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PETITIONER: CITY OF NAGPUR CORPORATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JOHN SERVAGE PHILLIP & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/11/1962

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L. HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1963 AIR  897            1963 SCR  Supl. (2) 600

ACT: Corporation-Power,  of sending  delegation--Jurisdiction  of civil court-Power of corporation to provide for expenses  of delegation-The  city of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948,  (C.P. and Berar 11 of 1950), ss. 58 (s), 88.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant Corporation passed a resolution  deciding  to send two of its members to a health conference at  Harrogate in U.K. On the application of the respondent, the High Court of  Bombay  issued a write restraining  the  appellant  from carrying out the resolution. Held,  that s. 58 (s) of the Nagpur Corporation  Act,  1948, which gave power to the appellant Corporation to provide for any  matter likely to promote public health  authorised  the resolution  and  it  was for the  appellant  Corporation  to decide  how a thing which it had the power to do was  to  be done.   It  was not a case where it could be said  that  the delegation  would have been of no benefit to  the  appellant Corporation  at  all  and  that was  enough  to  prevent  an interference by the Courts in the method of the exercise  of its undoubted power by the appellant Corporation. Mayor etc. of Westminster v. London & North Western  Railway Company, [1905 A.C, 426] relied upon.  601 The  resolution could not be challenged on the  ground  that the  budget  did not provide for the expenses of  the  dele- gation.   The budget in fact did so and even if it did  not, there was power tinder s. 88 of the Act to alter the  budget to make the necessary provision. Statutes  cannot be confined only to thoughts  prevalent  at the  time  when they are enacted.  They are put  in  general terms to embrace innovations.  Even if in 1948 delegation by Corporation  were  not in contemplation, s. 58  (s)  may  be interpreted  as  including in "matters likely to  promote  a public health", the sending of the delegations.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 508 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April 23, 1959 of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 110 of 1959. S.T.  Desai,  J.B.  Dadachanji,  O.C.  Mathur  and  Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. W.   S. Barlingay, R. Mahalingier and Ganpat Rai, for  respondent No. 1. M.   S. K. Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2. 1962.  November 29. The judgment of the Court was  delivered by SARKAR, J.-This appeal is against an order of the High Court of Bombay issuing a writ whereby the Municipal  Corporation. of  Nagpur,  the appellant before us,  was  restrained  from carrying  out  a  resolution proposing to send  two  of  its members  as delegates to a Health Congress at  Harrogate  in U.K. and sanctioning certain expenses in connection with the delegation. There is no doubt that if what a Corporation proposes to  do is what it had been authorised by its incorporating  statute to do, it is not the business of 602 a court to interfere with the mode in which the  Corporation decides  to act : see Mayor, etc. of Westminster  v.  London and  North Western Railway Company (1).  If, therefore,  the appellant  Corporation  had power  under  its  incorporating statute,  the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, to  send delegates  to  the Congress at Harrogate,  it  would  appear prima  facie  that writ was erroneously issued by  the  High Court.  Now, s. 58 (s) of the Act provides,               "The   Corporation  may  in   its   discretion               provides  from time to time either  wholly  or               partly  for  all  or  any  of  the   following               matters, namely :-               (s)   any  other matter likely to promote  the               public  health, safety and convenience of  the               public." The  question  is  whether  the  action  of  the   appellant Corporation is within this section. It  appears that the convenors of the Congress at  Harrogate had sent an invitation to the appellant Corporation to  send delegates to the Congress.  The following facts appear  from the invitation: delegates representing all aspects of public health  would  discuss at the Congress  subjects  of  common interest  ; there would be a health exhibition where  latest equipment  and products of leading manufacturers  and  trade and  research  organisations would be put on show;  and  the delegates  might  visit  water  supply  undertaking,  sewage disposal  works, housing schemes, hospitals, health  service contres,   food   factories   and   canteens   and   similar organisations.  We think it beyond question that a  delegate attending the congress Would certainly (1)  [1905] A.C. 426.  603 have  acquired much useful knowledge of  matters  concerning public   health  and  become  acquainted  with  the   modern equipment  and appliances used in, and organisations  suited for  and  the  latest trend of  thoughts  regarding  matters concerning  public  health.   appears to us  plain  that  by sending delegates to the Congress, the appellant Corporation would have acquired’ useful knowledge connected with  public health which it could utilise later to promote public health at  Nagpur.   The  sending  of  delegates,  therefore,   was something which the appellant Corporation was authorised  by

