http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: COMMERClAL AVIATION & TRAVEL COMPANY & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VIMAL PANNALAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/07/1988

BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1636            1988 SCR  Supl. (1) 431  1988 SCC  (3) 423        JT 1988 (3)    41  1988 SCALE  (2)1

ACT:      CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908: order Vll Rule (11b)-Plaint to be  rejected where  relief  claimed  undervalued-Duty  of Court  to   come  to   a  finding  that  relief  claimed  is undervalued.      Court  Fees   Act  1870:  Section  7(iv)  (f)-Suit  for dissolution of  partnership and  accounts-Valuation of suit- Suit valued  for jurisdiction  at Rs.25  lakhs and at Rs.500 for court  fee-Whether suit  undervalued for  the purpose of court fee.      Suits Valuation  Act 1887/Rules  Framed by  Punjab High Court as Applicable to Delhi. -

HEADNOTE:      The respondent plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court against  the   appellants  inter  alia  for  dissolution  of partnership and  for accounts. The plaintiff valued the suit for the  purpose of  jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and for the purpose of court fee at Rs.500.      The appellants raised a preliminary objection as to the valuation of  the suit contending that the relief sought for in the  suit had  been grossly  undervalued  and  the  Court should reject  the plaint under order VII, Rule 11(b), Civil Procedure Code.      The learned  Single  Judge  overruled  the  preliminary objection and  held that  the suit  was not undervalued. The Division Bench  in dismissing  the appeal;  followed a  Full Bench decision  of  the  same  High  Court  wherein  it  was observed that  paragraph (iv) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act gave  the right  to the  plaintiff in  any of  the suits mentioned in  the clauses  of that  paragraph to  place  any value that  he liked  on  the  relief  he  sought,  subject, however, to  any rule  made under  section 9  of  the  Suits Valuation Act,  and the Court had no power to interfere with the plaintiff’s valuation.      Before this  Court, the appellant contended (1) that in a suit  for accounts  the plaintiff could not value the suit most arbitrarily  according to  her whims  and (2)  that  an objective standard or positive material 432 appeared on  the face of the plaint and the valuation of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

relief ignoring  such objective standard was demonstratively arbitrary.      Dismissing the appeal it was, ^      HELD: (1)  The suits  which are mentioned under section 7(iv) are  of such  nature that  it is difficult to lay down any standard  of valuation.  Indeed, the Legislature has not laid down  any standard  of valuation in the Court Fees Act. [435B-C]      (2) It  is apparent  from Rule 4(i) of the Rules framed by the  Punjab High  Court under  section  9  of  the  Suits Valuation Act,  which are  applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi,  that valuation  for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction is  not the  same. Under these Rules, the value of suit  for accounts for purposes of court fee will have to be determined by the plaintiff. [434G-H]      (3) It  is manifestly clear from the provision of order VII, Rule 11 (b), that a Court has to come to a finding that the relief  claimed has  been undervalued  which necessarily means that  the Court  is able  to decide and specify proper and correct  valuation of  the relief.  But ordinarily it is not possible  for  the  Court  at  a  preliminary  stage  to determine the  value of  the relief  in a  suit for accounts simpliciter and  the Court  has no other alternative than to accept plaintiff‘s valuation tentatively. [435G-H; 436B-C]      (4) Where there are objective standard of valuation or, in other  words, the  plaintiff or  the Court can reasonably value the  relief correctly on certain definite and positive materials, the  plaintiff will  not be  permitted to  put an arbitrary  valuation  dehors  such  objective  standards  or materials. [439C-D]      (5)  The   plaintiff  cannot   whimsically   choose   a ridiculous figure  for filling  the  suit  where  there  are positive materials  and/or objective  standards of valuation of the  relief appearing  on the  face of  the plaint. These materials or  objective standards will also enable the Court to determine  the valuation  for the  purpose of  Order VlI, Rule 11(b), of the Code of Civil Procedure.[441C-D]      (6) The  valuation of  the relief  in the instant case, for the  rendition of accounts under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court  Fees   Act.  is   neither  unreasonable   nor  it  is demonstratively arbitrary.[442E] 433      Smt. Sheila  Devi &  Ors. v.  Shri Kishan  Lal Kalra  & Ors., ILR 1974 Delhi 491; S. Rm. Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S.  Rm. Ar.  Rm. Ramanathan  Chettiar, 119581  SCR  1024; Urmilabala Biswas  v. Binapani  Biswas, AIR  1938  Cal  161; Kishori Lal  Marwari v.  Kumar Chandra  Narain Deo, AIR 1939 Patna 572;  Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari, AIR   1940    Cal   482;   Meenakshisundaram   Chettiar   v. Venkatachalam Chettiar,[1979]  3 SCR  385; Tara  Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha  Krishna Maharaj,  [1987] 4  SCC;  Abdul  Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid, JT (1988) 2 SC 69 and Atma Ram Charan Das v.  Bisheshar Nath  Dina Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 689 referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2137 of 1988.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  14.3.1986  of  the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (O.S.) No. 65 of 1986.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, S.K.  Mehta, P.H.  Parekh and M.K.S. Menon for the Appellants.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

