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PETITIONER: COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI, MAHARAJA OF ALWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/10/1978

BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH UNTWALIA, N.L. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1979 AIR  126            1979 SCR  (2)  62  1979 SCC  (1) 512

ACT:      Constitution of  India 1950-Art. 363-Covenants agreeing to merger of princely states-Provision in Covenants that any dispute relating  to any  item of property of Ruler or state property to  be  referred  for  decision  to  a  nominee  of Government of  India and  such decision  shall be  final and binding on  all concerned-Communication of the Government of lndia to  the effect that the settlement of the inventory of properties was  an integral  part of an overall agreement in respect of  all outstanding  matters of dispute-Whether Such ’decision’ an  agreement and could be enforced by The Ruler- Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Art. 363.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  who was  the Ruler  of a  princely state entered into  a covenant  agreeing to merge his state into a union  called  the  United  States  of  Matsya.  The  Matsya Covenant, by Art. Xl Cl. (2) provided that the ruler of each state shall  furnish to  the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all the inn  movable properties,  securities and  cash  balances held by him as private property and cl. (3) provided that if any dispute arose as to whether any item of property was the private property of the ruler or the state property it shall be referred  to such  person as  the Government of India may nominate in  the decision  of that person shall be final and binding on all parties. The appellant furnished an inventory of all  properties claimed  to  be  his  private  "property. Sometime later  the rulers  of  the  constituent  States  of Matsya entered  into a  Covenant with  the Rajpramukh of the United State  of Rajasthan  for merger  of their States into the State of Rajasthan in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant. The Rajasthan Covenant by Art. XII, Cl. (2) provided for the settlement of  any dispute  as to  whether the  property was private property  or state  property by  reference  to  such person  as   the  Government   of  India   may  nominate  in consultation with  the Rajpramukh  and that  the decision of such person shall be final and binding on the parties.      The Ministry  of States,  Government of  India wrote on 14th September, 1949 to the appellant that the settlement of

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the inventory  was an  integral part of an overall agreement in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute and did not stand by itself. After correspondence with the Government of India  the   appellant  received   a  written  communication intimating the  decision  of  the  Government  of  India  in respect of 25 items of the property.      The appellant claimed that four buildings which were in occupation of  the State Government had been declared as his private properties  in the  inventory appended to the letter of the Government of India and that the State Govern- 63 ment should  pay rent  to him in respect of those buildings. This claim of the appellant having been rejected, he filed a suit in  the district  court  for  a  declaration  that  the properties  were   his  private   properties  and  that  the respondents should be ordered to pay rent to him.      The suit  was transferred  by the High Court to itself, The High  Court  dismissed  the  suit  on  the  ground  that adjudication of  the dispute  was barred  by Art. 363 of the Constitution.      In appeal  to this  Court it  was  contended  that  the letter of  14th September, 1949 was the result of a decision arrived at  in pursuance  of cl.  (3) of  Art. XI  of Matsya Covenant and  cl. (2)  of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and must  be construed  as a  decision of  the Government of India.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  The decision  sought to  be  enforced  is  an agreement hit  by Art.  363 of the Constitution and the High Court was right in dismissing the suit. [74H]      2. The  so-called decision was nothing but an agreement between the  Government of  India  and  the  appellant.  The letter clearly  stated that  the inventory  furnished by the plaintiff was  discussed with  him at  New Delhi  and that a copy of  the final  inventory  of  the  appellant’s  private properties, which  had the  approval of  the  Government  of India in the Ministry of States, Was forwarded to him. Under clause (3) Art. XI of the Matsya Covenant as also clause (2) of Art.  