REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL           D. NO. 37598 OF 2007

Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board …Appellant

Versus

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission       …Respondents and others

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. Whether  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  (for  short,  ‘the  

Limitation Act’) can be invoked by this Court for allowing the aggrieved  

person to file an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for  

short,  ‘the  Electricity  Act’)  after  more  than  120  days  from  the  date  of  

communication  of  the  decision  or  order  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal  for  

Electricity  (for  short,  ‘the  Tribunal’)  is  the  question  which  requires

determination in this appeal filed against order dated 17.5.2007 passed by  

the Tribunal in I.A. No.4 of 2007 in Appeal No.21 of 2006.

2. Appellant, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board was established under  

Section  58  of  the  M.P.  Reorganization  Act,  2000.   In  a  sense,  it  is  a  

successor  of  Madhya  Pradesh  Electricity  Board  insofar  as  the  State  of  

Chhattisgarh  is  concerned.  A  dispute  arose  between  the  appellant  and  

respondent No.3 – Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board in the matter of  

payment of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in the Western Region under  

the “Frequency Linked Energy Exchange” scheme, which was introduced  

with  effect  from  1.6.1992.   The  FLEE  charges  were  payable  to  the  

beneficiaries on the basis of monthly advises issued by Western Regional  

Electricity  Board  (renamed  as  Western  Regional  Board  Committee)  

(respondent No.5 herein).  The matter was considered by respondent No.1 –  

Central  Electricity  Regulatory  Commission,  which  passed  an  order  dated  

8.12.2005 fixing the liability of the appellant and respondent No.3 in the  

matter of payment of FLEE charges.   

3. The  appellant  challenged  the  aforementioned  order  in  Appeal  

No.21/2006,  which  was  allowed  by  the  Tribunal  vide  its  order  dated  

14.11.2006.  Soon thereafter, respondent No.3 filed IA No.4/2007 for issue  

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of a direction to respondent No.5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance  

with the Tribunal’s order in relation to post-reorganization period.  By order  

dated  17.5.2007,  the  Tribunal  allowed  that  application  and  directed  

respondent No.5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance with order dated  

14.11.2006.

4. Feeling aggrieved by the  last  mentioned order  of  the Tribunal,  the  

appellant  filed  this  appeal  on  24.12.2007.   Along  with  the  appeal,  the  

appellant  filed  an  application  for  condonation  of  160  days’  delay.   The  

reasons for not filing appeal within the period of 60 days specified in Section  

125 of the Electricity Act, as disclosed in the application are as under: -

i) The  impugned  order  had  been  pronounced  by  the  Tribunal  on  

17.5.2007 but the counsel for the appellant did not receive intimation of the  

said pronouncement and as such he was not aware of the same.

ii) That the procedure which was being followed by the Tribunal at that  

time  was  that  the  Registry  of  the  Tribunal  used  to  telephonically  give  

advance intimation to the counsel of the parties regarding pronouncement of  

the order.

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iii) The  appellant  came  to  know about  the  order  in  July,  2007  when  

respondent  No.5  sent  intimation  for  payment  of  FLEE  charges  to  the  

beneficiaries in the Western Region. Thereupon, the appellant informed its  

counsel about the impugned order who then sent letter dated 26.7.2007 to  

the Registrar of the Tribunal that intimation regarding pronouncement of the  

order  had  not  been  given  to  him  (the  date  has  been  wrongly  typed  in  

paragraph 3 of the application as 26.11.2007).    

iv) Respondent  No.3  had  filed  a  review  petition  against  order  dated  

14.11.2006, which was not decided by the Tribunal along with I.A. No.4 of  

2007 and the same was withdrawn on 25.10.2007.

v) Thereafter, the impugned order was considered and discussed by the  

appellant and after obtaining legal opinion, it was decided to file an appeal.  

vi) In  the  light  of  the  decision  taken  by  the  appellant,  the  counsel  

proceeded to prepare the appeal but some delay was caused due to extensive  

pleadings and voluminous documents.    

5. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No.3, it has been averred  

that the impugned order was communicated by the Deputy Registrar of the  

Tribunal  vide  his  letter  dated  11.6.2007;  that  the  appellant  and  the  

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respondents before the Tribunal were informed by the said letter that the  

matter was disposed of on 14.5.2007 and the parties may request for a copy  

of the order in PDF format through e-mail at registrar-aptel@nic.in or apply  

for a certified copy and further that the order would also be available in the  

Tribunal’s  website  (www.aptel.gov.in).   It  has  been  further  averred  that  

letter  sent  by  the  Deputy  Registrar  of  the  Tribunal  was  received  by  the  

appellant on 21.6.2007 which was entered in its receipt register at serial No.  

2082 and subsequently,  the same was received by the office of the Chief  

Engineer (Commercial) on 29.6.2007.  Respondent No.3 has supported this  

assertion  by  placing  on  record  photostat  copies  of  the  inward  register  

maintained  in  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  appellant,  which were  made  

available pursuant to an application filed under the Right to Information Act.  