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section 58 (s) of its incorporating statute to do. As we understand the judgment of the High Court, it does not seem  to  have felt much doubt about this.  The  High  Court appears,  however, to have taken the view that there was  no reasonable and legitimate connection between the sending  of the  delegates to the Congress and the promotion  of  public health  at Nagpur.  It is somewhat difficult  to  appreciate the  High  Court’s point of view.  In the first  place,  the High Court seems to have been sceptical of the benefit to be derived  from  the  delegation because the  subjects  to  be discussed  at  the  Congress were, in  its  opinion,  highly technical  and the delegates proposed to be sent being  non- technical  men, namely, lawyers, were not likely to be in  a position  to  follow the discussion.  We have no  reason  to think that the subjects to be discussed at the Congress were highly  technical.  That it would not have been so,  appears to  us clear from the fact that a very large  gathering  was expected at the Congress,, over 2,600 having attended at the previous one.  There is further no reason to think that  the delegates  proposed to be sent by the appellant  Corporation would not have been able to acquire at the Congress a  great deal of useful general knowledge regarding matters of public health.  Lastly, it is not for this Court to decide how  the delegation 604 should   have  been  constituted  so  that   the   appellant Corporation  might have had the largest benefit from it.  It was for the Corporation to decide how the thing which it had the power to do was to be done.  It was not a case where  it could be said that the delegation proposed to be sent  would have  been of benefit to the appellant Corporation  at  all, and that is enough to prevent an interference by the  courts in the method of the exercise of its undoubted power by  the appellant Corporation.  We are unable to agree with the view of the High Court that there is no reasonable or  legitimate connection  between  the sending of the  delegation  to  the Congress  and  the  provisions of s. 58 (s)  which  we  have earlier set out. The High Court also said that the capacity of the  appellant Corporation  to  make  use of the knowledge  gained  at  the Congress  was extremely limited.  There arc no materials  on the record on which this observation can be justified.   The appellant  Corporation can no doubt increase  its  capacity. In  any event, it would, after the delegation had  returned, have  been in a better position to discharge  its  functions concerning  public health within its present  capacity.   It would  be absurd to say that the appellant  Corporation  did not have the capacity to improve its public health services. There was no warrant to issue the writ on the ground of want of capacity. The High Court also relied on certain sections dealing  with the budget.  It was said that there was no provision in  the budget  for expenses of sending a delegation abroad.   Under s.  84 of the incorporating statute, no payment can be  made out of the municipal funds unless the expenditure is covered by the budget.  The High Court, therefore, observed that the resolution  sanctioning  expenses  for the  sending  of  the delegation  abroad  was beyond the powers of  the  appellant Corporation.  In the first place, we are pot  605 sure  that  the budget did not provide  for  such  expenses. There  was a head in it which dealt with allowances  payable to  the  members of the Corporation.  It may  reasonably  be contended that the expenses of the members for the visit  to the Congress are such allowances.  But assume, they are not.

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Section  88  of  the  Act gives  the  Corporation  power  to transfer the amount of one budget grant from one major  head to another provided however a certain balance is  maintained in the budget.  There is nothing to show that the  appellant Corporation  could not have acted in this case under  s.  88 and  altered  the provisions of the  budget  making  express provision  for the expenses of the delegation.  It  was  not even  suggested that the appellant Corporation could not  do so.  We  think it right also to point out that in  the  petition for  the writ it had not been said that the  resolution  was bad  because the expenses sanctioned by it were outside  the budget.   That  being so, this point should  not  have  been taken into consideration by the High Court.  It is true that the  Corporation  at the request of the  High  Court  placed before the High Court some of the papers in connection  with the budget.  That the Corporation out of respect to the High Court  should have-done and, therefore, actually did.   From this  it cannot be contended that the appellant  Corporation never  objected  to the resolution being challenged  on  the ground of a want of express provision in the budget for  the expenses  of the delegation or would not have prejudiced  in the  hearing of the petition if the resolution was  attacked on  the ground of want of a provision in the  budget.   This challenge  involved  a question of fact and  without  proper pleadings,  the’  appellant  Corporation  was  surely  at  a disadvantage  in meeting it.  Furthermore, we are  not  sure that  s.  84 would have made the resolution  invalid.   That section  only prohibits an expenditure for which the  budget does not provide. 606 So  it  may  be that all that  s.84  affects,is  the  actual expenditure.  It may not affect the resolution itself.   We  think it rights to point out that the high Court  held that  the  appellant  Corporation had  acted  honestly.   It observed   that  the  circumstances  did  not  warrant   the inference that the action of the Corporation was mala  fide. That being so, and the action proposed being clearly  within the statutory powers of the appellant Corporation, we  think that the High Court was in error in issuing the writ. We  may  now notice one or two points  of  minor  importance argued  at  the bar on behalf of the  respondents.   It  was said’  that  the question raised in-this appeal  had  become academic since the Congress was long over.  It may be stated that the Congress was held from April 27, to May 1, 1959 and the writ was issued by the High Court on April 23, 1959.  It is suggested that it is not, therefore, a fit case for deci- sion  in an appeal under Art. 136 of the  Constitution.   We are not at all impressed by this contention.  It seems to us that  it  is  a  matter of the  utmost  importance  for  the appellant   Corporation  to  know  its  rights   under   its incorporating  statute.   It  will  have  to  guide   itself according  to  our decision in future when a  similar  point arises  again.   If we do not decide the point  raised  now, then  on every subsequent occasion the Corporation would  be bound  by’ the judgment of the High Court under  appeal  and by the time the matter is brought up here the same  argument that  the question has become academic can always be  raised to defeat the point.  We think that the point raised by  the appellant Corporation as to its powers under the statute and how  far courts can review the exercise of its power by  the appellant  Corporation  is of great importance and  must  he decided in this appeal. It is also said that in 1948 when the City of  607

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Nagpur  Corporation Act was passed, these  delegations  were not in contemplation.  Therefore, s.    58  (s)  cannot   be interpreted as including promotion of   public   health   by sending of delegations.  This is, in    our     view,      a completely idle contention.  We have no reason to think that the  delegations  were  not  sent in  1948.   In  any  case, statutes  cannot be confined only to thoughts  prevalent  at the  time when they were enacted.  They are put  in  general words to embrace innovations as they come along.  Therefore, even  if  in 1948, delegations by Corporations were  not  in contemplation,  there is nothing to prevent us  interpreting s.  58  (s) as including within matters  likely  to  promote public health, actions involving the sending of  delegations where promotion of public health becomes likely as a  result thereof. We  allow the appeal.  In view of the order of  October  19, 1959,  the  appellant will pay the costs of  the  respondent Phillip.                                            Appeal allowed. 608