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PETITIONER: CHHOTAN PRASAD SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARI DUSADH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/11/1976

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BHAGWATI, P.N. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  407            1977 SCR  (2) 174  1977 SCC  (1) 102

ACT:         Oaths  Act 1873--Section 4---General Clauses Act 1897,  sec.         3(3)--Meaning   of   affidavit--Criminal   Procedure    Code         1898--Section 145(1), whether affidavits before a Magistrate         in 145(1) proceedings must be sworn before any other author-         ity empowered to administer oath.

HEADNOTE:             Proceedings under section 145(1) of the Criminal  Proce-         dure   Code   1898 were going on between the  parties.   The         appellants filed affidavits before the Magistrate.  The said         affidavits  were not sworn before the Magistrate who was  in         seisin  of the case but were sworn before some other  Magis-         trate.  It  was contended before the Magistrate by  the  re-         spondents  that the said affidavits were not  admissible  in         evidence.  The High Court held those affidavits to be  inad-         missible.         Dismissing the appeal by special leave,             HELD:  (1) In the absence of any specific  provision  to         the  contrary in the Criminal Procedure Code the  affidavits         have  to be sworn or affirmed in accordance with the  provi-         sions  of the Oaths Act, 1873.  Section 145(1) of  the  Code         provides that the Magistrate making an order under it  shall         require  the parties concerned in the dispute to attend  his         court  in person or by pleader and to put in such  documents         or  to adduce by putting in affidavits the evidence of  such         persons  as they rely upon in support of their  claim.   The         affidavits  contemplated by the sub-section are,  therefore,         evidence  for purposes of proceedings before the  Magistrate         concerned  even  though the Evidence Act does not  apply  to         them.  [175G-H]             (2)  There  is no provision in the Code  specifying  the         courts before whom the affidavits referred to in section 145         have to be sworn and affirmed.  The definition of  affidavit         in section 3(3) of.the General Clauses Act 1897 only  states         that  it  shall include affirmation and declaration  in  the         case of persons by law allowed to affirm or declare  instead         of swearing.  Section 4 of the Oaths Act reads as under:            "4.  The following Courts and persons are  authorised  to         administer by themselves or by an officer empowered by  them         in  this behalf, oaths and affirmations in discharge of  the

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       duties  or in exercise of  the powers imposed  or  conferred         upon them respectively by law :--            (a)  all Courts and persons having by law or  consent  of         parties authority to receive evidence;"         It  is clear that all Courts and persons  having by  law  or         consent of  parties authority to receive evidence are autho-         rised to. administer oaths and affirmations, but they can do         so only where they are otherwise acting in the discharge  of         the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed or conferred         upon  them  respectively by law.  In the  present  case  the         Magistrate  concerned with the proceedings under s.  145  of         the  Code was discharging the duties imposed and  exercising         the powers conferred by the Code and he alone could adminis-         ter  the  oaths  and affirmations to the  persons  who  made         affidavits and not Magistrates who were not discharging  any         such duty or exercising any such power. [176A-H]             Nandial  Ghose v. Emperor AIR 1944 Cal. 283,  Hemdan  v.         State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1966 Raj. 5; Govind v.  State         and  others AIR 1969 All. 405; Krishna Chandra Naik  v.  Sk.         Makbul  and  others AIR 1970 Orissa 309; Mahesh  Thakur  and         others v. Lakshman Prasad Thakur and another (1971) 19 Bihar         Law  Journal  727  and State of Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Trivedi         Prasad (1971) XVI H.R. Law journal 1059 approved.         175             Ahmad  Din v. Abdul Salem AIR 1966 Pb. 528  and  Shambhu         Nath Chopra v. State AIR 1970 Delhi 210, over-ruled.

