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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 917-918  of  1998 Appeal (civil)  1265-66  of  2001

PETITIONER: SMT. CHITRA KUMARI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/02/2001

BENCH: V.N. Khare & S.N. Variava.

JUDGMENT:

S. N. VARIAVA, J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J     Leave  granted in S.L.P.  (C) Nos.  22436-22437 of 1997. These  Appeals can be disposed off by this common  Judgment. It  must be first mentioned that these Appeals were on board along  with  three other Civil Appeals.  After arguments  on behalf  of  the Appellants had taken place Civil Appeal  No. 3221  of  1991,  Civil Appeal No.  3503 of  1991  and  Civil Appeal  No.   4133 of 1991 were withdrawn by the  Appellants therein.

   In these Appeals the Appellants have land with bungalows in  Ambala  Cantonment  area.  As is being  pointed  out  in greater  detail  hereafter, the cases had, till this  stage, proceeded  on  the footing that the land was granted to  the predecessors  of  these  Appellants on  "old  grant  terms". These Appeals therefore are fully covered by the decision of this  Court  in  the  case of Chief  Executive  Officer  vs. Surendra Kumar Vakil reported in (1999) 3 SCC 555.

   Before  arguments are considered facts in these  Appeals need  to  be noted.  In Civil Appeal Nos.  917-918  of  1998 Notice  of Resumption was given on 28th September, 1973.   A Suit  bearing  No.   280 of 1975 was filed in the  Court  of Senior  Sub-Judge,  Ambala, wherein the Order of  resumption was  challenged.  In the Suit it was, inter alia, averred as follows:

   "4.   That the order of resumption of the above bungalow is  illegal, invalid, malafide, whimsical,  unconstitutional and in-effective against the rights of the plaintiffs, inter alia, on the following grounds:-

(a)             xxx             xxx             xxx

   (b)  That in the first instance, it is wholly  incorrect that  the  site on which the building is standing is an  old grant  as  alleged by the defendant No.  2.   However,  even

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notice  of assumption, which the plaintiffs do not admit, in that  event  too, the Government has no right to resume  the property in the manner as alleged.  "

   The  Respondents in the Written Statement contended that the  land was on old grant terms and that they were entitled to  resume.  The trial Judge, inter alia, raised an issue to the following effect:

   "1.   Whether  the impugned resumption order is  illegal and  in  operative as alleged in para no.  4 of  the  plaint OPP."

   Strictly  speaking a specific and separate Issue on this aspect  would have had to be raised.  Such a specific  Issue was  not  raised  as, for reasons set out hereafter,  it  is clear that this contention raised in para 4(b) was not being pressed.  However, it is arguable that Issue No.  4 as it is framed  covered, amongst others, the ground of challenge  on the  basis that the land on which the building was  standing was  not on old grant basis.  Parties then led evidence.  In these Appeals the Appellants have not relied on the evidence led  by them.  But the original record is before the  Court. It could not be shown to us that Plaintiff/Appellant led any evidence  claiming ownership of land in question or  denying title  of  Respondents.  Admittedly documents shown  to  the Court  were  not  tendered as Exhibits.  On the  other  hand Respondents   tendered  and  got   marked  as  Exhibits,  an admission  in  writing by Appellants predecessors  that  the land  was on old grant terms, a copy of GGO No.  179 of 12th September,  1836 and the Register of Land Records.   Parties then  argued  their respective cases.  Ultimately, the  Suit was  decreed  by a Judgment dated 27th November, 1978.   The Judgment sets out the submissions which have been made under the  aforesaid  Issue No.  1.  In the submissions,  as  have been  reproduced in the Judgment, there is no submission  to the  effect that the land was not under the old grant  basis and/or that the Respondents were not the owners of the land. The  entire submission, under Issue No.  1, has been on  the basis  that  the  Appellants had not been heard  before  the Notice of Resumption was issued and/or that compensation had been  fixed in an arbitrary manner.  The Court has  accepted this   submission  and  held   that,  without  fixation   of compensation  and an opportunity of being heard, an order of resumption  could not be passed.  We have perused the entire Judgment.   In the entire Judgment there is no reference  to any  submission  that  the land was not under an  old  grant and/or that the Respondents were not the owners of the land. Even  though,  the  Suit has been decreed  and  a  permanent injunction passed in favour of the Appellants, the Court was careful  enough  to  hold  as  follows:   "In  view  of  the evidence,  reasons and findings set out above, a decree  for declaration  is  passed  in  favour of  the  plaintiffs  and against the defendants with costs, that the resumption order is illegal, void and ineffective and is not binding upon the plaintiffs  and  a decree for permanent injunction  is  also passed,  restraining  the defendants from dispossessing  the plaintiffs from the property in dispute except in due course of law."

