaped assessment. The decision of the Privy Council was  therefore held  to be information within the meaning of  s.  34(1)(b). The principle laid down in Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh’s case governed  the  present  case and it must be  held  that  the proceedings  initiated under s. 34 for the  assessment  year 1944-45 were legally valid. [732 G-733 B] 727     Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner  of   Income- tax, 35 I.T.R. 1, followed and applied.     Kamakhya Narain Singh’s case, 14 I.T.R. 6, referred to.     The contention that only two thirds of the income  could be  said to h,rye escaped assessment because  the  one-third share  of  the vendor could have been validly  assessed  the Income-tax  Officer  on  the  basis  of   the  High  Court’s judgment,   could   not  be  accepted.   When   once   valid proceedings are started under s. 34(1)(b) read with s. 22(2) the  previous  under-assessment is set aside and  the  whole assessment proceedings start afresh.  The Income-tax Officer then has not only the jurisdiction but the duty to levy  tax on  the  entire income that has escaped assessment  in  that year. [733 C-E]      It  is  well-established that where money  is  paid  to perfect  a title or as consideration ’for getting rid  of  a defect in title or a threat of litigation the payment  would be  a capital payment and not a revenue payment. Money  paid in consideration of the acquisition of a source of profit or income   is  capital  expenditure  both  on  principle   and authority. [733 F-G]     Atherton  v.  British Insulated awl Helsby  Cables  Ltd. [1926]  A.C. 205, 213 and Commissioner of Taxes  v.  Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. [1964] A.C. 948, referred to.     It was true that in the present case the High Court took into  consideration income from the mill in testing  whether the  offer  made by the purchaser of Rs.  1,15,000  for  the release  of the claim of the plaintiffs v, as a fair  offer. But that did not mean that the sons of the vendor were given as a result of the compromise a share in the profits of  the assessee.  It was clear from the circumstances of  the  case that  the  payment  was made by the  assessee  in  order  to perfect  his title to a capital asset, and no portion of  it could therefore could be set off against the profit. [735 C]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 893  to 892 and 1381 to 1386 of 1966.     Appeals  from the judgment and order dated  December  7, 1962  of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Referred  No. 24 of 1956.     D. Narsaraju, P. Ramrao, K.R. Chaudhuri and K.  Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 893 to. 898  of 1966)  and  the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 1281 to  1386  of 1966).     Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General, S.K. Aiyar  and  R.N. Sachthey,  for the respondent (in C.As. Nos. 893 to  898  of 1966)  and’  the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 1381  to  1386  of 1966).

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   The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Ramaswami, J.  The assessee  who  Is the  Kartha  of   a Hindu  Undivided Family was assessed in that status for  the relevant  assessment  years, 1944-45, 1945-46,  1946-47  not only  to  incometax  but also to  excess  profits  tax.   On February  1,  1941  he  purchased  from  Randhi  Appalaswamy (hereinafter  referred  to as the vendor)  a  spinning  mill known. as Sri Satyanarayana Spinning 728 Mills,  Rajahmundry for a sum of Rs. 54,731.   The  purchase was  made at a period when there was litigation between  the sons of the vendor and the vendor in respect of the spinning mill  and  other  properties.  The sons  had  filed  a  suit against  the  father,  the  vendor,  claiming  the  schedule properties including the mill as joint family properties and for  partition  of the same.  The vendor  claimed  that  the properties were his self-acquired properties.  The  District Judge,  Rajahmundry held that the properties were the  self- acquired properties of the vendor and dismissed the suit  of the plaintiffs.  Against the judgment of the District  Judge an appeal was filed in the Madras High Court, being A.S. No. 175  of 1938.  While the appeal was pending, on February  1, 1941  the  assessee purchased the mill from the  vendor  who purported  to sell the same as the sole owner. In  A.S.  No. 175  of 1938 the Madras High Court held that the  properties of the vendor were not his self-acquired properties but were joint  family properties in which the plaintiffs had  a  two thirds share.  Against this judgment the vendor preferred an appeal  to the Privy Council. While that appeal was  pending the   assessee  had  submitted  returns  for  the   relevant assessment  years.   However, before  the  assessments  were taken  up  the assessee entered into a compromise  with  the plaintiffs on September 7, 194S by virtue of which he got  a release  of the interest of the vendor’s sons on payment  of Rs. 1,15,000.  While the appeal was pending before the Privy Council  the  plaintiffs had applied to the High  Court  for recovery  of  their  share of the profits.  The  High  Court appointed  the  assessee as the Receiver  directing  him  to deposit  the  profits  in  the  High  Court.   The  assessee deposited  a sum of Rs. 1,09,613 for the year  1944-45,  Rs. 31,087 for the year 1945-46 and Rs. 4,775 for the year 1946- 47.  