http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: CHIGURUPATI VENKATA SUBBAYYA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PALADUGA ANJAYYA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/01/1972

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1972 AIR 1421            1972 SCR  (3) 172  1972 SCC  (1) 521

ACT: Madras  Estates Land Act (1 of 1908), ss. 20A and  189,  and Item  6, Part B of Schedule-Collector’s order under s.  20A- When affects the communal use of lands-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts, when barred. Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)  Act (26  of 1948), ss. 11 and 56-Power of Settlement Officer  to grant  patta  with  respect to  communal  lands-Decision  of Settlement Officer, when final.

HEADNOTE: A  suit  by the respondents for a declaration  that  certain lands  were communal lands was decreed by the High Court  in appeal.   In appeal to this Court, it was contended  that  : (1)  the Collector held under s. 20A of the  Madras  Estates Land  Act, 1908, that the lands were no longer required  for the purpose for which they were originally intended; (2) the first  appellant had been in possession of the  lands  after obtaining a grant from the Zamindar; (3) after the abolition of  Estate under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, the  lands were  granted to him by the Estates Manager; (4) during  the pendency  of  the  suit, the  Assistant  Settlement  Officer granted  a patta to him under s. 1 1 of the  Abolition  Act; (5)  the  decision of the Assistant Settlement  Officer  was final  under s. 56 of the Abolition Act(6) the  Civil  Court had no jurisdiction under s. 189(1) of the Estates Land Act; and  (7) that under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, the  communal rights were abolished. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (1) Under s. 20A of the Estates Land Act. before  the Collector  can  order diversion of the use of  any  communal land,  he  should first declare that the land is  no  longer required  for any of the purposes referred to in s.  3  (16) (a)  and (b), then direct by order in writing that the  land be used for any other specified communal purpose, and if  it is  not so required, then it may be converted into  ryotwari land   or   landholder’s  ryoti  land   according   as   the reversionary   right  vested  in  the  Government   or   the landholder.  In the present case, the Collector, apart  from making the order that the lands were no longer ’required for the  original  purpose,  did not make  any  other  order  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

writing. [178 G-H; 179 A-B] (2)  In view of ss. 20 and 20A of the Estates Land Act,  the Zamindar did not    have any right to deal with the communal lands. [176 D-E] (3)  The order of the Estates Manager is ineffective because it proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the lands  had already been converted into ryotwari lands. [179 C-D] (4)  The lands in dispute are not lanka lands, nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or the Estates Land Act.  The Assistant Settlement Officer  has no   power  to  convert  communal  land  into  ryoti   land. Therefore, he has no competence under s. 11 of the Abolition Act to grant, the ryotwari patta. [18OD-E] Valathar  Moopananri v. Board of Revenue 1966 (I) M.  L.  J. approved. 173 (5)  Under  s. 56 of the Abolition Act, the decision of  the Settlement Officer  is  made  final  only  with  respect  to matters referred to in s. 56(1) but the question whether the lands  in dispute continued to be  communal lands  does  not fall within its scope. [181 B-C] (6)  Under   s.   189(1)  of  the  Estates  Land   Act   the jurisdiction  of  the  civil courts is taken  away  only  in respect of suits or applications of the nature specified  in Parts A and B of the Schedule to the Act.  Item 5 of Part  B of the Schedule refers to a decision of the Collector under s. 20A(1), but, in the present case, there is no such  order in writing. [181 F-G] (7)  Under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, the lands vest in  the Government,  but the rights of the community over the  lands were not taken away.  Under the Act, only the rights created by  the principal or other land holder were  abrogated,  but the  rights  of the community over the lands were  not  such rights. [182D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. 556 of 1967. Appeal  by Special leave from the judgment and decree  dated August  29, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in  Second Appeal No. 644 of 1962. R.   Vasudev   Pillai   and  P.  Kesava  Pillai,   for   the appellants. K.   R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos.  1 to 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This is an appeal by special leave.  Defendants  2 to  7  in the suit are the appellants in this  appeal.   The plaintiffs  who  are respondents 1 to 4 herein  sued  for  a declaration  that Survey Nos. 12 to 18 comprising an  extent of  10 acres 54 cents in South Vallur village of  Vijayawada Taluk  are  communal  lands, the  villagers  therein  having rights  of  irrigation  and drainage.   In  that  suit  they challenged the assignment of suit lands in favour of the 2nd defendant  (1st  appellant) by the Estates  Manager  by  his order  of December, 21, 1952.  They also sought a  permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering  with the  exercise of their rights in those lands.  Further  they prayed for a mandatory injunction against defendants 2 to  7 directing them to restore "Agakodu" at their own  cost    to its original condition. The plaintiffs brought the suit in a representative capacity after obtaining the permission      of the court. The 2nd   defendant resisted the suit on various grounds. He

