REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    1473     OF 2009 ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1827 OF 2007

CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave is directed against final judgment  

and order dated 1st February, 2007 rendered by the High Court  

of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No. 62 of  

2004.  By  the  impugned  judgment,  the  High  Court  has  

dismissed the  Revision  Petition  filed  by  the  appellant  herein  

under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482 of the Code  

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”),  upholding  

the  order  passed  by  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Delhi,  

dated 8th January, 2004, framing charge against the appellant  

for commission of offence under Section 306 read with Section

34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”) arising  

out of FIR No. 329 of 2002 dated 4th July, 2002 registered at  

Police Station Mehrauli.

3. On 4th July,  2002,  one  Rahul  Kaushik  lodged  the  said  First  

Information Report  (FIR) with  Police Station,  Mehrauli  stating  

that his father Jitendra Sharma (hereinafter referred to as “the  

deceased”) had committed suicide on 3rd July, 2002 by shooting  

himself  with  his  licensed  revolver.  It  was  alleged  that  the  

deceased was a partner with the appellant in this appeal along  

with  two other  persons  viz.,  Jahuruddin and Mahavir  Prasad  

and  they  were  all  engaged  in  the  real  estate  business;  he  

committed suicide on account of the problems created by these  

three persons; the deceased left behind a suicide note which  

mentioned that there were some money transactions between  

them and thus, these three persons had abetted the deceased  

to  commit  suicide.  For  the sake of  ready reference,  relevant  

portion of the suicide note is extracted below:

“The money of Shri Bansi Dhar and Shri Grewal is with  Ram Pashre. The money of Shri Puri and Rajendra has  been given to Ramjan, Mehrauli by Jahur and Jahur has  become dishonest.  The money  of  B.C.  Malik  and  K.S.  Yadav  is  with  Mahesh,  who has  written  the  same and  given. The rest, the ex-SDE, Pamer Singh and had taken  and did not do Puri’s work.

My  children  known  nothing  about  this  matter.  C.K.  Chopra’s  money  has  been  given  by  Jahur,  Jahur  and  

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Chopra  are  saying  things  against  me  and  are  thereby  troubling me. Kartar etc., money was taken by Jahur and  Mahavir. They had taken it. The reason for the scandal  are Chopra and his friends. They are troubling me and  are pressurizing me to write all  this. I  am stressed and  therefore, going away.”

4. On completion  of  investigation,  the  police  filed  charge-sheet  

against  the  said  three  persons  including  the  appellant  for  

allegedly  committing  offence  punishable  under  Section  306  

read with Section 34 of the IPC. As per the charge-sheet, the  

case of the prosecution in short is that there appeared to be a  

dispute  between  the  deceased  and  the  appellant  regarding  

share of profits from the sale of the lands; prior to the incident,  

the deceased was asked to sign a settlement paper, according  

to which, the share of the deceased was reduced from 25% to  

10% in favour of one Tegh Singh Chabbra and the appellant,  

who were otherwise having 45% share each in the profits from  

sale  proceeds  of  lands  and  that  due  to  this  dispute,  the  

deceased  was  mentally  harassed  and  pressurized  by  the  

appellant and the other two accused, as a result whereof, the  

deceased committed suicide.

5. On being charge-sheeted, all the three accused were put up for  

trial before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge. The trial  

court felt satisfied that there was sufficient material on record  

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for framing of charge against all the three accused. Accordingly,  

on 8th January, 2004, the following charge was framed:

“…. That you all on 3.7.2002 at about 3.10 p.m. at house No.  108,  village  Saidulajake,  New  Delhi  in  furtherance  of  common intention, mentally tortured Jitender Sharma and  abetted him to commit suicide by your said act of mental  torture  and  thus  you  thereby  committed  an  offence  punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC  and within cognizance of this Court. ….”

6. Aggrieved by the framing of the charge, the appellant preferred  

a Revision Petition before the High Court. As already noted, the  

High Court declined to interfere with the order framing charge.  

Being dissatisfied with the said order,  the appellant  (accused  

No.1) is before us in this appeal.

7.  We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

8. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  

the appellant, submitted that even if the case of the prosecution  

is accepted on its face value, still on the basis of the material  

brought  on record  by the prosecution,  offence  under  Section  

306, IPC is not made out against the appellant. Referring to the  

undated  suicide  note  (Annexure  P-1)  and  the  document  

recording some final settlement (Annexure P-3), learned senior  

counsel was at pains to explain that even assuming for the sake  

of  argument,  that  there  was  some  ‘settlement’  between  the  

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deceased,  the  appellant  and  the  said  Tegh  Singh  Chabbra,  