        (Emphasis supplied)

   It  is thus to be seen that the even while decreeing the Suit  the  Court  has  held   that  the  Respondents   could dispossess  the  Plaintiffs by following due course of  law.

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The  question  of  dispossessing  the  Plaintiffs/Appellants would  not  arise if the Appellants were the owners  of  the land  and the land was not under an old grant.  This clearly shows  that  point  was not pressed before the  Trial  Court and/or  that if this point was pressed it has not been  held in  favour of Plaintiff/Appellant.  If the point was pressed then  it  must  be deemed to have been decided  against  the Appellant  as Court has permitted dispossession by following due course of law.

   The Respondents then filed an Appeal before the District Judge, Ambala.  No cross Appeal was filed by the Appellants. The  District  Judge dismissed the Appeal on 6th  September, 1979.   We  have  read the Judgment of the  District  Judge. Here  also there is no claim that the land was not under  an old  grant.   The  District  Judge has  also  in  the  final paragraph of his Judgment held as follows:

   "9.   Lest there be any misunderstanding it is clarified that  neither  the  assailed order dated 27.11.1978  of  the learned trial Court nor the judgment in this appeal would in any  way  stand  in  the way of Union  of  India  initiating proceedings  for  resumption  of  the  disputed  land  after compliance of the statutory formalities."

   This clarification could only have been issued, provided it  was  an admitted position that the land belonged to  the Union  of  India and that they could resume it by  following due  process  of  law.   If there had been a  claim  to  the ownership  of the land by the Appellants such  clarification could not have been issued.

   The  Respondents  then filed a Second Appeal before  the High  Court  of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.  During  the pendency  of this Appeal, this Court in the case of Union of India  vs.   Harish Chand Anand reported in 1995 Supp.   (4) SCC  113, held that the Respondents were entitled to  resume the  land  without prior determination of the amount of  the structure.   This  Court  held that the view that it  was  a condition  precedent  for the Respondents to give notice  to the  parties concerned, determine the compensation and  then only  resume the property was not correct.  It was held that the  view  taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of  Raj Singh  vs.   Union of India reported in AIR 1973 Delhi  169, was  a correct view and that the Government could resume the land  merely by giving one month’s notice.  It was held that the  amount  may  have  to be  determined  after  giving  an opportunity but that this could be done thereafter.  As this Court  had now finally laid down the law and as the Judgment of  the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court were  only on  the basis that prior opportunity of being heard had  not been  given,  the  High  Court by  its  Judgment  dated  7th November,  1997 reversed the Judgment of the Trial Court  as well  as  the first Appellate Court and dismissed the  Suit. In its Judgment the High Court observed as follows:

   "It  is  not  in  dispute that  the  plaintiffs  are  in possession  of the property in dispute on what are known  as ’old  grant’  terms.  The terms are contained in  order  No. 179 of 12-12-1836 issued by the Governor General of India in Council and have been produced on record."

   Thus  it is to be seen that before the High Court it had not  been disputed that the land was under an old grant term and  that  the terms of the old grant had been  produced  on

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record.

   At  this  stage,  it must be mentioned that  this  Court again had occasion to consider whether the view taken by the Delhi  High  Court in Raj Singh’s case (supra) was  correct. This  Court  has, in the case of Union of India & Anr.   vs. Tek  Chand  and  ors.  reported in (1999) 3 SCC  565,  again approved the view in Raj Singh’s case.