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

pleaded that   he  had been in possession of Survey Nos.  12 to  15  ever since 1946, after obtaining a  grant  from  the Zamindar  of  the ,South Vallur under Patta Ex.   B-8  dated January  15, 1946.  According to him after the abolition  of the Estates under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (in  short the  Estates Abolition Act), Survey Nos. 16 to 18 were  held to be unnecessary for the original purpose 174 by the Collector.  Thereafter those Survey Nos. were granted to  him  by the Estates Manager under Exh.B-16.  He  further pleaded  that during the pendency of the suit, a  Patta  for the  suit  lands  was granted to him under S.  1  1  of  the Estates  Abolition Act by the Assistant  Settlement  Officer under Exh.  B-30 dated December 10, 1955. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit upholding the contentions of the 2nd defendant.  It came to the conclusion that  the  plaintiffs had failed to establish  the  communal character  of the lands pleaded by them and further even  if those lands were communal lands at one time, they had ceased to  be  such  in view of the various orders  passed  by  the authorities. The first appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court  and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit as prayed  for.   It came  to  the  conclusion that the lands  in  question  were communal  lands and the villagers had rights  of  irrigation and  drainage through those lands.  It further came  to  the conclusion  that the various orders referred to by  the  2nd defendant  in his written statement were either  invalid  or ineffective.   The High Court has affirmed the  decision  of the 1st appellate court. Mr.  R.  V. Pillai, the learned Counsel for  the  appellants formulated  three  contentions before us viz. (1)  that  the conclusion  reached by the 1st appellate court and  affirmed by  the High Court that the lands in question  are  communal lands  has no basis, in evidence; (2) that the  Civil  court had  no  jurisdiction to entertain the suit and (3)  in  any event   the   communal  rights  in  the  suit   lands   were extinguished under s. 3 of the Estates Abolition Act. We  shall  now proceed to examine  these  contentions.   But before  doing  so,  it is necessary to point  out  that  Mr. Pillai attempted to reopen questions of fact which appear to have  been  conceded  before the High Court.   We  have  not permitted  him  to  do so.  From the judgment  of  the  High Court,  it  is  clear  that  the  arguments  in  that  court proceeded  on  the  basis  that the  suit  lands  were  once communal lands; Survey Nos. 12 to 15 even now continue to be communal lands but Survey Nos. 16 to 18 ceased to be as such because  of  the order passed by the Collector,  Krishna  on October 29, 1946 under s. 20-A(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act  as  well  as that passed by  the  Estates  Officer  and Assistant Settlement Officer subsequently, to which we shall refer presently.  In the course of the judgment the  learned judge of the High Court observed :               "It  is not in dispute that the lands S.  Nos.               12 to 18 and measuring 10 acres and 54  cents,               situate in South Vallur village in  Vijayawada               taluk are poramboke lands.               17 5               That  they  were  used  for  the  purpose   of               irrigation   and  drainage  is  also  not   in               dispute.   It is common ground that under  Ex.               A-1,  the Collector, Krishna passed  an  order               under  Section  20-A  (I) (a)  of  the  Madras               Estates Land Act as amended by Madras Act VIII               of 1934 to the effect that lands, S. Nos.  16,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

