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PETITIONER: CHHAGAN BAGWAN KAHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: N.L. KALNA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/03/1989

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1234            1989 SCR  (2)  52  1989 SCC  (2) 318        JT 1989 (1)   572  1989 SCALE  (1)653  CITATOR INFO :  R          1989 SC1812  (5)  F          1989 SC1881  (10,11)

ACT:             Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act,  198 5:         Sections 3 and 15--Expiry or revocation of an earlier dete n-         tion  order--No  bar  for  making  a  subsequent   detenti on         order--Necessity  for  fresh facts  for  passing  subseque nt         detention order.

HEADNOTE:             With  a  view to preventing the petitioner  detenu  fr om         acting  in  any  manner prejudicial to  the  maintenance of         public  order, an order of detention was passed against  h im         by the Comissioner of Police, Surat City, under section 3( 2)         of  the  Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social  Activities  Ac t,         1985.  The  grounds of detention referred  to  the  detenu ’s         criminal  activities connected with bootlegging on  a  lar ge         scale  and  in an organised manner, and  the  several  cas es         registered  and  pending against him on  that  account.  T he         detenu’s representations were dismissed by the 1st  respon d-         ent and the State Government.             It  was contended on behalf of the petitioner  that  t he         Detaining  Authority  for drawing his  requisite  subjecti ve         satisfaction  had  taken  into  consideration  the  previo

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us         grounds  of  detention which were the subject  matter  of  a         Special Criminal Application before the Gujarat High  Cour t,         and  the High Court had quashed the order of  detention  i m-         pugned in that case. On the other hand, it was contended on         behalf  of the respondents that the earlier  proceeding  w as         considered  only to a limited purpose of taking note of  t he         detenu’s continued involvement in bootlegging activities.         Allowing the writ petition, and quashing the detention ord er         it was             HELD: (1) Even if the order of detention comes to an e nd         either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detenti on         there  must be fresh facts for passing a  subsequent  orde r.         [58D]             Ghulam Nambi Zaki v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, [1970]  3         SCR  35;  Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate,  Cuttack

JUDGMENT:         Anr., [1969] 1 SCR 227; HarJas Dev Singh v. State of Punja b,         [1974] 1 SCR 281 and         53         Chotka  Hembram v. State of West Bengal, [1974] 3  SCC  40 1,         referred to.             (2) A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by  t he         Court issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or         certiorari,  the  grounds of the said order  should  not be         taken  into consideration either as a whole or in part  ev en         alongwith  the  fresh grounds of detention for  drawing  t he         requisite  subjective  satisfaction to pass  a  fresh  ord er         because  once  the Court strikes down an  earlier  order by         issuing a rule it nullifies the entire order. [58D-E]             Ibrahim  Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, [1985]  2  S CC         24, followed.             (3)  It is imperative therefore to read down section 15         of  the  Act  which provides for the  making  of  successi ve         orders  of  detention so as to bring it in  conformity  wi th         Article 22(4) of the Constitution. [59C]             Abdul  Latif  Abdul  Wahab Sheikh v. B.K.  Jha  &  Anr .,

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       [1987] 2 SCC 22 followed.             (4)  In the present case, no doubt, the order of  dete n-         tion  contains fresh facts. In addition, the  detaining  a u-         thority has taken into consideration the earlier grounds of         detention which grounds had been nullified by the High Cou rt         by  issuing a prerogative writ of habeas corpus. A  copy of         the  earlier grounds of detention was also one of the  doc u-         ments  furnished to the detenu which confirms the fact  th at         the  detaining authority has considered the earlier  groun ds         of  detention  alongwith  other documents  for  drawing  h is         requisite subjective satisfaction for passing the  detenti on         order.  The order of detention is vitiated on  that  groun d,         and is therefore liable to be set aside. [58F. G; 59F-G] &             ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 61         of 1989.         (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. )         V.V. Vaze, M.K. Pandit and P.H. Parekh for the Petitioner.         P.S. Poti, M.N. Shroff and Mrs. H. Wahi for the Respondent s.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by         54             S.  RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. This petition under Article 32         of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner, t he         detenu herein, challenging the legality and validity of  t he         order of detention dated 21.10.1988 passed by the  detaini ng         authority (the Commissioner of Police, Surat City)  clampi ng         upon  the  detenu the above said order  of  detention  und er         Sub-section  (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat  Prevention of         Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as         the  ’Act’)  on the ground that he on consideration  of  t he         materials placed before him was satisfied that it was nece s-         sary  to make the said order with a view to  preventing  t he         detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the  maint e-         nance  of  public  order in the area  of  Nanpura  Machhiw ad         falling  under the jurisdiction of Athwa Lines  Police  St a-         tion,  Surat City and directed the detenu to be detained in         Sabarmati  Central  Prison, Ahmedabad under  the  conditio