   As  the  Appellants were now non-suited on the basis  of law  finally  laid  down by this Court, they filed  on  10th December,  1997 a Review Petition.  In this Review Petition, for  the  first time, they sought to raise a point that  the land was not under the old grant terms.  For the first time, after  all  these  years,  they sought to  rely  on  certain documents  and seek a clarification from the High Court that its  comments to the effect that "it was not in dispute that the  land was on old grant terms" were not correct and  that the  same  should  be  deleted.  It was  now  sought  to  be contended  that they had never admitted that the land was on old  grant terms.  This Review Petition came to be dismissed on  24th December, 1997.  Thus the High Court has  confirmed that  at the time when the original Appeal was argued it was not  in  dispute  that the land was under old  grant  terms. Civil  Appeals  Nos.  917-918 of 1998 are filed against  the Judgment  dated 10th November, 1997 and the order dated 24th December, 1997.

   In   Civil  Appeals  arising  out   of  SLP   (C)   Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997 also the bungalow and land are in Ambala Cantonment.   The  notice  of resumption was given  on  30th July,  1971.   The  Suit  was  filed in  the  Court  of  the Sub-Judge, Ist Class, Ambala.  In this Suit it was contended that it was not proved that the land was on old grant terms. It  was  also urged that the terms of the old grant did  not permit  resumption of land.  However, no evidence was led to prove  that plaintiffs were owners.  Plaintiff/Appellant and his witnesses did not depose that land did not belong to the Respondents.   The Respondents had brought on record and got exhibited  an  admission in writing, by the predecessors  of the  Appellants,  that the land was on old grant terms,  the GGO  No.  179 dated 12th September, 1836 and the Register of Land  Records.   In  this case on the basis of  evidence  on record the Trial Court dismissed the Suit.

   The Appellants then filed an Appeal.  In the Appeal also it was contended that it was not proved that the land was on old grant terms.  The Appellate Court, after considering the evidence,  dismissed the Appeal on 3rd September, 1986.  The Appellants  then  filed  a Letters Patent Appeal  which  was dismissed  by  the High Court on 8th July, 1997.   A  Review Petition  was also filed and the same was also dismissed  on 7th  October,  1997.  Thus in this case the Appellants  have lost in all Courts.  All Courts have, on evidence and facts, held against the Appellants.

   It  must be mentioned that, in some other case filed  by these  Appellants  in 1990, an application is  made  calling upon  the  Respondents to produce the old grant and  certain other  documents.  In that Suit the Respondents have replied that the original records regarding the bungalow in question and the Notification through GGO 179 of 12th September, 1836 were  applied to the Ambala Cantonment, but that the  papers showing  that  Ambala  Cantonment  was   a  station  of  the Bangalore  Army  and the Notification were not available  on

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record.

   These  are the facts in brief.  Now let us consider  the submissions.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina  submitted  that  his  case  was  not covered  by  the  decision in Harish Chand’s  case  (supra). Relying  on Para 4(b) of the Plaint, which has been set  out hereinabove,  he  submitted  that  his  clients  had  always disputed that the land was on old grant basis.  He submitted that  in  the  Suit the old grant has not  been  brought  on record  by  the Respondents till date.  He pointed out  that all that had been brought on record was the cyclostyled copy of the Governor General in Council Order No.  179 dated 12th September,  1836.   He submitted that this was not  the  old grant.   He submitted that the grant would necessarily  have to  be  a  registered document.  He submitted  that  as  the Respondents  were contending that the land was on old  grant terms,  it  was for the Respondents to prove their  case  by producing  the old grant.  Mr.  Andhyarujina submitted  that an admission did not confer title.  He submitted that if the Respondents  were  claiming to be owners of the land it  was for them to prove their ownership.