             17  and  18 were no longer  required  for  the               purpose   for  which  they   were   originally               intended.   Under  that order,  the  Collector               asked  the Zamindar to say whether he had  got               any  reversionary rights in the, lands.   What               happened  subsequently is not clear  from  the               record.   It is however common ground that  S.               Nos. 12 to 15 (both inclusive) continued to be               communal lands and no order under section 20-A               (2)  was  at any time  passed  by  Collector               converting these communal lands into, ryotwari               lands  or  assigned them to  anyone  till  the               estate  was abolished.  It will thus be  clear               that  there was merely a declaration  that  S.               Nos. 16, 17 and 18 were no longer required for               the  purpose  for which they  were  originally               intended.   No further order converting  those               lands to ryotwari lands was passed and that S.               Nos.  12 to 15 continued to be communal  lands               till the estate was abolished." In view of the stand taken by the appellants before the High Court, it is not permissible for them to contend that Survey Nos. 12 to 18 were at no time communal lands nor is it  open to  them to contend that Survey Nos. 12 to 15 do  not  still continue  to be communal lands.  The controversy as  regards the  nature,  of the lands, therefore, must be  confined  to Survey  Nos.  16,  17 and 18.  In  this  view,  the  first contention  of Mr. Pillai fails so far as Survey Nos. 12  to 15 are concerned. So  far as Survey Nos. 16 to 18 are concerned, it  was  said that these lands had ceased to be communal lands as a result of  the  various orders passed by the authorities.   Let  us examine whether this contention is correct ? Before doing so it is necessary to refer to some of the provision,-, in  the Estates  Land Act as well as the Estates Abolition Act.   No material was placed before the court to show that the  South Vallur  Zamindari  Estate  included Survey Nos.  12  to  18. Section  3  of the Estates Land Act defines an  "Estate"  as meaning :               (a)   "any   permanently-settled   estate   or               temporarily settled zamindari;               (b)   any portion of such  permanently-settled               estate or temporarily-settled zamindari  which               is separately registered in the office of  the               Collector;               1 7 6               (c)   any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;               (d)   any inam village of which the grant  has               been  made,  confirmed or  recognized  by  the               Government notwithstanding that subsequent  to               the  grant, the village has been,  partitioned               among the grantees or the successors in  title               of the grantee or grantees.               Explanation  (1) Where a grant of an  inam  is               expressed  to be of a named village, the  area               which  forms the subject-matter of  the  grant               shall    be   deemed   to   be    an    estate               notwithstanding   that  it  did  not   include               certain  lands  in the village  of  that  inam               which have already been granted on service  or               other  tenure  or beep reserved  for  communal               purposes." This   definition  does  not  help  the   appellants.    The appellants have failed to establish that the Zamindar  could have   conveyed  ally  right  in  the  suit  lands  to   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