Respondent No.3 has then relied upon the appellant’s assertion that it came  

to know about order dated 17.5.2007 in July, 2007 and prayed that in the  

absence of any explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from July,  

2007 to December, 2007, the appeal cannot be entertained.  As regards the  

review  application,  respondent  No.3  has  averred  that  the  same  has  no  

bearing on the appellant’s grievance against order dated 17.5.2007 and in the  

absence of any explanation for the delay after 21.6.2007, the appeal should  

be dismissed as barred by time.    

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6. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant, it has been  

pleaded that in the absence of communication of order by the Tribunal in  

accordance  with  the  provisions  contained  in  Chapter  XVI  of  Appellate  

Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings)  

Rules, 2007 (for short, ‘the Rules’), the appeal cannot be dismissed as barred  

by time.  It has then been averred that letter dated 7.6.2007 of the Tribunal,  

which was signed by Deputy Registrar on 11.6.2007 cannot be treated as  

communication of order dated 17.5.2007. It  has been further averred that  

letter  dated  7.6.2007  was  received  in  the  secretariat  of  the  appellant  on  

25.6.2007  and  the  same  was  forwarded  to  the  concerned  department  on  

28.6.2007.  In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it has been averred that officers  

of the appellant had no knowledge of the impugned order till the receipt of  

intimation  from respondent  No.5  in  July  2007 regarding  payment  to  the  

beneficiaries  in the  Western Region and,  thereafter,  steps  were  taken for  

filing appeal.  

7. Shri  Ravi  Shankar Prasad,  learned senior counsel  for the  appellant  

argued  that  even  though  the  appeal  was  filed  after  more  than  120  days  

counted from the date of the Tribunal’s order and, in terms of proviso to  

Section 125 of the Electricity Act, this Court can extend the time for filing  

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an appeal up to a maximum of 60 days only, power under Section 5 read  

with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be exercised for condonation of  

delay beyond the period of  120 days.   In support  of  this  argument,  Shri  

Prasad placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Mukri Gopalan v.  

Cheppilat Puthanpurayil  Aboobacker  (1995) 5 SCC 5.  Learned senior  

counsel  laid  considerable  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  by  virtue  of  the  

impugned order huge liability has been created against the appellant and if  

the appeal is not entertained, it will suffer irreparable injury.   

8. Shri  C.S.  Vaidyanathan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  

respondent No.3 argued that in view of the plain language of the proviso to  

Section 125 of the Electricity Act, this Court has no power to extend the  

period  for  filing  an  appeal  beyond  120  days  and  the  provisions  of  the  

Limitation Act cannot be invoked for negating the legislative intendment to  

prescribe special limitation for filing an appeal against any decision or order  

of  the  Tribunal.   Learned  senior  counsel  further  argued  that  letter  dated  

7.6.2007 sent by Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal informing the parties that  

the IA was disposed of on 17.5.2007 and they may request for a copy of the  

order in PDF format through e-mail or apply for a certified copy amounts to  

communication  of  the  order  within  the  meaning  of  Section  125  of  the  

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Electricity Act read with Rule 98 of the Rules and the appeal filed after more  

than 120 days from the date of receipt of letter dated 7.6.2007 is liable to be  

dismissed as barred by time.  Learned senior counsel submitted that even if  

intimation given by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide letter dated  

7.6.2007  is  ignored,  the  appeal  is  liable  to  be  dismissed  because  the  

appellant had become aware of the Tribunal’s order on 17.7.2007 i.e., the  

day on which letter dated 6.7.2007 sent by respondent No.5 was received in  

the  office  of  its  Secretary.   Learned senior  counsel  submitted  that  if  the  

period of limitation is counted from 17.7.2007, the appeal could be filed by  

15.9.2007  whereas  the  same was  actually  filed  on  24.12.2007.   Learned  

senior counsel then invited the Court’s attention to the memo of appeal and  

application filed for condonation of delay to show that the same had been  

prepared on 7.9.2007 but were filed on 24.12.2007 i.e., after more than three  

and half months.  In support of his argument that this Court cannot extend  

the time beyond 60 days in terms of proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity  

Act, Shri Vaidyanathan relied upon the judgments of this Court in Union of  

India  v.  Popular  Construction  Company (2001)  8  SCC  470,  Singh  

Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others  

(2008) 3 SCC 70 and  Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v.  

Hongo India Private Limited and another (2009) 5 SCC 791.         

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9. For deciding the question framed at the threshold of this judgment, it  

will be useful to notice the relevant statutory provisions.

Electricity Act and the Rules

125.   Appeal to Supreme Court.– Any person aggrieved by  any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal,  may, file an  appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of  communication  of  the  decision  or  order  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified  in  section  100 of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  (5  OF  1908):

Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the  appellant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause  from  filing  the  appeal  within  the  said  period,  allow  it  to  be  filed  within  a  further period not exceeding sixty days.

94. Pronouncement of order.–(1) The Bench shall as far as  possible pronounce the order immediately after the hearing is  concluded.

(2) When  the  orders  are  reserved,  the  date  for  pronouncement of order shall be notified in the cause list which  shall be a valid notice of intimation of pronouncement".

(3) Reading of the operative portion of the order in the open  court shall be deemed to be pronouncement of the order.

(4) Any order reserved by a Circuit Bench of the Tribunal  may also be pronounced at the principal place of sitting of the  Bench  in  one  of  the  aforesaid  modes  as  exigencies  of  the  situation require.

