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PETITIONER: CHITAN J. VASWANI & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2473            1976 SCR  (2) 300  1975 SCC  (2) 829

ACT:      Suppression of  Immoral Traffic  in Women and Girls Act (104 of  1956) ss. 3. 7 and 18-Conviction under ss. 3 and 7- Power  of  Magistrate  to  order  eviction    of  keeper  or occupier.

HEADNOTE:      The appellants were keepers of a public place namely, a bar. They were convicted under s. 3(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffia in Women and Girls Act. 1956, for keeping or managing a  brothel in  the bar,  and under  s. 7(2)(a)  for knowingly permitting  prostitutes for  the purpose  of their trade to  resort to  or remain  in the bar. There was also a direction under  s. 18(1)  read with  s. 18(2)  of  the  Act evicting, the appellants from the bar.      It was  contended that  the order  of eviction was bad, because the  bar was   not  within 200  yds. of  any  public institution of the type referred to in s. 18(1). ^      HELD :  The Magistrate has power to order eviction when there is a conviction either under s. 3 or s. 7. [306 E]      Under s.  18(1), when a Magistrate receives information that a  brothel is  being run  within a distance of 200 yds. from certain  specified types of public institutions, he may order the  eviction of the occupier after hearing him. Under s. 18(2). once a court convicts a person under s. 3 or s. 7, it may  pass orders under s. 18(1) without further notice to such person to show cause as required in that sub-section. A close reading of s. 18(2), however indicates that the orders under sub-section  (1) referred  to therein do not wholesale import the  substantive paragraph  of s.  18(1) but only the eviction orders contained therein. [304 B, G; 305 F-H]      (a) The  consequence of  a conviction under s. 3 is the invalidation of  any lease of the premises where the brothel is run.  The logical  consquence must  be that  the occupier must be  thrown out  of such  premises. This is achieved  by the exercise of the power under s. 18(2). [305 B]      (b) Section  7(1)  punishes  prostitution  in  premises within a  distance of  200 yds. of specified places. Section 7(2)(b) punishes  the person who permits the use of premises in his  occupation for prostitution, and it is an ingredient of the  offence that  the premises  must be within 200 yards

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distance of  the specified  places; but  s. 7(2)(a) punishes the  keeper   of  any  public  place  who  knwingly  permits prostitutes to  resort to  such place  for their  trade.  No question  of   distance  arises   with  respect  to  such  a conviction. But  s. 18(2)  empowers the court to pass orders under  s.  18(1)  if  there  is  a  conviction  under  s.  7 regardless of whether it falls under s. 7(2)(a) or (b). [305 C-E]      Therefore, s.  18(2)  operates  not  merely  on  places within the  offendin distance  of 200 yds. but in all places where the  activity of prostitution had been conducted. [305 G]      (c) To  dispel the  ambiguity in  s. 18(2)  it must  be interpreted in  such a  way as  to advance  the  remedy  and suppress  the  evil.  If  the  purpose  of  extirpating  the commercial vice  from a  place were  to  be  successful  the occupier must be expelled from there. [304 H]      Sub-Div. Magistrate  v. Ram  Kali, [1968]  1 S.C.R. 205 and Heyden’s (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 71, case referred to. 301

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 300 of 1975.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  17th March,  1975 of  the Calcutta  High Court in Govt. Appeal  No. 9  of 1974  and Criminal Revision Nos. 438 and 524 of 1974.      D. Mookherjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the Appellants.      A. K. Sen and D. N. Gupta, for Respondent No. 2.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. Not  for dramatic effect but to sting social conscience,  we set out the tragic story of this case which  is  typical  of  the  spreading  disease  of  immoral traffic, to  remedy which the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women  And Girls  Act, 1956  (for  short,  the  Act)  was enacted by  Parliament in  a mood  of high morality but with such drafting  inefficiency that  it has pathetically failed to produce any decline in the malady.      The scene  is the  Isias Bar,  15, Free  School Street, Calcutta. A hall of enchantment extends nocturnal invitation to have  a nice time with svelte sylphs. The entrance fee is but a paltry Rs. 15/- per man and inside is served animating liquor. Scantily  clad female  flesh of  sweet seventeen  or thereabouts flit  about or sit on laps, to the heady tune of band music. They solicit carnal custom, and the willing male victims pay Rs. 30/-, choose whom they fancy, drink together and, taking  leave of  decencies, indulge in promiscuous sex exercise legally  described as  operation prostitution.  The stage is  busy with  many men  and girls  moving into rooms, lavatories and  chambers. The  curtain rises  and a  raiding party of  police and  excise officers  surprise this  arotic company drowned in drink and damsels.      This lacherous  drama need  not detain  us further. The Act went  into action,  a prosecution  was launched  against many under  s. 7 resulting in conviction and sentence of two persons, the  proprietor and  the manager  of the Isias Bar. Often times,  a bar  or restaurant  is  a  euphemism  for  a brothel  and   the  socialites,  unsuspectedly  and  without smirch, satisfy  their sex  in  these  respectably  labellel houses  patronised   by  even  prestigious  dignitaries  and opulent businessmen.      An appeal  to the  High Court  substantially failed and