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ns         specified  in the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social  Activ i-         ties  Order,  1985. In pursuance of the impugned  order  t he         detenu has been detained in the aforesaid prison.             The  second respondent, the State of  Gujarat,  approv ed         the  impugned order on 26.10.1988 and confirmed the same on         13.12’. 1988. The detenu submitted his representation  dat ed         15.12.  1988  which was received by the  1st  respondent on         19.12. 1988 on which date itself the same was rejected.  T he         copy of the representation sent to the second respondent w as         rejected on 21.12.1988.             It is stated in the grounds of detention that the dete nu         was  illegally keeping in possession the country liquor  a nd         openly selling the same at the comer of Nanpura,  Machhiwa d,         Masjid  Wali Gali, Bhandariwad and conducting a  den  (Add a)         and that he had been arrested in 1988 for offences under t he         Bombay  Prohibition Act in respect of which number of  cas es         were  registered  which  cases are still  pending  trial as         disclosed  in  Annexure  I. It is further  stated  that  t he         detenu  had  engaged  10 persons whose names  are  given in         paragraph  2 of the grounds of detention, to accelerate  h is         bootlegging  activities  and those hired  persons  who  we re         conducting den (Adda)under the instructions and guidance of         the  detenu had been arrested in 1988 in 19 different  cas es         under  the  Bombay Prohibition Act from  the  detenu’s  ad da         during  police raids of which 8 cases are pending trial  a nd         the remaining eleven are under investigation, the details of         which  are given in Annexure 11 attached to the  grounds of         detention.  On  the above materials and  the  statements of         witnesses  placed  before him, the detaining  authority  h ad         satisfied himself that the abovementioned bootlegging acti v-         ities of the detenu in a large scale in an organised  mann er         were  seriously  detrimental to the public health  and  we re         likely         55

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       to  endanger  public  health and  consequently  passed  th is         impuged order of detention. Hence this writ petition.             Mr.  V.V. Vaze, learned counsel appearing on  behalf of         the petitioner, detenu raised several contentions  assaili ng         the  legality and validity of the order of detention one of         which  being  that the detaining authority for  drawing  h is         requisite  subjective  satisfaction to clamp this  order of         detention upon the petitioner/detenu had taken into  consi d-         eration  the  previous grounds of detention  which  was  t he         subject  matter  of Special Criminal Application No.  46 of         1987 before the High Court of Gujarat. Since we are inclin ed         to dispose of this Writ Petition on this ground alone we a re         not traversing on other grounds.Admitedly, the  Commission er         of  Police, Surat City passed an Order of  detention.  Und er         Section  3(2) of the Act on 2.1. 1987 in No. PCB/  PASA/I/ 87         on the ground that between 1984 to 1986 there were 19  cas es         filed against the detenu under the Bombay Prohibition Act of         which 16 were pending in Court and three others under inve s-         tigation when this previous order was passed. The petition er         filed Special Criminal Application No. 46 of 1987 before t he         High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad challenging the  validi ty         of the said order. The High Court by its judgment dated 3. 8.         1987  quashed  the earlier impugned order of  detention  a nd         directed the release of the detenu forthwith. A copy of  t he         High court order is annexed to the Writ Petition as Annexu re         ’D’. The detaining authority in this case had made a  refe r-         ence  about  the previous order in the impugned  grounds of         detention which reads thus:         "You are associated with bootlegging activity for long tim e,         therefore, under order number dated 2.1.87 you were  order ed         to  be detained under PASA and were kept in  Baroda  Centr al         Jail. But you filed a petition against this order of  dete n-         tion in the High Court by Special Criminal Misc. Applicati on         No.  46/1987, After this petition was heard on  3.8.87,  t

