REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2012 OF 2002

Chittoor Chegaiah & Ors.              .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Pedda Jeeyangar Mutt & Anr.              .... Respondent(s)

   WITH  

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2011  OF 2002

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2014 OF 2002

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

Civil Appeal No. 2012 of 2002:

1) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  

order  dated  17.11.2000  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature,  Andhra  Pradesh  at  Hyderabad  in  Civil  

Revision  Petition  No.  2124  of  1996  whereby  and  

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whereunder  the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  petition  

filed by the appellants herein.    

Civil Appeal No. 2014 of 2002  :   

This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  

order dated 17.11.2000 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2322  

of  1996  whereby  the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  

petition  filed  by  the  appellants  herein  by  following  its  

judgment passed on the same day in C.R.P. No. 2124 of  

1996.

Civil Appeal No. 2011 of 2002:

This appeal is filed by the appellants who were not  

parties before the High Court against the judgment and  

order  dated  17.11.2000  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Andhra Pradesh in C.R.P. No. 2322 of 1996.

(a) Since  the  issues  which  arose  in  these  appeals  are  

similar, they were heard together and are being disposed  

of by this common judgment.  The facts in Civil Appeal No.  

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2012 of 2002 are sufficient for the disposal of  all  these  

appeals.  They are as under:

(b) A  property  consisting  of  29  acres  59  cents  in  T.S.  

No.11  and  old  T.S.  No.  507  of  Tirupathi  town  

originally belonged to the Plaintiff – Pedda Jeeyangar Mutt  

(hereinafter  called  ‘the  Mutt’)  –  respondent  herein.  The  

then  head  of  the  Mutt  granted  a  permanent  lease  in  

respect of 12 acres of land to one Kotilingam Subbaraya  

Chetti under a registered lease deed dated 8.01.1900.  He  

also granted a permanent lease in respect of 15 acres of  

land to one Shaik Budan Saheb under a registered lease  

deed dated 29.11.1915.    Shaik  Budan Saheb sold  the  

leasehold rights in equal halves to Narasimhaiah under a  

deed  dated  01.12.1919  and  Mandaram  Munikannaiah  

under a deed dated 19.08.1922.   Narasimhaiah sold his  

half  share  purchased  under  deed  dated  1.12.1919  to  

Mandaram Munikannaiah under a registered lease deed  

dated 19.08.1922.  Thus Mandaram Munikannaiah got 15  

acres from the said property and out of that he leased out  

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12  acres  of  land  to  Kotilingam  Subbaraya  Chetti  by  a  

registered lease deed dated 06.01.1919.  The Mutt  filed  

O.S.  No.152 of  1930 on the file  of  the District  Munsif’s  

Court,  Tirupathi,  against  Mandaram  Munikannaiah  in  

respect of  total  land.  During the pendency of  the suit,  

there  was  a  compromise  and  the  Mutt  executed  a  

registered permanent patta dated 11.03.1931 in favour of  

Mandaram Manikannaiah for the total land and he sold  

10 acres of land to Pappaiah under a registered sale deed  

dated 21.09.1935 and after his death, his son Polaiah sold  

the said land to Chittoor Siddaiah under a registered sale  

deed  dated  25.05.1938.   Polaiah  created  usufructory  

mortgage of the property in favour of Chithoor Siddaiah  

under a registered deed dated 07.06.1937 and eversince  

he is in possession of the property.  On 07.08.1964, the  

Mutt  filed  O.S.  No.  59  of  1964  before  the  Sub-Court,  

Chittoor  for  declaration  and  possession  which  was  

transferred to  Sub-Court,  Tirupathi  and renumbered as  

O.S. No. 7 of 1971 and  the same was dismissed by the  

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subordinate Judge.  Against the said judgment, Chittoor  

Siddaiah  (defendant  No.3  in  the  suit)  preferred  A.S.No.  