98. Transmission of order by the Court Master.–  (1) The  Court  Master  shall  immediately  on  pronouncement  of  order,  transmit the order with the case file to the Deputy Registrar.

(2) On  receipt  of  the  order  from  the  Court  Master,  the  Deputy Registrar shall  after due scrutiny, satisfy himself that  

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the provisions of these rules have been duly compiled with and  in token thereof affix his initials with date on the outer cover of  the  order.  The  Deputy  Registrar  shall  thereafter  cause  to  transmit the case file and the order to the Registry for taking  steps to prepare copies and their communication to the parties.

106. Filing through electronic media. – The Tribunal may  allow  filing  of  appeal  or  petition  or  application  through  electronic  media  such  as  online  filing  and  provide  for  rectification of defects by e-mail or net and in such filing, these  rules shall be adopted as nearly as possible on and from a date  to  be  notified  separately  and  the  Chairperson  may  issue  instructions in this behalf from time to time.

Limitation Act

5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.–  Any  appeal or any application, other than an application under any  of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (5 of 1908) , may be admitted after the prescribed period,  if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had  sufficient  cause  for  not  preferring  the  appeal  or  making  the  application within such period.

Explanation.–– The fact that the appellant or the applicant  was  misled  by  any  order,  practice  or  judgment  of  the  High  Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may  be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

29. Savings.– (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25  of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,  appeal or application a period of limitation different from the  period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3  shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the  Schedule  and  for  the  purpose  of  determining  any  period  of  limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any  special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24  (inclusive) shall  apply only in so far as, and to the extent to  which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local  law.

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(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being  in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this  Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such  law.

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in  section 2 shall  not  apply to cases arising in the territories  to  which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the  time being extend.

10. The  Electricity  Act  was  enacted  in  the  backdrop  of  dismal  

performance of various state electricity boards and alarming decline in the  

availability  of  power  necessary  for  domestic,  agricultural  and  industrial  

sectors.   Before  enactment  of  the  Electricity  Act,  the  electricity  supply  

industry was governed by the Indian Electricity Act 1910, The Electricity  

(Supply) Act, 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998.  

The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 mandated the creation of electricity board  

for  every  state.   The  state  electricity  boards  had  the  responsibility  of  

arranging the supply of electricity in the state.  Over a period of time, the  

performance of state electricity boards deteriorated on account of various  

factors including their inability to take decisions on tariffs in a professional  

and  independent  manner.   In  practice,  the  state  governments  started  

determining tariff and huge concessions were provided to various segments  

of the consumers, many of which were not deserving.  Cross-subsidies had  

reached  unsustainable  level.   To  address  this  issue  and  to  provide  for  

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independent  determination  of  tariffs,  the  Electricity  Regulatory  

Commissions  Act,  1998  was  enacted.   Under  that  Act,  the  Central  

Government  created  the  Central  Electricity  Regulatory  Commission  and  

most  of  the  state  governments  created  the  State  Electricity  Regulatory  

Commissions  either  under the Central  Act or  under their  respective  state  

legislations  with  a  view to  implement  the  policy  of  encouraging  private  

sector participation in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity  

and  to  harmonize  and  rationalize  the  provisions  of  the  three  Acts,  the  

Electricity  Act  was  enacted.     Part  II  thereof  contains  provisions  under  

which the Central Government is entitled to prepare the National Electricity  

Policy and tariff policy, in consultation with the state governments and the  

Central Electricity Authority for development of the power system based on  

optimal utilisation of resources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances  

or materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy.  Under the same part,  

the Central Government can prepare and notify national policies, permitting  

stand alone  systems  for  rural  areas,  for  rural  electrification  and for  bulk  

purchase  of  power  and  management  of  local  distribution  in  rural  areas  

through  panchayat  institutions,  users’  associations,  co-operative  societies,  

non-governmental organisations or franchisees.  Part III contains provision  

relating to generation of electricity.  Part IV regulates grant of licenses for  

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transmission  of  electricity,  distribution  of  electricity  and  trading  in  

electricity.  Part V deals with transmission of electricity including inter-state  

transmission.  Part VI deals with distribution of electricity.  Part VII contains  

provision relating to tariff.  The provisions contained in Part IX provide for  

establishment  of  the  Central  Electricity  Regulatory  Authority  and  its  

functions and duties and those contained in Part X provide for establishment  

of  the  Central  and  State  Electricity  Regulatory  Commissions  and  their  

functions. The Electricity Act also envisages establishment of Tribunal to  

hear  appeals  against  the  orders  of  adjudicating  officers  or  regulatory  

commissions (Part XI).  In terms of Section 111, any person aggrieved by an  

order made by an adjudicating officer except the one made under Section  

127 or  an order made by an appropriate Commission under this  Act can  

prefer  an  appeal  to  the  Tribunal.   The  composition  of  the  Tribunal  and  

qualifications prescribed for appointment of Chairperson and Member shows  

that the legislature intended to create a specialized adjudicatory forum for  

deciding various disputes emanating from the operation of the Act.  Section  

125 provides for an appeal to this Court against any order or decision of the  

Tribunal which can be filed within 60 days from the date of communication  

of  the  decision  or  order  of  the  Tribunal.   The  limitation  placed  on  the  

jurisdiction of this Court is that the appeal can be entertained only on one or  

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more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  

Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain the appeal within a  

further period not exceeding 60 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was  

prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period.  

