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PETITIONER: CHETTIAM VEETTIL AMMAD AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TALUK LAND BOARD AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1979

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1573            1979 SCR  (3) 839  1980 SCC  (1) 499  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC 718  (22)  RF         1992 SC1144  (10)

ACT:      Kerala Land  Reforms Act, 1963, Sections 81, 82, 82(4), 84(3) & 84(5)-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      The Kerala  State Legislature  felt  the  necessity  of making comprehensive  land reforms  in the State. The Kerala Agrarian  Relations   Act,  1960   (Act  IV   of  1961)  was accordingly passed  and received the assent of the President on January  21, 1961.  Some of  its provisions  were brought into force  with effect from February 15, 1961. That Act was struck down  as unconstitutional  by this  Court. The Kerala Ryotwari Tenants  and Kudikidappukars  Protection Act,  1962 was then  passed for  the temporary protection of tenants in those taluks.  The Kerala  High Court  declared it  null and void in its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabar area and most of the lands of Travancore area. As an interim legislation,  the   Kerala   Tenants   and   Kudikidappukars Protection Act 1963 was passed to provide some protection to the tenants. But it repealed the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection  Act,  1962,  and  suspended  the operation of  the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960. After re-examining the  requirements in  the field of land reforms as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963 was published in the  State Gazette  on Sept.  15, 1963. It covered a wide field in  the  matter  of  land  reforms  and,  inter  alia, provided for  the imposition  of a  ceiling on ‘holdings’ of lands,  the   surrender  of   excess  of   lands,  grant  of compensation thereof,  and the assignment of the surrendered lands in  accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals etc.  The Land  Reforms Act  1963 (Act  1 of 1964) received the  assent of  the President on Dec., 31, 1963. It was amended extensively, and in several material particulars by Act, 35 of 1969, Act 25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972.      The following three main points of controversy arose in the appeals :      1. Whether  lands converted  into  plantations  between April 1,  1964 and  January 1,  1970 qualified for exemption

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under s. 81(1)(e) of the Act.      2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under  s. 72K  of the  Act was binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.      3. Whether  the validity  or  invalidity  of  transfers effected by  persons owning  or holding  lands exceeding the ceiling limit  could be  determined with  reference  to  the ceiling area  in force  on the  date of  the transfer  or in accordance with  the ceiling  area prescribed  by Act  35 of 1969-whether sub-section  (3) of  s. 84 was retrospective in operation. ^      HELD :  Point No.  1. The  controversy is  whether  the restriction of  sub. section  (4) of  section 82  came  into force on January 1, 1970, because section 12 of the amending Act of 1971 was brought into force on that date, or 840 whether it came into force on April 1, 1964, when section 82 as originally enacted came into force. [853H, 854G]      All the  three  Acts  contain  provisions  about  their "commencement". Subsection  (3) of  section  1  of  the  Act provides that  : (i)  Section 1  of the  Act shall come into force at  once, (ii)  the other  provisions of the Act shall come into force on such dates as the Government may appoint, (iii)  different   dates  may  be  appointed  for  different provisions of  the Act,  and (iv)  any reference in any such provision  to  the  "commencement  of  this  Act"  shall  be construed as  a reference  to the  coming into force of that provision. The  Act was  published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964,  and,  by  virtue  of  section  3  of  the  Kerala Interpretation and  General Clauses Act, section 1 came into force on  that date.  Sec. 82, as has been stated, came into force on April 1, 1964, and the reference in sub-section (4) of that  section to  the "commencement  of this Act" meant a reference to  the coming  into force  of that provision with effect from  April 1,  1964. It  may be that the first three rules or  directions contained in sub-section (3) were spent on the  coming into  force of sec. 1 of the Act or its other provisions on the dates appointed for them, but, for obvious reasons, rule  (iv) continued  to hold the field inasmuch as it laid  down the rule of construction that any reference to the  commencement  of  the  Act  shall  be  construed  as  a reference to  the  coming  into  force  of  that  particular provision. It  was therefore applicable as a general rule of construction whenever  it became  necessary to ascertain the date of  commencement of  a particular  provision of the Act other than section 1. [854G, 855B-F]      Sub-section  (4)   of   section   82,   as   originally incorporated in  the Act,  came into force on April 1, 1964. It was  amended by  section 66  of the Amending Act of 1969, which came into force on January 1, 1970, but that proved to be fortuitous  and was  supplanted  by  section  12  of  the Amending Act  of 1971 from the same date. The sub-section as amended by  the Amending  Act of  1971 also  dealt with  the conversion of  land into  any other class of land "after the commencement of this Act", but it added the words "or into a plantation" and  provided that  such conversion shall not be taken into  consideration for  determining the extent of the land to be surrendered. [855F-H]      On the plain meaning of the proviso to sub-section 3 of section 1, it follows that when the provision of sub-section 4 of section 82 was brought into force on April 1, 1964, its amended version  also came into force from that date. [856B, E]      No particular  significance attaches  to the use of the

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expression "provisions"  or "provision"  in section  1(3) of the Act.  A provision is a distinct rule or principle of law in a  statute which  governs the situation covered by it. So an incomplete  idea, even  though stated  in the  form of  a section of  a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompleteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned. A provision of  law cannot therefore be said to exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing. [856G, 857C-D]      The amended section 82 of the Act is a distinct rule or a clause  for it  provides the extent of the ceiling area in the cases  mentioned in it, its effect on the lands owned or held individually by members of a family or jointly 841 by some  or all  the members  of the family, the taking into account of  the shares  of the  members of  the family or an adult unmarried  person, the  effect of  conversion  of  any class of  land into any other class of land specified in the Schedule or  into a plantation and the extent of land liable to be  surrendered, lands  covered by  a private  trust or a private institution and exemption of land covered by section 81(6).  The  section  is  therefore  a  "provision"  by  any standard as  it states the law relating to the imposition of ceiling on  land. It may well be stated that sub-section (4) of section  82 is also a provision of the law by itself, for it lays  down a distinct rule relating to conversion of land for observance by all concerned. [857D-F, H, 858A]      The view  taken by  the High  Court in  Ramunni Nair v. State of Kerala, (1976) KLT 632, in regard to the meaning to be attached  to the  words "the commencement of this Act" is substantially correct  and does  not call  for interference. [859B]      There  is  no  force  in  the  other  argument  that  a landholder is,  in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under  section 81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of  the "extent  of plantation  within  the  ceiling area" even though it were converted into a plantation during the period  April 1, 1964 to December 31, 1969. The argument is untenable  because while  sub-section (1)  of section  81 provides that  the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to lands and plantations mentioned in it, that is overridden by, and is subject to the requirement of, sub-section (4) of section 82. [859D-F]      Reference made  to Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan (1967) KLT 947  State of  Kerala & Ors. v. Philomina etc., [1977] 1 SCR 213,  and State  of Kerala  & Ors. v. K. A. Gangadharan, [1977] 1 SCR 960. Point No. 2.      The  question   for  consideration   is   whether   the certificate of  purchase issued  by the  Land Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under  Chapter III of the Act for the purpose of taking a  decision in  regard to the ceiling area under sub- section (5)  of section  85. Sub-section (1) of that section shows that  the question for examination by the Board is not that relating  to the existence of the tenancy rights of the person who  files the  statement under  sub-section (2), but that relating  to the bona fides of his belief that the land sought to  be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivation tenant.  The Land  Tribunal and  the Taluk  Land Board thus  operate  in  their  respective  fields  for  the purpose of the Act. [860 B, E-G].      Sub-section (2) of section 72K merely declares that the certificate of  purchase shall  be conclusive  proof of  the "assignment"  of  the  right,  title  and  interest  of  the

