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PETITIONER: CHINTA LINGAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/11/1970

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR  474            1971 SCR  (2) 871  1970 SCC  (3) 768  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC 597  (223)  R          1979 SC1803  (41)  R          1980 SC 962  (13)  R          1980 SC1382  (83)  F          1981 SC 873  (52)

ACT: Essential  Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955),  s.  3(1) and  s. 3(2)(d)-Opinion of Central Government under s.  3(1) whether  must  be  recited in  Control  Order-Order  whether invalid   without  such  recital--Section  3(2)(d)   whether suffers  from excessive-delegation-Absence of provision  for appeal  or revision against order of District  Collector  or Deputy  Commissioner  of  Civil  Supplies  whether   creates unreasonable  restriction on the right to carry on  business under Constitution of India, Art. 19(1)(f). Practice-Plea  for  which adequate foundation has  not  been laid in the pleadings could not be entertained.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants  who  were adversely affected  by  the  Rice (Southern  Zone) Movement Control Order 1957,  the  Southern States (Regulation of Exports of Rice) Order, 1964, and  the Andhra  Pradesh  Rice and Paddy  (Restriction  of  Movement) Order   1965,  moved  petitions  under  Art.  226   of   the Constitution  of India in the High Court of  Andhra  Pradesh challenging  the  validity of these orders.   The  petitions were  dismissed  by the High Court.  In appeal  before  this Court  by special leave as well as in a writ petition  under Art.  32 of the Constitution the following contentions  were advanced  before  this Court : (i) The said  Control  Orders offended  Art.  303 of the Constitution in as much  as  they suffered  from the vice of discrimination between one  State and  another and of preference to one State over  an  other; (ii) the orders were in the nature of executive instructions and   did  not  fall  within  the  meaning  of   subordinate legislation;  (iii)  even  if  they  could  be  regarded  as subordinate  legislation  they could not be saved  under  s.

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303(2)  in  the  absence  of  the  declaration  contemplated thereby;   (iv)  the  requisite  opinion  of   the   Central Government within s. 3(1) of the Essential Supplies Act  was not  found  in  any of the orders; (v)  the  Control  Orders imposed  unreasonable  restrictions  on  the  right  of  the petitioners to carry on trade, as arbitrary powers had  been conferred  in the matter of issuing or  withholding  permits and there were no provisions for appeal or revision  against refusal  to grant a permit; (vi) S. 3 (2) (d)  suffers  from excessive delegation. HELD  :  (i)  The  first  three  contentions  could  not  be entertained  since  no  firm foundation  had  been  laid  in respect of them in the pleadings. [875 G-876 B] (ii)There  was  no  necessity  of  reciting  the  requisite opinion within s.   3 (1) of the Act in the Control  Orders. it  is  implicit in the recital in the Control  Orders  that they  were being made under s. 3 of the Act, that the  Cent- rat Government had formed the requisite opinion within subs- s. (1) of that section. [876B-C] (iii)The  permit could be granted either by  the  State Government  or  by responsible officers of the rank  of  the District  Collector  or  the Deputy  Commissioner  of  Civil Supplies.  If the State Government alone 872 had  the  powers to issue the permits the challenge  on  the ground   of  unreasonableness  of  the  restrictions   would admittedly not be available.  There is no bar to any of  the aggrieved parties approaching the State Government by  means of a representation for a final decision even if the  matter has been dealt with by the District Collector or the  Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies in the first instance and the permit  has  been  refused  or  wrongly  withheld  by  those officers.  In these circumstances the absence of a provision for  appeal  or revision can be of no consequence.   It  has been  pointed  out in more than one decision of  this  Court that  when  the  power has to be exercised  by  one  of  the highest officers the fact that, no appeal has been  provided for is a matter of no moment. [876 D-877 B] M/s.  Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & 2  Ors. [1954] S.C.R. 803, K. L. Gupta v.  Bombay  Municipal Corporation  & Ors. [1968] 1, S.C.R. 274, 297  and  Pannalal Biniraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 233, 257.  referred to. (iv)The question whether s. 3 (2) (d) suffers from the vice of  excessive delegation was no longer at large.   In  Bhana Mal  Gulzari Mal’s case the attack on s. 3 of the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 which was similar  in terms  to  s.  3  of the Act  on  the  ground  of  excessive delegation  was  repelled.  it was  held  that  the  Central Government had been given sufficient and proper guidance for exercising  its  powers in effectuating the  policy  of  the statute. [877D-E] Union of India & Ors. v. M/s.  Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal & Ors., [1960] 2 S.C.R. 627, applied.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 212 of 1969. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of fundamental rights and Civil Appeals Nos. 1802 to 1805 of 1969. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated April  16,  1968 of the Andhra Pradesh High  Court  in  Writ Petitions Nos. 3657 and 3658 of 1967 and 8 and 48 of 1968.