XII of  the Rajasthan  Covenant, no approval of the Ministry of States  was  called  for.  What  each  of  these  clauses provided was  that if  any dispute  arose as  to whether any item of  property was  the private  property  of  the  ruler concerned or  of his  erstwhile state, it was to be referred to such  a person as the Government of India might nominate, and the  decision of that person was to be final and binding on all  parties concerned.  Neither the  Government of India nominated a  person to  whom the dispute was to be referred; nor did  any such  person give  a decision on the point. The contents of the letter, are not at all relatable to those of either of  the two  clauses. On the other hand, they clearly indicate  that  the  so-called  "decisions"  of  the  States Ministry contained  in the  inventory appended to the letter formed really the record of the agreement arrived at between the Ministry  of States  and the  plaintiff as  a result  of negotiations. [71D-H]      3.  Paragraph   three  of   the  letter  talks  of  the "settlement of  the inventory’. which was tc. be an integral part of  an "overall agreement in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself. What the said was that all the disputes regarding the property of the Ruler were  to be  settled by  an overall agreement that the contents of  the inventory  appended to  the  letter  merely recorded  the  settlement  between  the  appellant  and  the

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Ministry and  that  even  those  contents  were  not  to  be regarded as  final settlement  of  the  matters  dealt  with therein unless  they formed  part of  an agreement embracing all items of property. [72B-C]      4. In  the instant  case instead of having the disputes referred for  decision to  a person nominated by the parties they decided  to adopt  the method  of mutual  agreement  to settle those disputes. Such mutual agreement could not 64 be regarded  as a  decision by  a person  nominated  by  the Government of  India either  under clause  (3)  of  Art.  of Matsya Covenant  or clause  (2) of  Art.  Xll  of  Rajasthan Covenant. It must be deemed to be nothing more nor less than an agreement  simpliciter even  though it  was labelled as a decision of the States Ministry. [72H-73B]      5.  Article   363  of   the   Constitution   bars   the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which  was entered  into or  executed  before  the commencement of  the Constitution  by any Ruler of an Indian Sate to  which  the  Government  of  India  was  party.  The operation of  the Article  is not  limited to  any  "parent" Covenant and  every agreement  whether it was primary or one entered into  in pursuance  of the provisions of a preceding agreement would  fall within  the ambit  of the Article. The fact that  the agreement  contained in  the letter dated the 14th September,  1949 had  resulted from  action taken under the provisions  of the  Rajasthan Covenant,  is no answer to the plea  raised on  behalf of the respondents that Art. 363 of the  Constitution is  a bar to the maintainability of the two suits,  although that  agreement did  not flow  directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing  from the provisions of clause (2) of Art. XII thereof. [73D-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No  12  of 1965.      From the  Judgment and  Decree dated  29-4-1965 of  the Rajasthan High  Court in  D. B.  Civil Misc.  Case No. 67 of 1965.      B. D. Sharma for the Appellant.  S.  N. Kacker,  Sol. Genl.,  U. R. Lalit and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. l.      S. M. Jain for Respondent No. 2      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KOSHAL, J.  The facts  forming the  background to  this appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against its judgment dated the 29th April 1968, in so far as they are  undisputed, may  be stated  in some detail. On the 28th February  1948, the  Rulers of  the erstwhile States of Alwar,  Bharatpur,   Dholpur  and  Karauli  entered  into  a Covenant (hereinafter  referred to  as the  Matsya Covenant) agreeing to  merge their  States into one State known as the United State  of Matsya  which was to come into being on the 1st of  April 1948  with the  Ruler of  Dholpur as  its  Raj Pramukh. Article  VI of the Covenant provided that the Ruler of  each   Covenanting  State  shall,  as  soon  as  may  be practicable and  in any event not later than the 15th March, 1948, make  over the  administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh  and   that  thereupon  all  rights,  authority  and jurisdiction belonging  to such  Ruler which  appertained or were incidental  to the  Government of his State. shall vest in the United State of Matsya.