In other words, an appeal under Section 125 can be filed within a maximum  

period of 120 days if this Court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for  

not filing the same within 60 days from the date of communication of the  

decision or order appealed against.  Part XII contains provisions relating to  

investigation  leading  to  assessment  of  electricity  charges  payable  by  the  

consumer and enforcement  of  the  orders  of  assessment.   It  also contains  

provisions for appeal against the final order passed under Section 126.  Part  

XIV contains provisions to deal with theft of electricity, electric lines and  

materials, interference with meters and work of licensees and also provides  

for fiscal penalties and substantive punishments.  Section 145 declares that  

no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in  

respect of any matter which an assessing officer referred to in Section 126 or  

an appellate authority referred to in Section 127 or the adjudicating officer  

appointed under the Act is empowered by or under the Act to determine and  

no injunction shall be granted in such matters.

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11. The brief analysis of the scheme of the Electricity Act shows that it is  

a  self-contained  comprehensive  legislation,  which  not  only  regulates  

generation, transmission and distribution of electricity by public bodies and  

encourages  public  sector  participation  in  the  process  but  also  ensures  

creation of special  adjudicatory mechanism to deal  with the grievance of  

any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer under the  

Act  except  under  Section  127  or  an  order  made  by  the  appropriate  

commission.  Section 110 provides for establishment of a Tribunal to hear  

such appeals.   Section 111(1) and (2) lays down that any person aggrieved  

by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate commission  

under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 45  

days from the date on which a copy of the order made by an adjudicating  

officer or the appropriate commission is received by him.   Section 111(5)  

mandates that the Tribunal shall  deal  with the appeal as expeditiously as  

possible and endeavour to dispose of the same finally within 180 days from  

the date of receipt thereof.  If the appeal is not disposed of within 180 days,  

the  Tribunal  is  required  to  record  reasons  in  writing  for  not  doing  so.  

Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of  

the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of  

communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal.  Proviso to Section  

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125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period  

of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal  

within the initial period of 60 days.  This shows that the period of limitation  

prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially  

different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits  

etc.  The use of the expression `within a further period of not exceeding 60  

days’ in Proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing  

an appeal is 120 days.  There is no provision in the Act under which this  

Court  can  entertain  an  appeal  filed  against  the  decision  or  order  of  the  

Tribunal after more than 120 days.   The object underlying establishment of  

a special adjudicatory forum i.e., the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of  

any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or  

by an appropriate  commission  with a provision for further  appeal  to this  

Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections  

111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and  

implementation  of  different  provisions  of  the  Electricity  Act  are  

expeditiously decided by an expert  body and no court,  except this Court,  

may  entertain  challenge  to  the  decision  or  order  of  the  Tribunal.   The  

exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an order  

made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction.  It is thus  

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evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of  

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special  

or  local  law  prescribes  for  any  suit,  appeal  or  application  a  period  of  

limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions  

of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the  

Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply  

for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any  

suit,  appeal  or  application  unless they are not  expressly excluded by the  

special or local law.   

12. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133, this  

Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in the backdrop of the  

plea that  the provisions of that Act are not applicable to the proceedings  

under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.  It was argued that the  

words “expressly  excluded”  appearing in  Section 29(2)  would mean that  

there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the  

specific  provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is  to be  

excluded.  While rejecting the argument, the three-Judge Bench observed:

“………..what  we have to  see  is  whether  the  scheme of the  special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the  remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended  it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the  

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several  matters  provided  by  it.  If  on  an  examination  of  the  relevant  provisions  it  is  clear  that  the  provisions  of  the  Limitation  Act  are  necessarily  excluded,  then  the  benefits  conferred  therein  cannot  be  called  in  aid  to  supplement  the  provisions of the Act.  In our view, even in a case where the  special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24  of  the  Limitation  Act  by  an  express  reference,  it  would  nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to  what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the  subject-matter  and  scheme  of  the  special  law  exclude  their  operation.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is  

substantially  similar  to  Section  125  of  the  Electricity  Act  came  to  be  

interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company (2001) 8  

SCC 470.  The precise question considered in that case was whether the  

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application  

challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation  

Act,  1996.  The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in  Mangu  

Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan  

Shukla  v.  Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099,  Hukumdev Narain  

Yadav  v.  L.N.  Mishra (supra),  Patel  Naranbhai  Marghabhai  v.  

Dhulabhai Galbabhai (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:

“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is  concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the  proviso to sub-section (3).  In our opinion,  this  phrase would  amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section  

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29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act, and  would  therefore  bar  the  application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to  go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application  to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the  proviso,  would render  the phrase “but  not  thereafter”  wholly  otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse  to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an  application for setting aside such award “in accordance with”  sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to  grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our  purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned  in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application “in  accordance with” that sub-section.  Consequently by virtue of  Section 34(1),  recourse to the court  against an arbitral  award  cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance  of  the  period  fixed  under  Section  34  is  emphasised  by  the  provisions of Section 36 which provide that

“where the time for making an application to set aside the  arbitral  award under  Section 34 has expired … the award  shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in  the same manner as if it were a decree of the court”.