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the appeal by the State on some counts, partly succeeded. In this  Court,  leave  was  refused  regarding  the  challenge against  the  guilt  and  so  the  findings  sustaining  the conviction stand;  but  it  is  necessary  to  clarify  that ultimately the  High Court  modified the  conviction  to  an extent and  we have  to proceed  on  the  footing  that  the accused, have  been found  guilty of  offenses under s. 7(2) (a), s.  3(1) but  acquitted under  s. 7(2)(b). What is most pertinent to  the present  appeal is  that an order was made under s. 18(1) read with sec. 18(2) directing           "the occupiers  of portion of premises Nos. 15 and      15/A, Free  School Street commonly known as ’Isias Bar’      to be  evicted therefrom  within a period of seven days      from the 302      date of  this order  and restore  possession thereof to      the owner  landlord or  his agent and we further direct      that this  premises or any portion thereof shall not be      leased out, or otherwise given possession of, to or for      the  benefit   of  the  person  or  persons,  who  were      connected with the improper user thereof." We had  granted special  leave limited to the attack on this order for  eviction under  s. 18(2)  read with s. 18(1). The area of  discussion in  these arguments  is thus confined to the power  to throw  out the occupier of the guilty premises on conviction for offences under ss. 3(1) and 7(2)(a) on top of the sentence imposed.      An appreciation  of the legal tangle can be facilitated by  a   brief  but   necessary  sketch  of  the  indubitable foundational facts and the basic legal provisions bearing on the orders  under s.  18. The  court, as  earlier mentioned, passed an  order, following  on the  sentence, that  since a conviction under  ss. 3 and 7 had been rendered, there would be a  direction evicting  the appellants-occupiers  from the theatre of  prostitutional operation,  viz., the  Isiah Bar. The Bar is beyond the offending distance of 200 yards of any ’public place’  referred to  in sub-s. (1) of s. 7. The said sub-section itemises  premises  such  as  places  of  public religious  worship,   educational   institutions,   hostels, hospitals, nursing homes and such other public places as may be notified by the authority designated. At the same time it is a  proven fact  that the  appellants have been keeping or managing a  brothel within  the meaning  of s. 3(1), and are keepers of  a public  place knowingly permitting prostitutes for the  purposes of  their trade  to resort to or remain in such public  place viz.,  the Isiah Bar. Section 18, sub-ss. (1) to (4) may be reproduced in extenso before analysing the submissions made by counsel on either side:           "18(1).  A   magistrate   may,   on   receipt   of      information from  the police  or  otherwise,  that  any      house, room,  place or  any portion  thereof  within  a      distance of  two hundred  yards  of  any  public  place      referred to  in sub-section  (1) of section 7, is being      run or  used as  a brothel  by any  person, or is being      used by  prostitutes for carrying on their trade, issue      notice on  the owner, lessor or landlord of such house,      room, place  or portion  or the  agent  of  the  owner,      lessor or  landlord or  on the tenant, lessee, occupier      of, or  any other person in charge of such house, room,      place, or  portion, to  show cause within seven days of      the receipt  of the  notice why  the same should not be      attached for  improper  user  thereof;  and  if,  after      hearing  the   person  concerned,   the  magistrate  is      satisfied that  the house,  room, place,  or portion is      being  used   as  a   brothel  or   for   carrying   on

