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PETITIONER: CHHADAMI LAL JAIN AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ANDANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/09/1959

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1960 AIR   41            1960 SCR  (1) 736

ACT: Criminal   Trial-Commitment   Order-Quashing   of-Magistrate starting  trial  as  in  warrant  case-Prosecution   witness examined  and  cross-examined-Charge framed  without  giving opportunity  to  accused  to  adduce  defence  evidence  and commitment   order  passed--No  intimation  to  accused   of intention   to  commit-Whether  commitment  order   illegal- Prejudice--Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), ss. 208, 347 and 537.

HEADNOTE: A  complaint was filed against seven persons under SS.  409, 465,  467,  471 and 477A of the Indian  Penal  Code.   After examining  the  complainant  summonses were  issued  to  the accused to answer a charge under s. 406.  ’The trial started as  in a warrant case; prosecution witnesses  were  examined and  cross-examined and the statements of the  accused  were recorded, and the Magistrate heard arguments on the question of framing charges.  Thereafter, he framed charges under SS. 409  and 465 read with SS. 471 and 477A, and without  giving previous  intimation  of his intention to do so,  passed  an order  committing the appellants to the Court  of  Sessions. The  appellants, contended that the commitment  was  illegal because  the  case  having begun as a warrant  case  it  was incumbent upon the Magistrate, when he decided to commit the case  to  the  Court of Session,  to  follow  the  procedure provided  in Ch.  XVIII Code of Criminal Procedure,  but  he failed to comply with the provisions of SS. 208 to 213 of. 737 that Chapter.  The complainant urged that even if the provi- sions  of  SS.  208 to 213 had not  been  complied  with  no prejudice  was caused to the appellants and  the  commitment could not be( quashed. Held,   that  the  commitment  order  was  illegal  as   the Magistrate  had failed to comply with the provisions  of  s. 208  of  the Code of Criminal  Procedure.   The  proceedings having  begun as in a warrant case, if the Magistrate, at  a subsequent  stage, was of the view that the case  should  be committed  to the Court of Sessions, he had to act under  s. 347(1)  of the Code and to follow the  procedure  prescribed

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for  inquiries under Ch.  XVIII of the Code.  When,  in  the present case, the Magistrate decided to commit the case,  he should  have  refrained from framing the charge  and  should have  informed  the accused of his intention to  commit  and should  have  called  upon the accused  to  produce  defence evidence, if any.  The failure of the Magistrate to intimate his  decision to commit to the accused deprived them of  the right  to  produce defence evidence, if any, under  S.  208. The  denial  of this right was itself  sufficient  to  cause prejudice to the accused and failure of justice inasmuch  as the accused were prevented from leading evidence which might have induced the Magistrate not to frame the charge  against them. Subramania  Iyer  v. King-Emperor, (1901) L.R. 28  I.A.  257 Pulukuri  Kotayya v. King-Emperor, (1948) L.R. 74  I.A.  65, and’  Narain  Rao  v. The State of  Andhra  Pradesh,  [1958] S.C.R, 283, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 143  of 1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 8th May,  1957, of  the Allahabad High Court, in Criminal Reference No.  149 of  1956,  arising out of the judgment and order  dated  the 14th January, 1956, of the First Additional Sessions  Judge, Agra,  in Sessions Trial No. 141 of 1954 and Criminal  Misc. No. 1 of 1956. G.   S. Pathak and Mohan Behari Lal, for the appellants. G.   C.  Mathur,  C.  P.  Lal and G.  N.  Dikshit,  for  the respondent No. 1. Janardan Sharma, for respondent No. 2. 1959.   September  14.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by WANCHOO  J.-This is an appeal oil a certificate  granted  by the Allahabad High Court in a criminal matter.  The facts of the case may be set out in some 738 detail  to  bring out the point raised in  this  appeal.   A complaint was filed by Rajendra Kumar Jain against the  four appellants and three others under ss. 409, 465, 467, 471 and 477A  of  the Indian Penal Code.  It is  not  necessary  for present  purposes to set out the details of  the  complaint. Suffice   it  to  say  that  after  the  statement  of   the complainant  under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure hereinafter  referred to as the Code) summonses were  issued to  the  accused persons requiring them to answer  a  charge under s. 406 of the Penal Code.  Prosecution witnesses  were then  examined and cross-examined and the statements of  the accused  persons recorded.  The Magistrate then heard  argu- ments  on  the  question of framing of  charges  which  were concluded  on September 23, 1954.  It was then ordered  that the case should be put up on September 30, 1954, for orders. On that date the Magistrate framed charges against the  four appellants  under ss. 409 and 465 read with s. 471 and  477A of the Penal Code.  On the same date the Magistrate  ordered commitment of the four appellants to the Court of Session on these charges.  The remaining three accused were discharged. There  was then a revision petition by Rajendra  Kumar  Jain against  the discharge of one of the three accused,  namely, Bhajan  Lal.   When  the matter came  up  before  the  First Additional Sessions Judge Agra, he ordered suo motu on April 9, 1955, after a perusal of the commitment order that Bhajan Lal be committed to the Court of Session to stand his trial.