130  of  1973  and  one  S.Veeraswamy  Naidu  (defendant  

No.4 in the suit)  who was a purchaser from Mandaram  

Munikannaiah filed A.S. No. 243 of 1973   on the file of  

the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   The  High  Court  

allowed the said appeals.  In the year 1980, the Mutt –  

respondent herein, filed eviction petition bearing  A.T.C.  

No.  35  of  1980  and  the  same  was  dismissed  by  the  

Principal District Munsif-cum-Special Officer, Tirupathi by  

order dated 24.08.1987.   During the pendency of A.T.C.  

No. 35 of 1980, the Mutt filed O.S.No. 176 of 1981 on the  

file of the Additional sub-Court, Tirupathi for declaration  

and permanent injunction and the same was disposed of  

by holding that the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as  

permanent  owner  but  without  a  right  to  recover  

possession.   Against the order passed in A.T.C. No. 35 of  

1980,  the  Mutt  filed  ATC No.9  of  1987  under  the  A.P.  

Tenancy Act and the same was allowed by the Additional  

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District Judge vide order dated 03.06.1996. Aggrieved by  

the said order,  the appellants herein filed Civil  Revision  

Petition No.  2124 of  1996 before  the High Court  which  

was  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  on  17.11.2000.  

Following the judgment in Civil Revision Petition No. 2124  

of 1996, on the same day, the High Court dismissed Civil  

Revision Petition No.  2322 of  1996.  Hence the present  

appeals have been filed before this Court by way of special  

leave petitions.

2)   Heard Mr.  M.N. Rao,  learned senior counsel  for  the  

appellants and Mr. A.V. Rangam, learned counsel for the  

respondents.

3)  Before going into the merits of the claim made by both  

the parties, it is useful to refer the definition of “cultivating  

tenant” in Section 2(c) and “landlord” under Section 2(f) of  

the Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Tenancy At, 1956 (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the Act’):

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Section  2 (c) ““Cultivating tenant” means a person who cultivates by his  own labour or by that of any other members of his family or  by hired labour under his supervision and control, any land  belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or  implied, but does not include a mere intermediary”;

Section 2 (f) ““landlord” means the owner of a holding or part thereof who  is entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding  or  part,  and  includes  the  heirs,  assignees,  legal  representatives  of  such  owner  or  person  deriving  rights  through him”:

With  these  statutory  definitions  and  the  Mutt  having  

approached the authorities under the Act for eviction of  

the appellants,  let  us consider  the rival  claims.   In the  

earlier part of the pleadings, we have adverted to the case  

of both the parties, however, it is useful to trace the rival  

claim  briefly  hereinafter.   As  early  on  29.11.1915,  

permanent lease was executed in favour of Sheik Budan  

Saheeb in respect of 15 acres of land.  The suit land was  

sold by him into two halves one to Shri Narasimhaiah and  

another to Mandaram Munikannaiah.   Narasimhaiah sold  

his share to Mandaram Munikannaiah by sale deed dated  

19.08.1922.   

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4)  The Mutt granted 12 acres of land on permanent lease  

to one Kotilingam Subbaraya Chetti in the year 1919 and  

this land was occupied by Mandaram Munikannaiah.  It  

was pointed out that there is a condition in the lease deed  

dated 19.11.1915 that those land shall always remain as  

Modati Eeedu (1st Charge) for cist and pay Jodi payable to  

the Government.   

5)  The Mutt filed O.S. No. 152 of 1930 against Mandaram  

Munikannaiah  in  respect  of  the  land  occupied  by  him.  