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landowner and  the intermediary  (if any)  to the  tenant in respect of  the holding  concerned. There  is nothing in the sub-section to  require that  the finding  recorded  by  the Tribunal in  those proceedings  would be conclusive proof of any other  matter so  as to bind the Taluk Land Board or any authority. Sub-section (2) of section 72K therefore does not impinge  on  the  authority  of  the  Taluk  Land  Board  to discharge its  own functions  under section  85(5). [860G-H, 861A-B]      As  such   the  Board   is  quite  free  to  cause  the particulars mentioned  in the  statement to be verified, and to ascertain  whether the person filing it owns or holds any other land,  and to  determine the  "extent" as  well as the "identity" of  the excess  land  which  he  is  required  to surrender. In that sphere of work, 842 the certificate  of purchase  is not  required by  law to be conclusive proof  in regard to the surplus or any other land held by  its holder  so as  to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of section 85. [861B- D]      Moreover,  although  the  certificate  of  purchase  is conclusive proof in respect of the matters stated in section 72K(2), that  only means  that no contrary evidence shall be effective to  displace it,  unless the  so called conclusive evidence is  inaccurate on  its face,  or fraud can be shown (Halsbury’s Laws  of England,  fourth edition, vol. 17, page 22  paragraph   28).  "Inaccuracy   on  the   face"  of  the certificate is  not as  wide in its connotation as an "error apparent on  the face  of the record". It will therefore not be permissible  for the  Board to  disregard the evidentiary value of  the certificate  of purchase  merely on the ground that it  has not  been issued  on a  proper appreciation  or consideration  of  the  evidence  on  record,  or  that  the Tribunal’s finding  suffers from  any procedural error. What sub-section (2)  of section  72K provides  is an irrebutable presumption of law, and it may well be regarded as a rule of substantive law.  But even so, it thereby does not take away the jurisdiction  of the  Taluk Land  Board to make an order under section  85(5) after  taking  into  consideration  the "conclusive" evidentiary  value of the certificate as far as it goes. [861E-H, 862A]      The view  taken in Kunianujan Thampuran & Ors. v. Taluk Land Board, (1976) KLT 716 is thus not quite correct. [862B] Point No. 3.      Some of  the persons  who owned or held lands exceeding the  ceiling   prescribed  by   the  Act,   had  voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land  Reforms Bill,  1963, in  the State  Gazette  on September 15, 1963. Section 84 of the Act therefore provides that, except for the transfers mentioned in the section, the transfers so made shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat  the provisions  of the Act, and shall be invalid. The section  has thus  been linked  with  section  82  which specifies the  ceiling area,  and has  been so amended as to reduce that  area considerably.  The question is whether the validity of  a voluntary  transfer is  to be determined with reference to  the ceiling  area in  force on the date of the transfer, or  the reduced  ceiling area  prescribed  by  the Amending Act  of 1969. As has been observed by this Court in State of  Kerala &  Ors. v.  K. A. Gangadharan, [1977] 1 SCR 960, section  84 has  been enacted with a view to making the provisions of  sections 83  and 85  effective. Section 15 of the Amending  Act of 1972 (which inserted sub-section (3) in section 84)  does not  state that  it  has  been  made  with

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retrospective effect,  and  sub-section  (3)  does  not,  in terms, state that it shall be deemed to have come into force from the  date of  the  amendment  which  was  made  by  the Amending Act  of 1969.  Even so,  it is necessary to examine the true effect of the insertion and to decide whether it is retroactive. [862G-H, 863A, D, G, H, 864A-B]      The primary  rule of construction is that courts should be guided  by the  plain and  clear language of the statute, for  the  legislature  is  intended  to  mean  what  it  has expressed. It is an equally important rule of interpretation that a  statute is not to be read retrospectively except for necessity. [864B]      So construed,  it is  obvious that although the Act had not  even   come  into  force  on  September  15,  1963,  it invalidated the  transfers made after that date in excess of the ceiling area it prescribed. It follows therefore that so long as September 15, 1963 continues to remain the date with reference to which 843 the transfers  are to  be invalidated,  the variation in the extent of  the ceiling  has necessarily to work back to that date. The  legislature therefore inserted sub-section (3) of section 84  to clarify that the expression "ceiling area" in the  earlier   sub-sections  would  mean  the  ceiling  area specified in section 82(1) as amended by the Amending Act of 1969, i.e. the reduced ceiling. [864D-F]      In taking  this view  the Court made a reference to the notes on  clauses to  the Amending Bill of 1972 and observed that while it was true that the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained from any statement by way of a note on the clauses  of the  Bill or,  brevet, and  the duty  of the Court is  to find  the natural  meaning of  the words  in  a statute in the context in which they are used, it has always been considered  permissible and even desirable to take note of the history of the statute and the circumstances in which it was  passed or the mischief at which it was directed. The reason is that the meaning which is to be given to a statute should be  such as  will carry out its object. So viewed, it appears that, as has plainly been stated in it, the "ceiling area" referred  to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 84 is the reduced ceiling area specified by the Amending Act of 1969. It  is  clearly  retrospective,  as  it  is  meant  to invalidate the  transfers made after September 15, 1963 when the Bill of 1963 was published. [864F, 865G-H, 866A-B, C]      The Court  then examined some of the appeals separately and recorded its finding thereon. [866F-868 & 869, 879-877].      While examining  civil appeal  No. 1015  of  1976,  the Court examined  the question  whether a child in the womb on January 1,  1970 was  a member of the family for the purpose of section  82(1)  (c)  of  the  Act.  It  referred  to  the definition of the expression "family" in clause (14) of sec. 2 and  of the  expression "minor" as defined in clause (36A) and held  that two  postulates were  necessary for obtaining the benefit  of the  increase of  one standard acre for each member of  the family  in excess  of five,  namely, that the member should  be in existence, and it should be possible to ascertain that  he had  not attained  the age of 18 years on the  appointed   date.  It  was  held  that  as  both  these conditions could not be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre  sa mere,  it would not be regarded as a member of the family for purposes of sec. 82 of the Act. [868D-F].