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 316         of 1971.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  the 17th September, 1971 of the Patna High  Court  in         Criminal Revision No. 2488 of 1971) and         Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1971.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  the  7th  October, 1971 of the Patna  High  Court  in         Criminal Revision No. 1491 of 1971.)             D. Goburdhan and D.P. Sharma for the appellants in  both         the appeals.             S.C.  Agrawala and V.J. Francis for respondents in  both         the appeals.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             SHINGHAL,  J.--The  point  for  consideration  in  these         appeals   by special leave is whether affidavits,  sworn  or         affirmed  before  magistrates who are not in seisin  of  the         case  under section 145 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,         hereinafter  referred to as the Code, could be read in  evi-         dence  under  that section ?  The High Court has  held  such         affidavits  to be inadmissible in evidence, in its  impugned         judgments dated September 17, 1971 and October 7, 1971,  and         that is why the present appeals by special leave have arisen         at the instance of the aggrieved parties.             It  is  not in controversy that in the  absence  of  any         specific provision to the contrary in the Code, the  affida-         vits  have  to be Sworn or affirmed in accordance  with  the         provisions  of the Oaths Act, 1873.  It is also not in  con-         troversy  that the Oaths Act of 1969 has no  application  to         the controversy.             Sub-section  (1)  of section 145 of the  Code  provides,         inter  alia,  that the Magistrate making an order  under  it         shall require the parties concerned in the dispute to attend         his  court in person or by pleader and to put in such  docu-         ments, or to adduce, "by putting in affidavits, the evidence

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       of  such  persons"  as they rely upon in  support  of  their         claims.  The affidavits contemplated by the sub-section  are         therefore  evidence for purposes of the  proceedings  before         the  Magistrate concerned even though the Evidence Act  does         not  apply  to them by virtue of the  express  provision  of         section 1 of that Act.             Chapter  XLVI of the Code deals with miscellaneous  mat-         ters  including the affidavits referred to in sections  539,         539-A and 539-AA. Section 539 deals with courts and  persons         before  whom affidavits and affirmations to be  used  before         any High Court or any officer of such Court may be sworn and         affirmed.  Section 539-A relates to         176         affidavits  in  proof of conduct of public  servants,  while         section 539-AA relates to the authorities before whom  affi-         davits  to be used under section 510A or 539-A may be  sworn         or  affirmed. An affidavit under section 145 is not  however         of  a formal character because it is meant to prove or  dis-         prove  the  competing claim of the parties as  respects  the         fact of actual possession of the subject or dispute.   There         is  thus no provision in the Code specifying the  courts  or         persons  before whom the affidavits referred to  in  section         145 have to be sworn and affirmed.  This has therefore to be         done  according  to   the  general  provisions  relating  to         affidavits.             The  definition of "affidavit" in section 3(3)  of   the         General  Clauses  Act (Act X of 1897) only  states  that  it         shall  include  affirmation and declaration in the  case  of         persons  by  law  allowed to affirm or  declare  instead  of         swearing.   But  it  is an essential  characteristic  of  an         affidavit  that  it should be made on  oath  or  affirmation         before  a person having authority to administer the oath  or         affirmation It is here that section 4 of the Oaths Act comes         into operation which provides as follows:--               "4. The following Courts and persons are authorised to         administer by themselves or by an officer empowered by  them         in  this behalf, oaths and affirmations in discharge of  the         duties  or  in exercise of the powers imposed  or  conferred         upon them respectively by law :--               (a) all Courts and persons having by law or consent of         parties authority to receive evidence;"         Then follow clause (b) and a proviso, with which we are  not         concerned.             It is therefore clear that all courts and persons having         by  law or consent of parties authority to receive  evidence         are   authorised  to administer oaths and affirmations,  but         they can do so only where they are otherwise acting" in  the         discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed         or  conferred upon them respectively by law."  So the  court         or person mentioned in clause (a) of section 4 of the  Oaths         Act can administer oath or affirmation to the deponent in an         affidavit  only  if the, court or person in  acting  in  the         "discharge  of the duties or in exercise of the  powers  im-         posed  or conferred upon them respectively by law."  In  the         present cases, the Magistrates concerned with the proceeding         under  section 145 of the Code were discharging  the  duties         imposed and exercising the powers conferred by the Code, and         they  alone could administer the oaths and  affirmations  to         the persons who made the affidavits, and not the magistrates         who  were  not discharging any such duty or  exercising  any         such  power.  As the affidavits in the cases before us  were         admittedly not sworn or affirmed before Magistrates who were         dealing  with  the disputes under section 145 of  the  Code,         they  were  not  proper affidavits and  did  not  constitute         evidence for purpose of section 145.  A similar view