During the pendency of the suit, there was a compromise  

and the Mutt executed a registered permanent lease Patta  

(though not a permanent lease) on 11.03.1931 in favour of  

Mandaram  Munikannaiah  for  the  total  extent  of  land,  

namely, 29 acres-59 cents.  It is useful to refer the terms  

of permanent lease patta dated 11.03.1931:

i)  Mandaram Munikannaiah shall enjoy entire schedule  

property by paying Rs. 25/- to the Mutt from Fasali 1340.

ii)    In future Mandaram Munikannaiah or his legal heirs  

can transfer etc.  the schedule mention land to any one  

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and such fact shall be intimated to Pedda Jeeyangar the  

Matadhipathy,  and  transfer  deed  shall  be  got  executed  

with his consent by the transferer.

iii)    The schedule mention land shall always been first  

Eeedu (1st Charge) for the said permanent lease amount.

iv)    The pedda Jeeyangar alone shall pay the usual jodi,  

Cess, etc. and cist to Government.

v)      Further Pedda Jeeyangar shall have a right to claim  

the  excess  amount  paid,  if  any,  to  Government  from  

Mandaram Munikannaiah.

vi)    Mandaram Munikannaiah shall  have absolute  and  

unlimited  rights  in  respect  of  schedule  mentioned  land  

and shall enjoy the same as per his wishes in perpetuity.

vii)     The Pedda Jeeyangar have no manner of right in  

respect  of  the  land  except  the  right  to  recover  theerva  

(rent).

6)  By pointing out the various clauses in the permanent  

lease,  Mr.  M.N.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

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appellants submitted that the Mutt has no right in respect  

of the property except to recover theerva (rent).

7)  An extent of land of 10 acres which is a subject matter  

of the said suit was sold to Pappaiah on 21.09.1935.  After  

the  death  of  Pappaiah,  his  son  Polaiah  became  the  

absolute owner of the subject matter of the suit property.  

By  registered  deed  dated  07.06.1937,  Polaiah  created  

usufructry mortgage of the property in favour of Chittoor  

Siddaiah (father  of  the  appellant)  and eversince  he  has  

been in possession and enjoyment of the property to the  

knowledge of the Mutt.  The materials placed further show  

that by a registered deed dated 25.05.1938 Polaiah sold  

the said 10 acres of land to Chittoor Siddaiah.

8)  In order to establish its right, title and possession, the  

Mutt filed O.S. No. 59 of 1964 before Sub-Court, Chittoor  

on  07.08.1964  which  was  subsequently  transferred  to  

Sub-Court  Tirupathi  and re-numbered as O.S.  No.  7 of  

1971.   In  the  said  suit  the  Mutt  is  the  plaintiff  and  

Thirumala  Tirupathi  Devasthanam  is  Defendant  No.  1,  

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Defendant No. 2 – Board of Trustees of TTD, Defendant  

No. 3 – Chittoor Siddhaiah, father of the present appellant  

and Defendant No. 4 is Veeraswamy Naidu.  In the plaint,  

it  was contended that  permanent  lease  deed  which  was  

executed in favour  of  Mandaram Munikannaiah was null  

and void and the same was barred under Section 29 of the  

Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,  

1929.  On the other hand, in the written statement, it was  

specifically contended that the subject matter of the land  

has been perfected by the predecessors of the appellant by  

adverse  possession.   On  03.10.1972,  the  Sub-Court  

Tirupathi  decreed  the  suit  holding  that  the  defendants  

have failed to pay the rents as tenants and, therefore, they  

are liable to be evicted.  The plea of adverse possession  

was rejected.  The Court also held that Defendant Nos. 3  

and  4  (appellants  herein)  are  only  entitled  to  

compensation  for  the  improvement  effected  in  the  field.  

Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellants  

herein filed appeal A.S. No. 130 of 1973 before the High  

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Court.  Defendant No. 4 has also filed an Appeal No. 243  

of 1973.  The Mutt has filed cross objections.  The High  

Court by a common judgment dated 12.10.1976 held that  

the  appellants  have  perfected  the  title  in  respect  of  

tenancy  rights  by  adverse  possession  and the  suit  was  

filed  beyond  the  period  of  limitation.   The  High  Court  

further held that the Act will apply to the facts of the case  

and observed that it would be open to the parties to take  

steps as may be open to them under the provisions of the  

Tenancy Act.  With the said observation, the High Court  

disposed  of  the  appeals  and  dismissed  the  cross  

objections filed by the Mutt.  It is important to point out  

that the judgment of the High Court in the above appeals  

become final as no appeal was preferred.   