appellants.   In view of S. 20 and 20-A of the Estates  Land Act,  to  which we shall refer a little later,  no  Zamindar appears  to have had any right to deal with communal  lands. Hence the alleged grant by the Zamindar, does not appear  to confer on the first appellant any title. This takes us to the question whether the order made by  the Collector on October 18, 1946 (Exh.  A-1) can be  considered as having conferred any title on the Zamindar in respect  of Survey Nos. 16, 17 and 18.  That order reads : "Re.  A3-13 M.P.                   46 Exhibit A. 1 Proceedings of the Collector, Krishna at Chilakatapudi.               Sub(:E.L. Act-Bezwada Taluk, South Vallur,  S.               Nos.  17, 18, 16 Enquiry under  Section  20-A.               Order under Section 20-A (I) (a) passed.               Read:This office D. Dis. 5876-45 D/29-3-45 and               R.D.0’s Dis. 9609,/46 dated 18-10-46.                                   ORDER               Under  Section 20A(1) (a) of the  Madras  E.L.               Act as amended by Madras Act VIII of 1934, the               lands  mentioned  in the  schedule  below  are               declared  to  be no longer  required  for  the               purpose   for  which  they   were   originally               intended. 177                         SCHEDULE Taluk       Village   S. No.  Extent    Original classifica-                                         tion. Bezwada   South Vellur   16   0-85       Agakodu P.W.D.                          17   1-72       Drainage channel                          18   1-19       Poramboke                               Sd/-                              29/10 Collector               (2)   The  Zamindar  is  requested  to   state               whether   he  has  any  oral  or   documentary               evidence to prove that the reversionary  right               in  the lands vest in him and to adduce it  if               any,  before the Collector within  sixty  days               from the date of this order.                                            Sd/-                                  2-10-53,                                 Try.  Deputy Collector,                                         Krishna". For determining the effect of that order, it is necessary to refer  to  some of the provisions of the Estates  Land  Act. Section 3 (2) of that Act defines "ryot" as meaning:               "a  person  who  holds  for  the  purpose   of               agriculture   ryoti  land  in  an  estate   on               condition of paying to the landholder the rent               which is legally due upon it"               "Ryoti  land"  is defined in s. 3  (16)  which               says               "  "Ryoti  land" means cultivable land  in  an               estate  other than private land but  does  not               include-               (a)               (b)   throshing-floor, cattle-stands,  village               sites, and other lands situated in any  estate               which are set apart for the common use of  the               villagers.               (c)               Section 20-A of the Estates Land Act says               "(1)  Subject  to  such  rules  as  the  State               Government  may prescribe in this behalf,  the               District  Collector may on the application  of               the  landholder,  a ryot or any  other  person

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

             interested-               (a)   declare that any land or any portion  of               any  land  which is set apart for any  of  the               purposes  referred to in sub-clauses  (a)  and               (b) of clause 16 of               17 8               section  3  is  no  longer  required  for  its               original purpose; and               (b)   by order in writing direct-               (i)   that any such land or portion in respect               of which such declaration is made be used  for               any other specified communal purpose; or               (ii)  if such land or portion is not  required               for any communal purpose, that it be converted               into ryotwari land or landholder’s ryoti  land               according  as the reversionary rights in  such               land vest under the terms, express or  implied               of  the sanad, title-deed or other  grant  (in               the Government) or in the landholder               Provided   that   before   making   any   such               declaration and order, the District  Collector               shall  have due regard to any other  customary               rights  of the landholder or the ryots in  the               user of such land or portion and shall satisfy               himself that the exercise of such rights would               otherwise  be provided for adequately  if  the               declaration and order are put into effect :               Provided further that in the case of any  land               of  the description referred to in  sub-clause               (a)   of   clause  (16)  of  section   3   the               reversionary  rights  in  which  vest  in  the               landholder   under  the  terms,   express   or               implied,  of  the sanad, title-deed  or  other               grant, any order under subclause (i) of clause               (b) shall be made only with the consent of the               landholder.               (2)   Without   the  written  order   of   the               District  Collector under clause (b)  of  sub-               section  (1), no land which is set  apart  for               any of the purposes referred to in  subclauses               (a) and (b) of clause (16) of section 3  shall               be  assigned  or used for any  other  purpose.               Nothing  contained in this  sub-section  shall               affect or take away or be deemed to affect  or               take   way   the  customary  rights   of   the               landholder  or  the ryots in the user  of  any               such land." Before  the Collector can order the diversion of the use  of any communal land, he should first declare that the land  or any portion of that land is no more required for any of  the purposes referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause  ( 1 6) of s. 3 and he should further make an order in  writing directing  that  the same be used for  any  other  specified communal  purpose  or if the same is not  required  for  any communal purpose, that it be converted into ryotwari land or landholder’s ryoti land.  It is clear from sub-s. 179 (2)of  s. 20-A that without a written order of the  District Collector under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1), go land which was set apart  for any of the purposes referred to in  sub-cls.  (a) and (b) of cl. (16) of s. 3 can be assigned or used for  any other  purpose.   The order of the Collector  on  which  the first  appellant has relied is an incomplete  order.   Apart from  making a declaration that Survey Nos. 16 to 18 are  no more  required for purposes for which they  were  originally