Under  the  compromise the  assessee  was  entitled  to withdraw  these  amounts on payment of  Rs.  1,15,000.   The Privy  Council decided the appeal on July 2, 1947  reversing the  order  of  the High Court and  restoring  that  of  the District  Judge  holding that Appalaswamy was  the  absolute owner  of  the mill and the sons had no   right,   title  or interest  therein.   On  receipt  of  the  Privy   Council’s decision which finally determined the rights of the  parties and  the ownership of the assessee in the mill, the  Income- tax Officer issued on March 2, 1948 a notice under s. 34  of the  Income-tax Act in respect of Rs. 1,09,613  received  by the assessee as lease income of the mill.  It was  contended for  the assessee (1 ) that the proceedings initiated  under s.  34  of  the Act for the  year  1944-45  assessment  were invalid  in law as there was no new information  leading  to the discovery that income had escaped assessment, (2’)  that in any event the assessee was entitled to set off the sum of Rs.  1,15,000  paid  to the sons of  Appalaswamy  under  the compromise  approved by the High Court for  releasing  their rights.  if any, in the mill against the  assessee’s  income from the mill. The 729 Income-tax  Officer rejected these contentions and   treated the  whole  amount of Rs. 1,15,000 as  paid  toward  capital

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expenditure in acquiring an asset.  The Appellate  Assistant Commissioner  rejected  the  appeal of  the  assessee.   The Tribunal  affirmed  the  order of  the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner.  It held in the first place that the  assessee had  not  disclosed the impugned source of income  from  the mill  in his original assessment, that the matter as to  the assessee’s ownership of the mill was sub-judice and that the decision  of the Privy Council constituted  information  not only  of law but also as to the factum of the  ownership  of the  Mill and the income therefrom.  The Tribunal  expressed the  view that the sum of Rs. 1,15,000 could not be  allowed to be set off against the assessee’s income from the mill as it  was an ex gratia payment to the sons of Appalaswamy  who had no right, title or interest in the mill and it was  paid in  order to perfect a supposed defective title and as  such was of capital nature.  Thereafter the Income-tax  Appellate Tribunal  stated a case to the High Court under s. 66(2)  of the  Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 on the following  questions of law:                    "R.  A.  NO.  779 which  relates  to  the               assessment year 1944-45:                     (1)  Whether  on the facts  and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, in respect of  the               assessment  year 1944-45, the assessment  made               on  the  assessee  in the status  of  a  Hindu               undivided family in respect of income received               by   him  as  Receiver  could   be   justified               notwithstanding  the provisions of section  41               of the Act ?                     (2)  Whether,  on the facts and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, the assessment  of               the  entire   income  of Rs. 1,09,613  in  the               hands of the assessee is valid in the face  of               the  compromise memo, dated 7-9-1945  approved               by the Court?                     (3)  Whether,  on the facts and  in  the               circumstances of the case, the assessee is not               entitled  to  set  off Rs. 1,15,000 being  the               amount paid to the minors for releasing  their               fights in the property from out of the  amount               received from the mill ?                     R.A. No. 780 which relates to assessment               year 1945 -46:                    (1)  Whether  on  the facts  and  in  the               circumstances of the case, the assessment made               under section 34 of the Act is valid in law ?                     (2)  Whether  on the facts  and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, in respect of  the               assessment year 1945-46, 730               the  assessment on the assessee in the  status               of a Hindu undivided family in respect of  the               income  received by him as Receiver  could  be               justified  notwithstanding the  provisions  of               Section 41 of the Act ?                      (3)  Whether, on the facts and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, the assessment  of               the entire  income  of Rs. 31,087 in the hands               of  the assessee is valid in the face  of  the               compromise  memo, dated 7-9-1945  approved  by               the Court ?                      (4)  Whether, on the facts and  in  the               circumstances of the case, the assessee is not               entitled  to  set  off Rs. 1,15,000 being  the               amount paid to the minors for releasing  their