    Rajinder Sachar,  K.C. Dua  and  G.S.  Sistan  for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DUTT,  J.  Special  leave  is  granted.  Heard  learned Counsel for the parties.      This appeal is at the instance of the defendants and is directed against  the judgment  of the Division Bench of the Delhi High  Court whereby  the Division  Bench affirmed  the judgment of  a learned  Single Judge of that Court rejecting the  contention   of  the   appellants  that  the  suit  was undervalued by  the plaintiff-respondent  and,  accordingly, the plaint should be rejected under clause (b) of Rule 11 of order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.      The respondent,  who is the plaintiff, has filed a suit against the  appellants,  inter  alia,  for  dissolution  of partnership and  for accounts.  The suit has been valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and at Rs.500 for the purpose of court fee.      The  appellants   filed  an   application   wherein   a preliminary objection  was raised as to the valuation of the suit. It was contended by them that the relief sought for in the suit had been grossly undervalued 434 and the Court should reject the plaint under order VII, Rule 11(b) of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure. The  learned Single Judge of  the High  Court  overruled  the  said  preliminary objection and  held that  the suit  was not  undervalued. On appeal by the appellants, a Division Bench of the High Court took the  same view as that of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench  placed reliance  upon and  followed  a  Full Bench decision  of the same High Court in Smt. Sheila Devi & Ors. v.  Shri Kishan  Lal Kalra  & Ors.,  ILR 1974 Delhi 491 where it  has been observed, inter alia, that paragraph (iv) of section  7 of  the Court  Fees Act  gives a  right to the plaintiff in  any of  the suits  mentioned in the clauses of that paragraph  to place  any value  that he  likes  on  the relief he  seeks, subject,  however, to  any rule made under section 9  of the  Suits Valuation  Act and the Court has no power  to  interfere  with  the  plaintiffs  valuation.  The Division Bench  felt itself  bound by  the said  Full  Bench decision and,  accordingly, it  dismissed the  appeal of the appellants. Hence this appeal.      At the  outset, it  may be  mentioned that in regard to suits for  accounts, the  Punjab High Court has framed rules under section  9 of the Suits Valuation Act fixing court fee and jurisdictional  value of  a suit for accounts. Rule 4 of the Rules  framed by  the  Punjab  High  Court  provides  as follows:           "4(i) Suits  in which  the plaintiff in the plaint           seeks to  recover the amount which may be found to           the plaintiff  on taking unsettled account between           him and defendant;                (ii). suits  of either of the kinds described           in  order  XX,  Rule  13  of  the  Code  of  Civil           Procedure:           Value for  the purpose  of court  fee ..  as deter           mined by the Court Fees Act, 1870.           value for  the purposes  of jurisdiction  for  the           purpose of  Suits  Valuation  Act,  1887  and  the           Punjab Courts Act, 1918 as valued by the plaintiff           in the  plaint subject  to  determination  by  the           court at any stage of the trial."      It is  not disputed  that the above rules framed by the Punjab High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act are applicable  to the  Union  Territory  of  Delhi.  It  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