   He  submitted that the Appellants had ample evidence  to show  that they were the owners of the land.  In support  of this  he  relied  upon a Sale Deed dated  21st  April,  1926 between Milliam Robert Pearce and George Erner Sysmes on the one  hand  and Lala Balmokand Bhalla on the other.  In  this Deed  it  is  recided  that one  Lewis  Herbert  Robbin  had appointed  the vendors as his executors to administrate  his affairs  and that the said Lewis Herbert Roobin had  expired on  1st  May,  1925.  It is stated that the  Will  had  been proved in the High Court at Lahore and that the vendors were now  the  owners of the property and were selling the  same. He pointed out that the recital showed that the property was on  a  perpetual lease free from rent from the Secretary  of State  for  India in Council.  He submitted that this was  a registered  document which showed that the land in  question was not under old grant terms.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina  also relied upon a Lease dated  28th August, 1936, wherein Lala Balmokand Bhalla had leased out a dwelling  house  along  with  out houses  and  land  to  the Secretary  of State for India in Council.  He submitted that if  the  land  was  on old grant terms, then  there  was  no question  of  the  predecessors in title of  the  Appellants leasing  out the land to the Secretary of State for India in Council.   Mr.   Andhyarujina also relied upon another  Sale Deed  dated  25th January, 1943, by which  Balmokand  Bhalla sold  the  property to Lala Padam Pershad and  Lala  Mahabir Pershad.

   Mr.  Andhyarujina submitted that if this land was on old grant  terms,  then not only the lease would not  have  been executed,  but such sales could not have taken place as  the old  grant  terms  did not permit transfer  without  written permissions.   At this stage it must be noticed that none of these  documents  had  been brought on record in  the  Suit. These documents had been annexed for the first time, only in the Review Petition filed in the High Court.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina  submitted that earlier the  Himachal Pradesh  High  Court had, in the case of Durga Das  Sud  vs. Union  of  India reported in AIR 1972 HP 26, taken the  view

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that  principles of natural justice had to be complied  with and  that no notice of resumption could be given unless  and until  compensation  was  first   fixed  after  hearing  the concerned  parties.  He pointed out that the Allahabad  High Court  had taken the same view in the case of Mohan  Agarwal vs.   Union  of  India reported in AIR 1979 All.   170.   He submitted  that  this  was  the  law  which  prevailed.   He submitted  that because of this law the trial Court took  an easy  way  out  and decided his clients’ suit  only  on  the narrow  point  of principles of natural justice  not  having been  followed.   He  submitted  that it  has  nowhere  been mentioned  that his clients had not pursued or had given  up their  case  that the land was not on old grant  terms.   He submitted  that merely because the Trial Court took an  easy way  out  and  did not decide all the points  urged  by  his clients  would be no reason for depriving the Appellants  of their  valuable right.  He submitted that as his clients had succeeded  in  the trial Court they did not need to file  an Appeal.   He submitted that before the first Appellate Court also his clients succeeded.  He submitted that only in 1995, in  Harish  Chand’s case (supra), this Court  overruled  the view  taken by Allahabad High Court and the Himachal Pradesh High  Court and approved a contrary view taken by the  Delhi High  Court in Raj Singh’s case (supra).  He submitted  that the  trial Court and Appellate Court decided in his  clients favour  only  on  the basis of the law  then  existing.   He submitted that the Courts chose to decide the case merely on one  point,  even though his clients had at all  stages  not given  up the case that the land was not on old grant terms. He  submitted  that  his  client cannot be  made  to  suffer because the Courts chose not to decide other aspects.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina relied upon Section 110 of the Indian Evidence  Act and submitted that whenever a question  arises whether  any person is the owner of anything of which he  is shown  to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not  the  owner is on the person who affirms that he is  not the  owner.   He  submits  that  the  Appellants  and  their predecessors in title have been in possession since at least 1926.   He  submits  that  the burden was  entirely  on  the Respondents  to  show  that they were not  the  owners.   He submits  that  the only way that the burden could have  been discharged  was  to produce the old grant.  He submits  that merely  producing a Register in which it has been  mentioned that  the property is on old grant terms is not  sufficient. He submits that the Register and the copy of GGO 179 of 1836 would  be  secondary  evidence.   He  submitted  that   such evidence  would be barred under the provisions of Section 91 of  the Indian Evidence Act unless it was shown that the old grant  was not available.  He submitted that in this case no evidence  had been led to show that the old grant, if  there was  one,  had  been lost or misplaced or that  it  was  not available.  He submitted that mere production of Register or a cyclostyled copy of the terms of the grant was no evidence at all.