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65 Article  Xl   of  the  Covenant  provided  for  the  private properties of the Ruler and ran thus:           "1. The  Ruler of each Convenanting State shall be      entitled to  the full  ownership, use  and enjoyment of      all  private,   properties  (as   distinct  from  State      properties) belonging  to him on the date of his making      over the  administration  of  that  State  to  the  Raj      Pramukh.           "2. He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the      1st May,  1948,  an  inventory  of  all  the  immovable      properties, securities  and cash  balances held  by him      .16 such private property.           "3. If  any dispute  arises as to whether any item      of property  is the  private property  of the  Ruler or      State property  it shall  be referred to such person as      the Government  of India  may nominate and the decision      of that  person shall  be  final  and  binding  on  all      parties concerned."      The  United   State  of   Matsya  came  into  being  as stipulated in  the Matsya  Covenant on the 1st of April 1948 and during  the same  month the  Ruler of  Alwar, who is the appellant  before  us,  furnished  to  the  Raj  Pramukh  an inventory of  all the  immovable properties,  securities and cash balances  held  and  claimed  by  him  as  his  private properties.      On the  11th of  April 1948,  the Rulers of ten States, namely, Banswara,  Bundi, Dungarpur,  Jhalawar,  Kishengarh, Kotah, Mewar,  Partabgarh, Shahpura  and Tonk entered into a Covenant agreeing  to merge  them into  one State  named the United State  of Rajasthan.  That Covenant was superseded by another dated the 10th of March 1949 (hereinafter called the Rajasthan  Covenant)  through  which  the  United  State  of Rajasthan was  to consist  of the said ten States as also of four  others,  namely,  Bikaner,  Jaipur,  Jaisalmer  ,  and Jodhpur, with the Ruler of Jaipur as the Raj Pramukh. Clause (c) of  Article I  of the  Rajasthan  Covenant  defined  the expression "new  Covenanting State"  to mean any of the said four States.  Article II  of  the  Covenant  last  mentioned provided that  the United  State of  Rajasthan would include any  other  State,  the  Ruler  of  which  entered  into  an agreement with  the Raj  Pramukh, with  the approval  of the Government of  India? to  the integration of that State with the United State of Rajasthan      Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant provided:           "(1) The  Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be      entitled to  the full  ownership, use  and enjoyment of      all  private   properties  (as   distinct  from   State      properties), belonging to 66      him on  the date  of his making over the administration of that  State to  the Raj  Pramukh of  the former Rajasthan state or  as the  case may  be, to  the Raj  Pramukh of  the United State under this Covenant.           " (2) If any dispute arises as to whether any item      of property  is the  private property of the Ruler of a      Covenanting State  other than  a new Covenanting State,      or is  State pro  perty, it  shall be  referred to such      person as  the Government  of  India  may  nominate  in      consultation with  the Raj Pramukh, and the decision of      that person  shall be  final and binding on all parties      concerned:           "Provided  that   no  such  dispute  shall  be  so      referable after the first day of May, 1949.           "(3) The  private properties  of the Ruler of each

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    new Covenanting State shall be as agreed to between the      Government of  India in  the States  Ministry  and  the      Ruler concerned,  and the settlement of properties thus      made shall be final."      On the  1st of  May 1949,  the Rulers  of the States of Alwar,  Bharatpur,   Dholpur  and  Karauli  which  were  the constituent States  of the  United State  of Matsya, entered into  an   agreement  (hereinafter   called   the   Amending Agreement) with  the Raj  Pramukh of  the  United  State  of Rajasthan merging  with four States into it with effect from the 15th  of May  1949 in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant. While subscribing  to the  Amending Agreement  the Ruler  of Dholpur acted  not only  in his capacity as such but also as the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Matsya. Article IV of that Agreement effected amendments in the Rajasthan Covenant so as  to make  it applicable  to the  said four States with effect from the date last mentioned. No charge, however, was made in the provisions of clause (c) of Article I of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant.      On the  14th of  September 1949, Mr. V. P. Menon of the Ministry of States, Government of India, wrote the following letter to the Ruler of Alwar:      "My dear Maharaja Sahib,           "Your Highness  will recall  that the inventory of      immovable  properties,  securities  and  cash  balances      furnished by Your Highness in accordance with Article,-      XI of  the Covenant  for the  formation of  the  United      State of Matsya was discussed with Your Highness at New      Delhi on  the 9th  and 10th  April, 1949. I now forward      for Your Highness’s information a 67           copy of  the final  inventory of  Your  Highness’s private properties. It has the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States.           "2. The  following claims of Your Highness and the      counter-claims of  the  former  Matsya  Government  are      still under  consideration and  the  decision  will  be      communicated to Your Highness as soon as possible.           (1) cash balance of the Alwar State treasury;           (2) claim  for Rs.  4,82,520 as  arrears of  Privy Purse of Your Highness for 6 years from 1936-37 to 1942-43.           "3.  Your   Highness  will   appreciate  that  the      settlement of  the inventory  is an integral part of an      over-all  agreement   in  respect  of  all  outstanding      matters of dispute and does not stand by itself.           "With kind regards,                                            "Yours sincerely,                                                         Sd/-                                              "(V. P. Menon)" This letter  was  accompanied  by  a  copy  of  the  "final’ inventory which  listed 32  items. Reproduced  below is  the item at Serial No. 1 of that inventory: ------------------------------------------------------------ "S. Description of property.           Decision of the State No                                     Ministry. ------------------------------------------------------------ 1. City Palace including adjoining    building. . . . . .             Ancestral. The portion of                                    the building  at  present                                    in use  by the  State for                                    administrative   purposes                                    or   for    Museum    and                                    Imperial    Bank     will                                    continue to  be  so  used                                    till   such    time    as

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                                  required.             The                                    requirements of the State                                    in future  will not be of                                    the same  order as  today                                    and every  effort will be                                    made   to   release   the                                    accommodation at  present                                    occupied in  the Zenana &                                    Mardana  Mahals   at  the                                    earliest      practicable                                    date. The State will bear                                    the maintenance  cost  of                                    the portions  used by it.                                    Any      addition      or                                    alteration in the portion                                    used by  the  State  will                                    require the prior consent                                    of   His   Highness   and                                    should be  carried out at                                    State expense." ------------------------------------------------------------ 68      Thereafter, correspondence went on between the Ministry of States  and the  Ruler of Alwar and on the 24th September 1952  the   later  received   from  the   former  a  written communication dealing  with  26  items  of  properties.  The opening clause of Para 2 of the letter stated:           "2.  The   Government  of   India  have  carefully      considered all  the outstanding questions in respect of      your High  Courts private  properties, in  consultation      with the  Rajasthan Government,  and their decisions in      respect thereof are as follows:-" The description  of each  item covered  by  the  letter  was followed by the decision in respect thereof That part of the letter which deals with item 26 is set down below:           "(26) City Palace including adjoining buildings:      The  City   Palace  with   the   adjoining   buildings, comprising of  the Jagir  office, Central  Record,  lmperial Bank, Treasury,     Gandhi National School etc. will be your Highness’s ancestral property. The secretariat building will however be State 1) property.      This decision  was reiterated  in an  office Memorandum issued by  the Government  of  Rajasthan  in  the  Political Department on  the 30th  of December  1952. Through a letter dated the  14th of  October 1959 proceeding from his Private Secretary and  addressed to the Chief Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,  Government  of  India.  the  Ruler  of  Alwar claimed rent  for three  properties known as the Secretariat building, Daulat  Khana building  and  Indra  Viman  Station adjoining the City Palace and the bungalow at Sariska, which were in  the occupation  of the  Rajasthan  Government.  The claim was  made on  the ground  that all the four properties had been  declared to be the private properties of the Ruler in the  inventory appended  to the  letter  dated  the  14th September 1949 mentiond above. The claim was rejected by the Ministry of  Home Affairs which asserted in its letter dated the 24th  of December  1959  that  the  four  properties  in question had  not been  recognized as the private properties of the  Ruler. The claim was reiterated by the Ruler through a letter  issued by  Shri Gopesh  Kumar Ojha,  his  Legal  & Financial Adviser, but the name was again turned down by the Ministry of  Home Affairs  through their  letter  dated  the 6th/8th of December 1960 in which the position taken was:           "The  Statement   regarding  the  extent  of  your      Private Property rights in the City Palace area made in