This  is  a  significant  departure  from  the  provisions  of  the  Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set  aside the award expired, the court was required to “proceed to  pronounce  judgment  according  to  the  award,  and  upon  the  judgment so pronounced a decree shall  follow” (Section 17).  Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of  the  1996  Act  is  that  the  award  becomes  immediately  enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were  any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in  Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue  in favour of curtailment of the court’s powers by the exclusion  of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

        (emphasis  supplied)

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14. In Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur and others (supra), the  

Court  interpreted  Section 35 of  Central  Excise  Act,  1944,  which is  pari  

materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed:

“The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal  being creatures of statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the  delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The  period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is  statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  (in  short  “the  Limitation  Act”)  can  be  availed for condonation of  delay.  The first  proviso to Section 35  makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within  three months from the date of communication to him of the decision  or  order.  However,  if  the  Commissioner  is  satisfied  that  the  appellant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause  from  presenting  the  appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be  presented within a further period of 30 days.  In other words, this  clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in  terms of the proviso further 30 days’  time can be granted by the  appellate  authority  to  entertain  the  appeal.  The  proviso  to  sub- section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the  appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented  beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position  clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain  the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of  60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore,  there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The  Commissioner  and  the  High  Court  were  therefore  justified  in  holding  that  there  was  no  power  to  condone  the  delay  after  the  expiry of 30 days’ period.”

(emphasis supplied)

The  same  view  was  reiterated  in  Commissioner  of  Customs,  Central  

Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 73.   

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15. In  Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India  

Private  Limited  and  another  (2009)  5  SCC  791,  a  three-Judge  Bench  

considered the scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that High  

Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section  

35-H thereof.  The argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be  

invoked for condonation of delay was rejected by the Court and observed:

“30.  In  the  earlier  part  of  our  order,  we  have  adverted  to  Chapter  VI-A  of  the  Act  which  provides  for  appeals  and  revisions  to  various  authorities.  Though  Parliament  has  specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case  of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of  days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the  Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the  case of revision by the Central Government has been provided.  However,  in  the  case  of  an  appeal  to  the  High Court  under  Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under  Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no  further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the  High Court is mentioned in the Act.

32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35- B,  35-EE,  35-G  and  35-H  makes  the  position  clear  that  an  appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within  180 days only from the date of communication of the decision  or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions  makes  the  position  clear  that  the  legislature  intended  the  appellate  authority  to  entertain  the  appeal  by  condoning  the  delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the  preliminary limitation period for  preferring an appeal.  In  the  absence  of  any  clause  condoning  the  delay  by  showing  sufficient  cause after the prescribed period, there is complete  

21

exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court  was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to  condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180  days.

35.  It  was  contended  before  us  that  the  words  “expressly  excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference  made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the  Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this  regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here  in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy  provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a  complete code by itself which alone should govern the several  matters  provided by it.  If,  on an examination of  the relevant  provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act  are  necessarily  excluded,  then  the  benefits  conferred  therein  cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.  In our considered view, that even in a case where the special  law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the  Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be  open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the  nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter  and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other  words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act,  therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation  Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to  filing of reference application to the High Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. In  view  of  the  above  discussion,  we  hold  that  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal  

filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120  

days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso.  Any  

interpretation  of  Section  125  of  the  Electricity  Act  which  may  attract  

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applicability  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act  read  with  Section  29(2)  

thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special  

limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal  

and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.

17. The  judgment  in  Mukri  Gopalan  v.  Cheppilat  Puthanpurayil  

Aboobacker (supra)  on  which  reliance  has  been  placed  by  Shri  Ravi  

Shankar Prasad has no bearing on this case.  The issue considered in that  

case  was  whether  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act  can  be  invoked  for  

condoning the delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent  

Control Act.  A two-Judge Bench interpreted Section 18 of the Kerala Rent  

Control Act and held that even though that section is a special provision, in  

the absence of any indication of maximum period within which the appeal  

can be entertained by the Appellate Authority, Section 5 of the Limitation  

Act would get attracted.  It is significant to note that there is no provision in  

the  Kerala  Rent  Control  Act  similar  to  the  one contained in   proviso to  

Section  125  of  the  Electricity  Act,  Section  34(3)  of  the  Arbitration  and  

Conciliation Act and Section 35(1) or 35-H of the Central Excise Act, 1944.  

Therefore,  the  ratio  of  Mukri  Gopalan  v.  Cheppilat  Puthanpurayil  

Aboobacker (supra) cannot be invoked for declaring that this Court has the  

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power to entertain an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act after  

120 days counted from the date of communication of the decision or order of  

the Tribunal.  