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In view of this order he dismissed the revision petition  as infructuous.   Thereupon Bhajan Lal went in revision to  the High Court.  That petition was heard by Roy, J., and he  set aside  the order of commitment of Bhajan Lal and one of  the reasons given by him for doing so was that a Magistrate  was not  empowered  to  frame  a charge and  make  an  order  of commitment  until  he  had taken all such  evidence  as  the accused  might  produce before him.  As Bhajan Lal  had  not been called upon to produce evidence in defence the order of commitment made by the Sessions Judge was held to be not  in accordance with law.  This order was passed on 739 October  6,  1955.  Thereupon on January 7, 1956,  the  four appellants  filed  a revision petition before  the  Sessions Judge  praying that the order of commitment  passed  against them  be quashed and the main reason advanced in support  of this  petition  was  that the  learned  Magistrate  had  not observed  the mandatory provisions of law laid down  in  ss. 208  to  213 of the Code which were essential  for  a  valid commitment.   This  petition came up before the  same  First Additional  Sessions  Judge and he made a reference  to  the High Court that as the procedure followed by the  Magistrate was  irregular the order of commitment, dated September  30, 1954, was bad in law, and should be quashed. This  reference came up for bearing before  another  learned Judge  of the High Court, namely, Chowdhry, J., and he  took the  view that the Magistrate had not failed to comply  with the  provisions of s. 208 and that non-compliance  with  the provisions  of ss. 211 and 212 was curable under s.  537  of the Code.  He, therefore, rejected the reference.  There was then  an  application for a certificate to  appeal  to  this Court which was allowed, particularly, as the view taken  by Chowdhry,  J., was in conflict with the view taken  by  Roy, J., already referred to. The  main contention of the appellants before us is that  as the case began before the Magistrate as a warrant case under s.  406  of  the  Penal Code,  it  was  incumbent  upon  the Magistrate, when he decided, in view of the provisions of s. 347  (1) of the Code, that the case should be  committed  to the  Court of Session, to follow the procedure  provided  in Ch.   XVIII  of the Code and inasmuch as he  had  failed  to comply  with ss. 208 to 213 of the Code the  commitment  was bad in law and should be quashed. The first question that falls for consideration,  therefore, is  whether  the  Magistrate when he began  this  case,  was proceeding  in the manner provided for the trial of  warrant cases.  Section 347 (1) of the Code comes into play when  at any  stage  of  the  proceedings  in  any  trial  before   a Magistrate,  it  appears to him that the ease  ought  to  be tried by the Court of 740 Session;  he  has  then  to commit  the  accused  under  the provisions herein before contained.  The Sessions Judge  who made the reference held that the case before the  Magistrate proceeded  from  the  beginning as if it was a  trial  of  a warrant case.  It was on that basis that the Sessions  Judge held that when the Magistrate made up his mind that the case ought  to be committed to the Court of Sessions in  view  of the  provisions of s. 347(1) of the Code it was his duty  to observe the procedure laid down in Ch.  XVIII, particularly, under  ss.  208,  211 and 212 of the  Code.   The  order  of reference  was  sent to the Magistrate for  explanation,  if any,  and the Magistrate replied that he had no  explanation to  submit.  He did not say in his explanation that  he  was not proceeding as in a warrant case and that the proceedings