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Shyamala  Pappu,  Bindra Thakur and Vineet  Kumar,  for  the petitioners and the appellants. Jagadish  Swarup, Solicitor-General and R. N. Sachthey,  for respondent No. 1 (in all the matters). P.Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3  (in  C.A. No. 1802 of 1969), respondent No. 2  (in  C.As. Nos. 1803 and 1804 of 1969) and respondents Nos. 2 to 4  (in C.A. No. 1805 of 1969). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. The points involved in the writ petition and the appeals by special leave relate to the constitutionality and validity                             873 of the provisions of three Control Orders issued under s.  3 (2)  (d)  of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (Act  10  of 1955)  hereinafter  called the "act.." The  validity  of  s. 5(2)(d) of the act itself has also been assailed. The Control Orders which were promulgated under s. 3(2) (d)  of the Act were the following               (i)   The Rice (Southern Zone)Movement Control               Order, 1957.               (ii)The   Southern  States  (Regulation   of               Exports of Rice) Order, 1964; and               (iii)The   Andhra  Pradesh  Rice   and   Paddy               (Restriction of Movement) Order, 1965.               In  the a peals the appellants had  moved  the               High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 226 of               the Constitution.  There the petitioner;, were               dealers  in  rice and rice  products  such  as               puffed,  parched and beaten rice (beaten  rice               is  known as powa’ while, parched and  puffed               rice  is  known as Murmura’).   Some  of  the               petitioners had applied for permits to  export               powa,  murmura  and idling from the  State  of               Andhra  Pradesh to other States  while  others               had  applied for permits to transport  one  or               other  of  the rice products  to  some  places               within  Andhra Pradesh.  The applications  for               permits  were’-either  rejected  or  were  not               disposed of by the authorities concerned.   In               the writ petitions the High Court examined all               the   contentions  raised   exhaustively   and               repelled  the attack on the  constitutionality               of  s.  3  (2)  (d) of the  Act  as  also  the               relevant clauses of the Control Orders.               Section 3 of the Act provides               (1)   If the Central Government is of  opinion               that it is necessary or expedient so to do for               maintaining  or  increasing  supplies  of  any               essential  commodity  or  for  securing  their               equitable  distribution and  availability  at               fair  prices  or for  securing  any  essential               commodity  for  the defence of  India  or  the               efficient  conduct of military  operations  it               may,  by  order,  provide  for  regulating  or               prohibiting     the     production,     supply               distribution  thereof and trade  and  commerce               therein.               (2)   Without  prejudice to the generality  of               the,  powers  conferred by subsection  (1)  an               order made thereunder may provide-               (a)....................               (b)....................               874               (c)....................