   In  support of his submission he relied upon the case of Union  of India vs.  Purushotam Dass Tandon reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 720.  In this case Allahabad Polytechnic filed an interpleader Suit as there was a dispute between the persons who  had let out the property to them and the Union of India as  to  the ownership of the property.  In the  interpleader Suit the question was whether the person who had let out the property  to  the Polytechnic was the owner or  whether  the Union  of  India was the owner of that property.  The  Court

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held  that the burden to prove its title was on the Union of India and that it should discharge their burden by producing the  old  grant.  The Court held that the Court should  know the terms and the date of the grant and that an admission in a  standard  draft for seeking permission of the  Cantonment Board  for  transfer was no proof of title.  However, to  be noted,  this  was a case where the question of title of  the Union was in serious dispute.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina also relied upon the authority in the case  of P.  T.  Anklesaria vs.  H.  C.  Vashistha  reported in  AIR  1980 Bombay 9.  In this case the land and house  in the  Pune Cantonment were sought to be resumed.   Resumption was  challenged  on the ground that this was not  Government land.   It was held that it cannot be said that all land  in the Cantonment were Government land and there was no land of private  ownership  in the Cantonment.  It was held that  it had  first  to be established that the land belonged to  the Government.   It  was  held that even though  there  may  be entries  in  the Register of the Government,  those  entries raised no presumption that they are true, until the contrary is  proved.   It  must also be mentioned  that  this  matter ultimately  came  up  before  this Court.   This  Court  has remitted  the matter back to the High Court with  permission to  the Union to lead proper evidence, if it so chose.  This again  was a case where there was a dispute whether the land belonged to the Government.

   Mr.   Andhyarujina then submitted that there was nothing to  show  that the GGO No.  179 dated 12th  September,  1836 applied  to Ambala.  He submitted that there was nothing  to show  that  Ambala  was part of the Bengal  Army.   In  this behalf  he  referred to the reply filed by the  Respondents, wherein it has been stated as follows:

   "8.   G.G.O.  179 of 12.9.1836 is applicable to all  the cantonments of India.  For the purpose of administration the Bengal Army was organized in two portions the Bengal Command and  the  Punjab Command.  The Punjab Command  included  the Peshwar  Cantonment.   Notes on old grant terms in  Military Land Manual are being filed as ANNEXURE-R- 2."

   He  submitted  that  in support of this  contention  the Respondents  were relying upon the Extract from the Military Land  Manual  which had been annexed to the said  Affidavit. He  pointed  out that in this Extract there was not  a  word about  Ambala.   He  submitted  that in  the  Rejoinder  the Appellants  have  denied that Ambala fell within the  Bengal Army.

   Mr.   Yogeshwar  Prasad on behalf of the Appellants,  in Civil  Appeals  arising out of SLP (C) Nos.  22436-22437  of 1997,  supported  Mr.   Andhyarujina in his  arguments.   He further submitted that in his case it was all along disputed that the land was on old grant.  He submitted that the grant had  not been produced in this case.  He pointed out that in the  subsequent  Suit  which was filed in 1990 it  had  been admitted that these papers were not available.  He submitted that Ambala became a Cantonment only in 1845.  Threfore, GGO 179  of  1836  could  not  possibly  apply  to  Ambala.   He submitted  that in his case also there was no proof to  show that the land was on old grant terms.  Mr.  Yogeshwar Prasad also  relied  on  certain  Sale  Deeds  and  a  Lease  Deed. However,  these  have been produced, for the first time,  in this Appeal.

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   On  the other hand, Mr.  Rohtagi submitted that in Civil Appeal  Nos.   917-918 of 1998 it was an  admitted  position that  the land was on old grant terms.  He submits in  Civil Appeals  (arising out of SLP (C) Nos.  22436-22437 of  1997) that  on  facts  all  Courts  had  held  in  favour  of  the Respondents.   He  points  out that in both  the  cases  the Appellants   or  the  predecessors   had  given   affidavits admitting the fact that the land was on old grant terms.  He points out that the affidavits were tendered in evidence and marked  as  exhibits and/or are on record.  He submits  that the  notices of resumption were given in 1971 and 1973.   He submits  that Mr.  Andhyarujina’s clients have litigated for the last approximately 17 years on an admitted position that the  land was on old grant terms.  He submits that it is now too  late  in the day and would be a travesty of justice  if they  were  to  be  permitted to resile  from  the  admitted position  and  at this belated stage be allowed  to  contend that  the land did not belong to the Government.  He submits that Mr.  Yogeshwar Prasad’s clients have lost in all Courts on facts and have not been able to show that the findings of the Courts below are not based on evidence in that case.