9)  After the judgment of the High Court in A.S. No. 130 of  

1973, nearly after three years the Mutt filed ATC No. 35 of  

1980 under the A.P. Tenancy Act against the appellants  

for  eviction  on  the  ground  that  the  appellants  herein  

defaulted  in  payment  of  rent  from  1373  fasli  (1963  

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onwards).  It was highlighted by the appellants by filing  

reply contending that what was granted by the Mutt  in  

favour  of  Mandaram Munikannaiah  on  11.03.1931  was  

not a permanent lease but it was only a permanent patta.  

It was pointed out that the father of the appellants had  

purchased the suit property by way of registered sale deed  

dated 25.05.1938 and since then they are in continuous  

possession and enjoyment of the suit property.  Further it  

was contended that  the  appellants  even otherwise  have  

perfected  the  title  by  adverse  possession  and  therefore  

there is no relationship of landlord and tenants between  

the Mutt and the appellants.  In the same way, the ATC  

filed by the Mutt is barred by limitation.   

10)  During the pendency of ATC No. 35 of 1980, the Mutt  

filed O.S. No. 176 of 1981 on the file of additional Sub-

Court Tirupathi for declaration and permanent injunction.  

The suit was disposed of holding that the plaintiff therein  

is entitled for declaration as permanent owner but without  

right to recover possession.  Here again, the said finding  

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become final  as the Mutt  has not challenged the same,  

however, appeal was filed by the appellant herein against  

the order of granting injunction by the learned Judge in  

O.S. No. 176 of 1981.  The appeal A.S. No. 75 of 1989,  

which was also dismissed and second appeal filed by the  

appellants  herein  that  is  S.A.  No.  1081 of  2000 is  still  

pending on the file of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at  

Hyderabad.   

11)  On 24.08.1987, learned Judge dismissed ATC No. 35  

of  1980  holding  that  the  appellants  perfected  title  by  

adverse possession.  On 03.06.1996, ATA No. 9 of 1987  

filed by the Mutt was allowed without taking note of the  

dismissal of ATC 35 of 1980 filed by the very same Mutt.  

In those circumstances, Civil Revision No. 2124 of 1996  

was filed by the appellants before the High Court under  

Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Among  the  

several  contentions,  the  main  contention  raised  by  the  

appellants herein is that the judgment of the High Court  

in appeal A.S. No. 130 of 1973 became final and the Mutt  

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has lost the right to recover the land from the appellants  

herein.   The  judgment  would  operate  as  res  judicata  

against  the  Mutt.   However,  on  17.11.2000,  the  High  

Court dismissed the Civil  Revision No. 2124 of 1996 by  

holding  that  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  

between the appellants and the first respondent-the Mutt,  

does not suffer from any legal infirmity, not barred by any  

res judicata dismissed the revision.  As observed earlier,  

challenging the said order three appeals have been filed  

before this Court.   

12)  Now, we have to consider whether the decision of the  

High Court in holding that the findings given in A.S. No.  

130 of  1973,  the  earlier  judgment  on the same subject  

matter,  would not  operate  as  res  judicata, when in  the  

said decision the High Court had categorically held that  

the appellants perfected their title by adverse possession  

in  the  schedule  property  and  the  suit  is  barred  by  

limitation.   In  addition  to  the  same,  we  have  also  to  

consider whether the High Court is correct in holding that  

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the Mutt is entitled to recover the suit lands when there is  

irrevocable condition in the lease patta dated 11.03.1931  

wherein  it  is  stated  that  the  Mutt  is  entitled  only  for  

recovery of theerva (rent) and not the possession.   