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before  him throughout were proceedings in the nature of  an inquiry under Ch.  XVIII.  When, however, the matter came up before  the  High Court, Chowdhry, J., was of  opinion  that though  the  Magistrate  was competent to try  the  case  as summonses has been issued under s. 406 1. P. C. only, it was open  to  him to hold an inquiry under Ch.  XVIII  from  the very  beginning  in view of the provisions of s.  207  which empower a Magistrate to follow the procedure provided in Ch. XVIII in cases exclusively triable by a Court of Session and also in cases which are not exclusively triable by the Court of Session but which in the opinion of the Magistrate  ought to  be tried by such Court.  The High Court was  further  of the view that the offence mentioned in the summons should be deemed  to  have  given notice to the accused  that  it  was optional with the Magistrate to hold an inquiry with a  view to  commit  them  to the Court of Session  or  to  try  them himself as in a warrant case because column 8 of Schedule 11 of  the Code says that a case under s. 406 is triable  by  a Court of Session, Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first  or  second class.  Therefore, according to  the  High Court  the  matter was at large whether the  Magistrate  was going to adopt one procedure or the other despite the  issue of summonses under s. 406 of the Penal Code and that 741 nothing  had  happened to induce the belief in  the  accused that  they  would be tried as in a warrant case.   The  High Court, therefore, held that the case was proceeded with from the  beginning as if it was an inquiry under Ch.  XVIII  and on  that view it held that there was no non-compliance  with s. 208 of the Code.  As for non-compliance with ss. 211  and 213,  the  High Court was of the view that  it  was  curable under s. 537 of the Code as no prejudice was caused. We must say with respect that this view of the nature of the proceedings  before  the Magistrate is not correct.   It  is true that it is open to a Magistrate to hold an inquiry from the beginning under Chapter XVIII in a case not  exclusively triable by the Court of Session.  But the mere fact that the Magistrate  has such power does not necessarily indicate  to the  accused that he is holding an inquiry under Ch.   XVIII rather  than a trial before himself.  Where the case is  not exclusively  triable  by the Court of Session,  the  accused would  naturally  conclude that the proceedings  before  the Magistrate are in nature of a trial and not an inquiry under Ch.   XVIII.   If the Magistrate intends to use  his  powers under  s.  207 and hold an inquiry from the beginning  in  a case  not exclusively triable by the Court of  Session,  the only  way in which the accused ’Can know that he is  holding an  inquiry and not a trial is by the  Magistrate  informing the  accused that he is holding an inquiry under Ch.   XVIII and  not  trial.   If he fails to do  so,  the  accused  can reasonably  conclude  that a trial is being held.   In  this case  undoubtedly  the Magistrate did not  indicate  to  the accused from the beginning that his proceedings were in  the nature  of  an  inquiry under  Ch.   XVIII.   Therefore  the accused would naturally conclude that the proceedings before him  were in the nature of a trial of a warrant case as  the summonses  that they had received were under s. 406  of  the Penal  Code  only.  The fact that in the complaint  s.  467, which  is  exclusively triable by a Court  of  Session,  was mentioned  is  of no consequence for the summonses.  to  the accused  were  only for a trial under s. 406  of  the  Penal Code.   It  must, therefore, be held  that  the  proceedings before 742 the  Magistrate began as in the trial of a warrant case  and