JUDGMENT:

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    CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1015 OF 1976      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated  31-5-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 1615/75).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1023 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 3-1-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2879/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2811 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 22-10-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 1086/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 574-575 OF 1978      (Appeals by  Special Leave from the Judgment and Orders dated 30-3-1976 and 11-10-76 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1640 and Review Petition No. 73/76 respectively). 844           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 25-11-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 1880/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 143 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1976  of the  Kerala High  Court  in  C.R.P.  No. 599/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1309 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated  25-2-1977  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 4194/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1863 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 26-5-77 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1815/76A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2070 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 18.8.1976 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 68/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2584 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 2-9-1976  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 332/76- E).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2585 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 12-10-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 829/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2586 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 12-10-1976  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 726 of 1976).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2587 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 3209/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623 OF 1977      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 10-12-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 2626/75).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 290 OF 1978      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 3-1-1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1977 of 76-A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 362 OF 1978      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 29-7-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1553/77- D). 845           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 882 OF 1978

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    (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 29-11-1977  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 4574/78-G).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 1978      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 15-3-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3028/76- E).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 869 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 12-10-1977  of the  Kerala High  Court in CRP Nos. 635 and 859 of 1976).      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 870 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated  25-7-1977  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 2333/77).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 871 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 27-9-1976  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 128/76- B).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 872 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 15-10-1976  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 465/76).           CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 873-874 OF 1979      (Appeals by  Special Leave  from the Judgment and Order dated 4-3-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP Nos. 1682 and 1706/76D).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 875 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 2-2-1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 383/78- A).           CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 876-877 OF 1979      (Appeals by  Special Leave  from the Judgment and Order dated 17-3-1978  of the  Kerala High  Court in CRP Nos. 4977 and 4978 of 1976-A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 878 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 20-3-1978  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4980 of 1976-B).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 879 OF 1978      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 20-3-1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 21/77- B).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 881 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated  26-7-1978  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 2098/78). 846           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 883 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 2-8-1978  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2203/77- G).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 884 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 1-9-1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1978 of 78-F).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 885 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 17-7-1978  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 146/77- C).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 886 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 16-8-79 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2351/78A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order

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dated 23.11.1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 28 of 77-C).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 890 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 3-11-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 5358/76- E).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 894 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 19-12-1977  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 3980/77E).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 895 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated  2-12-1977  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 2542/77B).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 896 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 31-3-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3264/76- F).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 897 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 27-5-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1978/76- A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 898 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 12-8-1977 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 2898/77- C).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 899 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 3-8-1978  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4686/76- A).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 8-9-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 3941/76). 847           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 901 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 28-2-1977  of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 1665 of 1976).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 902 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 2-3-1978  of the  Kerala High Court in CRP No. 633/78- E).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 903 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 26-7-1978 of the Kerala High Court in CRP No. 4762/76- F).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1019 OF 1979      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 18-10-1978  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  CRP  No. 1117/78-H).           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1015/76      For the Appellants: T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar      For the Respondents: P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1723/77      For the Appellant: K. S. Ramamurthi, T. R. G. Warriyar, S. Balakrishnan,  C. S.  A. Iyer, M. K. D. Namboodari and C. K. Bharthan.      For the  Respondents:  M.  M.  Abdul  Khader,  Advocate General, Kerala and K. M. K. Nair.      For the  Intervener: K.  K. Venugopal, Addl. Sol. Genl, and K. J. John.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2811 OF 1977      For the Appellant: K. N. Bhat and V. K. Verma,      For the  Respondents: Dr.  V. A. Seiyed Mohammad and K. M. K. Nair.

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         CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 574-575/78      For the  Appellants: G.  B. Pai,  K. J.  John and J. B. Dadachanji.      For the  Respondents: K.  T. Harindra  Nath and  V.  J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40/77      For the  Appellant: M.  C. Bhandare, K. J. John, and J. B. Dadachanji.      For the Respondents: P. A. Francis and N. Sudhakaran.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 143/77      For the Appellants: T. C. Raghavan and P. K. Pillai.      For Respondents 1-2: K. M. K. Nair. 848           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1309/77      For the Appellant: T. C. Raghavan, and N. Sudhakaran,      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.      For  the   Intervener:  Mathai   M.  Paikeday   and  N. Sudhakaran.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1863/77      For the Appellant: T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar,      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar and V. J. Francis,           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2070/77      For the Appellant: T. C. Raghavan, N. Sudhakaran and P. K. Pillai,      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair,           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2584/77      For the  Appellants: T.  C. Raghavan, N. Sudhakaran and P. K. Pillai,      For Respondents 1-3: P. A. Francis and K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2585/77      For the Appellant: M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare, P. Santhalingam, A. N. Karhanis and Miss M. Poduval.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair,           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2586/77      For the Appellant: P. K. Pillai.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2587/77      For  the   Appellant:  K.   T.  Harindra  Nath  and  N. Sudhakaran.      For the Repondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623/77      For the Appellant: T. R. G. Warriyar and A. S. Nambiar.      For  the  Respondents:  G.  Govindan  Nair  and  K.  R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 290/78      For the Appellants: Anant Krishnan, S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodri.      For the  Respondents 1-3:  P. Govindan  Nair and K.M.K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 362/78      For the  Appellants: K.  T. Harindernath  and  Mrs.  S. Gopala krishnan.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 882/78      For the  Appellants :  T. C. Raghavan, S. Balakrishnan, C. K. Bharathan, CSA Iyer and M. K. D. Namboodri.      For  the  Respondents:  P.  Govindan  Nair  and  K.  R. Nambiar. 849           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227/78      For the  Appellants: Dr.  V. A.  Syed Mohd  and  K.  R. Nambiar.      For the  Respondent: F. S. Nariman, K. Joseph and K. J. John.      For the  Intervener (Rubber  Board): K.  K.  Venugopal,

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Addl. Sol. Genl. and K. J. John.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 869/79      For the Appellants: N. Sudhakaran.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 870/79      For the Appellant: N. Sudhakaran.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 871/79      For the Appellant: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondent: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 872/79      For the Appellant: P. K. Pillai.      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 873-874/79      For the Appellant: N. Sudhakaran.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis.      For the Respondents 4-5: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondent No. 6: S. B. Saharya.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 875/79      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 876/79      For the  Appellants:  T.  R.  G.  Warriyar  and  A.  S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 877/79      For the Appellant: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 878/79      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 879/78      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents 1-2: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 881/79      For the Appellant: Saroja Goplakrishnan.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis. 850           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 883/79      For the  Appellants:  S.  Balakrishnan  and  M.  K.  D. Namboodri.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 885/79      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents 1-3: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 884/79      For the Appellant: P. K. Pillai, Sr.      For the Respondents: Mr. K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 886/79      For the Appellant: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 889/79      For the  Appellants:  S.  Balakrishnan  and  M.  K.  D. Namboodri.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 890/79      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 894/79      For the Appellant: N. Sudhakaran.      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 895/79      For the  Appellants: M.  C. Bhandare, S. Bhandare, Miss M. Poduval and J. Santhalingam.      For the Respondents 1-3: K. R. Nambiar.