whereunder  the deceased was  allegedly  forced to  forego his  

share of profits in favour of the said Tegh Singh Chabbra, the  

settlement  neither  shows  any  instigation  on  the  part  of  the  

appellant to the deceased to do something, nor any role of the  

appellant  in  any  conspiracy  which  ultimately  resulted  in  the  

commission  of  suicide  by  the  deceased,  and  therefore,  the  

appellant cannot be said to have abetted commission of suicide  

by  the  deceased.  It  was  also  argued  that  since  as  per  the  

suicide note, the deceased owed some money to the appellant,  

he would not encourage or provoke his debtor to commit suicide  

so as to lose his money. In support of the proposition that to  

attract the offence of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, an  

intentional aiding and active complicity is an essential ingredient  

of said provision, learned counsel relied on the decision of this  

Court in  Shri Ram Vs. The State of U.P.1.  Reliance was also  

placed on the decisions of this Court in State of Maharashtra &  

Ors. Vs. Som Nath Thapa & Ors.2 and State of Maharashtra  

Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj3 to contend that the trial court had  

failed to apply its mind to the question whether or not there was  

any ground for presuming that the appellant had committed the  

1 (1975) 3 SCC 495 2 (1996) 4 SCC 659 3 (1997) 4 SCC 393

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alleged offence.

9. Per  contra,  Mr.  Mohan  Jain,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  State,  supported  the  

decision of the High Court. He submitted that the suicide note  

cannot  be  read  de  hors  the  other  material,  including  the  

statements of some of the persons recorded during the course  

of investigations. It was contended that there is ample material  

on  record  for  presuming  that  the  accused,  including  the  

appellant,  have  abetted  the  commission  of  suicide  by  the  

deceased.  The learned  counsel  thus,  submitted  that  the  trial  

court has not committed any illegality in framing charge against  

the  appellant  and,  therefore,  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  

dismissing  the  Revision  Petition  filed  by  the  appellant,  

particularly when the scope of revision is very limited.

10. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:

“306. Abetment of suicide  

If  any  person  commits  suicide,  whoever  abets  the  commission  of  such  suicide,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment of either description for a term which may  extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”  

11. From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to constitute  

an  offence  under  Section  306  IPC,  the  prosecution  has  to  

establish: (i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii) that such  

suicide was abetted by the accused. In other words, an offence  

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under Section 306 would stand only if there is an “abetment” for  

the  commission  of  the  crime.  The  parameters  of  “abetment”  

have  been  stated  in  Section  107  of  the  IPC,  which  defines  

abetment of a thing as follows:

“107. Abetment of a thing

A person abets the doing of a thing, who -

First-   Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly-  Engages  with  one  or  more  other  person  or  persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an  act  or  illegal  omission takes place in pursuance of  that  conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly-   Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,  the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation,  or  by wilful  concealment  of  a material  fact  which he is  bound  to  disclose,  voluntarily  causes  or  procures,  or  attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said  to instigate the doing of that thing.”

12. As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in  

doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing;  

or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons  

in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal  

omission takes place in pursuance of  that  conspiracy,  and in  

order to the doing of that thing; or  thirdly, intentionally aids, by  

any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation  

to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful  

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concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may  

also come within the contours of “abetment”. It is manifest that  

under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or  

persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is  

essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of the  

IPC.

13. Therefore,  the  question  for  consideration  is  whether  the  

allegations  levelled  against  the  appellant  in  the  FIR  and  the  

material  collected  during  the  course  of  investigations,  would  

attract any one of the ingredients of Section 107 IPC?  

14. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to  

have abetted in doing of a thing, who “instigates” any person to  

do that thing. The word “instigate” is not defined in the IPC. The  

meaning  of  the  said  word  was  considered  by  this  Court  in  

Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh4.  Speaking for the  

three-Judge Bench, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was)  

said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or  

encourage  to  do  “an  act”.  To  satisfy  the  requirement  of  

“instigation”, though it is not necessary that actual words must  

be  used  to  that  effect  or  what  constitutes  “instigation”  must  

necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence.  

Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be  4 (2001) 9 SCC 618

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capable of being spelt  out.  Where the accused had, by his  

acts  or  omission  or  by  a  continued  course  of  conduct,  

created such circumstances that the deceased was left with  

no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an  

“instigation” may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit  

of  anger  or  emotion  without  intending  the  consequences  to  

actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

15. Thus, to constitute “instigation”, a person who instigates another  

has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an act by the  

other by “goading” or “urging forward”. The dictionary meaning  

of  the  word  “goad”  is  “a  thing  that  stimulates  someone  into  

action:  provoke  to  action  or  reaction”  (See: Concise  Oxford  

English  Dictionary);  “to  keep  irritating  or  annoying  somebody  

until he reacts”  (See:  Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary –  

7th Edition).  Similarly,  “urge”  means  to  advise  or  try  hard  to  

persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to  

move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by  

pushing  or  forcing  such  person.  Therefore,  a  person  who  

instigates another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with  

intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by  

the  latter.  As  observed  in  Ramesh  Kumar’s case  (supra),  

where  the  accused  by his  acts  or  by  a  continued  course  of  

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conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left  

with no other option except to commit suicide, an “instigation”  

may  be  inferred.  In  other  words,  in  order  to  prove  that  the  

accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be  

established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying  

the  deceased by  words,  deeds or  wilful  omission  or  conduct  

which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or  

pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful  

omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more  

quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the  

intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit  

suicide while acting in the manner noted above.  Undoubtedly,  

presence  of  mens  rea  is  the  necessary  concomitant  of  

instigation.