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             rights in the property from out of the  amount               received from the mill ?                     R.A. No. 781 which relates to assessment               year 1946-47:                     (1)  Whether,  on the facts and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, in respect of  the               assessment year 1946-47 the assessment on  the               assessee  in the status of a  Hindu  undivided               family in respect of income received by him as               Receiver  could be justified,  notwithstanding               the provisions of section 41 of the Act ?                      (2)  Whether, on the facts and  in  the               circumstances  of the case, the assessment  of               the entire  income  of Rs. 4,775 in the  hands               of  the assessee is valid in the face  of  the               compromise  memo, dated 7-9-1945  approved  by               the Court ?                      (3)  Whether  on the facts and  in  the               circumstances of the case, the assessee is not               entitled  to  set  off Rs. 1,15,000 being  the               amount paid to the minors for releasing  their               right  in the property from out of the  amount               received from the Mill ?;’     The  Appellate Tribunal pointed out in the statement  of the  case  that  question  No. 1 in R.A.  No.  780  for  the assessment year 1945-46 pertained to the earlier  assessment year 1944-45 in R.A. No. 779 and also that question No. 2 in R.A. No. 780 and R.A. No. 779 for the assessment year  1945- 46  and the corresponding excess profits tax assessment  did not  arise  in  that  year  but  pertained  to  the  earlier assessment   year   1944-45  in  R.A.  No.   779   and   the corresponding excess profits tax assessment in R.A. No. 782.      The  High Court answered question Nos. 1 and 2 in  R.A. No.  779  and  question  No.  1  in  R.A.  No.  780  in  the affirmative. 731 The High Court held that re-assessment proceedings have been validly  initiated under s. 34 of the Act.  The  High  Court found  that the assessment on the assessee in the status  of Hindu Undivided Family in respect of income received by  him as  Receiver  was proper.  The High Court thought  that  the basis  of  the compromise in the Madras High  Court  entered into  between  the assessee and the minor sons of the vendor Appalaswamy  wherein the assessee paid Rs. 1,15,000  to  the minor  sons cannot be ignored. The High Court negatived  the contention   of the  Income-tax Department that the  sum  of Rs.  1,15,000  was paid -to cure a supposed  defect  in  the title   and  that  it  was  a  capital  payment.  Upon   the interpretation of the terms of the compromise the High Court took  the  view  that the amount of Rs.  1,15,000  was  paid partly  towards  acquisition  of capital  asset  and  partly towards the discharge of the claim towards profits and hence it  should be apportioned towards capital and income in  the proportion  of  90/85. C.As. Nos. 1381 to 1386 of  1966  are brought  by certificate from the judgment of the High  Court on  behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax and  C.A.  Nos. 893  to 898 of 1966 were brought by special leave  from  the same judgment to this Court on behalf of the assessee.     After  the Amending Act of 1939 and before the  Amending Act of 1948 Section 34 stood as follows:                   "(1)  If  in  consequence   of    definite               information which has come into his possession               the    Income-tax  Officer,   discovers   that               income, profits or gains chargeable to income-               tax  have escaped assessment in any  year,  or

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             have   been  under-assessed,  or   have   been               assessed  at too low a rate, or have been  the               subject of excessive relief under this Act the               Income-tax Officer may in any ease in which he               has  reason to believe that the  assessee  has               concealed  the  particulars of his  income  or               deliberately furnished inaccurate  particulars               thereof at any time within eight years, and in               any  other case at any time within four  years               of  the end of that year, serve on the  person               liable  to pay tax on such income  profits  or               gains  or  in  the case of a  company  on  the               principal officer thereof a notice  containing               all  or any of the requirements which  may  be               included in a notice under sub-section (2)  of               section  22, and may proceed to assess or  re-               assess  such income, profit or gains, and  the               provisions of this Act, shall. so far as  tony               be, apply accordingly as if the notice were  a               notice issued under that sub-section.               ..............................                     (2) No order of assessment under section               23  or  of assessment or  re-assessment  under               sub-section (1) of this 732               section shall be made after the expiry, in any               case  to which clause (c) of  sub-section  (1)               of   section  28 applies, of eight years,  and               in  any  other case, of  four years  from  the               end of the year, in which the income,  profits               or gains were first assessable. The  first  question  arising in this case  is  whether  the proceeding  under s. 34 is legally valid.  It was  contended by  Mr.  Narasaraju that the decision of the  Privy  Council could  not  be said to be definite  information  within  the meaning  of  the section.  