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if  the Magistrate at a subsequent stage of the  proceedings was  of  the view that the case should be committed  to  the Court  of Session, he would have to act under s. 347 (1)  of the Code.  We have been at pains to refer to this aspect  of the matter for considerations would be different if the case was  exclusively triable by the Court of Session  and  began from  the  outset as an inquiry under Ch.  XVIII.   What  we shall say hereafter must, therefore, be taken to apply  only to  a  case  which began as a proceeding  in  a  warrant  or summons  case and in which the Magistrate at a  later  stage takes action under s. 347 (1). This  brings  us  to  a consideration of  the  duty  of  the Magistrate  who takes action under s. 347 (1) of  the  Code. That section reads as follows:- "  If  in any inquiry before a Magistrate or  in  any  trial before a Magistrate, before signing judgment, it appears  to him  at  any stage of the proceedings that the case  is  one which  ought  to be tried by the Court of  Session  or  High Court, and if he his empowered to commit for trial, he shall commit   the  accused  under  the  provisions   hereinbefore contained." The first question that has to be decided is the meaning  of the  words " under the provisions hereinbefore contained  ". These words have been the subject of decision by a number of High Courts and the High Courts are unanimous that they mean that if the Magistrate decides at some stage of the trial to commit  the  accused,  he  has  to  follow  the   provisions contained  in Ch.  XVIII.  It is not necessary to  refer  to those  decisions for the words themselves are  quite  clear. They lay down that if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that  the accused ought to be committed for trial, he  shall commit  in accordance with the provisions contained  in  the earlier  part of the Code, namely, in Ch.  XVIII.   This  of course  does  not mean that the Magistrate must  begin  over again  from  the beginning.  All that he has to do  when  he decides that the case ought to be committed is to inform the accused  and  see  that the provisions  of  Ch.   XVIII  are complied with so far as they have not been complied 743 with up to the stage at which he decides that there ought to be a commitment.  Now the procedure under, Ch. XVIII is laid down in ss. 208 to 213 of’ the Code.  The Magistrate  begins by  hearing the complainant, if any, and takes all  evidence that  may  be produced in support of the prosecution  or  on behalf of the accused or as the Magistrate may call himself. The  Magistrate is also required to issue process to  compel the  attendance  of  any witness or the  production  of  any document  or  other  thing if  the  complainant  or  officer conducting  the prosecution of the accused applies  to  him. After  the  evidence  under  s.  208  has  been  taken   the Magistrate  then  examines the accused for  the  purpose  of enabling  him  to  explain any  circumstances  appearing  in evidence  against him under s. 209.  Thereafter if he is  of opinion that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the  accused  for  trial, lie can discharge  him  unless  it appears  to  him’ that such person should  be  tried  before himself  or  some other Magistrate in which case he  has  to proceed  accordingly.  On the other hand, if the  Magistrate is  of opinion after taking the evidence and  examining  the accused that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused  for  trial, he has to frame a charge under  s.  210 declaring  with  what offence the accused is  charged.   The charge is then read over and explained to the accused and  a copy thereof, if he so requires, is furnished to him free of cost.  After the charge is framed the Magistrate calls  upon

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the accused under s. 211 to furnish a list of persons orally or in writing whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial.  The Magistrate may also allow the accused  to furnish  a further list at a later stage in his  discretion. Section 212 gives power to the Magistrate in his  discretion to summon and examine any witness named in any list under s. 211.  Then comes s. 213 which lays down that if the  accused has  refused to give a list as required by s. 211 or  if  he has  given one and the witnesses, if any,  included  therein whom  the Magistrate desires to examine, have been  summoned and  examined under s. 212 the Magistrate may make an  order committing the accused for trial by the High Court or the 744 Court  of Session and shall also briefly record the  reasons for such commitment.  On the other hand, if he is  satisfied after  hearing the witnesses for the defence that there  are not  sufficient grounds for committing the accused,  he  may cancel the charge and discharge the accused. It  will  be  seen  from this  analysis  of  the  provisions relating  to  commitment that s. 208 gives a  right  to  the accused to produce evidence in defence before the Magistrate examines  him  under s. 209 and proceeds to frame  a  charge under  s. 210.  Now when a Magistrate makes up his  mind  to commit  a  case  not exclusively triable  by  the  Court  of Session  under -the power given to him under s. 347  (1)  of the  Code, he has to follow this procedure.  But as we  have said earlier it is not necessary that the Magistrate  should begin from the beginning again when he so makes up his mind. The  Magistrate  may make up his mind at any  stage  of  the trial  before him and generally speaking four  contingencies may arise.  Firstly, he may make up his mind after the trial is  practically over and the witnesses for  the  prosecution have  been examined and crossexamined after the charge,  the accused has be-en examined both under ss. 253 and 342 of the Code  and and all the defence evidence has been  taken.   In such  a ’case ss. 208, 209 and 210 have been  complied  with and all that the Magistrate has to do is to intimate to  the accused that he intends to commit him for trial and ask  him to  give  the  list of witnesses under s.  211  and  proceed thereafter   as  provided  in  Ch.   XVIII.  Secondly,   the Magistrate may make up his mind after all the witnesses  for the  prosecution have been examined and  cross-examined  and the  charge has been framed but no defence has  been  taken. In such a case that part of s. 208 which lays down that  all the  evidence for the prosecution shall be taken,  has  been complied with and the Magistrate may then proceed to  comply with  the rest of section 208 and take the defence  evidence and then proceed further under ss. 209 to 213 and amend  the charge  so  as  to make it conformable to  a  charge  in  an inquiry  under  Ch.   XVIII  or  cancel  it.   Thirdly,  the Magistrate may make up his mind after 745 some  of  the prosecution witnesses have been  examined  and cross-examined and a charge has been framed.  In such a case he  has  to examine the rest of  the  prosecution  witnesses under s. 208 and take the defence evidence, if any, produced by  the  accused  and  then proceed under  ss.  209  to  213 amending   or  cancelling  the  charge  already  framed   as indicated  earlier.   Lastly, the Magistrate may  have  only just  begun taking evidence for the prosecution and may  not have  framed a charge.  In such a case he takes the rest  of the  prosecution evidence and complies with  the  provisions from   ss.  208  to  213.   But  in  each  of   these   four contingencies  it is the duty of the Magistrate to  intimate to  the  accused that he has made up his mind to  commit  in