apparent from  Rule 4 extracted above that valuation for the purposes of  court fee  and jurisdiction  is not  the  same. Indeed, in the instant case, the respondent has valued 435 the suit  at Rs.25  lakhs for  the purpose  of jurisdiction. That valuation  has not  been challenged  by  the  appellant either in  the  High  Court  or  in  this  Court.  The  only challenge that  has  been  made  by  the  appellant  is  the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee.      So far as suits coming under section 7(iv) of the Court Fees  Act  are  concerned,  the  Legislature  has  left  the question of  valuation of the relief sought in the plaint or memorandum  of  appeal  to  the  plaintiff.  The  reason  is obvious. The  suits which  are mentioned under section 7(iv) are of  such nature  that it  is difficult  to lay  down any standard of  valuation. Indeed, the Legislature has not laid down any  standard of valuation in the Court Fees Act. Under Section 9  of the  Suits Valuation  Act, the High Court may, with the  previous sanction  of the  State Government, frame rules for  the valuation  of suits  referred to  in  section 7(iv) of  the Court fees Act. Although the Punjab High Court has framed  rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act which are  applicable to  the Union Territory of Delhi, such rules do  not lay down any standard of valuation with regard to suits  coming under  section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. It has  already been  noticed that  under Rule  4(i) of  the Punjab High  Court Rules, the value of suit for accounts for purposes of  court fee  will be  as determined  by the Court Fees Act,  which means that the valuation of the relief will have to  be made  by the plaintiff under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act.      In a  suit for accounts it is almost impossible for the plaintiff to  value the  relief correctly.  So long  as  the account is  not taken, the plaintiff cannot say what amount, if at all, would be found due to him on such accounting. The plaintiff may think that a huge amount would be found due to him, but upon actual accounting it may be found that nothing is due  to the  plaintiff. A suit for accounts is filed with the fond  hope that on accounting a substantial amount would be found  due to  the plaintiff.  But the  relief cannot  be valued on such hope, surmise or conjecture.      In this  connection, we  may refer  to the provision of order VII,  Rule II(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, inter  alia, that  the plaint  shall  be  rejected where the  relief claimed  is undervalued and the plaintiff, on being  required by  the Court  to correct  the  valuation within a  time to  be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. It is manifestly  clear from  the provision  of order VII, Rule II(b) that  a Court has to come to a finding that the relief claimed has  been undervalued,  which necessarily means that the Court  is able  to decide and specify proper and correct valuation of the relief and, after determination of 436 the correct  value of  the relief, requires the plaintiff to correct his  valuation within  a time  to be  fixed  by  the Court. If  the plaintiff  does  not  correct  the  valuation within  the  time  allowed,  the  plaint  is  liable  to  be rejected. The  question is  whether in  a suit  for accounts simpliciter, the  Court can  come to  a finding  as  to  the proper and  correct value  of the  relief  until  the  final determination is  made. In our opinion, ordinarily it is not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determining the value  of the relief in a suit for accounts simpliciter. If the  Court is  itself unable  to  say  what  the  correct valuation of  the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

to correct  the valuation that has been made by him. Indeed, in a suit for accounts it is also difficult for the Court to come to  a  finding  even  as  to  the  approximate  correct valuation of  the relief.  In such  a case, the Court has no other  alternative  than  to  accept  plaintiff’s  valuation tentatively.      There has  been a divergence of judicial opinion on the question as  to whether the plaintiff in a suit for accounts is entitled  to put  any  valuation  he  likes.  It  is  not necessary to refer to the decisions of different High Courts on the  point, and  suffice it  to say  that  they  are  not uniform, some holding that the plaintiff is free to give his own valuation  and others  holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to  give an  arbitrary valuation without having any link or connection with the relief in question.      In this  connection, we may refer to a Five-Judge Bench decision of  this Court in S.Rm. Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S.  Rm. Ar.  Rm. Ramanathan  Chettiar,  [1958]  SCR  1024 Gajendragadkar,  J.  speaking  for  the  Court  observed  as follows:-           "If the  scheme laid  down for  the computation of           fees payable  in suits covered by the several sub-           sections of  s. 7 is considered, it would be clear           that in  respect of  suits  falling  under  sub-s.           (iv), a  departure has  been made  and liberty has           been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for           the purposes  of court fees. The theoretical basis           of ’this  provision appears to be that in cases in           which the  plaintiff is  given the option to value           his claim,  it is  really difficult  to value  the           claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for           instance  the   claim  for   partition  where  the           plaintiff seeks  to enforce  his right to share in           any property  on the  ground that  is joint family           property. The  basis of  the  claim  is  that  the           property in respect of which a share is claimed is           joint family  property.  In  other  words,  it  is           property in which the 437           plaintiff  has   an  undivided   share.  What  the           plaintiff purports  to do  by making  a claim  for           partition is  to ask the court to give him certain           specified properties  separately and absolutely on           his own  account for  his share  in  lieu  of  his           undivided share  in the  whole  property.  Now  it           would  be   clear  that   the  conversion  of  the           plaintiff’s alleged  undivided share  in the joint           family property  into his separate share cannot be           easily  valued   in  terms   of  rupees  with  any           precision or definiteness. That is why legislature           has left  it to  the option  of the  plaintiff  to           value his  claim for the payment of court fees. It           really  means  that  in  suits  falling  under  s.           7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the           value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to           be accepted  by the  court in  computing the court           fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the           circumstances of  this case  it is  unnecessary to           consider whether,  under the  provisions  of  this           section, the  plaintiff has been given an absolute           right or option to place any valuation whatever on           his relief. "      In the  above decision,  this Court  took the view that the conversion  of the  plaintiff’s undivided  share in  the joint family  property into  his separate  share  cannot  be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