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         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 896/79      For the Appellant: N. Sudhakaran.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 897/79      For the Appellants: P. K. Pillai.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 898/79      For the Appellants: A. S. Nambiar.      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 899/79      For the  Appellants:  S.  Balakrishnan  and  M.  K.  D. Namboodri.      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 900/79      For  the  Appellant:  S.  Balakrishnan  and  M.  K.  D. Namboodri.      For the Respondents: 1-3: K. R. Nambiar. 851           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 901/79      For the Appellant: P. K. Pillai.      For the Respondents: K. M. K. Nair.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 902/79      For  the  Appellant:  S.  Balakrishnan  and  M.  K.  D. Namboodri.      For the Respondents: K. R. Nambiar.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 903/79      For the Appellant: S. B. Saharya.      For the Respondents: V. J. Frnacis.           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1019/79      For the Appellant: T. T. Kunhikannan.      For the Respondents: V. J. Francis.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHINGHAL, J.  The learned  counsel for  the  appellants have categorically  stated  at  the  Bar  that  no  question relating to  the validity  of the  Kerala Land  Reforms Act, 1963 (Act  1 of  1964), hereafter referred to as the Act, or any of  its provisions,  arises in  these appeals by special leave. We  have heard  them together  virtually as companion appeals at  the instance  of learned  counsel for they arise out of  several judgments  of the  High Court  of Kerala  in matters relating to the implementation of the provisions for the restriction  on ownership  and  possession  of  land  in excess of  the ceiling area and the disposal of excess land. These are  the subject  matter of Chapter III of the Act, as amended from  time to  time. It is not necessary to refer to the dates  of all  judgments of the High Court of Kerala, or to all  the points  of controversy there, as learned counsel have been able to channelise their arguments into three main points of  controversy, which have been argued at length. It is true  that all these points do not arise in all the cases before us,  and some  learned counsel have raised additional arguments in  the peculiar  facts and circumstances of their cases. It  will therefore  be convenient  and proper to deal with the  three main  points  first,  and  to  take  up  the additional points  for consideration  with reference  to the appeals  in   which  they   have   been   raised   for   our consideration. This,  it is  agreed, will  be a proper and a fair course  to adopt  for the disposal of these appeals. It is also  agreed by learned counsel that the other appeals in which such  additional points  have not  been  raised  shall stand decided  according to  our decision  on the three main points.      In order  to understand  the controversy  in its proper perspective, it  may be  mentioned that,  as  in  the  other States in the country, the Kerala State legislature felt the

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necessity of making "comprehensive" 852 land reforms  in the  State. The  Kerala Agrarian  Relations Act, 1960  (Act 4  of  1961)  was  accordingly  passed,  and received the  assent of  the President  on January 21, 1961. Some of  its provisions  were brought into force with effect from February  15, 1961.  This Court struck down that Act as unconstitutional in its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdurg and  Kasaragod taluka.  The Kerala  Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars  Protection Act,  1962, was  then passed for the temporary protection of tenants in those taluks. The State  High   Court  declared   it  null  and  void  in  its application to  the ryotwari  lands of  the Malabar area and most of  the lands of Travancore area. So the Kerala Tenants and Kudikidappukars  Protection Act,  1963,  was  passed  to provide some  protection  to  tenants.  It  was  an  interim legislation. Even so it repealed the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars  Protection Act, 1962, and suspended the operation of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960.      After re-examining  the requirements  in the  field  of land reforms as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, was published  in State  Gazette on  September 15,  1963. It covered a  wide field  in the  matter of  land reforms  and, inter alia,  provided for  the imposition  of a  ceiling  on "holding" of  lands, the  surrender of excess lands grant of compensation therefor, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in  accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals and  Land Board  etc. The  Bill was enacted as the Kerala Land  Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), and received the assent  of the  President on  December 31,  1963. It was amended extensively, and in several material particulars, by Act 35  of 1969,  and then  by Act  25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972. There  were other  amendments also,  but it  is agreed that they do not bear on the controversy before us.      The three  main points  of controversy in these appeals have been  formulated by  learned counsel for the appellants as follows:-           1.   Whether  lands   converted  into  plantations between April  1, 1964  and  January  1,  1970  qualify  for exemption under section 81(1)(e) of the Act.           2.   Whether a  certificate of  purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.           3.   Whether  the   validity  or   invalidity   of transfers  effected  by  persons  owning  or  holding  lands exceeding  the  ceiling  limit  should  be  determined  with reference to  the ceiling  area in  force on the date of the transfer or  in accordance  with the ceiling area prescribed by Act  35 of  1969-whether sub-section (3) of section 84 is retrospective in operation. 853 We shall  examine the  three points  one by  one but  before doing so  it will  advantageous  to  refer  briefly  to  the substantive provisions  of the Act which bear on the appeals before us.      It will  be recalled  that the  Act came into existence when the  other attempts  to make  legislative provision for land reforms  did not work out satisfactorily for one reason or the  other. The  Act was  therefore enacted  by way of "a comprehensive legislation"  to bring  about land  reforms in the Kerala  State. While  Chapter  I  of  the  Act  contains provisions relating,  inter alia,  to its  commencement  and defines some of the important terms and expressions, Chapter

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II contains  many provisions  for the benefit of tenants and "deemed tenants",  including restoration of lands and fixity of  their   tenure,  purchase   of  landlords’   rights   by cultivating tenants  and rent  payable by certain categories of tenants  etc. The  provisions of the Chapter do not apply to  the   leases,  tenancies   and  transferred   lands  and transactions  mentioned   in  section   3.  We  are  however primarily concerned  with  Chapter  III  under  the  general rubric "Restrictions  on ownership and possession of land in excess of  ceiling  area  and  disposal  of  excess  lands." Section 81 deals with "exemptions", including "plantations". Section  82   prescribes  the  "ceiling  area",  section  83 prohibits the  owning  or  holding  or  possessing  under  a mortgage lands  in excess  of the  ceiling area.  Section 84 declares what  voluntary transfers  shall be  deemed  to  be invalid. Subsection  (3) of  the section  has attracted much controversy and we shall deal with it in due course. Section 85 makes  it obligatory  to surrender  the excess  land, and section 86  vests such  excess lands in the State Government free from  all encumbrances.  Section 87 makes provision for the surrender  of excess  land obtained by gift, purchase or mortgage, lease, surrender or any other transfer inter vivos or by  bequest or  inheritance or  otherwise  if  the  total extent of  land thereby  exceeds the ceiling area. These are the main  provisions which  bear on  the three  points which have been raised for our consideration. Point No. 1      The question is whether lands converted into plantation between April  1, 1964  and January  1, 1970 are exempt from the operation of the provisions of Chapter III of the Act in regard to  the restriction  on ownership  and possession  of land in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by it. It will be recalled  that while  section 82  prescribes the  ceiling area of  the land,  section 81 states what shall be exempted from its  operation. Clause  (e) of  sub-section (1) of that section thus  specifically provides  that the  provisions of Chapter III  shall not  be applicable to "plantations". That has been  so from the inception of the Act, and the question therefore is whether those who felt tempted by the exemption in favour of plantations and converted their lands 854 into plantations  after the  commencement of  the Act, would get the benefit of the exemption and, if so, from which date would the conversion be recognised ?      This has  been dealt with in sub-section (4) of section 82 of  the Act  which prescribes  the ceiling.  It is not in dispute before  us that  section came into force on April 1, 1964. The sub-section as originally enacted in Act I of 1964 therefore came into force on that date. It read as follows:-           "82(4) Where,  after the commencement of this Act, any  class  of  land  specified  in  Schedule  II  has  been converted into  any other  class of  land specified therein, the extent  of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried  person owning  or holding  such land at the time of  the conversion  shall be  determined without taking into account such conversion." Section 82  was however  substantially amended by section 66 of the  Amending Act  of 1969 which, inter alia, reduced the ceiling area  of the  land and  amended the wordings of sub- section (4) also. That section came into force on January 1, 1970. It  is not necessary to refer to it as the legislature amended sub-section (4) of section 82 once again, by section 12 of  the Amending Act of 1971, which, by virtue of section 1 of  that Act,  also came into force on January 1, 1970 and thereby supplanted,  from the  very inception, the amendment