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             (d)   for  regulating by licences, permits  or               otherwise     the     storage,      transport,               distribution,  disposal, acquisition,  use  or               consumption of, any essential commodity; The 1957 Control Order extends to the States of Andhra  Pra- desh, Kerala, Madras, Mysore and Pondicherry which has  been called  the Southern Zone.  According to cl. 3(1) no  person can  export or attempt to export or abet the export of  rice from any place within the Southern Zone except under and  in accordance  with  a permit issued by  the  State  Government concerned  or any officer authorised in this behalf by  that Government  subject to the condition that such export  shall be  regulated in accordance with the export quotas fixed  by the  Central  Government.   Now this control  order  made  a division  into  Southern Zone or regions in  the  matter  of export  of rice.  By the Control Order of 1964 the  Southern Zone  or  regions were further divided into  four  specified areas  i.e.,  States of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala,  Madras  and Mysore.  Clause 3 of this order prohibited the export by any person  of rice from any place within a specified area to  a place outside that area except under and in accordance  with the  permit  issued by the State Government  or  an  officer authorised by that Government in that behalf.  The rice  was defined by cl. 2(b) to include broken rice and paddy as also broken rice and paddy products other than bran or husk.  The Control  Order of 1965 imposed further restrictions  on  the movement of rice and paddy.  By, clause 3 restrictions  were placed on the movement of these commodities from any  place in any block to any place outside that block even within the State of Andhra Pradesh. Mrs.  Shyamala Pappu on behalf of the writ  petitioners  and the  appellants  before  us made an  attempt  to  raise  the following contentions in respect of the Control Orders :               1.All  the three Control  Orders  offended               Art.  303 of the Constitution.  They  suffered               from  the vice of discrimination  between  one               State,  and another and of preference  to  one               State over another.               2.These  orders  were  in  the  nature  of               executive Instructions and did not fall within               the meaning of subordinate legislation.               3.Even if the Control Orders could be regarded               as subordnate legislation they were not  saved               by   Art.  303(2)  in  the  absence   of   the               declaration contemplated thereby,                                    875               4.The  requisite opinion of  the  Central-               Government wit hin s. 3 (1) of the Act was not               to be, found in any of the Orders.               5.The Control Orders imposed unreasonable res-               trictions  on the right of the petitioners  to               carry  on trade as arbitrary powers  had  been               conferred   in  the  matter  of   issuing   or               withholding  permits and there were no  provi-               sions  for appeal or revision against  refusal               to grant a permit. Art.  301  in  Part XIII of the  Constituion  declares  that subject to the other provisions of this Part trade, commerce and  intercourse throughout the territory of India shall  be tree.   Under  Art. 302 Parliament may by  law  impose  such restrictions  on freedom of trade. commerce  or  intercourse between  one  State and another or within any  part  of  the territory of India as may be required inthe      public interest.  Article 303 reads :-                "(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 302,