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view of the provisions of s. 347(1) and then proceed in  the manner  indicated  above. It is necessary that  the  accused should know when the Magistrate makes up his mind  to commit so that their right under s. 208 to produce defence, if any, before commitment is made is safeguarded. Now what happened in this case was this.  The Magistrate had apparently  taken  all  the  prosecution  evidence  and  the prosecution witnesses had been examined and  cross-examined; the  Magistrate  had framed no charges  upto  September  30, 1954.   He had heard arguments on the question  whether  any charges  should be framed and had fixed  September  30,1954, for orders in this respect.  When, therefore, he decided  on September  30,1954, that the case ought to be  committed  to the  Court  of  Session, the proper course for  him  was  to refrain from framing any charges and intimate to the accused that  he intended to commit them for trial.  He then  should have  called upon them to produce defence evidence, if  any, under  s. 208 and then proceeded further under  Ch.   XVIII. The  Magistrate, however, failed to inform the accused  that -he had made up his mind to proceed under s. 347 (1) and  to commit  them for trial.  What he did on September 30,  1954, was   to  frame  charges  forthwith  and  record  an   order committing the accused to the Court of Session under s.  213 of  the-Code.  He thus deprived them of their right to  lead defence evidence, if any, under s. 208. It may be that if he had told them that he was 746 going to proceed under s. 347 (1) and commit them for  trial and  asked  them  if there was any defence  evidence  to  be produced,  they  might have said that they did not  wish  to produce  any defence before him at that stage. But what  the accused  would have said if the Magistrate had proceeded  in this  manner  is  irrelevant  in  considering  the  question whether the commitment in this case was bad in law  inasmuch as  it  did  not comply with s. 208 so  far  as  giving  the accused an opportunity to lead defence evidence, if any, was concerned.   The fact remains, therefore, that in this  case the  Magistrate when he decided to act under s. 347 (1)  did not  intimate  that decision to the  accused  and  proceeded forthwith  to  commit  them for trial  under  s.  213,  thus depriving them of the right to produce defence evidence,  if any, under s. 208. The  next  question  which falls for  consideration  is  the effect  of this non-compliance with s. 208 of the  Code  and whether it is curable under s. 537 of the Code.  The  effect of  Don-compliance with various provisions of the  Code  and whether  such  non-compliance is curable under s.  537  have -been the subject of a large number of cases before  various High Courts and also before their Lordships of the  Judicial Committee  of  the Privy Council.  It is  not  necessary  to refer  to this mass of authorities.  One of the earliest  of these  case decided by the Privy Council is Subramania  Iyer v.  King-Emperor  (1), while one of the latest  is  Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor(2).  The law was summed up by  their Lordships  of the Judicial Committee in  Pulukuri  Kotayya’s case (2 ) at p. 75 in these words: When  a  trial is conducted in a maner different  from  that prescribed  by the Code (as in N.A. Subramania  Iyer’s  case (1),  the  trial  is  bad, and  no  question  of  curing  an irregularity   arises;  but  if  the  trial   is   conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity  occurs  in the " course of such  conduct,  the irregularity can be cured under s. 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves’ as must nearly always  be the case, a breach of one or more of the very  comprehensive