13)   The  common  judgment  of  the  High  Court  dated  

12.10.1973 in A.S. No. 130 and 243 of 1973 with cross  

objections are available and placed before this Court as  

Annexure-P1.   After  narrating  the  entire  events  

commencing from permanent lease patta, the High Court  

came to  the  conclusion  a)   the  suit  for  eviction  of  the  

appellants  and  for  recovery  of  possession  is  not  

maintainable before a Civil Court b) a proceeding in that  

direction  is  maintainable  only  before  the  statutory  

designated authority under the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy  

Act,  1956 c)  the suit is barred by limitation and d) the  

appellants have perfected their title to the suit properties  

with respective tenancy rights.

14) Res Judicata  is defined under Section11 of the Code  

of Civil Procedure [CPC] as under:

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“No Court shall  try any suit  or issue in which the matter  directly  and  substantially  in  issue  has  been  directly  and  substantially  in  issue  in  a  former  suit  between  the  same  parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them  claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent  to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue  has  been  subsequently  raised,  and  has  been  heard  and  finally decided by such Court.”

Explanation I- The expression "former suit"  shall  denote a  suit  which has been decided prior  to  the suit  in question  whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation  II.-  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  the  competence of  a  Court  shall  be determined irrespective  of  any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of  such Court. Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the  former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied  or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have  been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  a  matter  directly  and  substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not  expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of  this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect  of public right or of a private right claimed in common for  themselves and others, all persons interested in such right  shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim  under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to  a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in  this  section  to  any  suit,  issue  or  former  suit  shall  be  construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the  execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding  and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. Explanation  VIII.-An issue heard  and finally  decided by a  Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue,  shall  operate  as  res  judicata  in  as  subsequent  suit,  notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was  not  competent  to  try  such subsequent  suit  or  the suit  in  which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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From the above,  it  is  clear  that  a court  is  barred from  

entertaining  an  issue  which  has  already  been  decided  

previously by any court of law.  

15) The appellants in the present case have argued that  

the decision of the High Court in  A.S. No. 130 of 1973  

fully resolved the issues arising in the present case and,  

thus, would bar their agitation now. In order to determine  

this question, we must look closely at the decision of the  

High Court and see what the Court actually held.

16) The  Mutt  had  approached  in  appeal  to  the  High  

Court in A.S. No. 130 of 1973 for declaration of the title of  

the  concerned  property  in  their  favour.  The  Court  held  

that  it  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  suit  for  

possession  against  the  defendants  owing  to  the  A.P.  

Tenancy Act, 1956. It was held that it was the Tahsildar  

acting under the Act who was competent to entertain such  

matters  relating  to  the  termination  of  tenancy  and  the  

eviction of the cultivating tenant. The court reached this  

conclusion  by  examining  the  Act  holding  that  the  

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relationship  of  Tenant-Landlord  is  established,  thus  

confirming  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Act  and  ousting  the  

jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Nevertheless, the court went  

on to determine the title of the property itself. Arguments  

were raised that the permanent lease or patta entered into  

would be in violation of Hindu Religious Endowments Act,  

and  thus  be  infructuous.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  

permanent  lease  deed  29.11.1915  is  ab  initio  void as  

sanction  was  not  obtained  from  the  Endowment  

Authorities  as  prescribed  under  the  Madras  Hindu  

Religious  and  Charitable  Endowments  Act,  1929  which  

prohibits any alienation, lease, sale or mortgage exceeding  

five years and the appellants who had purchased in good  

faith  and  continuing  in  possession  without  any  

interruption  since  1931,  have  perfected  their  title  by  

adverse  possession.   The  court  on  this  point  held  that  

since the suit had not been brought within the limitation  

period of 12 years, the appellants had perfected their title  

with  respect  of  tenancy  rights  on  the  basis  of  adverse  

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possession.