   Mr.   Rohtagi  pointed  out, from the  original  records which  were  available in this Court, that in  Civil  Appeal Nos.  917-918 of 1998 the Appellants had given evidence.  He pointed  out  that  in  the evidence there was  not  even  a statement that the Appellants or their predecessors were the owners  of  the property and/or that the Government was  not the  owner of the land.  He points out that in this case the documents  which have been relied upon by Mr.   Andhyarujina were  not  part of the record and had  been  surreptitiously brought  on record by way of Review Petition only after  the High  Court  delivered  the impugned Judgment.   He  further points out that in the Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP (C) Nos.  22436-22437 of 1997) some documents have been produced for  the  first time in the Appeal and are now sought to  be relied  upon.  He submits that the ratios laid down, in  the cases  of  P.   T.  Anklesaria and  Purushotam  Dass  Tandon (supra),  have  no application to these cases.   He  submits that  those were cases where it was denied that the land was on  old  grant  terms.  He submits that in those  cases  the Government  was required to prove that it was the owner  and had  failed to do so.  He submits that in one of these cases it  has  been an admitted position that the land was on  old grant terms and in the other all Courts have, on facts, held in  favour of the Respondents.  He further points out  that, even  though  it  was not necessary, in  Civil  Appeal  Nos. 917-918  of  1998, the witness of the Government  had  given evidence that this is a Government land.  He points out that the  witness  has  produced  the Register  of  land  records showing  that the land is on old grant terms.  He points out that  the witness has produced GGO 179 dated 12th September, 1836.  He submits that even in Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP  (C)  Nos.   22436-22437  of 1997)  the  Government  has produced  the  Register  of Land records and  the  GGO.   He submits  that in both the cases the Government has  produced written admissions of the parties or their predecessors that the land was on old grant terms.

   He  submits  that these cases are fully covered  by  the authority  of  this  Court in Surendra  Kumar  Vakil’s  case (Supra).   He further submits that an admission is a  strong piece  of evidence and is relevant and admissible by  virtue of  Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act.  He submits  that

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such  an  admission  would be binding unless he is  able  to explain away such admission.  He submits that neither of the Appellants  have  given any explanation or even stated  that the  admission  was  given under force  or  compulsion.   He submits that counsel cannot for the first time, in arguments during  SLP, supply explanation on behalf of their  clients. He  submits that the Appellants have no case at all and  the Appeals must be dismissed.

   We  have  considered the rival submission.  In our  view Mr.   Rohtagi is quite right.  It is now too late in the day for  Mr.   Andhyarujina’s clients to take a contrary  stand. Mr.   Yogeshwar  Prasad’s clients have on facts lost in  all Courts  below.  Notice to produce documents, given belatedly in  some  other  case, is of no relevance so  far  as  these Appeals  are concerned.  The practice of annexing irrelevant documents  and trying to rely on them for the first time  in the  Appeal or in Review Petitions in the High Court  should be deprecated.

   In  Civil Appeal Nos.  917-918 of 1998 it is clear that, at  all stages, the case has progressed on the basis that it was  not disputed that the land was on old grant terms.   Of course,  in  the Plaint, in Para.  4(b) it had been  averred that  the land was not on old grant terms.  However,  except for  making such an averment that point has clearly not been pressed  at  any stage.  In evidence given by the  plaintiff and/or  on  his behalf, there is no statement that the  land was  of  plaintiff  ownership and/or that the land  did  not belong  to the Government.  During trial the documents,  now sought  to be relied upon by Mr.  Andhyarujina were  neither produced nor tendered nor got marked as Exhibits.  Were they produced  Respondents would have had an opportunity to cross examine  the  witnesses and show that the averments  in  the documents  were  not correct and/or to explain how  and  why lease  was taken by the Secretary of the State.  It is clear that  the  averments  in para 4(b) of the  Plaint  were  not pressed.   That they were not pressed is also clear from the Judgment  of the Trial Court.  It sets out all the arguments of  the parties.  No submission on the question of ownership of land by the Plaintiff and/or that the land was not on old grant  terms has been recorded.  If it was argued and  their submissions  were not recorded cross objections should  have been filed particularly when in the last paragraph the Trial Court  clarifies  that the Government could resume the  land after  following  due procedure of law.  There could  be  no question  of  resumption if it was being disputed  that  the Government  was the owner of the land.  If Mr.  Andhyarujina is  right and the parties had not given up this  contention, then  it  would be worse for the Appellants inasmuch  as  it would  then  mean  that  the trial Court  had  not  accepted Plaintiffs/Appellants  claim  to ownership of land  and  had negatived it.