18. The next question which requires consideration is as to what is the  

date  of  communication  of  the  decision  or  order  of  the  Tribunal  for  the  

purpose of Section 125 of the Electricity Act.  The word `communication’  

has not been defined in the Act and the Rules.  Therefore, the same deserves  

to  be  interpreted  by  applying  the  rule  of  contextual  interpretation  and  

keeping in view the language of the relevant provisions.  Rule 94(1) of the  

Rules lays down that the Bench of the Tribunal which hears an application  

or petition shall  pronounce the order immediately  after conclusion of the  

hearing. Rule 94(2) deals with a situation where the order is reserved.  In  

that event, the date for pronouncement of order is required to be notified in  

the  cause  list  and  the  same  is  treated  as  a  notice  of  intimation  of  

pronouncement.   Rule  98(1)  casts  a  duty  upon  the  Court  Master  to  

immediately after pronouncement transmit the order along with the case file  

to the Deputy Registrar.   In terms of Rule 98(2), the Deputy Registrar is  

required to scrutinize the file, satisfy himself that provisions of rules have  

been complied with and thereafter,  send the case file to the Registry  for  

taking steps to prepare copies of the order and their communication to the  

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parties.  If Rule 98(2) is read in isolation, one may get an impression that the  

registry of the Tribunal is  duty bound to send copies of the order  to the  

parties and the order will be deemed to have been communicated on the date  

of receipt thereof, but if the same is read in conjunction with Section 125 of  

the  Electricity  Act,  which  enables  any  aggrieved  party  to  file  an  appeal  

within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of  

the  Tribunal,  Rule  94(2)  which  postulates  notification  of  the  date  of  

pronouncement of the order in the cause list and Rule 106 under which the  

Tribunal  can  allow filing of  an appeal  or  petition  or  application  through  

electronic media and provide for rectification of the defects by e-mail or net,  

it  becomes clear  that  once the factum of pronouncement of order  by the  

Tribunal  is  made known to the parties  and they are given opportunity to  

obtain a copy thereof through e-mail etc., the order will be deemed to have  

been communicated to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the  

main part of Section 125 will commence from that date.

19. The  issue  deserves  to  be  considered  from  another  angle.   As  

mentioned above, Rule 94(2) requires that when the order is reserved, the  

date of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause list and that shall be a  

valid notice of pronouncement of the order.  The counsel appearing for the  

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parties are supposed to take cognizance of the cause list in which the case is  

shown for pronouncement.  If title of the case and name of the counsel is  

printed  in  the  cause  list,  the  same will  be deemed as  a  notice  regarding  

pronouncement of order.  Once the order is pronounced after being shown in  

the cause list with the title of the case and name of the counsel, the same will  

be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and they can obtain  

copy through e-mail or by filing an application for certified copy.

20. In  Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v.  Deputy Land Acquisition  

Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500, this Court considered whether an award made  

under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  can  be  treated  to  have  been  

communicated  on  the  date  of  its  making.    The  application  filed  by  the  

respondent for making reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition  

Act was rejected by the Collector  on the ground that  the same had been  

made after more than six months from the date of award i.e., 25.3.1951.  The  

High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant.  This Court  

noted  that  no  notice  of  the  award  was given  to  the  appellant  as  per  the  

requirements of Section 12(2) and it was only on or about January, 1953 that  

he  received  the  information  about  making  of  the  award.   He  then  filed  

application on 24.2.1953 for reference.  This Court considered the nature of  

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the  award  made  by  the  Collector  under  Section  12(2)  and  held  that  the  

period of six months prescribed for making application would commence  

from the date the award was made known to the party.  Paragraph 6 of the  

judgment which contains discussion on the issue of communication of award  

reads as under:   

“There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion.  If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the  Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to  be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects  the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all  decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that  the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The  knowledge  of  the  party  affected  by  such  a  decision,  either  actual  or constructive,  is an essential  element which must be  satisfied before the  decision can be brought  into force.  Thus  considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in  the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing  it  in  the  office  of  the  Collector;  it  must  involve  the  communication of the said award to the party concerned either  actually  or  constructively. If  the  award is  pronounced in  the  presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be  said  to  be  made  when  pronounced.  If  the  date  for  the  pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and  it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced  the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if  the  said  party  is  not  actually  present  on  the  date  of  its  pronouncement. Similarly if  without  notice of  the date of its  pronouncement,  an  award  is  pronounced  and  a  party  is  not  present  the  award  can  be  said  to  be  made  when  it  is  communicated to the party later.  The knowledge of the party  affected by the award, either actual or constructive,  being an  essential  requirement  of  fairplay  and  natural  justice  the  expression “the date  of the award” used in the proviso must  mean the date when the award is either communicated to the  party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In  

27

our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the  words  “from the  date  of  the  Collector’s  award”  used  in  the  proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. In  Assistant  Transport  Commissioner,  Lucknow v.  Nand Singh  

(1979) 4 SCC 19, this Court considered a somewhat similar question in the  

context of filling an appeal under Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles  

Taxation Act, 1935.  The Allahabad High Court held that the date of the  

communication of the order will be the starting point for limitation of filing  

an appeal.  While approving the view taken by the High Court, this Court  

observed as under:

“In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and  cannot be interfered with by this Court. Apart from the reasons  given by this Court in the earlier judgment to the effect that the  order must be made known either directly or constructively to  the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer  an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our  judgment and that is this: It is plain that mere writing an order  in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order  in  the  eye  of  law in  the  sense  of  affecting  the  rights  of  the  parties  for  whom  the  order  is  meant.  The  order  must  be  communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of  making it known, which may make it possible for the authority  to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known  the  order.  In  a  given  case,  the  date  of  putting  the  order  in  communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be  the date of the communication of the order or the date of the  order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be  effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to  his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not.  