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which had  been brought  about by  the Amending Act of 1969. The amended  sub-section, which is the subject matter of the point under consideration, reads as follows,-           "82(4) Where,  after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Section II has been converted into any  other class  of land specified in that Schedule or into  a   plantation,  the  extent  of  land  liable  to  be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined   without    taking   into   consideration   such conversion."      The controversy therefore is whether the restriction of sub-section (4)  of section  82 came into force from January 1, 1970  because section  12 of the Amending Act of 1971 was brought into  force on  that date,  or whether  it came into force on  April 1,  1964,  when  section  82  as  originally enacted by  the Act  came into force. As it happens, all the three Acts contain provisions about their "commencement" and it is  these which have to be interpreted for the purpose of resolving the dispute.      Sub-section (3)  of section  1 of  the Act  provides as follows,-           "1(3). The  provisions of  this Act,  except  this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force 855      on such  date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint:           Provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions  of this  Act, and any reference in any such provision  to the  commencement of  this Act,  shall be construed as  reference to  the coming  into force  of  that provision." It therefore  provides that:  (i) section 1 of the Act shall come into  force at  once, (ii)  the other provisions of the Act shall  come into  force on  such dates as the Government may appoint,  (iii) different  dates may  be  appointed  for different provisions  of the  Act, and (iv) any reference in any such  provision to  the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. The  Act was  published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964,  and,  by  virtue  of  section  3  of  the  Kerala Interpretation and  General clauses Act, section 1 came into force on that date. Section 82 as has been stated, came into force on April 1, 1964, and the reference in sub-section (4) of that  section to  the "commencement  of this Act" meant a reference to  the coming  into force  of that provision with effect from  April 1,  1964. It  may be that the first three rules or  directions contained in sub-section (3) (mentioned above) were  spent on  the coming into force of section 1 of the Act  or its  other provisions on the dates appointed for them, but,  for obvious reasons, rule (iv) continued to hold the  field   in  as  much  as  it  laid  down  the  rule  of construction that any reference to the "commencement of this Act" shall  be construed  as a  reference to the coming into force  of   that  particular  provision.  It  was  therefore applicable as  a general  rule of  construction whenever  it became necessary  to ascertain the date of commencement of a particular provision of the Act other than section 1.      It will be recalled that sub-section (4) of section 82, as originally  incorporated in  the Act,  came into force on April 1,  1964. As  has been  mentioned, sub-section  (4) of section 82  was emended by section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969, which  came into  force on  January 1,  1970, but that proved to be fortuitous because it was supplanted by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971 from the same date.

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    The sub-section,  as amended  by the  Amending  Act  of 1971, also  dealt with the conversion of land into any other class of  land "after  the commencement of this Act", but it added the  words "or  into a  plantation" and  provided that such conversion  shall not  be taken  into consideration for determining the  extent of land liable to be surrendered. It has been argued that the expression "the commencement 856 of this  Act" refers  to January  1,  1970,  on  which  date section 12  of the  Amending Act  of 1971  was brought  into force, and  not to  April 1,  1964 when it was first brought into force  as mentioned above. Reference in this connection has been  made to  sub-section  (2)  of  section  1  of  the Amending Act of 1971.      The argument  is however untenable on the plain meaning of the  proviso to  sub-section (3)  of section 1 of the Act which clearly  states that any reference in any provision of the Act to the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a  reference to  the coming into force of that provision. So when the "provision" of sub-section (4) of section 82 was brought into  force on  April 1,  1964, its  amended version would also  come into force from that date. And it will be a matter of no consequence that section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971,  which amended  the sub-section, came into force on January 1,  1970. It  will be  remembered that section 66 of the Amending  Act of 1969 which amended section 82 came into force on  January 1, 1970, and as the legislature decided to amend it  once again  by section 12 of the Act of 1971, with retrospective effect  from the  same date (January 1, 1970), it made  a specific provision to that effect in section 1 of the Amending  Act of  1971 and left the date of commencement of the  Act for purposes of sub-section (4) of section 82 to be determined according to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1  of the  Act which,  as has  been  stated,  was  a subsisting provision.  It would  follow that sub-section (4) as amended  by the  Amending Act  of 1971 came into force on April 1,  1964. It  may be  that, as  has been argued by Mr. Venugopal, the  expression "commencement  of this  Act" is a term of  "art". We have interpreted it as it stands, without detracting from the value attributed to it by Mr. Venugopal.      Mr.  Warriyar   has  however   argued  that  particular significance  attaches   to  the   use  of   the  expression "provisions" or  "provision" in  section 1(3) of the Act and that the High Court erred in presuming that "at all relevant times a  ’provision’ which  resulted in certain consequences was in force from April 1, 1964 onwards." He has invited our attention  to  Saidu  Muhammed  v.  Bhanukuitan(1)  for  the contention that the true meaning of "provision" is a section or series  of sections  forming  a  self-contained  integral whole, that  section 82  to 85  should  be  construed  as  a "composite provision"  dealing with  the ceiling  area,  and that the  assumption that  section 82(4)  alone was  brought into force  as a distinct provision, when section 83 had not been brought into force, is not legally sustainable.      The  Century  Dictionary  (which  is  an  encyclopaedic lexicon of  the English  language)  defines  "provision"  as follows,- 857           ’In  law,   a  stipulation;  a  rule  provided;  a distinct clause  in an  instrument or  statute;  a  rule  or principle to be referred for guidance; as, the provisions of law; the provisions of the Constitution." In "Words and Phrases" (Permanent Edition) the definition is as follows:-      "As applied  to legislation,  the word  "provision" has