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       177         has  been  taken in Nandial Ghost v. Emperor(1),  Hemdan  v.         State  Rajasthan and others(2),  Govind v.  State  and  oth-         ers(3),  Krishna Chandra Naik  v.  Sk. Makbul and  others(4)         Mahesh  Thakur  and  others v. Lakshman  Prasad  Thakur  and         another(5) and  State Madhya Pradesh v. Triveni Prasad(6) on         which  reliance has been placed by counsel for the  respond-         ents.             We have gone through Ahmad Din v. Abdul Selem,(7)  which         has  been  cited  with approval in Shambhu  Nath  Chopra  v.         State,(8) on which reliance. has been placed by counsel  for         the  appellants.   We find however that in Ahmad Din’s  case         (supra) the Punjab High Court did not take proper notice  of         the  requirement  of  section 4 of the Oaths  Act  that  the         courts and persons mentioned in clause (a) could  administer         oaths  only  "in discharge of the duties or in  exercise  of         the  powers imposed or conferred upon them  respectively  by         law."   We have also examined the reasoning in Shambhu  Nath         Chopra’s  case (supra), but the Delhi High Court there  went         wrong in holding that the evidence on affidavits referred to         in section 145 of the Code was of a formal character  within         the  meaning of section 510A so as  to attract section  539-         AA.             At  the High Court has rightly held in the two  impugned         judgments that the affidavits were inadmissible in  evidence         as  they  were sworn before Magistrates who  were  never  in         seisin  of the case, we find no force in these  appeals  and         they are hereby dismissed.         P.H,P.                                         Appeals  dis-         missed.         (1) A.I.R. 1944 Cal. 283.            (2) A.1.R. 1966 Raj. 5.         (3) A.I.R. 1969 All. 405.        (4) A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 209.         (5) (1971) 19 Bihar, Law          Journal 727.               (6) [1971] XVI M.P.L. J. 1059a         (7) A.I.R. 1966 Pb. 528.         (8) A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 210.         13 -- 1:158SCI/77         178         STATE OF KERALA         v.         M.T. JOSEPH         November 25, 1976         [A. N. RAY, C.J., M.H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]             Kerala  Land  Reforms Act 1963--Kerala  Government  Land         Assignment  Act  1960--Sec. 8---Whether after a  person  ac-         quires title to Government land any further restrictions can         be imposed.             The Government of Travancore sanctioned a scheme for the         reclamation  of the Vimbana Lake upon terms  and  conditions         contained  in  at document dated  4-10-1963.   The  document         provided that one Joseph his father on payment of Rs.  10’/-         per acre which was to. be recovered in 10 equal  instalments         would  be given possession of certain tracts of  land  which         they undertook to reclaim.  The said agreement was  modified         by  an order dated 12-2-1941 and a fresh agreement was  exe-         cuted  in July 1941. The said agreement provided  that  till         tie remittances of all amounts due to the Government by  way         of land value are paid the executant shall have no right  of         alienation  in respect of the property in question and  that         till  then the property shall remain with the Government  as         sole owner. It further provided that, until the entire  land         value  is paid by the executant and until the assignment  of         the  land  and issue of Patta is  completed,  the  executant         undertook not to do any act which might reduce the value  of         tie  property.  Joseph complied with  the  conditions   laid         down  in the  agreement and ;acquired full ownership  rights