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    our letter  dated 24-12-59  are based upon the decision      reached  in  March  1952  after  discussion  with  your      Highness  and   we  regret  that  they  cannot  now  be      reopened." 69      2. It  was in  the above  background that  the Ruler of Alwar filed  two suits, being suits Nos. 4 and 5 of 1963, in the court  of the  District Judge,  Alwar. In Suit No. 5 the prayer made  was that  the three  properties  known  as  the Secretariat building,  Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station be  declared to  be the  private properties  of  the plaintiff  and  that  the  State  of  Rajasthan  be  ejected therefrom, or, in the alternative, be ordered to pay rent at a specified  rate. A decree for 36,000% was also claimed for mesne profits. In suit No. 4 of 1963, the Claim was that the plaintiff was  entitled to  rent or mesne profits in respect of a building forming part of the Mardana Palace.      3. Both  suits were  resisted by the Union of India and the State of Rajasthan who were joined as the two defendants to each  of them  and it  was claimed  inter-alia  that  the provisions of  article 363 of the Constitution of India were a complete bar to their maintainability.      4. The  two suits  were transferred by me High Court of Rajasthan   to    itself   and   the   question   of   their maintainability was  mooted before  it with reference to the provisions of  article  363  of  the  Constitution  1  which states:           (1)  Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution                but subject to the provisions of article 143,                neither the Supreme Court nor any other court                shall  have   jurisdiction  in   any  dispute                arising out  of any  provision of  a  treaty,                agreement,  covenant,  engagement,  sanad  or                other similar  instrument which  was  entered                into or  executed before  the commencement of                this Constitution  by  any  Ruler  of  Indian                State and  to which  the  Government  or  the                Dominion of  India or  any of its predecessor                Governments was  a party and which has or has                been  continued   in  operation   after  such                commencement, or in any dispute in respect of                any right  accruing under or any liability or                obligation  arising   out  of   any  of   the                provisions of  this Constitution  relating to                any   such   treaty,   agreement,   covenant,                engagement,   sanad    or    other    similar                instrument.           (2) In this article-                (a)  "Indian   State"  means   any  territory                     recognised before  the  commencement  of                     this Constitution  by His Majesty or the                     Government of  the Dominion  of India as                     being such a State; and                (b)  "Ruler" includes  the Prince,  Chief  or                     other per  son  recognised  before  such                     commencement by 70           His Majesty  or the  Government of the Dominion of      India as the Ruler of any Indian State.      The High  Court  proceeded  to  determine  whether  the dispute in  suit No.  5 of  1963 was  one arising  out of an agreement such  as fell  within the ambit of article 363 (as was contended  by the  defendants) or was merely a one-sided decision of  the Government of India and, therefore, outside the purview of the article as was asserted by the plaintiff.

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It held  that the  "decisions" contained in the latter dated the 14th  of September  1949 had  really  resulted  from  an agreement between  the Ministry of States and the plaintiff, that the  extent of  the building  adjoining the City Palace was not to be found with precision in the inventory appended to the  said letter,  that consequently  there  was  a  real dispute between  the parties  whether the  suit property was included in the expression "adjoining building" and that the adjudication of  such a  dispute was barred by the provision of article  363 of the Constitution. Suit No. 5 of 1963 was, therefore, dismissed,  but with  no order  as to  costs.  In regard to  suit No.  4 of 1963, however, the High Court held that the  property in dispute was clearly a part of the City Palace itself  as it was comprised in the Mardana Mahal that the dispute was altogether illusory in view of the fact that right up  to the  8th of  December 1960,  the Government  of India had  been taking  the stand that the disputed property was the  private property of the plaintiff, that the dispute was consequently not barred by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, and that the suit, there fore, deserved to be  decided by  the District  Judge  on  merits.  In  the result, suit  No. 4  of 1963 was remitted to the trial court for decision according to law.      5. It  is the  judgment of the High Court in suit No. S of 1963 alone that is challenged in this appeal.      6. Mr. B. D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant- Ruler, has  vehemently contended  that the  letter dated the 14th December  1949 was  not  the  result  of  an  agreement between the  plaintiff and the Government of India and that, on the other hand, it was a decision arrived at in pursuance of clause  (3) of  Article XI  of the  Matsya  Covenant.  In support of  this contention  it was  pointed  out  that  the letter was  issued as a sequel to the inventory furnished by the plaintiff  under clause (2) of that Article and that the operative part  of the  inventory appended  to the letter is headed "decision of the States Ministry" which, according to learned Counsel,  clearly negatives  an  agreement.  