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    prostitution, then the magistrate may pass orders-           (a)  directing eviction  of  the  occupier  within                seven days  of the  passing of the order from                the house, room, place, or portion; 303           (b)  directing that  before letting  it out during                the period  of one year immediately after the                passing of  the order,  the owner,  lessor or                landlord or the agent of the owner, lessor or                landlord shall  obtain the  previous approval                of the magistrate:           Provided that,  if the  magistrate finds  that the      owner, lessor  or landlord  as well as the agent of the      owner, lessor or landlord, was innocent of the improper      user of the house, room, place or portion, he may cause      the same  to  be  restored  to  the  owner,  lessor  or      landlord,  or   the  agent  of  the  owner,  lessor  or      landlord, with  a direction that the house, room, place      or portion  shall not be leased out, or otherwise given      possession of,  to or for the benefit of the person who      was allowing the improper user therein.           (2) A  court convicting  a person  of any  offence      under section 3 or section 7 may pass orders under sub-      section (1),  without further  notice to such person or      show cause as required in that sub-section.           (3) Orders passed by the magistrate or court under      sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be subject      to appeal  and shall  not be stayed or set aside by the      order of  any court,  civil or  criminal, and  the said      orders shall cease to have validity after the expiry of      one year:           Provided that  where a  conviction under section 3      or section  7 is set aside on appeal on the ground that      such house,  room, place  or any portion thereof is not      being run  or used as a brothel or is not being used by      prostitutes for  carrying on  their  trade,  any  order      passed by  the trial  court under sub-section (1) shall      also be set aside.           (4)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any      other  law   for  the  time  being  in  force,  when  a      magistrate passes  an order under sub-section (1), or a      court passes  an order under sub-section (2), any lease      or agreement  under which  the house,  room,  place  or      portion is  occupied at  the time shall become void and      inoperative."      The project  of the  statute,  to  the  extent  we  are concerned, may  now be  set out.  When a magistrate receives information that  any brothel is being run within a distance of 200  yards of any public place such as has been mentioned earlier [in  sub-s. (1)  of s. 7] he may issue notice to the owner, tenant,  occupier or  other person  in charge  of  or connected with  the brothel  to show cause why it should not be  attached  for  improper  user.  After  a  hearing  being conducted, the  magistrate, if satisfied, may order eviction of the  occupier  and  further  direct  that  the  owner  or landlord shall  not let out the premises for a period of one year after  the passing  of the  order, without his previous approval. 304 In  short,   the  house  of  ill-fame  where  Mrs.  Warren’s Profession  is   carried  on  is  virtually  sealed  off  by attachment  by   the  magistrate.   However,  if  the  owner satisfies  the  magistrate  of  his  innocence,  it  may  be restored to him with a direction that it shall not be leased out to  the person  who had  been improperly  using  it  for

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immoral purposes.      Section 18(1)  proprio vigore  applies only to brothels within the  vicious distance of 200 yards of specified types of  public   institutions.  No   criminal   prosecution   or conviction is  necessary for  taking action  under s. 18(1). Strictly speaking,  this is  not a  punitive provision but a preventive one.  This power  vested  in  the  magistrate  is calculated to  ensure moral hygiene in the locality which is particularly sensitive.  If one  may say  so, it  is a moral scavenging operation,  or a  fumigation process  whereby the dangerous visitations  may be totally inhibited by a legally enforced closure.  So far as we are concerned, the Isiah Bar is not  shown to  be within  the offending  distance and  s. 18(1) cannot  therefore apply. Indeed the Magistrate and the High Court  have proceeded to exercise powers under s. 18(2) and the  entire controversy  before us  is as  to  the  real import of  that provision.  By way of aside, we may say that plausible submissions  were  urged  by  Shri  D.  Mukherjee, supported by the language of s. 18(2). Had the drafting been more careful,  and  lucid,  the  argument  would  have  been obviated. This  Court has,  more than once, pointed out that lack of  legislative simplicity  has led  to  interpretative complexity. The  home truth  that  legislation  is  for  the people and  must, therefore, be plain enough has hardly been realised by our law-makers. Judges, looking at statutes, are forced to  play a  linguistic game  guessing at  the general legislative purpose  and  straining  at  semantics.  In  the present case we have had to reach the conclusion against the appellants by broadening the dimensions of Heyden’s case(1), importing a  ’context-purpose’ teleological  approach. There are many  canons of  statutory construction,  but the golden rule is that there are no golden rules-if we may use Shavian language.      We must  emphasize once more that legislative draftsmen and legislators  must  not  confuse  each  other  but  start talking to their real audience-the people, by writing law in unmistakable and simple language.      Back to  s. 18(2). Once a court convicts a person under s. 3  or s. 7 as in this case, it may pass orders under sub- s. (1)  of s.  18 without  further notice  to such person to show cause as required in that sub-section. Shri Mukherjee’s submission is  that this power of eviction is conditioned by the limitations  of s.  18(1). Orders under sub-s. (1) of s. 18 can,  admittedly, be passed only if the brothel is within 200 yards’  distance. Since,  in this  case,  the  place  is beyond that  distance, Shri Mukherjee argues that sub-s. (2) cannot apply.  The words ’pass orders under sub-s.’  creates ambiguity which  we have  sought  to  dispel  by  trying  to advance  the  remedy  and  suppress  the  evil  through  the interpretative methodology. 305      Shri A.  K. Sen has explained-and we think rightly-that s. 3  punishes persons who keep brothels. Sub-s. (3) of s. 3 lays down  that notwithstanding any other law ’any lease ... under which  such premises  ... are  held or occupied at the time of the commission of the offence, shall become void and inoperative  with   effect  from   the  date   of  the  said conviction’. It is plain therefore that the consequence of a conviction under  s. 3  is the  invalidation of the lease of the  premises   where  the   brothel  is  run.  The  logical consequence must  be that the occupier must be thrown out of the prostitutional premises. This is achieved by exercise of the power under s. 18(2).      Section 7(1) punishes prostitution in premises within a distance of  200 yards of specified sensitive places set out