28

On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear  that the respondent had no means to know about the order of  the  Taxation  Officer  rejecting his  prayer  until  and unless  he  received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of  Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the  date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an  appeal within 30 days of that date.”

(emphasis supplied)   

22. In  Muthiaha  Chettiar  v.  I.T.  Commissioner,  Madras AIR  1951  

Madras  2004,  a  two-Judge  Bench  of  Madras  High  Court  considered  the  

question whether  the limitation of  one year  prescribed for filing revision  

under Section 33-A (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 is to be computed from  

the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Commissioner or the  

date on which the petitioner had an opportunity of coming to know of the  

order.  It was argued on behalf of the department that other provisions of the  

Act have been amended to provide for appeal within specified time to be  

counted  from the date  of  the  receipt  of  the  order  sought  to  be  appealed  

against, but no such amendment was made in Section 33-A and therefore,  

the period of limitation will start from the date of order.  While rejecting the  

argument,  Rajamannar,  C.J.,  referred to  earlier  decisions in  Secretary of  

State  v.  Gopisetti  Narayanasami 34  Madras  151  and  Swaminatha  v.  

Lakshmanan AIR 1930 Madras 490 and observed:

29

“………..The  only  question  that  we  have  to  decide  is  as  to  whether there is anything in the reasoning of the learned Judges  in Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami, 34 Mad. 151 :  (8  I.C.  398)  &  Swaminatha  v.  Lakshmanan,  53  Mad.  491:(A.I.R. (17) 1930 Mad. 490) which makes the application  of the rule laid down by them dependent on the provisions of a  particular statute.  We think there is none.  On the other hand,  we consider that the rule laid down by the learned Judges in the  above two decisions – & we are taking the same view – is based  upon a  salutary  & just  principle,  namely that,  if  a  person is  given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse  order  within  a  prescribed  time,  limitation  should  not  be  computed  from  a  date  earlier  than  that  on  which  the  party  aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of  knowing the order & therefore, must be presumed to have had  knowledge of the order.”   

23. In Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s. M.M. Rubber and  

Co., Tamil Nadu (1992) Supp 1 SCC 471, a three-Judge Bench highlighted  

a distinction between making of an order and communication thereof to the  

affected person in the context of Section 35-E (3) and (4)  of the Central  

Excise Act, 1944.  The Bench noted the scheme of Section 35, distinction  

between sub-sections (3)  and (4) thereof and held that  in case where the  

order is subject to appeal, the same is required to be communicated to the  

affected person.  Relevant portions of that judgment are extracted below:  

“5. Before we discuss the arguments of the learned counsel,  it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions in the Act.  Section  35  of  the  Act  provides  for  an  appeal  by  a  person  aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Act by a  Central Excise Officer lower than a Collector of Central Excise  

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and  that  such  an  appeal  will  have  to  be  filed  “within  three  months  from the  date  of  the  communication  to  him of  such  decision  or  order”.  Sub-section  (5)  of  Section  35-A requires  that on the disposal of the appeal, the Collector (Appeals) shall  communicate  the  order  passed  by  him  to  the  appellant,  the  adjudicating  authority  and  the  Collector  of  Central  Excise.  Section  35-B  provides  for  a  right  of  appeal  to  any  person  aggrieved by, among other orders, (1) an order passed by the  Collector (Appeals) under Section 35-A and (2) a decision or  order  passed  by  the  Collector  of  Central  Excise  as  an  adjudicating  authority.  Such  an  appeal  will  have  to  be  filed  “within three months from the date on which the order sought  to  be  appealed  against  is  communicated  to  the  Collector  of  Central Excise or as the case may be the other party preferring  the appeal”. The Appellate Tribunal also is required to send a  copy  of  the  order  passed  in  the  appeal  to  the  Collector  of  Central Excise and the other party to the appeal……………… …..  8. At this stage itself we may state that sub-section (4) of  the Act provides that the adjudicating authority shall  file the  application before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order made  under  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2)  “within  a  period  of  three  months  from  the  date  of  communication  of  the  order  under  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2)  to  the  adjudicating  authority”. 9. The words “from the date of decision or order” used with  reference to the limitation for filing an appeal or revision under  certain statutory provisions had come up for consideration in a  number of cases. We may state that the ratio of the decisions  uniformly is that in the case of a person aggrieved filing the  appeal or revision, it shall mean the date of communication of  the decision or order appealed against. However, we may note a  few leading cases on this aspect. 10. Under Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860 the  starting point of limitation for appeal by way of suit allowed by  that section was the passing of the Survey Officer’s decision  and in two of the earliest cases, namely,  Annamalai Chetti v.  Col. J. G. Cloete and Seshama v.  Sankara it was held that the  decision was passed when it was communicated to the parties.  