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he         Hon’ble High Court quashed the detention order and  releas ed         you  from detention. The proceedings taken against you  ha ve         had  no effect on you and after you were released  from  t he         detention, you have continued your activity."             The detenu, presumably based on the above statement, h as         stated in his writ petition that the present order of dete n-         tion  is clamped upon him since the earlier order passed on         2.1.  1987  had been quashed and set  aside.  The  detaini ng         authority in attempting to reply         56         to  the  allegations  made in paragraph no. 6  of  the  Wr it         Petition, wherein it is averred "The petitioner states  th at         in  some  of the cases, the petitioner is acquitted  and in         none  of the cases the petitioner is convicted till  today ",         has  made  the  following statement in paragraph  9  of  h is         counter:         "It  is submitted that the present detaining authority  to ok         into consideration the previous grounds of detention also to         establish  that  the petitioner was engaged  in  bootleggi ng         activities since long."             Now  on  this above statement it  has  been  streneous ly         urged  that  since the detaining authority for  drawing  h is         subjective satisfaction had taken into consideration all t he         previous  grounds of detention, namely, the earlier  groun ds         of detention passed on 2.1. 1987 which had been subsequent ly         quashed  by  the High Court the present detention  order is         liable to be set aside. According to learned counsel for t he         petitioner, once the previous grounds of detention had  be en         quashed  on its merit, then the detaining authority  has no         justification to take into consideration the earlier groun ds         of detention for passing this present detention order  whi ch         should  have been based only on the fresh grounds that  we re         available subsequent to the quashing of the previous  dete n-         tion  order. In support of this statement several  decisio ns         were  relied  on about which we  make  reference  presentl

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y.         Firstly,  the  attention of the Court was  drawn  to  Ghul am         Nambi  Zaki v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1970] 3  SCR 35         wherein  the  State contended that the  existence  of  fre sh         material is not a condition precedent for passing the seco nd         order  and that in any event, the second order can  be  ma de         when  the first order is withdrawn or revoked for  technic al         defect.  Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the bench  repell ed         that contention holding thus:         "The matter is not res integra. In a number of decisions of         this  Court to which reference will be made presently,  th is         point has been considered and it has been held that once an         order  of  revocation is made, another order  detaining  t he         same  person can only be passed if some additional or  fre sh         material  is in possession of the State Government on  whi ch         action can be based."             Then referring to the decision of the Constitution Ben ch         in Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack and Anot h-         er, [1969] 1 SCR 227, the learned Chief Justice observed:         57         "In  other words, the revocation or expiry of  the  previo us         order  cannot lead ipso facto to a revival of the  detenti on         by  the  passing of a fresh order, because a person  who is         entitled to his liberty can only be put in a second jeopar dy         when there are additional or fresh facts against him."         Ultimately, he concluded:         "As  pointed out in the All India Reporter case  (Hadiband hu         Das case) the inference is very compulsive that fresh  fac ts         must  be found for new orders otherwise once the old  dete n-         tion  comes to an end either by the expiry of the period of         detention or by the cancellation of the order of  detentio n,         a fresh detention cannot be ordered."             In Har Jas Dev Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1974]  1         SCR 281, this Court while examining a similar question  wi th         regard  to validity of second detention order  passed  und er         Section  14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal  Security  A ct         (Act  26 of 1971) on identical grounds of the earlier  ord

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er         expressed its view:         "In  these circumstances after the date on which  the  ord er         cease to be in force, unless fresh facts have arisen on  t he         basis of which the Central Government or State Government or         an  Officer, as the case may be, was satisfied that such an         order  should be made, the subsequent detention on the  ve ry         same grounds would be invalid."             The learned counsel also cited for the same principle of         law, the decision in Chotka Hembram v. State of West  Beng al         & Ors., [1974] 3 SCC 401.             Those  decisions mentioned albeit are cases wherein  t he         first  detention order ceased to be either by revocation or         by  expiry  of the period of detention. What  would  be  t he         legal implications and ultimate effect of quashing an  ord er         of detention by the High Court in exercise of its  jurisdi c-         tion  under  Article 226 of the Constitution of  India  th is         Court  in  Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat  &  Ors .,         [1985] 2 SCC 25, made the following rule:         "   .....  When the High Court exercises jurisdiction  und er         Article 226 of the Constitution it does not make an order of         revocation. By issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas         58         corpus or certiorari it quashes the order impugned before it         and by declaring the order to be void and striking down  t he         same it nullifies the order. The ultimate effect of  cance l-         lation of an order by revocation and quashing of the same in         exercise of the high prerogative jurisdiction vested in  t he         High  Court  may  be the same but the manner  in  which  t he         situation  is obtained is patently different and  while  o ne         process is covered by Section 11(1) of the Act, the other is         not  known to the statute and is exercised by  an  authori ty         beyond  the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of  t he         Act. It is, therefore, our clear opinion that in a situati on         where  the order of detention has been quashed by  the  Hi gh         Court,  sub-section (2) of Section 11 is not applicable  a nd