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       by  fulfilling the  said  terms.  In 1957,  Joseph  executed         a  deed of settlement of this land.  Thereafter Kerala  Land         Reforms Act of 1963 was passed so that the State Land  Board         started  proceedings  for the surrender of  the  land.   The         question  before the Land Board was whether the  whole  land         should be treated as a single unit belonging  to  Joseph  or         whether  it may be divided and treated as separate units  of         persons in whose favour Joseph made the settlement.  If  the         children of Joseph had  acquired rights under the settlement         each  of them could be treated as entitled  to  compensation         for  a separate unit.  The State  relied  on  section  8  of         the  Kerala Government Land Assignment Act 1960  which  pro-         vides  that  all  provisions,  restrictions  conditions  and         limitations  contained ha any Patta or other  document  evi-         dencing an assignment of- Government land shall be valid and         take  effect according to their tenure, any rule of  law  or         usage to the contrary notwithstanding.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  Tie  terms in the 1941 agreement  operated  as  a         restraint upon the alientation of the rights only so long as         all the amounts due to the Government by way of land revenue         were  not paid up.  Since, in the present case   the  entire         amount  had  been paid by 10 yearly instalments  before  the         year 1957 and since the Government had effected the mutation         in  its  record  acting upon the  settlement  of   1957   in         favour  of the  children  of  Joseph, it  could not be  said         that  there was any patta or other documents containing  any         condition to which section 8 of the Act applied.  The  chil-         dren derived rights under the deed of settlement and  there-         fore,  each of them is entitled to compensation for a  sepa-         rate unit.  [180 C-E]             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  587-696         & 598-600 of 1976.             (Appeals  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and  order         dated 13th of July 1975 of the Kerala High Court in CRP Nos.         1188,  1227, 1250, 1272. 1278, 1279., 1284-1287, 1309,  1312         and 1386/73).         179             M.M.  Abdul Khader, Adv. Genl. and K.M.K. Nair, for  the         Appellants.             T.S.  Krishnamoorthy Iyer and P.K. Pillai, for  RR.  ex-         cepting R. 8 in CA 587/76.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             BEG, J.--These appeals by special leave raise the  ques-         tion whether the Kerala High Court had correctly interpreted         and  applied Section 8 of the Kerala Govt.  Land  AsSignment         Act,  1960  (hereinafter referred to as ’the  Act’)  to  the         cases before us.  This provision reads as follows:                              "8.   All   provisions,   restrictions,                       conditions and limitations over, contained  in                       any  Patta  or other  document  evidencing  an                       assignment  of Government land shah  be  valid                       and take effect according to their tenor,  any                       rule   of  law  of  usage  to   the   contrary                       notwithstanding".             The  facts  upon which the provision was  sought  to  be         applied  are these:  On 23 October, 1939, the Government  of         Travancore  sanctioned a. scheme for the reclamation of  the         Vimbang Lake upon terms and conditions which were set  forth         in a document dated 4 October, 1939.  The agreement provided         that one M. T. Joseph and his father, on payment of Rs. 10/-         per  acre, which were to be recovered in ten  equal  instal-         ments,  would be given possession of certain tracts of  land         which  they undertook to reclaim.  For the first  two  years         after what is called the "Registry" of the names of the  two

