27 November 2008
Supreme Court
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COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE,BANGALORE Vs SRIKUMAR AGENCIES ETC. ETC.

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,P. SATHASIVAM,AFTAB ALAM, ,
Case number: C.A. No.-004872-004892 / 2000
Diary number: 6704 / 2000
Advocates: B. KRISHNA PRASAD Vs M. P. DEVANATH


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4872-4892 OF 2000

Commnr. Of Central Excise, Bangalore …Appellant

Versus

Srikumar Agencies etc.etc. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

1. These  appeals were placed before a three-Judge Bench because of

reference made by a Division Bench with the following order:

“The  point  involved  in  this  batch  of  appeals  is whether the printing on the package is merely incidental or  primary.  On  this  point  we  find  that  there  are  two

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streams of judgments of this Court. Therefore, keeping in view the conflict  of  opinion,  on  the point  involved in Rollatrainers  Ltd.  and  Anr.  v.  Union  of  India  & Ors. (1994 Suppl. (3) SCC 293), Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v.  Paper Print & Products Co. (1997 (10) SCC 564)  and Metagraphs  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  Collector  of  Central Excise,  Bombay  (1997  (1)  SCC  262),  we  deem  it appropriate that these cases be placed for hearing before a larger Bench.

Registry  is  directed  to  place  the  matter  before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.”   

2. When the appeals  were  taken up for  hearing,  Mr.  G.E. Vahanvati,

learned Solicitor  General  pointed out  that  the Customs, Excise  and Gold

(Control)  Appellate  Tribunal,  Chennai   (in  short  ‘CEGAT’)  disposed  of

several appeals without detailed analysis of the factual position involved.  It

merely referred to some judgments and submissions of learned counsel for

the assessees  who are  present  respondents  to  hold  that  the assessees  are

entitled to relief. The conclusions are practically non-reasoned and abrupt

conclusions were arrived at to hold that printing on media was not merely

incidental to its primary use but in fact clearly show the nature of goods

contained therein. It is pointed out that five categories were involved.  In the

case  of  respondents  –Srikumar agencies  the  article  involved was  Printed

Gay Matter and Printed Agarbathi, in the case of  M/s Faxwell Printers the

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article  involved  was  Printed  Gay Wrappers,  in  the  case  of  M/s  Rajhans

Enterprises   the article  involved was Printed Labels,  in  the  case of  Sree

Vijay Industries, it was Printed Agarbathi Labels and in the case of Regency

Printers, it was Printed Labels. The articles were contextually different. It

was  also  submitted  that  without  detailed  anaylsis  of  the  factual  position

mere reliance on the decisions  was not the proper way to dispose of the

appeals. It is also pointed out that the view expressed by CEGAT even on

facts  was contrary to the ratio laid  down by this  Court in  I.T.C. Ltd. v.

Collector of Central Excise, Madras (JT 1998 (8) SC 527).

3. In response, learned counsel for the respondents-assessees submitted

that  the CEGAT is  the last  finding authority.  From its  varied experience

having dealt with large number of cases, even by visual inspection of the

materials it was in a position to record a conclusion. It is also submitted that

the factual scenario is not different in these cases vis-a-vis those assessees

whose  cases  were  the  subject  matter  of  the  decisions  which  have  been

referred to by CEGAT.   

4. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to

how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on

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which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as

Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of

their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they

appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as

statutes.  To  interpret  words,  phrases  and  provisions  of  a  statute,  it  may

become necessary for  judges  to  embark  into  lengthy discussions  but  the

discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes,

they  do  not  interpret  judgments.  They  interpret  words  of  statutes;  their

words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In  London Graving Dock Co.

Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

“The  matter  cannot,  of  course,  be  settled  merely  by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of  interpretation  appropriate  thereto.  This  is  not  to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.”

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid

said,  “Lord  Atkin’s  speech.....is  not  to  be  treated  as  if  it  was  a  statute

definition It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J in

(1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a

reserved judgment of  Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And,

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in  Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris

said:

“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment,  and  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.”

5. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a

world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by

blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.  

The  following  words  of  Lord  Denning  in  the  matter  of  applying

precedents have become locus classicus:

“Each  case  depends  on  its  own  facts  and  a  close similarity between one case and another is not enough because  even  a  single  significant  detail  may alter  the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against  the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.”

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“Precedent  should  be  followed  only  so  far  as  it marks  the  path  of  justice,  but  you  must  cut  the  dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the  path  to  justice  clear  of  obstructions  which  could impede it.”   

6. Since the factual position has not been analysed in detail, disposal of

appeals by mere reference to decisions, was not the proper way to deal with

the  appeals.   The  CEGAT also  does  not  appear  to  have  dealt  with  the

relevance and applicability of ITC’s case (supra) on which strong reliance

has been placed by learned Solicitor General.  The CEGAT ought to have

examined the cases individually and the articles involved. By clubbing all

the cases together and without analyzing the special features of each case

disposing  of  the  appeals  in  the  manner  done  was  not  proper.  In  the

circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment in each case and remit

the matter to CEGAT presently known as Customs, Excise &  Service Tax

Appellate Tribunal ( in short ‘CESTAT’)  to be dealt with by the appropriate

Bench.   In  view  of  the  aforesaid  order  there  is  no  need  to  answer  the

reference made.  

7. Since the matters are pending since long, we request the  

CESTAT to dispose of the appeals as early as possible preferably by the end

of February, 2009.  

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8. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.  

……………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………..J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

………………………….J. (AFTAB ALAM)

New Delhi, November 27, 2008  

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