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       the  detaining  authority is not entitled  to  make  anoth er         order under Section 3 of the Act on the same grounds."             It  emerges from the above authoritative  judicial  pr o-         nouncements that even if the order of detention comes to an         end  either  by  revocation or by expiry of  the  period of         detention there must be fresh facts of passing a  subseque nt         order.  A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by  t he         Court issuing a high prerorgative writ like habeas corpus or         certiorari the grounds of the said order should not be tak en         into consideration either as a whole or in part even  alon g-         with  the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the  requ i-         site  subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order  becau se         once the Court strikes down an earlier order by issuing ru le         it nullifies the entire order.             In  the present case, no doubt, the order  of  detenti on         contains  fresh  facts. In addition to  that  the  detaini ng         authority  has referred to the earlier detention  order  a nd         the  judgment of the High Court quashing it, presumably  f or         the  purpose of showing that the detenu in spite of  earli er         detention  order was continuing his bootlegging  activitie s.         But what the detaining authority says clearly in paragraph  9         of his affidavit in reply is that he took into considerati on         the  previous grounds of detention also for  his  conclusi on         that the detenu ’was engaged in bootlegging activities sin ce         long’. In other words the detaining authority has taken in to         consideration the earlier grounds of detention which groun ds         had  been  nullified by the High Court in  Special  Crimin al         Application No. 46 of 1987 by issuing a prerogative writ of         habeas corpus.             Under Section 15 of the Act, the expiry or revocation of         an earlier detention order is not a bar for making a  subs e-         quent detention         59         order  under Section 3 against the same person. The  provi so         annexed to that Section states that in a case where no fre sh

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       facts  have arisen after expiry or revocation of an  earli er         order made against such person the maximum period for  whi ch         such  person may be detained in pursuance of the  subseque nt         detention order shall in no case extend beyond the period of         12  months  from  the date of detention  under  the  earli er         order. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Shei kh         v.  B.K. Jha and Another, [1987] 2 SCC 22 = 1987 2  SCR  2 03         speaking  for  the bench of this Court  while  dealing  wi th         Section 15 of the Act observed:         "It,  therefore, becomes imperative to read down Section 15         of  the  Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social  Activities  Ac t,         1985  which provides for the making of successive orders of         detention so as to bring it in conformity with Article 22( 4)         of  the Constitution. If there is to be a collision  betwe en         Article 22(4) of the Constitution and Section 15 of the Ac t,         Section 15 has to yield. But by reading down the  provisio n,         the  collision  may be avoided and Section 15  may  be  su s-         tained."             Mr.  Poti  has sought to explain the  statement  of  t he         detaining  authority  made in his counter  saying  that  t he         earlier proceeding was considered only to a limited  purpo se         of  taking  note of the detenu’s  continued  involvement of         bootlegging  activities; but the entire grounds  of  earli er         detention  as they were, were not considered. We are  unab le         to accept this explanation because the detaining  authorit y,         in the counter, in clear terms had expressed that he consi d-         ered  the earlier grounds of detention also. Incidently, it         was brought to our notice that a copy of the earlier groun ds         of detention was also one of the documents furnished to  t he         detenu in the present case which confirms the fact that  t he         detaining  authority has considered the earlier  grounds of         detention along with other documents for drawing his  requ i-         site  subjective  satisfaction  for  passing  this  impugn ed         order.  In  other words, the earlier  grounds  of  detenti

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on         dated  2.1. 1987, quashed by the High Court was one  of  t he         material documents considered by the detaining authority in         drawing his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, we hold th at         this  order of detention is vitiated on the ground that  t he         detaining authority has taken into consideration the groun ds         of  earlier  detention order alongwith other  materials  f or         passing  this impugned order. Hence, the order is liable to         be  set aside. Accordingly, we quash the detention order on         this  ground  and direct that the detenu be set  at  liber ty         forthwith  if  his detention is not required for  any  oth er         case.         R.S.S.                              Petition allowed.         60