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In  Secretary  of  State  for  India  in  Council v.  Gopisetti  Narayanaswami Naidu Garu construing a similar provision in  the Survey and Boundary Act, 1897 the same High Court held  that a decision cannot properly be said to be passed until it is in  some way pronounced or published under such circumstances  the  parties  affected  by  it  have  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  knowing what it contains. “Till then though it may be written  out,  signed and dated,  it  is  nothing but  a decision which the  officer intends to pass. It is not passed so long it is open to him  to tear off what he has written and write something else.” In  Raja  Harish  Chandra  Raj  Singh v.  Deputy  Land  Acquisition  Officer construing  the  proviso  to  Section  18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  which  prescribed  for  applications  seeking  reference to the court, a time-limit of six weeks of the receipt of  the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six  months from the date of the Collector’s award whichever first  expires, this Court held that the six months period will have to  be calculated from the date of communication of the award. In  Asstt.  Transport  Commissioner,  Lucknow v.  Nand  Singh  construing  the  provision  of  Section  15  of  the  U.P.  Motor  Vehicles Taxation Act, it was held that for an aggrieved party  the  limitation  will  run  from  the  date  when  the  order  was  communicated to him. 11. The ratio of these judgments were applied in interpreting  Section 33-A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in Muthia  Chettiar v. CIT with reference to a right of revision provided to  an aggrieved assessee. Section 33-A(1) of the Act on the other  hand  authorised  the  Commissioner  to  suo  moto  call  for  the  records of any proceedings under the Act in which an order has  been passed by any authority subordinate to him and pass such  order thereon as he thinks fit. The proviso, however, stated that  the  Commissioner  shall  not  revise  any order  under  that  sub- section “if the order (sought to be revised) has been made more  than one year previously”. Construing this provision the High  Court in Muthia Chettiar case held that the power to call for the  records and pass the order will cease with the lapse of one year  from the date of the order by the subordinate authority and the  ratio  of  date  of  the  knowledge of  the order  applicable  to  an  aggrieved party is not applicable for the purpose of exercising  

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suo  moto  power.  Similarly  in  another  decision  reported  in  Viswanathan  Chettiar v.  CIT construing  the  time-limit  for  completion of an assessment under Section 34(2) of the Income  Tax Act,  1922, which provided that it  shall  be made “within  four years from the end of the year in which the income, profit  and gains were first assessable,” it was held that the time-limit  of  four  years  for  exercise  of  the power should be calculated  with  reference  to  the  date  on  which  the  assessment  or  reassessment  was  made  and  not  the  date  on  which  such  assessment  or  reassessment  order  made  under  Section  34(2)  was served on the assessee. 13. So  far  as  the  party  who  is  affected  by  the  order  or  decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should  be made aware of passing of such order. Therefore courts have  uniformly  laid  down  as  a  rule  of  law  that  for  seeking  the  remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order  was  communicated  to  him  or  the  date  on  which  it  was  pronounced  or  published  under  such  circumstances  that  the  parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing  of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of  the  party  affected  by  such  a  decision,  either  actual  or  constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied  before  the  decision  can be said to  have been concluded and  binding on him. Otherwise the party affected by it will have no  means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of  appealing  against  it  or  otherwise  having  it  set  aside.  This  is  based upon, as observed by Rajmannar, C.J. in   Muthia Chettiar    v.    CIT   “a salutary and just principle”. The application of this    rule so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependent  on the provisions of the particular statute, but it is so under the  general law.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that even though the name  

of the counsel for the appellant was not shown in the cause list of 14.5.2007  

i.e., the date on which the impugned order was pronounced by the Tribunal,  

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the  factum of  pronouncement  was  conveyed  to  the  parties  including  the  

appellant  vide  letter  dated  7.6.2007,  which  was  signed  by  the  Deputy  

Registrar on 11.6.2007 and they were informed that they can obtain copy  

through e-mail or make an application for certified copy.  Undisputedly, that  

letter  was received in the secretariat  of  the appellant  on 21.6.2007.  The  

appellant had come to know about the impugned order in July 2007 from  

another  source  i.e.,  respondent  No.5,  which  had  sent  communication  for  

payment of FLEE charges.  The communication sent by respondent No.5  

was received by the  appellant  on 17.7.2007.   It  is,  thus,  evident  that  on  

21.6.2007 or at least on 17.7.2007, the appellant had come to know through  

proper channel that the order has been pronounced by the Tribunal in I.A.  

No.4/2007.  It is not clear from the record whether the appellant had applied  

for  certified  copy  or  obtained  the  one  through  e-mail,  but  this  much  is  

evident that the appellant did obtain/receive a copy of order dated 17.5.2007.  

If that was not so, the appellant could not have filed appeal under Section  

125 of the Electricity Act.  The preparation of appeal, which bears the date  

7.9.2007 is a clinching evidence of the fact that the appellant had not only  

become aware of the order of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof.  

However, instead of filing appeal within 60 days from the date of receipt of  

letter  dated  7.6.2007  sent  by  the  registry  of  the  Tribunal  or  the  

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communication sent by respondent No.5, the appellant chose to file appeal  

only on 24.12.2007 and that too despite the fact that the same was prepared  

on 7.9.2007.  The appellant has not offered any tangible explanation as to  

why the appeal could not be filed for more than three and half months after  

its preparation.  Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appeal  

has been filed after more than 120 days from the date of communication of  

the Tribunal’s order and, as such, the same cannot be entertained.

25. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.  However, the parties are left to  

bear their own costs.

….….………………….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

…..…..…………………..J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi April 15, 2010.

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