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

intended,  the  Collector did not appear to  have  made  any order under cl. (b) of s. 20-A.  Hence despite the order  of the Collector, Survey Nos. 16 to 18 continue to be  communal lands. Reliance  was next placed by the appellants on the order  of the  Estates Manager dated December 21, 1952 (Ex.  B-2)  for claiming  title to the suit properties.  In this  order  the Estates  Manager preceded on the basis that the  Collector’s order  to which we have already made reference  had  already converted Survey Nos. 16 to 18 into ryotwari lands.  This is an erroneous assumption.  That assumption cannot confer  any right  on  the 1st appellant.  The Estates  Manager  is  not shown  to  have had any power under any law to  convert  the communal lands into ryoti lands.  Hence his order cannot  be considered  as having validly converted the suit lands  into ryoti lands. Lastly  appellants  sought  support from the  order  of  the Assistant Settlement Officer made on December 10, 1955  (Ex. B-30).  This order was made during the pendency of the  suit and  without  notice to the  plaintiffs-respondents.  it  is purported  to have been made under s. 11 (a) of the  Estates Abolition  Act.  Under that order the  Assistant  Settlement Officer  granted  to the 1st ’appellant  ryotwari  patta  in respect  of Survey Nos. 16 to 18. Section 11 of the  Estates Abolition  Act, does not authorise the Assistant  Settlement Officer  to  convert the communal land into  a  ryoti  land. That section  reads :               "  Every ryot in an estate shall, with  effect               on and from the notified date, be entitled  to               a ryotwari patta in respect of               (a)   all   ryoti  lands  which,   immediately               before   the  notified  date,  were   properly               included  or  ought  to  have  been   properly               included  in  the holding and  which  are  not               either  lanka  lands or lands  in  respect  of               which  a land-holder or some other  person  is               entitled  to a ryotwari patta under any  other               provision of this Act; and               (b)   all  lanka  lands  in   his   occupation               immediately  before  the notified  date,  such               lands having been               1 80               in   his   occupation  or  in  that   of   his               predecessors  in-title continuously  from  the               1st day of July 1939 :               Provided that no person who has been  admitted               into possession of any land by a landholder on               or  after  the 1st day of  July,  1945  shall,               except   where   the   Government   after   an               examination of all the circumstances otherwise               direct,  be  entitled to a ryotwari  patta  in               respect of such land.               Explanation  :-No lease of any lanka land  and               no person to whom a right to collect the  rent               of  any  land  has  been  leased  before   the               notified  date,  including an  ijardar  or a               farmer  of  rent,  shall  be  entitled  to   a               ryotwari  patta in respect of such land  under               this section." The  lands with which we are concerned are not  lanka  lands nor  were they declared to be ryoti lands either  under  the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act.  That being so, the Assistant Settlement Officer had no competence to  grant ryotwari patta in respect of those lands-see the decision of the Madras High Court in Valathar Mooppannar and ors. v. The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