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provisions of the code.  The distinction (1) (1901) L.R. 28 I.A. 257. (2) (1948) L.R. 74 I.A. 65. 747 drawn  in many of the cases in India between  an  illegality and  an irregularity is one of degree rather than  of  kind. This view finds support in the decision of their  Lordships’ Board  in Abdul Rehman v. The King-Emperor(1) where  failure to comply with ss. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held to be cured by s. 535 and 537." These  observations were quoted with approval by this  Court in Narain Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(2).  It  seems, therefore, fruitless to consider whether the  non-compliance with  s. 208 in this case is an illegality which  cannot  be cured  under  s.  537 or an irregularity  which  is  curable thereunder.   As the stage of trial has not been reached  in this  case,  no question arises of considering  whether  the trial  has  been conducted in a manner different  from  that prescribed by the Code.  What we have to see is whether  the breach  of  s. 208 which has occurred in this case  is  such that the Court will presume prejudice to the accused by  the mere  fact of the breach.  If such presumption can be  made, the  breach would obviously be not curable under s.  537  of the  Code,  even assuming that that  section  applies.   The question, therefore which eventually emerges is whether this breach of s. 208 is of such a character that the Court  will presume that there has been prejudice to the accused by  the mere fact of the breach.  Now the accused has a right  under s.  208 to produce evidence in defence, if any,  before  the Magistrate  proceeds  to decide whether a charge  should  be framed or not.  The Magistrate’s decision whether the charge should  be framed or not is bound to be affected one way  or the  other if evidence is produced by the accused,  for  the Magistrate  ’Would then be bound to consider the  effect  of that evidence on the question of framing the charge.  If the accused  is denied the opportunity of leading that  evidence which he has a right to do under s. 208, it seems to us that the denial of such right is sufficient to cause prejudice to the  accused and s. 537 would have no application to a  case of this kind.  The possibility that the accused may not have produced defence if asked by the Magistrate whether he would do so, (1) (1926) L.R. 54 I.A. 96, (2) [1958] S.C.R. 283. 748 is  of  no  consequence,  so  far  as  this  conclusion   is concerned.   If this is the reply expected, it makes it  all the  more incumbent on the Magistrate to inform the  accused that  he was intending to commit the case and ask him if  he wished to produce evidence.  If the accused did not want  to do  so, the Magistrate would have done his duty and his  way would  be  clear to proceed further with  his  intention  to commit  the  accused.   But  when  the  Magistrate  did  not intimate  to  the  appellants  in  this  case  that  he  was intending  to commit them for trial and proceeded  to  frame charges  and  pass  the order  of  commitment  forthwith  on September 30, he was denying to them their right to  produce defence under s. 208 of the Code.  The denial of that  right is in our opinion in itself sufficient to cause prejudice to the  accused and failure of justice inasmuch as the  accused were  prevented  from  leading  evidence  which  might  have induced the Magistrate not to frame a charge against them or cancel it.  We are, therefore, of opinion that the breach of s.  208 which took place in this case was such as was  bound to  cause a failure of justice and there is,  therefore,  no

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question   of   the   application  of  s.   537   in   these circumstances.  The commitment is, therefore, bad in law and must be quashed on this ground alone. In the petition of appeal the appellants have referred  also to breach of provisions of ss. 211, 212 and 213 of the Code. As we have come to the conclusion that the breach ’of s. 208 in  this case is sufficient to invalidate the commitment  it is  not  necessary  to consider the effect  of  the  further breach  of ss. 211, 212 and 213.  What we have said in  this case  wit respect to the effect of the breach of s. 208  may not  be taken as applying to the breach of ss. 211, 212  and 213 for the considerations arising out of those breaches may be different. We,  therefore,  allow  the  appeal,  quash  the  order   of commitment  as well as the charges framed and send the  case back  to the Magistrate to proceed in the  manner  indicated above according to law. Appeal allowed. 749