   The Appellants never went in Appeal against the Judgment of  the  Trial  Court.  Even when the  Respondents  went  in Appeal  no  cross  objections were filed.  Even  before  the first  Appellate  Court  it has not been stated  that  their submissions  were not dealt with and/or that the portion  of the  Judgment  permitting resumption, after due  process  of law, could not have been granted.  On the contrary the first Appellate  Court is also clarifying that the Government  can resume  after following due process of law.  This shows that even  before  the first Appellate Court it was  an  admitted position  that the Government was the owner of the land  and

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that the land was on old grant terms.

   When  the  Respondents went in Second Appeal before  the High  Court,  at this stage also, no cross  objections  were filed.   Before the High Court it was not disputed that  the land was on old grant terms.  The High Court has so recorded in  its Judgment.  It is settled law that one has to proceed on  basis  of what has been recorded by the Court.   If  any party  feels  aggrieved  of what has been  recorded  by  the Courts  a  clarification  has to be sought  from  that  same Court.  In this case the clarification was sought, by way of Review  Petition, to which as stated above, fresh  documents were  purported to be attached for the first time.  The High Court  has rejected the Review Petition.  The High Court has thus confirmed that at the time the Second Appeal was argued it  was  not disputed that the land was on old grant  terms. This  Court  has  to  go by what has been  recorded  in  the Judgement.  What is recorded in the Judgment is supported by the  conduct of the parties inasmuch as no evidence was  led to dispute the fact, no documents were tendered or marked as Exhibits  and no submissions were made on this aspect.  That it  was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms is also supported by what has been recorded in the Judgments of the  trial court and the First Appellate Court.  There is no evidence  that  the  written admissions were  taken  forciby and/or   that  they  were  not   binding  or  not   correct. Admissions  are  relevant  evidence if not  explained  away. Thus  these cases have been fought over the last 17 years on an  admitted position.  Mr.  Rohtagi is right that it  would be  a  travesty  of justice and would amount  to  permitting parties  to  misuse  laws delays if at this stage  they  are permitted  to change their stand and take contentions  which are  contrary  to  what has been the admitted  position  all these years.

   In   Civil  Appeals  (arising  out   of  SLP  (C)   Nos. 22436-22437  of  1997)  all  the  Courts  below  have  given concurrent  findings of fact.  We see no infirmity in  these findings.  The findings of fact are based on evidence before the Trial Court and require no interference.

   Once  it is admitted that land was on old grant terms it is  irrelevant to argue that it is not shown that Ambala was under  the Bengal Army.  The same would be the position when on evidence Court has held that land is on old grant terms.

   It  may only be mentioned that even in the three Appeals which  were withdrawn, it had been an admitted position that the land was on old grant terms.  As that position could not be  controverted and as those parties were fully covered  by Surendra  Kumar  Vakil’s  case (supra), those  Appeals  were withdrawn.

   In these Appeals, the principles laid down in Purushotam Dass  Tandon’s  case and P.  T.  Anklesaria’s  case  (supra) would  not  apply.   In our view, these  Appeals  are  fully covered  by  the ratio laid down in Surendra  Kumar  Vakil’s case.   In  our view there is no infirmity in  the  impugned Judgments  of  the High Courts.  Accordingly, these  Appeals are  dismissed.   There  will, however, be no  Order  as  to costs.