easily valued  in terms  of rupees  with  any  precision  or definiteness. It  is true  that the  Court did  not consider whether the  plaintiff had  been given  an absolute right or option to  place any  valuation whatever on his relief under the provision  of section  7(iv) of  the Court Fees Act, but the difficulty that would be felt by the Court in exercising its power  under order  VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure is  that if  it is unable to determine the correct value of  the relief,  it cannot  direct  the  plaintiff  to correct the  valuation. Order  VII, Rule  11(b) contemplates correct valuation  and not approximate correct valuation and such correct valuation of the relief has to be determined by the  Court.  If  the  Court  cannot  determine  the  correct valuation of  the relief  claimed,  it  cannot  require  the plaintiff to  correct the valuation and, consequently, order VII, Rule 11(b) will not be applicable.      But, there  may be  cases  under  section  7(iv)  where certain positive objective standard may be available for the purpose of  determination of the valuation of the relief. If there be  materials or objective standards for the valuation of the  relief, and  yet the  plaintiff ignores the same and puts an  arbitrary valuation,  the Court, in our opinion, is entitled to  interfere under  order VII,  Rule 11(b)  of the Code of Civil Procedure. for the Court will be in a Position to determine the correct 438 valuation with  reference  to  the  objective  standards  or materials available  to it. In Urmilabala Biswas v. Binapani Biswas &  ors., AIR  1938 Cal  161 a suit was instituted for declaration of  title to Provident Fund money amounting to a definite sum  with a  prayer for  injunction restraining the defendant from  withdrawing the said money. It was held that there was  no real  distinction between the right to recover money and  the right  to that  money itself,  and  that  the relief should  have been valued at the Provident Fund amount to which  title was  claimed  by  the  Plaintiff.  Thus,  it appears that  although in  that case  the suit was one under section 7(iv)(c)  of  the  Court  Fees  Act,  there  was  an objective standard  which would enable the plaintiff and the Court too to value the relief correctly and, in such a case, the Court  would be  competent to  direct the  plaintiff  to value the relief accordingly.      In Kishori  Lal Marwari v. Kumar Chandra Narain Deo and another, AIR  1939 Patna  572 a  question arose  as  to  the valuation of  a suit  for injunction  restraining a  decree- holder from  executing his  decree on  the ground  that  the decree was  collusive and  obtained by fraud and, therefore, void and  incapable of  execution. It  was held by the Patna High Court  that the plaintiff must value his suit according to the amount of decree and must pay ad valorem court fee on such amount.  In  this  case  also,  there  was  a  positive objective standard for the valuation of the suit.      We may  now refer  to a  decision of  the Calcutta High Court in  Nalini Nath  Mallik Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari & Ors., AIR  1940  Cal  482.  But,  before  we  refer  to  the decision, we  may point out that by the Bengal Amendment Act VII of  1935, a  new section  8-C has  been inserted  in the Court Fees Act. Section 8-C provides that if the Court is of opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued, it  may  revise  the  valuation  and  determine  the correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it thinks fit for such  purpose.  In  Nalini  Nath  Mallik  Thakur’s  case (supra), it  has been  observed that although a satisfactory valuation may  not be  possible in the majority of the cases falling under  section 7(iv), when once the Court has formed