It was said that  the  Income-tax Officer was fully aware of the circumstances of the case and the  assessee had placed all the relevant facts  before  him namely that under the High’ Court’s judgment the vendor  was only  entitled to one-third share of the income pending  the decision  of  the appeal before the Privy Council.   In  our opinion there is no justification for tiffs argument.  It is not  true to say that the assessee brought all the  relevant facts  before  the Income-tax Officer.  On the  Contrary  he deliberately suppressed the fact that there was a compromise between  himself  and  the plaintiffs  under  which  he  was entitled  to the whole of the income from the mill.  At  any rate  the  Privy  Council’s decision  which  determined  the rights  of  the parties irrespective of the  compromise  did constitute definite information within the meaning of s.  34 of  the  Income-tax  Act.  This view is  borne  out  by  the decision  of  this Court in Maharaja Kumar  Kamal  Singh  v. Commissioner of Income-tax. (1) In that case the  Income-tax Officer  had,  following the decision of the High  Court  in Kamakhya  Narain  Singh’s  case("’)  omitted  to  bring   to assessment  for  the  year 1945-46 the  sum  of  Rs.  93,604 representing interest on arrears of rent due to the assessee in  respect  of  agricultural land on the  ground  that  the amount  was  agricultural  income.  Subsequently  the  Privy Council, on appeal from that decision held that interest  on arrears of rent payable in respect of agricultural land  was not  agricultural income. As a result of this  decision  the Income-tax Officer initiated re-assessment proceedings under s. 34(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act and brought the amount  of Rs.  93,604 to tax.  In these circumstances it was  held  by

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this Court firstly that the word information in s.  34(1)(b) included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and so would cover information as to relevant  judicial decisions,  secondly  that  ’escape’ in  s.  34(1)  was  not confined to cases where no return had been submitted by  the assessee  or  where income had not been  assessed  owing  to inadvertence  or oversight or other lacuna  attributable  to the  assessing  authorities.   But even in a  case  where  a return  had  been (1) 35 I.T.R. 1.     (2) 14 I.T.R. 6. 733 submitted, if the Income-tax Officer had erroneously  failed to tax a part of the assessable income, it was a case  where that  part  of  the  income  had  escaped  assessment.   The decision  of  the Privy Council, therefore, was held  to  be information  within  the meaning of s. 34( 1 ) (b)  and  the proceedings  for re-assessment were validly  initiated.   In our  opinion  the  principle of this  decision  governs  the present  case  and  it must be  held  that  the  proceedings initiated  under s. 34 for the assessment  year  1944-45were legally  valid.   It was stated on behalf of  the  appellant that   in  any  case  the  income-tax  Officer  could   have legitimately  assessed one-third share of the  income  which was  due  to the assessee according to the judgment  of  the Madras High Court and there was escape only to the extent of two-third share of the income.  This argument is not of much avail  to the appellant because once proceedings under  s.34 are  taken to be validly initiated with regard to  two-third share  of  the income, the jurisdiction  of  the  Income-tax Officer  cannot  be  confined only to that  portion  of  the income. Section 34 in terms states that once the  Income-tax Officer  decides  to reopen the assessment he  could  do  so within  the  period  prescribed’  by serving on  the  person liable  to  pay tax a notice containing all or  any  of  the requirements  which  may be included in a  notice  under  s. 22(2)  and may proceed to assess or re-assess  such  income, profits  or  gains.  It is, therefore, manifest  that   once assessment is reopened by issuing a notice under sub-s.  (2) of s. 22 the previous under-assessment is set aside. and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh.  When once  valid proceedings  are  started under s. 34(1)(b)  the  Income-tax Officer had not only the jurisdiction but it was his duty to levy  tax on the entire income that had  escaped  assessment during that year.     The second question involved in this case is whether the High  Court  was right in holding that any  portion  of  the amount of Rs. 1,15,000 was liable to be treated as  business expenditure.   It  is well established that where  money  is paid to perfect a title or as consideration for getting  rid of  a  defect  in the title or a threat  of  litigation  the payment  would be capital payment and not revenue   payment. What  is essential to be seen is whether the amount  of  Rs. 1,15,000  was  paid for bringing into existence a  right  or asset  of  an enduring nature. In other words if  the  asset which is acquired is in its character a capital asset,  then any  sum paid to acquire it must surely be  capital  outlay. Money  paid in consideration of the acquisition of a  source of  profit  or’  income  is  capital  expenditure  both   on principle  and authority.  In Atherton v. British  Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd.(1) Viscount Cave said:                  "But where an expenditure is made, not only               once for all, but with a view to bringing into               existence an (1) [1926] A.C. 205, 213. 734