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this  well-understood   meaning:   "Actual   expression   in language"-the clothing  of legislative  ideas in words which can be pointed out on the page and read with the eye." A provision is therefore a distinct rule or principle of law in a  statute which  governs the situation covered by it. So an incomplete  idea, even  though stated  in the  form of  a section of  a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompleteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned. A provision of  law cannot therefore be said to exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing.      Examined in this perspective, section 82 of the Act (as amended by  section 12  of the  Amending Act of 1971) is, to say the least, a distinct rule or clause for it provides the extent of  the ceiling  area in  the cases  mentioned in  it (sub-section (1)  ), its  effect on  the lands owned or held individually by  the members  of a family or jointly by some or all  of the members of the family (sub-section (2) ), the taking into  account of  the shares  of the  members of  the family or  an adult  unmarried person (sub-section (3)), the effect of  conversion of  any class  of  land  specified  in Schedule II  into any  other class  of land specified in the schedule or  into a plantation and the extent of land liable to be  surrendered by  a person  owning or holding such land (sub-section (4)  ), lands  owned by  a private  trust or  a private institution  (sub-section (5)  )  and  exemption  of lands covered  by section 81 (sub-section (6) ). The section is therefore a "provision" by any standard, and it is futile to argue  that this  is not so merely because the provisions relating to  the prohibition  on the  owning or  holding  or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area and the surrender of excess land and its vesting in  the State Government have been dealt with in the other sections  (83, 85  and 86).  Sections 83,  85  and  86 contain certain  other provisions  relating to  the  law  of ceiling on land, but that cannot detract from the basic fact that section  82 contains  a provision-in  fact an important provision-of the  law relating  to the imposition of ceiling on land  dealt with in Chapter III. It may well be said that sub-section (4) of section 82 is also a provision of the law by itself, for it lays down a dis- 858 tinct rule relating to conversion of lands for observance by all concerned.      We have  gone through Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan,(1) but that  was quite a different case where the section which authorised the  launching of  the prosecution of a defaulter was brought  into force,  but not  the other provision which prescribed the period of limitation for the prosecution, and the High  Court, was  persuaded to take the view that it was the  legislative  intent  that  the  prosecution  should  be governed by  the limitation prescribed by the other section. In the  case before  us, however, the application of section 82 is  not dependent  on any other section, so as to make it an incomplete  provision by  itself. It  deals with "ceiling area" and  is a  provision by  itself, so  that it  could be brought into  force from  a date  different from  section 83 which prohibited  the holding  of  land  in  excess  of  the ceiling area.  It may  be pointed  out, that  the  "ceiling" prescribed by  section 82  was material  not  only  for  the purpose of  Chapter III  of the  Act, but  had a  direct co- relation to  some of  the  provisions  of  Chapter  II  e.g. sections 16 and 53.      It has next been argued by Mr. Warriyar that in view of the decisions of this Court in State of Kerala and others v.

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Philomina etc.(2)  and State  of Kerala  and others v. K. A. Gangadharan,(3) the High Court erred in taking the view that section 82(4)  came into  force on  April 1, 1964 because it has been  held in both those cases that determination of the surplus land  was to  be  on  the  basis  of  the  situation existing on  January 1,  1970, and that if any land had been converted  into  a  plantation  before  that  date,  it  had necessarily to be exempted from the operation of the ceiling law by  virtue of section 81. But they were different cases. Thus State  of Kerala  v. Philomina  (supra) related  to the transfer of  "Kayal" lands  between September  15, 1963  and January  1,  1970.  As  Chapter  III  of  the  Act  was  not applicable to  those lands  because of  the exemption  under section 81, and as that exemption continued until January 1, 1970 when  section 65  of the Amending Act of 1969 came into force, it  was held  by this Court that as the exemption was not withdrawn  until January  1, 1970,  the  transfers  made between September  15, 1963  and January  1, 1970 were valid under the  provisions of  the Act. The decision in that case thus turned  on the  meaning of section 83 and 85. That view was noticed  by this  Court in State of Kerala and others v. K. A.  Gangadharan (supra) and it was held that the dominant legislative intent  was the  imposition of  the  ceiling  on lands and the consequential obligation to 859 surrender lands  owned or held in excess of the ceiling area on the  notified date, namely, January 1, 1970. The gifts of excess land  made on  March 28, 1974 were therefore ignored. That was  also, therefore, a different case and cannot avail the appellants.      The view  taken by  the High  Court in  Ramunni Nair v. State of  Kerala(1) in  regard to the meaning to be attached to  the  words  "the  commencement  of  this  Act"  is  thus substantially correct  and does not call for interference by us. It  may be  mentioned that  learned Advocate General has pointed out that in the Act as it stands amended at present, the expression  "commencement of  this Act"  refers  to  the commencement  of   the  Act,  and  while  referring  to  the commencement of  the Amending.  Act of  1969, the words used are "commencement  of the  Kerala Land  Reforms  (Amendment) Act, 1969"  and that  the Amending Act of 1971 has also been referred to  as such. It is therefore futile to contend that the rule  of interpretation  mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 1  that any  reference in  a provision of the Act to the "commencement  of this  Act" shall  be  construed  as  a reference to  the coming into force of that provision, shall not be  construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision as originally enacted.      Mr. Balakrishnan  tried to  raise the  argument that  a landholder is,  in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under  section 81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of  the "extent  of plantation  within  the  ceiling area" even if it were converted into a plantation during the period April  1, 1964  to December 31, 1969. The argument is untenable  because  while  sub-section  (1)  of  section  81 provides that  the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to the  lands and  plantations  mentioned  in  it,  that  is overridden by,  and is  subject to,  the requirement of sub- section (4) of section 82.      Point No. 1 is decided against the appellants. Point No. 2      The question  is  whether  a  certificate  of  purchase issued by  the Land Tribunal under section 72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act.

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    The  provisions   relating  to   the  purchase  of  the landlord’s rights  by cultivating  tenants appear under that heading, and  are contained in sections 53 to 74 of the Act. The Tribunal  is competent to pass orders on the application for   purchase,   including   the   determination   of   the compensation and  the  purchase  price  under  section  72F. Section 72K 860 provides for  the issue  of the certificate of purchase sub- section (2) of that section reads as follows,-           "(2) The certificate of purchase issued under sub- section (1)  shall be  conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant  of the  right, title  and interest  of the land- owner and  the intermediaries,  if any,  over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates." The real question for consideration therefore is whether the certificate is  binding on  the Taluk  Land  Board  for  the purpose of  taking a  decision in regard to the ceiling area under sub-section (5) of section 85.      It may  be mentioned  in this connection that while the Land Tribunal  deals with  most of  the matters  relating to tenants and  is constituted under section 99, the Taluk Land Board is  constituted under  section  100A  and  deals  with statements filed  under sub-section  (2) of  section  85  by persons owning  or holding  land in  excess of  the  ceiling area. Sub-section  (5) of  section 85  provides further that the Taluk Land Board shall-           (a)  cause  the   particulars  mentioned   in  the statement to be verified,           (b)  ascertain whether  the  person  to  whom  the statement relates owns or holds any other lands, and           (c)  by order determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. A reading  of sub-section  (1) of  section 85 shows that the question  for  examination  is  not  that  relating  to  the existence of  the tenancy rights of the person who files the statement, but that relating to the bona fides of his belief that the  land sought  to be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. The Land Tribunal and the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective fields and serve the purpose of the Act.      Now the certificate of purchase which the Land Tribunal issues (in  the prescribed  form) evidences the "assignment" of the  assigned land  to the  purchaser. Sub-section (2) of section 72K  of the Act mentioned above merely declares that the  certificate   shall  be   conclusive  proof   of   that ’assignment’ of  the right,  title and interest of the land- owner and  the intermediaries  (if any)  to  the  tenant  in respect of the holding concerned (or portion thereof). There is nothing in the sub-section which could be said to declare that the finding recorded 861 by the  Tribunal in  those proceedings  would be  conclusive proof of  any other  matter which  it may determine so as to bind the Taluk and Board or any other authority. Sub-section (2) of  section 72K  therefore does  not,  in  terms  or  in substance, impinge  on the authority of the Taluk Land Board to discharge  its own  functions under  section 85(5) of the Act.      The Board  is thus  quite free to cause the particulars mentioned in  the statement  filed under  sub-section (2) of section 85  to be  verified and  to  ascertain  whether  the person filing  the statement  owns or  holds any other land, and to  determine the  "extent" as well as the "identity" of the excess  land which  he is  required to  surrender. If  a