It  was further urged  that even  the  Rajasthan  Covenant  did  not envisaged any  agreement in  so far  as  the  plaintiff  was concern  cd   because  he  was  not  the  Ruler  of  a  "new Covenanting State" with 71 in the meaning of that expression as used in clauses (2) and (3) of  Article XII  thereof, that it was clause (2) of that Article which  governed him  and which  again provided for a decision being  given on disputes relating to properties and that the  letter dated  14th September  1949 must  still  be construed as  a decision  if the Matsya Covenant was held to be inapplicable.  A careful  examination of  the material on the record,  however, clearly  makes out that the contention is without substance as we shall presently show.      7. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had furnished the inventory  of the  properties held  by him in accordance with Article  XI of  the Matsya Covenant as is stated in the opening paragraph  of the letter dated the 14th of September 1949. It  further cannot  be gain-said that the third column of the  inventory to that letter was headed "decision of the State Ministry". These two factors, without more, might have gone a  long way to support the case propounded on behalf of the plaintiff, but they are sought to be used out of context as is  clear from  a perusal of the entire letter from which it can be safely spelt out that the so-called "decision" was nothing but  an agreement  arrived at between the Government of India  and the plaintiff. It is pertinent that the letter mentions that  the inventory  furnished by the plaintiff was

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discussed with him at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th of April 1949 and  then states  that a copy of the final inventory of the plaintiff’s  private properties,  which had the approval of the  Government of  India in  the Ministry of States, was forwarded to him. Now, under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant  as also  clause (2)  of Article  XII of the Rajasthan Covenant no approval of the Ministry of States was called for. In fact, what each of those clauses provided was that if any dispute arose as to whether any item of property was the  private property  of the  Ruler concerned or of his erstwhile State,  it was  to be  referred  to such person as the Government  of India might nominate, and the decision of that person  was to  be final  and binding  on  all  parties concerned. Now, it is not the case of the plaintiff that the Government of  India nominated  a person to whom the dispute was to  be referred;  nor is  it claimed  by him that such a person gave  any  decision.  The  contents  of  the  letter, therefore, are  not at  all relateable to those of either of the two  clauses just  above-mentioned. On  the other  hand, they clearly  indicate that the so-called "decisions" of the Sates Ministry  contained in  the inventory  appended to the letter formed  really the record of the agreement arrived at between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a result of negotiations  held on  the 9th and 10th of April 1949. In this  connection,   reference  may   pointedly  be  made  to paragraph 3 of the letter which bears repetition: 72           "3.  Your   Highness  will   appreciate  that  the      settlement of  the inventory  is an integral part of an      overall agreement in respect of all outstanding matters      of dispute and does not stand by itself."      This  paragraph   talks  of   "the  settlement  of  the inventory" which  was to be an integral part of an "over-all agreement in  respect of all outstanding matters of dispute" and was  not  to  stand  by  itself.  In  our  opinion,  the paragraph is  a clincher against the plaintiff and indicates without any  shadow of  doubt that  what the letter said was that all  the disputes  regarding the  property of the Ruler were to  be settled  by  an  over-all  agreement,  that  the contents of  the inventory  appended to  the  letter  merely recorded  the  settlement  between  the  plaintiff  and  the Ministry of  States and that even those contents were not to be regarded  as a final settlement of the matters dealt with therein unless  they formed  part of  an agreement embracing all items of property.      8. It  may be  noted here  that the Matsya Covenant had been abrogated  with effect  from the  15th May  1949 by the Rajasthan Covenant as modified by the Amending Agreement and there was thus no question of any decision being given after that date  under clause  3  of  Article  XI  of  the  Matsya Covenant and  that the  only surviving provision under which disputes regarding  property owned by the plaintiff could be determined after  the 15th  of May  1949, was Article XII of the Rajasthan  Covenant. It is true that the expression "new Covenanting State"  as defined in clause (c) of Article I of that Covenant  meant only any of the four States of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer  and Jodhpur,  that the definition was not amended by  any provision of the Amending Agreement, so that the  State  of  Alwar  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  "new Covenanting Stat._" for the purpose of clause (3) of Article XII of  the Rajasthan  Covenant and  that the clause of that Article  in  accordance  with  which  disputes  relating  to property claimed  by tho  Ruler  of  Alwar  as  his  private property were to be determined was clause (2) which provided for their  decision by  a person nominated by the Government