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             asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit               of  a trade, I think that there is  very  good               reason    (in   the   absence    of    special               circumstances    leading   to   an    opposite               conclusion)  for treating such an  expenditure               as properly attributable not to revenue but to               capital." In  Commissioner of Taxes v.  Nchanga  Consolidated   Copper Mines Ltd.(1) Lord Radcliffe observed at p. 960:                  "Courts  have  stressed the  importance  of               observing  a demarcation between the  cost  of               creating, acquiring or enlarging the permanent               (which  does not mean perpetual) structure  of               which the income is to be the produce or fruit               and the cost of earning that income itself  or               performing   the  income-earning   operations.               Probably  this  is as illuminating a  line  of               distinction as the law by itself is likely  to               achieve."     It is, however, contended on behalf of the assessee that the  amount  of  Rs.  1,15,000  was  paid  partly  for   the acquisition  of  capital asset and partly to  discharge  the claim   towards  profits  and  hence  there  should  be   an apportionment of ,’.he amount.  It is not possible to accept this  contention.   It appears from the order  of  the  High Court  that the value of the mill was fixed at Rs.  1,15,000 after  taking into consideration the fact that the mill  was built  on a leasehold premises.  The value of the  machinery was  fixed  at Rs. 1,36,000 and the leasehold  interest  was fixed  at Rs. 14,000. On this basis the share of the  minors was  taken to be Rs. 90,000. In respect of the  profits  the claim  of  the plaintiffs was taken to be Rs.  85,000.   The total claim was therefore Rs. 1,75,000 so that the offer  of Rs. 1,15,000 for the release of the claim of the  plaintiffs in  the  mill  was  held  to  be  .fair.   The  High  Court. therefore, certified the compromise to be for the benefit of the  minor  plaintiffs.  In the course of its  order,  dated September 7, 1945 the High Court observed:                    "There   are,  however,  numerous   risks               which  the continuance of the litigation would               necessarily  involve. The Privy Council  might               hold  that  the  null  was  the   selfacquired               property  of  the father, in  which  case  the               plaintiffs would get nothing and would incur a               liability  for costs.  It might also  be  held               that,  though  the  property  was  the  family               property,  the  father  was  entitled  as  the               natural  guardian  to sell  the  interests  of               minor  sons in discharge of a  binding  family               obligation.  There is the further  possibility               that  by  the  time the  litigation  ends  the               property will have deteriorated and its  value               will have (1) [1964] A.C. 943. 735               been materially reduced. by the termination of               the lease of the land.                    Taking   all  these  contingencies   into               consideration we are of opinion that the offer               made by the purchaser of Rs. 1,15,000 for  the               release of the claim, if any, of the two  sons               in  the mill sold to him by their father is  a               fair  offer, the acceptance of which would  be               beneficial to the minor second plaintiff." It  is true that the High Court took into consideration  the

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income  from the mill in testing whether the offer  made  by the  purchaser of Rs. 1,15,000 for the release of the  Claim of the plaintiffs was a fair offer.  But that does not  mean that  the sons of Appalaswamy were given as a result of  the compromise  a share in the profits of the assessee.   It  is clear  from the circumstances of this case that the  payment of Rs. 1,15,000 was made by the assessee in order to perfect his title to capital asset and the assessee is not  entitled to set off any portion of the amount as attributable to  the lease money.  It was a lump sum payment for acquisition of a capital asset and the claim of the plaintiffs for the  lease money  from the property was merely ancillary or  incidental to the claim to the capital asset.  In our opinion the  High Court  was  in error in holding that the  amount  should  be apportioned  between capital and income.  In the  result  so far  as questions 3 and 4 in R.A. 779, questions 1 and 2  in R.A. 780 and questions 2 and 3 in R.A. 781 are concerned the answer  is that the entire amount of Rs. 1,15,000 should  be treated  as  capital   payment  and   the  assessee  is  not entiled to exclude from the income sought to be assessed  in his hands any portion of that amount.     We  accordingly allow C.A. Nos. 1381 to 1386 of 1966  to the  extent indicated above.  C.A. Nos. 893 to 898  of  1966 are dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs in either of two sets of appeals. G.C.                C.A. Nos. 1381 to 1386/66 allowed.                     C.A. Nos. 893 to 898/66 dismissed. Sup CI/69--3 736