16. In the background of this legal position, we may advert to the  

case at hand.  The question as to what is the cause of a suicide  

has no easy answers because suicidal ideation and behaviours  

in  human  beings  are  complex  and  multifaceted.  Different  

individuals  in  the same situation react  and behave differently  

because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus  

accounting  for  individual  vulnerability  to  suicide.  Each  

individual’s suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective  

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experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-respect.  Each  

of these factors are crucial and exacerbating contributor to an  

individual’s vulnerability to end his own life,  which may either  

be  an  attempt  for  self-protection  or  an  escapism  from  

intolerable self.

17. In the present case, the charge against the appellant is that he  

along  with  other  two  accused  “in  furtherance  of  common  

intention”,  mentally  tortured  Jitendra  Sharma  (the  deceased)  

and abetted him to commit  suicide by the said act  of  mental  

torture.  It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment  

or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have  

been uttered with mens rea.  The onus is on the prosecution to  

show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take  

an extreme step to bring an end to his life.  In the present case,  

apart  from  the  suicide  note,  extracted  above,  statements  

recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to  

show that on account of business transactions with the accused,  

including  the  appellant  herein,  the  deceased  was  put  under  

tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps  

not willing to do.  Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the  

appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was  

left  with no other option except to end his life and, therefore,  

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clause  firstly  of Section 107 of the IPC was attracted.  Briefly  

dealing  with  the  material  available  on  record,  in  the  order  

directing framing of charge against the appellant,  the learned  

trial court has observed as under:

“In  the  present  case  the  evidence  shows  threatening  given to the deceased.  One witness called Kartar Singh  says that CK Chopra was heard saying to the deceased  that the deceased had become dishonest because he was  refusing to sign a paper in which the share in some joint  property  was shown to  be 10%.  On another  occasion  Chopra  was  heard  by  this  witness  to  say  that  Chopra  would ruin the deceased if he did not give up his claim for  25% and did not agree to accept 10%.  Witness Padam  Bahadur has stated inter  alia that  he overheard Jahoor  and Mahavir telling the deceased that Chopra had asked  them to say that this was the last opportunity to sign the  document and that if he wanted to live in the society he  should sign the agreement or should die by taking poison.  Soon thereafter the deceased committed suicide.

Thus the evidence is not of a mere quarrel in which one  person  told  the  other  go  and  die  without  actually  suggesting that the opponent should commit suicide.  In  the  present  case  the  evidence  collected  by  the  investigation suggest that the deceased had been actually  pushed to the wall and the escape by committing suicide  was suggested by the accused persons.”

18. In the light of the material on record, in our judgment, it cannot  

be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an inference  

that  the  appellant  had  “instigated”  the  deceased  to  commit  

suicide and, therefore, there was ground for presuming that the  

appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section  

306 read with Section 34 IPC.  It  is trite that at the stage of  

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framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material  

and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts  

emerging  therefrom,  taken  at  their  face  value,  disclose  the  

existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence  

or  offences.   For  this  limited  purpose,  the  court  may sift  the  

evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to  

accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states.  At this  

stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to  

find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has  

committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the  

conclusion that  it  is  not  likely  to  lead to  a conviction.   (See:  

Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi  & Ors.  Vs.  Jitendra  

Bhimraj Bijja & Ors5).

19. In  Som Nath Thapa & Ors.  (supra),  a three-Judge Bench of  

this  Court  explained  the  meaning  of  the  word  “presume”.  

Referring  to  dictionary meanings of  the  said  word,  the  Court  

observed thus:

“…if on the basis of materials on record, a court could  come  to  the  conclusion  that  commission  of  the  offence  is  a  probable  consequence,  a  case  for  framing of charge exists.  To put it differently, if the  Court  were  to  think  that  the  accused  might  have  committed the offence it  can frame the charge, though  for  conviction  the  conclusion  is  required  to  be  that  the  accused has commuted the offence.  It is apparent that at  

5 (1990) 4 SCC 76

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the  stage  of  framing  of  charge,  probative  value  of  the  materials  on  record  cannot  be gone into;  the  materials  brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted  as true at that stage”.

(emphasis supplied)

20. In  view  of  the  settled  legal  position,  noted  above,  we  are  

convinced that the trial court was correct in law in coming to the  

conclusion that a case for framing charge against the appellant  

had been made out.  Similarly, the scope of revisional powers of  

the High Court under Section 401 of the Code being limited, the  

High  Court  was  justified  in  dismissing  the  Revision  Petition,  

preferred by the appellant.

21. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in  

this  appeal,  which  is  dismissed  accordingly.   It  goes  without  

saying that nothing said by the High Court or by us hereinabove  

shall be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of  

the case pending trial.

                             ……………………………………….J.       (D.K. JAIN)

 ……………………………………..…J.                        (H.L. DATTU)

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 10, 2009.

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