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       lessees  no tax was to be levied. The "Registry" was  liable         to  be  cancelled if adequate progress was not  made  within         these two years. It appears that the agreement was  modified         by  an order dated 12 February, 1941 and a  fresh  agreement         was  executed  in July 1941 by M.T. Joseph  (now  dead)  who         entered into possession of Keyal land, constructed the  ring         bunds  at considerable expense, and brought the  very  large         tracts  of and to be reclaimed under paddy cultivation.   In         June 1957, M.T. Joseph executed a deed of settlement of  all         this  land, after he had acquired full ownership  rights  by         fulfilling  the  terms of the agreement.  The Act  which  is         sought  to be now applied was then passed.  After that,  the         Kerala  Land  Reforms Act of 1963. was passed so  that  the,         "State Land Board" started proceedings for the surrender  of         these  lands in accordance with the provisions of  the  Land         Reforms Act.             The only question now before us is whether, by an appli-         cation  of  section 8 of the Act, the whole land  is  to  be         treated  as  a single unit belonging to M.T.  Joseph  (since         dead),  on the dispositions made by M.T. Joseph,  under  the         deed  of  settlement  executed by him on  15th  June,  1957,         distributing the land among his children, resulted in  sepa-         rate  units  for the purposes of compensation for  the  land         surrendered.  If the children had acquired right  under  the         deed of settlement each of them could be treated as entitled         to  compensation for a separate unit. If the deed was of  no         effect, the mere fact that the children were in  possession,         under  an authority from their father could not change  the’         ownership of the land in the constructive possession of  the         father.             We  have  been taken through the deed  of  agreement  of         July, 1941, with the Government. which contains the  follow-         ing term, the effect of which has to be determined:         180                             "Till  the remittance of all amount  due                       to.  the  Government by  way  tharavila  (land                       value) etc. the executant shall have no  right                       of  alienation  in  respect  of  the  schedule                       property  and the property shall  remain  with                       the  Government as sole owner.  The  executant                       shall  remit the tax at the thirteenth  thoram                       in  the  village office every year  after  the                       first  two  years of registry so  long  as  no                       default  is made in the payment of  instalment                       and obtain receipt therefor.  Until the entire                       tharavila (land value under this agreement  as                       stated  above  is paid by  the  executant  and                       until the assignment of the land and issue  of                       patta  is completed the  executant  undertakes                       not to do any act which may  reduce  the value                       of  the  property and  if as stated above  due                       to any reason the property is recovered.  from                       the  executant  he shall not put  forward  any                       claim  for improvements etc. and the  property                       shall be surrendered to Government".             It is clear to us that this term in the agreement  oper-         ated  as a restraint upon the alienation of rights only  so.         long as. all the amounts due to the Government as  Tharavila         had not been paid up.  The whole amount had to be paid up in         ten  yearly  instalments. It has been paid up  before  1957.         Furthermore, as the Kerala High Court found, the  settlement         of land on 15th June, 1957 had not merely been given  effect         to  by  a mutation in the relevant  Government  records  but         pattas  had  actually been given by the  Government,  acting         upon  the settlement of 1957, in favour of the  children  of

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       M.T. Joseph. Hence, it could not be said that there was  any         patta  of other document containing any condition  to  which         Section 8 of the Act could apply. We find, from the Judgment         under  appeal,  that several questions, which have  no  real         bearing  on the rights of the parties, were:  also.  argued.         One of these questions was whether land could be acquired by         adverse possession by the alienees of the allottees of  the.         land  from the Government under the scheme for its  reclama-         tion.   We fail to see how a question of adverse  possession         arises  here  when  the Government  itself   recognises  the         rights of the children of M.T. Joseph in the pattas executed         by it in their favour.             The High Court recorded the following findings about the         Government  acting  on the terms of the settlement  of  15th         June, 1957, the correctness of which had not been challenged         before us:                             "This   settlement   deed    has    been                       recognised   by  the Government  mutation  has                       been effected in the names of the children and                       pattas have also. been issued to them.  It has                       been further stated on behalf of the  revision                       petitioners (the heirs of the said Joseph  and                       those   who  took under  the  settlement  deed                       dated  15.6.1957) that levy under  the  Kerala                       Rice  and Paddy (Procurement by  Levy)  Order,                       1966,  has  been collected from  each  of  the                       shares  under the deed of 1957, that land  tax                       has  been imposed on each of the shares  sepa-                       rately  and agricultural income-tax  collected                       on the income of the properties of each of the                       sharers".             We  do  not think it is necessary to go into  any  other         question. The High Court was of opinion that some facts  had         still to be as-         181         certained  when  the case goes back to the  Land  Board  for         proceeding on the footing determined by the High Court.   We         think that we should make it clear that matters to. be still         determined could not, in view of our finding, involve deter-         mination  of  any  question  of adverse  possession  of  the         claimants, the children of M.T. Joseph.             For  the reasons given above, we dismiss these  appeals.         We make no order as to costs.         P.H.P,                                         Appeals  dis-         missed.         182