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             neither  Parliament nor the Legislature  of  a               State shalt have power to make any law  giving               or authorising" the giving of, any  preference               to  one  State  over another,  or  making,  or               authorise  the making of,  any  discrimination               between  one State and another, by  virtue  of               any  entry relating to trade and  commerce  in               any of the Lists. in the, Seventh Schedule.               (2)   Nothing  in  clause  (1)  shall  prevent               Parliament  from  making any  law  giving,  or               authorising  the giving of, any preference  or               making,  or  authorising the  making  of,  any               discrimination  if it is declared by such  law               that it is necessary to do so or the  purpose               of  dealing  with  a  situation  arising  from               scarcity of goods in any part of the territory               of India." Now the Control Orders were made under s. 3 of the Act.  The object  essentially was to regulate the export and  movement of  rice  and of rice and paddy products from  the  Southern States.   These Control Orders were laid before both  Houses of Parliament as required by sub-s. (6) of s. 3 of the  Act. It has not been shown how this form of legislation would  be mere  executive  instruction and would not  constitute,  law made  by  Parliament  within the  meaning  of  s.  302.   No foundation was laid in the pleadings either before the  High Court  or  in  the writ petition before us  as  to  how  the restrictions  which were imposed by the Control Orders  were not in the public interest.  It is significant that even  on the 876 point of preference to one State over another or discrimina- tion  between one State and another State there is  complete absence  of pleading in the writ petition filed  before  us. The  High Court adverted to the matter but we have not  been shown  that  any proper or firm foundation was laid  in  the writ  petitions  before the High Court on  the  question  of preference   or  discrimination  within  Art.  303(1)..   No argument,  therefore, can be entertained on  these  matters. We are unable to see the necessity of reciting the requisite opinion  within s. 3 (1) of the Act in the  Control  Orders. It  is  implicit in the recital in the Control  Orders  that they were being made under s. 3 of the Act that the  Central Government  had formed the requisite opinion  within  sub-s. (1)  of  that  section.  This disposes  of  the  first  four contentions. As regards the 5th point it is noteworthy that the permit is to  be  issued  by the State  Government  concerned  or  any officer authorised in this behalf by that Government.  It is common  ground  that the officers authorised  by  the  State Government  are  the  District  Collector  and  the   Deputy Commissioner  of Civil Supplies.  These officers cannot but be regarded as fairly high in rank  who’  are  expected to discharge  their  duties in a responsible  In-Messrs  Dwarka Prasad  Laxmi  Narain  v. The State of  Uttar  Pradesh  &  2 Others(1)  in which the provisions of cl. 4(3) of  the  U.P. Coal  Control Order 1953 which gave the licensing  authority absolute power to grant or refuse to grant any-licence  were struck  down  on  the  ground  that  a  law which  confers arbitrary  and uncontrolled power upon the executive in  the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities  must  be held to be  unreasonable.   There  the power  could  be exercised by any person to whom  the  State Coal  Controller  might choose to delegate  the  same.   The matter  which has been stressed before us relates  generally

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to  the  absence  of any provision  relating  to  appeal  or revision in the Control Orders if the District Collector  or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies refuses to grant a permit  under clause 3 of the Order.  In Dwarka  Prasad’s(1) case  the  delegation  could be made to any  one  which  was certainly a relevant factor in judging the reasonableness of the  impugned  provision.  But in the cases  before  us  the permit is to be granted either by the State Government or by responsible  officers of the rank of the District  Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies.  Indeed,  Mrs. Pappu  quite  properly agreed that if the  State  Government alone  had the power to issue the permits the  challenge  on the ground of unreasonableness of the restrictions-would not be available. We consider that there is no bar to any of the aggrieved parties approaching the State Government by  means of a representation (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 803. 877 for a final decision even if the matter has been dealt  with by  the  District Collector or the  Deputy  Commissioner  of Civil  Sup-plies  in the first instance and the  permit  has been  refused  or wrongly withheld by  these  officers.   In these circumstances the absence of a provision for appeal or revision can be of no consequence.  At any rate it has  been pointed  out  in more than one decision of this  Court  that when  the, power has to be exercised by one of  the  highest officers the fact that no appeal has been provided for is  a matter  of  no  moment;  (See K.  L.  Gupta  v.  The  Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors (1).  It may also be  remembered that emphasis was laid in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (  2 ) on the power being vested not in any  minor  official but in top-ranking authority.  It was said that though:  the power   was  discretionary  but  it  was   not   necessarily discriminatory  and  abuse  of power  could  not  be  easily assumed.   There  was  moreover a  presumption  that  public officials  would  discharge  their duties  honestly  and  in accordance with rules of law. Lastly an effort was made to agitate the point that s. 3 (2) (d)   of  the  Act  suffers  from  the  vice  of   excessive delegation.   This question is no longer at large.   In  The Union of India & Others v.    Messrs.  Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal & Others(3) the attack on s.  3  of the  Essential  Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 which was similar in terms  to s.  3 of the Act on the ground of excessive  delegation  was repelled.  It was held- that the Central Government had been given  sufficient  and proper guidance  for  exercising  its powers in effectuating the policy of the statute. In  the  result the writ petition and the appeals  fail  and they are dismissed with costs.  One set of hearing-fee. G.C.                         Appeals dismissed (1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 274 at p. 297.  (2) (1957) S.C.R. 233 at p. 257 (3)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 627. 878