17) Therefore, the High Court in that instance held two  

things, (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the  

matters owing to the special process prescribed under the  

Tenancy  Act;  and  (2)  the  title  with  respect  of  tenancy  

rights was perfected  owing to adverse possession. These  

two rulings are not in conflict with each other,  and are  

equally  binding.  The jurisdiction of  the High Court  was  

ousted only to  a limited extent,  i.e.  with respect  to  the  

eviction of the tenants and possession of the property, as  

the procedure for that was provided under the Act.  But  

the Court continued to have jurisdiction with respect to  

the determination of the title of the property.  

18)  The  appellants  seem  to  have  misunderstood  the  

import of the High Court decision while relying on it for  

the purposes of  res judicata. The court, in no uncertain  

terms,  held  that  the  title  of  ownership  belongs  to  the  

present respondents, but the present appellants had the  

title  with  respect  of  tenancy  rights.  This  decision  was  

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perfected  by  non-appeal  and  is  binding  on  the  parties.  

Thus,  the  present  appellants  are not  the owners  of  the  

property, but tenants on conditions prescribed under the  

permanent  lease  patta  dated  11.03.1931  mentioned  

above. Thus, we hold that the decision of the High Court  

in 1973 would not bar any proceedings under the Tenancy  

Act as the issue decided by the court in that instance was  

merely the tenancy title in favour of the appellants, while  

the present case is eviction of tenants under Section 13 of  

the Act.

19) Coming to the next question, it has to be determined  

whether a permanent lease gives rise to a tenant-landlord  

relationship within the meaning of the Act. The appellants  

have  relied  upon  Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.’s  opinion  in  G.  

Veeraswamy v.  Uppardasta  Papanna,  1969  An.  W.R.  

359, where it was held that the Act applies only to tenancy  

agreements  and  not  to  permanent  tenancies.  We  must  

also note two other opinions regarding the interpretation  

of the application of the Act. In  U. Pappanna Sastri v.  

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Naga Venkata Satyavati,  AIR 1972 AP 53,  the  Court  

placed  reliance  on  K.  Sesharatnamma v.  A.  

Satyanarayana, 1963 (2) An. W.R. 32. It was held that  

the  pre-condition  for  establishing  the  tenant-landlord  

relationship is that the landlord should have reserved for  

himself the right to evict the tenant.  

20) Thus, a person shall qualify to be a landlord under  

the meaning of the Act if he is entitled to evict the tenant.  

Such  entitlement  can  arise  either  directly  due  to  the  

agreement entered into (i.e. by providing the time period of  

tenancy)  or  by  providing  the  conditions  or  terms  of  

tenancy violating which the tenant may be evicted under  

Section  13.  We  find  no  reason  why  a  permanent  lease  

which  provides  terms  would  not  result  in  a  tenant-

landlord  relationship  since  it  is  implied  in  such  an  

agreement  that  non  fulfillment  of  the  prescribed  terms  

would give the right to the landlord to evict the tenant.  

One such term can be payment of  periodic  rent,  which  

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exists in the present case. Thus, the respondents in the  

present case do qualify as landlords.

21) For  the  aforementioned  reasons,  we  hold  that  the  

present proceedings emerging from the ruling of the IIIrd  

Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, exercising the powers  

of  Appellate  Authority  under the A.P.  Tenancy Act does  

not suffer from any legal infirmity as the proceedings are  

not  barred  by  res  judicata.  Furthermore,  the  parties  

qualify as tenant-landlord and are, thus, amenable to the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Tenancy  Act.  In  view  of  categorical  

finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenants have  

committed default in payment of rent from fasli 1372 and  

never paid rent, they are liable to be evicted as per Section  

13  of  the  Act  which  was  rightly  affirmed  by  the  High  

Court.  We thus find no reason to interfere in the order of  

the High Court,  consequently,  all  the  three appeals  are  

dismissed with no order as to cost.

...…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)  

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...…………………………………J.  NEW DELHI;          (H.L. DATTU)  MARCH 8, 2010.   

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