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of India  in that behalf. The fact remains, however, that no such person was ever nominated and that the letter dated the 14th September,  1949,  cannot  be  construed  (for  reasons already stated  by us) as laying down a decision of any such person. What  appears to  have happened  is that  instead of following the  course indicated in clause (2) last mentioned and having  the disputes  referred for  decision to a person nominated by  the Government  of  India,  the  parties  (the Government of  India and the appellant) decided to adopt the method of mutual agreement to settle those disputes-a method which always  remained open  to  them,  notwithstanding  the Matsya 73 Covenant and  the Rajasthan  Covenant. Such mutual agreement could, by  no  stretch  of  imagination  be  regarded  as  a decision by  a person  nominated by  the Government of India either under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant or clause  (2) of  Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and must be  deemed to be nothing more or less than an agreement simpliciter even  though it  was labelled  as a "decision of the States Ministry" in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September, 1949.      9. Another  contention raised  by Mr.  Sharma was  that even if  the letter  dated the 14th September, 1949 was held to evidence  an agreement,  it was not hit by the provisions of article  363 of  the Constitution  inasmuch as  it was an agreement resulting  from the Rajasthan Covenant which alone according to  him, was the agreement covered by the article. This contention  is also  without substance.  Article 363 of the Constitution  bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising  out of any agreement which was entered into or executed  before the  commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler  of an  Indian State  to which  the Government  of India was  a party.  The operation  of the  article  is  not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether it is  primary or  one entered  into  in  pursuance  of  the provisions of  a preceding  agreement would  fall within the ambit of  the article.  Thus the  fact  that  the  agreement contained in  the letter  dated the  14th September 1949 had resulted from  action taken  under  the  provisions  of  the Rajasthan Covenant,  is no  answer to  the  plea  raised  on behalf  of   the  respondents   that  article   363  of  the Constitution is  a bar  to the  maintainability of  the  two suits, although we may add, that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and  departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Article XII thereof.      10. The only other contention put forward by Mr. Sharma was based  on the  contents of  column 3  of Item  1 of  the inventory appended  to the  letter dated  the 14th September 1949. He drew our attention to the mention in that column of the portions of the adjoining building being occupied by the State for administrative purposes or for Museum and Imperial Bank and  also comprising  the Zenana  and  Mardana  Mahals. According to  him,  this  meant  that  the  entire  building adjoining the  City  Palace  was  held  to  be  the  private property of  the plaintiff,  which  finally  vested  in  the plaintiff as  from the  date of  the letter and of which the plaintiff could  not be  divested by any subsequent decision of the  Ministry of  States. In  this connection, Mr. Sharma urged that  the Ministry of States had no power of reviewing a settlement  once arrived  at and  argued that  if  it  was claimed that such 6-817 SCI/78 74

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a power existed, the determination by a court of the limited question of  the power  of review  would be  barred  by  the provisions  of   article  363   of  the  Constitution.  This contention also  is of  no avail  to him. As held above, the agreement dated  the 14th September 1949 was not to stand by itself but  was to  be a  part  and  parcel  of  an  overall agreement embracing  all outstanding  matters of dispute. It follows that  the terms  of the  agreement contained  in the letter were  liable to  change till  a final  agreement  was reached, and in this view of the matter no finality could be said to  attach to those terms until all the disputes became the subject-matter of an agreed settlement. The terms of the inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative, the process  of settlement  being a  continuous one till all the  disputes   were  finally  resolved.  And  the  ultimate decision of  the Ministry  of Home  Affairs conveyed  in its letter of  the 24th  of December  1959,  not  to  treat  the Secretariat building,  Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace to be the private property of the  plaintiff, was based upon a mutual agreement between the parties  which was  reached after  discussion  in  March 1952, as  part of  an over-all  agreement as is evident from the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated the 6th/8th of December 1960.      11. In  view of  the conclusions  arrived at  above, we hold that  the ‘’decision"  sought to  be  enforced  by  the plaintiff  is  an  agreement  hit  by  article  363  of  the Constitution and that the High Court was right in dismissing suit No.  5 of  1963 as  being not maintainable. The appeal, therefore, fails  and is  dismissed, but with no order as to costs. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 75