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certificate of  purchase is  issued by  the Land Tribunal to any such  person and he tenders it in proceedings before the Taluk Land  Board, the  Board is required by law to treat it as conclusive  proof of  the fact  that the right, title and interest of  the land owner (and intermediary) over the land mentioned in  it has been assigned to him. It is however not the requirement  of the law that the certificate of purchase shall be  conclusive proof of the surplus or other land held by its  holder so  as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of section 85.      Mr. Warriyar is not justified in arguing that the Taluk Land Board has power only to determine the "identity" of the surplus  land,  leaving  every  other  matter  to  the  Land Tribunal. The  argument loses  sight of  requirement of sub- section (5)  of section 85 that the Board shall, inter alia, by order,  determine not  only the "identity" of the land to be surrendered but also its "extent".      It would  thus appear  that even though the certificate of purchase  issued under  sub-section (1) of section 72K is conclusive proof  of the  assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the  holding concerned  under sub-section  (2), that only means that  no  contrary  evidence  shall  be  effective  to displace it,  unless the  so-called conclusive  effective is inaccurate on  its face,  or fraud  can be shown (Halsbury’s Laws of  England, fourth edition, vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28). It  may be  stated that "inaccuracy on the face" of the certificate is  not as  wide in its connotation as an "error apparent on  the face  of the record". It will not therefore be permissible  for the  Board to  disregard the evidentiary value of  the certificate  of purchase  merely on the ground that it  has not  been issued  on a  proper appreciation  or consideration  of  the  evidence  on  record,  or  that  the Tribunal’s finding  suffers from  any procedural error. What sub-section (2)  of section  72K provides  is an irrebutable presumption of law, and it may well be regarded as a rule 862 of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does  not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under section 85(5) after taking into consideration the "conclusive" evidentiary value of the certificate of  purchase according to section 72K (2) as far as it goes.      We are  therefore of the opinion that the view taken in Kunjanujan Thampuran  and others  v. Taluk  Land Board(1) is not quite  correct. While  the High  Court was  justified in taking the  view that  the scope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board  is that  relating to the surplus land with which the Land  Tribunal is  not  concerned,  the  certificate  of purchase has  its own  "conclusive" evedentiary value to the extent provided in section 72K (2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land  Board. It  will therefore  be for  the Board  to arrive at  its own decision under sub-section (5) of section 85, according  to the law, and it will be permissible for it to examine,  where necessary,  whether  the  certificate  is inaccurate on  its face,  or has  been obtained  by fraud or collusion.      Point No. 2 is decided accordingly.      Mr. Bhandare  tried to  raise an  ancillary argument in C.A. No. 2585 of 1977 that if on the date on which the Taluk Land Board  undertakes an  enquiry for  the determination of surplus land,  a  proceeding  is  pending  before  the  Land Tribunal for  the grant  of a  certificate of  purchase, the Board will  have no  jurisdiction to  examine a matter which falls within  the jurisdiction  of the  Tribunal.  We  find,

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however,  that   no  such   question  was   raised  for  the consideration of  the High  Court, where the controversy was confined to  the  genuineness  of  the  lease,  and  we  are therefore not  required to examine the abstract point of law set out by Mr. Bhandare. It will be sufficient for us to say that the  ancillary argument  can easily  be answered in the light of  our decision  on point No. 2 if and when it arises for consideration  in a  given case, for the function of the Board is  to determine  the extent  and the  identity of the Land to be surrendered and not matters relating to the issue of a  certificate of  purchase. If a certificate of purchase has a bearing on what the Board is called upon to decide, we have  no   doubt  that   the  Board   will  take   it   into consideration, if it is produced for its consideration, with due regard  to the  evidentiary value  assigned to  it under section 72K (2) in the light of our decision on point No. 2. Point No. 3      Some of  the persons  who owned or held lands exceeding the  ceiling   prescribed  by   the  Act,   had  voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the 863 State Gazette  on September  15, 1963. Section 84 of the Act therefore provides  that, except for the transfers mentioned in the  section, the transfers so made shall be deemed to be transfers calculated  to defeat  the provisions  of the Act, and shall  be invalid. The section has thus been linked with section 82  which specifies  the ceiling  area. As  has been stated, the  ceiling area  was considerably  reduced by  the amendment which  was made  in section 82 by the Amending Act of 1969.  That Act amended section 84 also, with effect from January 1,  1970. It  was again  amended by  Act 17  of 1972 (hereafter referred  to as  the Amending  Act of  1972) with effect from November 2, 1972, when that Act came into force. It, inter  alia, inserted  sub-section (3)  in section 84 as follows,-           "(3) For  the removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and  (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (1) of  section 82  as amended  by the  Kerala Land  Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, (35 of 1969)." The question  therefore  is  whether  the  validity  of  the voluntary transfer is to be determined with reference to the ceiling area  in force  on the  date  of  transfer,  or  the reduced ceiling area prescribed by the Amending Act of 1969. As has  been stated,  sub-section  (3)  of  section  84  was inserted  on   November  2,   1972,  and   the   point   for determination is whether it was retrospective or retroactive in operation  so as  to govern  the transfers effected after September 15, 1963 (date of publication of the Bill of 1963) even though  the original section 84, read with the original section 82,  invalidated only  those transfers which were in excess of  the higher  ceiling prescribed  by  the  original section 82.      Section  84  follows  section  82  which,  it  will  be recalled, prescribes the ceiling area, and section 83, which prohibits the  owning or  holding  or  possession  (under  a mortgage) land  in excess  of the  ceiling area. As has been observed by this Court in Gangadharan’s case, section 84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of section 83 and  85 effective.  It makes references to "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2), and sub-section (3) states what exactly is meant thereby.      The sub-section  clarifies that the expression "ceiling area" in  sub-sections (1)  and (2)  of section 84 means the