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

the opinion  that the  plaintiff’s  estimate  is  wrong,  it becomes the  duty of  the Court  to estimate  a correct  and reasonable valuation of the relief claimed and it is for the Court to  decide on  the  merits  of  each  particular  case whether the  provisions of section 8-C should be invoked for the purpose  of revising the plaintiff’s valuation. Further, it  has   been  observed  that  if  the  relief  claimed  is impossible to  value, the  Court is,  of course,  not  in  a position to say that such relief has been wrongly valued and there is consequently no scope for the operation of section 439 8-C, but in a suit where it is sought to set aside a decree, such valuation,  although difficult, is not impossible. In a suit to  set aside  a decree  prima facie  the value  of the relief claimed  by the  plaintiff would  be the value of the decree and  the onus  would clearly  lie on him to show that the relief  should be valued at some smaller amount. It thus follows from  the above decision that if the Court is of the opinion that  the plaintiff’s  estimate is wrong, it becomes the duty  of the  Court to estimate a correct and reasonable value of  the suit.  If, however,  the Court  is  not  in  a position to  decide the correct value of the suit, it has to accept the  value that  has been  put the  plaintiff on  the relief claimed. In Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur’s case (supra), there was  an objective  standard of  valuation, namely, the decree which was souyht to be set aside.      Thus, where  there are objective standards of valuation or,  in   other  words,  the  plaintiff  or  the  Court  can reasonably value  the relief  correctly on  certain definite and positive  materials, the plaintiff will not be permitted to  put   an  arbitrary   valuation  dehors  such  objective standards or materials.      Mr. Sorabjee,  learned Counsel  appearing on  behalf of the appellants,  has strenuously  urged that, in the instant case, the  respondent has  valued the  suit most arbitrarily according to  her whims.  It is  submitted by  him that in a suit for  accounts the  plaintiff cannot  put  an  arbitrary valuation on  the relief  claimed by  him. Much reliance has been placed  by him  on a  few decisions of this Court which will be referred to presently.      In   Meenaakshisundaram   Chettiar   v.   Venkatachalam Chettiar, [1979]  3 SCR  385 this  Court made  the following observation:           "The plaintiff  is required to state the amount at           which he  values the  relief sought.  In suits for           accounts it  is not  possible for the plaintiff to           estimate correctly  the amount  which  he  may  be           entitled to  for, as in the present case, when the           plaintiff  asks   for  accounting   regarding  the           management by  a power of attorney agent, he might           not know  the state  of affairs of the defendant’s           management and  the amount  to which  he would  be           entitled to  on accounting.  But it  is  necessary           that the  amount at  which he  values  the  relief           sought for should be a reasonable estimate."      That observation  has been  made  by  this  Court  with reference to 440 the special  provision, namely,  section 35(1)  of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act XIV of 1955. Section 35(1) provides  that in  a suit  for accounts,  fee shall be computed on  the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint. Section 35(1)  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Court  Fees  and  Suits Valuation Act  is different  from section  7(iv)(f)  of  the Court Fees  Act. While under section 7(iv), the court fee is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

payable according  to the  amount at which the relief sought is valued  in the  plaint or  memorandum  of  appeal,  under section 35(1), the court fee shall be computed on the amount sued for  as estimated  in the plaint. In Meenakshisundram’s case (supra)  the plaintiff had given a detailed estimate in the plaint  and this  Court was  satisfied that the estimate was quite adequate and reasonable.      In Tara  Devi v.  Sri  Thakur  Radha  Krishna  Maharaj, [1987] 4  SCC 69 it has been laid down by this Court that in a suit  for declaration  with consequential  relief  falling under section  7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is free  to make  his own estimation of the relief sought in the plaint and such valuation both for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction  has to  be ordinarily accepted. Further it has been  observed that it is only in cases where it appears to  the   Court  on   a  consideration   of  the  facts  and circumstances of  the case  that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable  and   the  plaint   has  been  demonstratively undervalued, the  Court can  examine the  valuation and  can revise the  same. In that case, the plaintiff had valued the lease-hold interest  on the  basis  of  the  rent  and  such valuation was  held to be reasonable and not demonstratively arbitrary.      In making  the above observation, this Court has placed reliance upon  its earlier  decision  in  Meenakshisundram’s case (supra)  which, as  noticed above,  related to  section 35(1) of  the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. But one  significant fact  that is to be noticed in the case is that  there is  an objective  standard of valuation, that is,  the   rent  of  the  lease-hold  interest.  It  may  be reiterated that  when there  is  an  objective  standard  of valuation, to  put a  valuation on  the relief ignoring such objective standard, might be a demonstratively arbitrary and unreasonable valuation  and the  Court would  be entitled to interfere in the matter.      Another decision  of this  Court on which much reliance has been placed by the appellants is the case of Abdul Hamid Shamsi v.  Abdul Majid & ors, JT 1988 (2) SC 69. It was also a suit  for accounts  and came under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act. It has been observed as follows:                            VINEET 441           "It is  true that  in  a  suit  for  accounts  the           correct amount  payable by  one party to the other           can be  ascertained only  when  the  accounts  are           examined  and  it  is  not  possible  to  give  an           accurate valuation  of the  claim at the inception           of the  suit. The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed           to give  his own  tentative valuation.  Ordinarily           the Court shall not examine the correctness of the           valuation chose,  but  the  plaintiff  cannot  act           arbitrarily in this matter. If a plaintiff chooses           whimsically a  ridiculous figure  it is tantamount           to not  exercising his  right in  this regard.  In           such a  case it  is not only open to the Court but           its duty  to reject such a valuation. The cases of           some  of  the  High  Courts  which  have  taken  a           different view  must be  held  to  be  incorrectly           decided."      We are  also of  the view  that  the  plaintiff  cannot whimsically choose  a ridiculous  figure for filing the suit most arbitrarily  where there  are positive materials and/or objective standards  of valuation of the relief appearing on the  face  of  the  plaint.  These  materials  or  objective standards will  also  enable  the  Court  to  determine  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

