26 September 1962
Supreme Court
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CHIMANLAL JAGJIVANDAS SHETH Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Case number: Appeal (crl.) 107 of 1961


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PETITIONER: CHIMANLAL JAGJIVANDAS SHETH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/09/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. IMAM, SYED JAFFER AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1963 AIR  665            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 344  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1968 SC1450  (10)

ACT: Drugs---Absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and  gauze--- Whether drugs-Sentence, reduction of-Drugs Act, 1940 (23  of 1940),as  amended by Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1955, ss.  3(b), 18.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was found in possession of large quantities of absorbent  cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze  which  he had  manufactured.  On analysis these were found to be  sub- standard and the appellant was prosecuted under s. 18 of the Drugs  Act, 1940, for manufacturing sub-standard drugs.   He was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  three  months  and  to pay a fine  of  Rs.  500/.   The appellant  contended that these articles were not  drugs  as defined in s. 3(b) of the Act and that the sentence  imposed was too severe. Held, that absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and  gauze were "drugs" within the meaning of s. 3(b) and the appellant was rightly convicted.  In the definition "drugs"  "included substances  intended  to  be used for  or  in  treatment  of diseases".    "Substances"   was   something   other    than "medicines"  and  meant "things".  The  said  articles  were sterilized  or otherwise treated to make them  disinfectant; they  were  used for surgical dressings and  were  essential materials  for treatment in surgical cases.  The  object  of the  Act of maintaining high standards of medical  treatment would  be defeated if the necessary concomitants of  medical or surgical treatment were allowed to be diluted. Held,  further,that  the  sentence  erred  on  the  side  of leniency rather than severity and could not be reduced.   It was  a  case  where large quantities of  spurious  and  sub- standard  drugs had been manufactured by the appellant.   He was guilty of an antisocial act of a very serious nature.

JUDGMENT:

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 107  of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June 16, 1961, of the Bombay High Court in Cr.  A. No. 21 of 1961.  345 Rajni  Patel,  J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur  and  Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. H.R.  Khanna,  R. H. Dhebar and R. N. Sachthey,  for  the respondents. 1962.   September  26.   The  judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by SUBBA  RAO,  J.-This  appeal by special  leave  against  the judgment  of the High Court of judicature at  Bombay  raises the  question  of construction of s.3(b) of the  Drugs  Act, 1940,  as  amended  by  the  Drugs  (Amendment)  Act,  1955, hereinafter called the Act. This  appeal has been argued on the basis of facts found  by the  High Court.  The appellant was carrying on business  in the  name  of  Deepak  Trading  Corporation  at   Bulakhidas Building, Vithaldas Road, Bombay.  On December 27, 1958, the Sub Inspector of Police, accompanied by the Drug  Inspector, raided  the  said  building and found  large  quantities  of absorbent  cotton  wool, roller bandages,  gauze  and  other things.   It  was  found that the  appellant  was  not  only storing  these  goods in large quantities but  was  actually manufacturing them in Bombay and passing them off as  though they were manufactured by a firm of repute in  Secunderabad. The samples of the aforesaid articles and lint were sent  to the Government Analyst, who reported that out of the samples sent  to him only the lint was of standard quality  and  the other articles were not of standard quality.  The  appellant was’ prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court Bombay,  for an offence under s. 18 of the Act, inter  alia, for manufacturing drugs which were not of standard  quality. The learned Presidency.  Magistrate acquitted the  appellant on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove  that the  articles were in the possession of the appellant.   The High Court on a resurvey of the evidence came to a different conclusion and found that the said articles 346 were  not only found in the possession of the appellant  but also  were manufactured by him and that they were below  the standard  prescribed.   On the finding’, it  convicted  the. appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- under  each count.  Hence the appeal. Though  an attempt was made to argue that the said  articles had not been proved to be below the prescribed standard,  it was subsequently given up’ The only question that was argued is whether the said articles are drugs within the meaning of s.   3(b) of the Act.  The said section reads ""drug" includes               (i)all  medicines for internal or  external               use  of  human  beings  or  animals  and   all               substances  intended to be used for or in  the               treatment mitigation or prevention of  disease               in   human  beings  or  animals   other   than               medicines  and substances exclusively used  or               prepared for use in accordance with the  Ayur-               vedic or Unani systems of medicine, and               (ii)such substances (other than food) intended               to affect the structure or any function of the               human  body  or intended to be  used  for  the               destruction  of vermin or insects which  cause

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             disease  in human beings or animals as may  be               specified  from  time to time by  the  Central               Government  by  notification in  the  Official               Gazette. The  said definition of ""drug" is comprehensive  enough  to take  in not only medicines but also substances intended  to be used for or in the treatment of diseases of human  beings or animals.  This artificial definition  347 introduces  a distinction between medicines  and  substances which are not medicines strictly so-called.  The  expression "substances",  therefore,  must  be  something  other   than medicines but which are used for treatment.  The part of the definition  which  is  material  for  the  present  case  is "’substances  invented to be used for or in the  treatment". The  appropriate meaning of the expression  "substances"  in the section is "things".  It cannot be disputed, and  indeed it  is  not  disputed, that absorbent  cotton  wool,  roller bandages  and gauze are "substances" within the  meaning  of the  said expression.  If so, the next question  is  whether they are used for or in "treatment".  The said articles  are sterilized  or otherwise treated to make  them  disinfectant and  then  used for surgical dressing;  they  are  essential materials  for treatment in surgical cases.   Besides  being aseptic these articles have to possess those qualities which are  utilized  in  the  treatment  of  diseases.   Thus  for instance, in the case of gauze-one of the articles concerned in this appeal-it has to conform to a standard of absorbency in  order  that it might serve its  purpose:  otherwise  the fluid  which oozes is left to accumulate at the site of  the wound  or  sore.  The Legislature designedly  extended  the definition of "’drug" so as to take in substances which  are necessary  aids for treating surgical or other  cases.   The main  object of the Act is to prevent substandard in  drugs, presumably   for  maintaining  high  standards  of   medical treatment.    That  would  certainly  be  defeated  if   the necessary concomitants of medical or surgical treatment were allowed  to  be diluted: the very same evil  which  the  Act intends  to  eradicate would continue to  subsist.   Learned counsel  submitted that surgical instruments would not  fall within  the  definition and that gauze and lint  would  fall within the same class.  It is not necessary for the  purpose of  this appeal to definite exhaustively  "the  ’substances" falling  within the definition of "’drugs"; and we  consider that  whether  or not surgical instruments are  drugs",  the articles concerned in this case are. 348 Learned  counsel  for the appellant sought to  rely  upon  a report  of  a high powered committee  consisting  of  expert doctors, who expressed the opinion in the report that as the surgical  dressings  did not come under the purview  of  the Drugs Act, no control on their quality was being  exercised. Obviously, the opinion of the medical experts would not help us  in  construing a statutory  provision.   We,  therefore, hold, agreeing with the High.  Court, that the said articles are  substances  used for or in the "treatment"  within  the meaning of s. 3(b) of the Act. An  impassioned appeal was made for reducing  the  sentences imposed  upon  the appellant.  When a similar  argument  was advanced  in the High Court, it pointed out that this was  a gross case where large quantities of spurious drugs had been manufactured  by  the  appellant and  passed  off  as  goods manufactured by a firm of repute.  The appellant was  guilty of  an  anti-social act of a very serious  nature.   In  our view,  the  punishment of rigorous  imprisonment  for  three

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months  was more lenient than severe.  There is no case  for interference  with the sentences.  The appeal fails  and  is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 349