Board of Revenue, Madras(1).  That officer has purported  to grant  the  patta  in question even without  notice  to  the interested  parties  and that during ,the  pendency  of  the suit. For the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that Survey Nos. 16 to 18  have ceased  to  be  communal lands or that  the  appellants  had obtained any lawful title to them. It  was  urged that the order of  the  Assistant  Settlement Officer  whether the same was in accordance with law or  not must be deemed to be final in view of S. 56 of the Abolition Act.  This contention is again untenable.  Section 56 says :               "(1)  Where  after an estate  is  notified,  a               dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent  due               from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or               (b)  what amount of rent is in arrear  or  (c)               who the lawful ryot in respect of any  holding               is,  the  dispute  shall  be  decided  by  the               Settlement Officer.               (2)   Any person deeming himself aggrieved  by               any  decision of the Settlement Officer  under               subsection (1) may, within two months from the               date of the decision or (1)  (1966) I.M.L.J. 354. 181               such  further time as the Tribunal may in  its               discretion  allow, appeal to the Tribunal  and               its decision shall be final and not be  liable               to be questioned in any Court of law." The  decision of the Settlement Officer which is made  final under  this section must be a decision in respect of one  of the  matters  referred  to  in sub-s. (1)  of  s.  56.   The controversy  with which we, are concerned in this case  viz. whether  the suit lands continue to be communal  lands  does not  fall  within the scope of that section.  Hence  we  are unable  to accept the contention of the appellant  that  the order  made  by the Settlement Officer has become  final  or conclusive.  It is a wholly invalid order.  In this view, it is not necessary to consider whether an order made under  s. 11   without  notice  to  the  interested  persons  can   be considered as a valid order. The contention that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to go into the controversies arising for decision in this  case in  view  of  s. 189(1) of the Estates  Land  Act  is  again without merit.  That section provides :               "A  District  Collector or  Collector  hearing               suits or applications of the nature  specified               in Parts A and B of the Schedule and the Board               of   Revenue   or   the   District   Collector               exercising     appellate     or     revisional               jurisdiction   therefrom   shall   hear    and               determine   such  suits  or  applications   or               exercise such jurisdiction as a Revenue Court.               No Civil court in the exercise of its original               jurisdiction  shall  take  cognizance  of  any               dispute  or  matter in respect of  which  such               suit or application might be brought or made." The  jurisdiction of the civil courts is taken away only  in respect of suits or applications of the nature specified  in parts  (A) and (B) of the Schedule to the Act.  No  reliance was placed by the appellants on any of the matters mentioned in  part  (A)  of the Schedule.   Even  as  regards  matters mentioned in part (B) reliance was only placed on item 5  of that  Schedule.   Part  13  refers  to  applications  to  be disposed  of by a District Collector or Collector.   Item  5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

refers to a decision of the Collector under s. 20-A(1).   We have  already come to the conclusion that the Collector  had made  no  order  under that section.  Hence s.  189  of  the Estates Land Act is not attracted to the present case.   The dispute  with  which we are concerned is  a  civil  dispute. Therefore  the courts below had jurisdiction to  decide  the same under s. 9 of the Civil Procedure.  Code. The  only other contention that remains to be considered  is that  the communal rights in the suit lands stood  abolished under s. 3 of 182 the Estates Abolition Act.  This contention does not  appear to have been taken before the High Court.  Therefore we  see no  justification to go into that contention.   That  apart, there  appears to be no basis for that contention.   Section 3(a)  of  the Estates Abolition Act,  repeals  several  acts including the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.  In view of cl. (b)  of  that  section all Estates  including  the  communal lands,  porambokes  and  other  ryoti  lands,  waste  lands, pasture  lands,  lanka lands, forests, mines  and  minerals, quarries,  rivers and streams, tanks and  irrigation  works; fisheries  and ferries stood transferred to  the  Government and  vested in them free from all encumbrances.  It  further provides  that  the Madras Revenue Recovery Act,  1864,  the Madras  Irrigation Cess Act, 1865 and all  other  enactments applicable  to  ryotwari areas shall apply to  that  estate. Clause  3  of that section prescribes that "all  rights  and interests created in or over the estate before the  notified date  by  the  principal or any other  landholder  shall  as against the Government cease and determine." It  is  true  that the suit lands in view of  s.  3  of  the Estates  Abolition Act did vest in the Government.  That  by itself  does not mean that the rights of the community  over it  were taken away.  Our attention has not been invited  to any provision of law under which the rights of the community over those lands can be said to have been taken away.   What has been abrogated is the rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or other landholder.  The rights of the community over the suit lands  were not created by the principal or any other  land- holder.   Hence  those rights cannot be said  to  have  been abrogated by cl. (c) of s. 3 of the Estates Abolition Act. In  the result this appeal fails and the same  is  dismissed with costs. V.P.S.                                 Appeal dismissed. 183