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therein. Section  7(2) works  out a dichotomy: sub-s. (2)(a) punishes the  keeper  of  any  public  place  who  knowingly permits prostitutes  to resort  to such  place (that is, any public place).  No question of distance arises here but sub- s. 2(b)  specifically mentions,  as  an  ingredient  of  the offence, that  the premises  must be such as are referred to in sub-s. (1) (that is, within 200 yards distance). A person convicted either under sub-s. (1) or under sub-s. (2) (a) or (b) s.  7 will  be covered  by s.  18(2) because  the latter provision empowers  the court  to pass orders under s. 18(1) if there  is a  conviction under s. 7, regardless of whether it falls  under sub-s.  (2) (a)  or  (b)  of  that  section. Moreover, if  we have  regard to  the wholesome  purpose  of cleansing houses  of ill-fame,  it can be achieved only by a broader construction of s. 18(2).      This Court  in Sub-Div.  Magistrate v. Ram Kali(1) held that s.  18(1) deals  with one class and s. 18(2) relates to another class.  Section 18(1)  is a  summary  procedure  for closing down obnoxious places of prostitution, without going through the  detailed process  of a criminal prosecution. It is  a   quick-acting  defensive   mechanism,  calculated  to extinguish  the   brothel  and   promote   immediate   moral sanitation, having  regard to  the social  susceptibility of places like  shrines, schools,  hostels, hospitals  and  the like, Section  18(2) on  the other hand, operates only where persons have  been convicted of offences under s. 3 or s. 7. Thus the  place is found to be put to prostitutional use, in a criminal trial. It stands to reason that if the purpose of extirpating the  commercial vice  from that venue were to be successful, the occupier must be expelled therefrom. This is precisely what  has been  done in  the present case. Section 18(2) operates  not merely  on places  within the  offending distance of  200 yards  but in all places where the activity of prostitution has been conducted.      A close  reading of  s. 18(2) indicates that the orders under sub-s.  (1), referred  to therein,  do not, wholesale, import the  substantive paragraph  of s. 18(1), but only the evicting orders  contained in s. 18(2), clauses (a) and (b). What is,  by a  process of  abbreviation, imported  into  s. 18(2) is  the decretal  part of s. 18(1) to the extent it is written into s. 18(1), (a) and (b). There is some clumsiness 306 about the  drafting, as  we have already stated. Even so, if the purpose  is carried  to the  meaning that we assign, the section fulfils the social cause.      We are in the International Women’s Year-a circumstance meaningful socially,  but not  relevant legally. Even so, it is time  to tighten  up  this  statute  and  we  may  permit ourselves a  few concluding  observations, hopefully. Maybe, there are other provisions of the Act which have contributed to its dismal failure in the field and the legislature must, in the  International Year  of Women,  protect the virtue of the weaker  sex from  the purchasing  power of the takers of virginity who sip every flower and change every hour.      No nation,  with all its boasts, and all its hopes, can ever morally  be clean  till all  its women are really free- free to live without sale of their young flesh to lascivious wealth or  commerciailsing their luscious figures. India, to redeem this  ’gender justice’  and to prescribe prostitution whereby rich  men buy poor women through houses of vice, has salved its  social conscience  by enacting  the Act. But the law is  so ill-drafted and lacunose that few who follow "the most ancient  Profession in  the World" have been frightened into virtue  and the customers of wine-cum-women are catered to  respectably   in  bars,   hotels  and   night-clubs   in

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sophisticated and subtle ways, especially in our cities.      We dismiss  the appeal,  upholding  the  power  of  the magistrate to  order eviction  when there  is  a  conviction under s.  3 or  s. 7 confident that public power vested in a public functionary for public benefit shall be used whenever conditions necessary for the exercise are present, so that a comprehensive social  purpose of  moral clean-up  of  public places is accomplished. V.P.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. 307