valuation for  the purpose  of order  VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  Indeed, in  Abdul Hamid  Shamsi’s case, it  has been  noticed by this Court that the plaintiff has laid  a claim to a sum of Rs1,26,796.72, besides another sum of  over Rs.84,000  as his  share in  the profit  for  a particular period  by reference  to the  proceeding  of  the Incom-Tax  Department  mentioned  in  paragraph  11  of  the plaint. Further,  a copy  of the profit and loss account for the calendar  year 1979  was annexed by the plaintiff to the additional affidavit  filed on his behalf before this Court, which also  gave positive  indication as to the valuation of the relief.  The plaintiff  in that  case  valued  the  suit without making  any reference  whatsoever to those materials or objective  standards available  to him and in the context of these  facts, this Court made the above observation. But, if  there   be  no   material  or  objective  standard,  the plaintiff’s valuation has to be accepted.      It is  however, urged  by Mr.  Sorabjee  that  such  an objective standard  or positive material appears on the face of the  plaint. Our attention has been drawn to paragraph 33 of the plaint where it has been stated by the plaintiff that on rendition  of  accounts,  the  plaintiff  estimates  that approximately a  sum of Rs.25 lakhs to 30 lakhs would become due  to  her  share.  It  is  submitted  on  behalf  of  the appellants that  in view  of such a statement in the plaint, the respondent  should have  valued the relief for rendition of accounts  at Rs.25  lakhs. We  are unable  to accept  the contention. The statement does not, in our opi- 442 nion, constitute  any objective  standard of  valuation or a positive material  from which it can be said with any amount of certainty  that the  valuation of the relief for accounts should be  at the sum of Rs.25 lakhs. The respondent was not required to  make such  a statement in the plaint. It is the wishful thinking  of the  respondent that  on account  being taken, she  would be  entitled to  such a  huge amount.  The respondent has  not given  in the  plaint  any  material  in support of the estimate of Rs.25 lakhs to Rs.30 lakhs to her share. As  has been  stated already,  this is no material at all on  which any  reliance can be placed for the purpose of valuation of the relief. In this connection, we may refer to a decision  of the  Lahore High Court in Atma Ram Charan Das v. Bisheshar  Nath Dina  Nath, AIR  1935 Lahore 689. In that case  also  the  question  was  whether  the  plaintiff  had correctly valued  the relief  for the rendition of accounts. in the  plaint, the  plaintiff stated that a sum of Rs.8,000 was due  to him  from the defendants, but he valued the suit for purposes  of  jurisdiction  and  court  fee  at  Rs.5000 tentatively. It  was .  held that the plaintiff could not be prejudiced or  damnified merely  because  he  added  to  the plaint a computation which was unnecessary for him to live.      We have  considered the  facts and circumstances of the case and  also the  legal position  and, in  our  view,  the valuation of  the relief for the rendition of accounts under section  7(iv)(f)   of  the   Court  Fees   Act  is  neither unreasonable nor it is demonstratively arbitrary.      In the  circumstances, the  appeal  is  dismissed  with costs quantified at Rs.5,000. R.S.S.                             Appeal dismissed. 443