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area specified  in sub-section (1) of section 82 "as amended by the  Kerala Land  Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1969  (35  of 1969)". As  has been  mentioned, that  amendment was made by section 66  which came  into force on January 1, 1970. It is true that  section 15  of the  Amending Act  of 1972  (which inserted sub-section (3) in section 84 of the Act) does 864 not state  that it  has been made with retrospective effect, and sub-section  (3) does not, in terms, state that it shall be deemed  to have  come into  force from  the date  of  the amendment which  was made  by the Amending Act of 1969. Even so, it  is necessary  to examine  the  true  effect  of  the insertion of  the sub-section  and to  decide whether  it is retroactive.      In doing  so, we shall be guided by the plain and clear language of  the sub-section,  that is  the primary  rule of construction, for  the legislature  is intended to mean what it has  expressed. We  shall also  bear in  mind  the  other equally important  rule of  interpretation that a statute is not to be read retrospectively except for necessity.      Section 84  has been  enacted for the purpose of making certain voluntary  transfers invalid on the ground that they are deemed  to be  calculated to defeat the provision of the law relating  to  imposition  of  ceiling  on  land.  It  is therefore  co-related   to  section   82  (which  fixed  the ceiling), and  if the  Legislature decided  that the ceiling should be  reduced, it is natural that the deeming provision of section  84 should  attach to  transfers in excess of the reduced ceiling because the crucial date of invalidation has been stated  in section  84, right from the inception of the Act, to  be September  15, 1963,  irrespective  of  the  law relating to  the ceiling. It will be remembered that the Act had not  even come into force on September 15, 1963, but it, all the same, invalidated the transfers made after that date in excess  of the  ceiling it  prescribed. So,  as  long  as September  15,  1963  continues  to  remain  the  date  with reference to  which the transfers are to be invalidated, the variation in  the extent  of the  ceiling has necessarily to work back  to that  date. The legislature therefore inserted sub-section (3) in section 84 to clarify that the expression "ceiling area"  in the  earlier sub-sections  would mean the ceiling area  specified in  section 82(1)  as amended by the Amending Act  of 1969,  i.e. the  reduced ceiling. In taking this view  we have  only taken  into consideration the plain and clear wordings of the sub-section, and if in doing so it so happens  that  sub-section  (3)  becomes  retroactive  in operation, we must hold that it is so. Any other view of the meaning  and  effect  of  sub-section  (3)  will  amount  to disregarding what  the legislature has expressed and reading more in the law than what it provides.      It has  to be appreciated that, from the inception, the Act forward  on voluntary transfers effected after September 15, 1963, for the obvious reason that the Bill was published on that  date in  the State Gazette and those concerned know that they  would be  required to surrender the excess lands. It is not surprising that voluntary transfers of land should have been made to get over that eventuality. 865 Section 84  therefore provided  from the very beginning that such transfers  shall be  deemed to  be calculated to defeat the provisions  of the  Act and  shall be  invalid. When the ceiling fixed  by the  original section  82 was considerably reduced by  the Amending  Act of  1969, and when the reduced ceiling was  to govern the liability to surrender the excess land, it  was only  natural that  provision should have been

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made  to   invalidate  voluntary  transfers  effected  after September 15,  1963 with  reference to that reduced ceiling. It has to be appreciated that even those who did not want to defeat the  provisions of  the Act  by  voluntary  transfers after September  15, 1963 and retained the lands themselves, were affected  by  the  amendment  which  was  made  by  the Amending Act  of 1969  and were  not entitled  to claim that this should  not be  so merely because the Amending Act came into force  later. A  doubt was  however  raised  about  the matter in V. N. Narayanan Nair and others v. State of Kerala and others(1).  It was  therefore  considered  necessary  to introduce the  Kerala Land  Reforms (Amendment)  Bill, 1972, clause 15  of which,  inter alia, provided for the insertion of the  following as  sub-section (3)  of section  84 of the Act,-           "(3) For  the  removal  of  doubts  it  is  hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and  (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (1) of  section 82  as amended  by the  Kerala Land  Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 or 1969)." Notes on  clauses were appended to the Bill. In paragraph 10 thereof it was stated as follows:-           "There have  been some  doubts as  to the scope of the expression  "ceiling area" as used in the section. It is proposed to provide that the ceiling area referred to in the section is  the ceiling  area under  the  principal  Act  as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)." The legislature inserted the sub-section without any change.      It is true that the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained  from any  statement by  way of a note on the clauses of  a Bill  or breviate and, as has been stated, the duty of  the court  is to  find the  natural meaning  of the words in  a statute,  in the context in which they are used, but it  has always  been considered  permissible,  and  even desirable, for  a court,  while interpreting  a statute,  to take  note   of  the   history  of   the  statute   and  the circumstances in which it was passed or 866 the mischief  at which  it was  directed. The reason is that the meaning which is to be given to a statute should be such as will  carry out its object. If sub-section (3) of section 84 is examined with due regard to all these factors, it will appear that,  as has plainly been stated in it, the "ceiling area" referred  to in  sub-sections  (1)  and  (2)  of  that section for  examining the  question of  the validity of the transfers made  after September  15,  1963  is  the  reduced "ceiling area" specified by the Amending Act of 1969.      In fact  as has  been stated  in the Craies on "Statute Law," seventh  edition, at  page 395,  to explain  a  former statute, the  subsequent statute  has relation  back to  the time when the earlier Act was passed. In such a case, as the Act is  "declaratory", the presumption against construing it retrospectively so  as to  respect  vested  rights,  is  not applicable. As  sub-section  (3)  of  section  84  in  terms clarifies the  meaning of the expression "ceiling area" with reference to  which certain  voluntary transfers  are to  be invalidated, it  is clearly  retrospective as it is meant to invalidate the  transfers made after September 15, 1963 when the Bill of 1963 was published.      We are  therefore satisfied  that  the  view  taken  in Narayana Patar  v. State  of Kerala(1)  and others  in  this respect  is  quite  correct  and  point  No.  3  is  decided accordingly.      In the  result, the appeals in which only points Nos. 1

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and 3  have been  raised for  our consideration fail and are dismissed.      We shall now examine those appeals in which point No. 2 and/or  additional   points  have   been  raised   for   our consideration.                     C.A. No. 869 of 1979                   Issac Joseph and another                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      As we  have taken  a different view on point No. 2, and as the purchase certificate came up for consideration in the High Court,  the appeal  is allowed  to the  extent that the High Court  shall re-examine  the matter in the light of our decision on that point.                     C.A. No. 876 of 1979              P. Kunhukutta Tharakan and others                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      Mr.  Warriyar  has  argued  that  the  High  Court  has committed an  error of  law in  taking  the  view  that  the certificate of purchase was not 867 conclusive proof  of the  assignment of  the right, title or interest of  the   landowner and the intermediaries over the holding. In  view of  our decision  on point  No. 2,  it  is necessary  that   the  High   Court  should  re-examine  the controversy. The  appeal is  therefore allowed,  and  it  is ordered accordingly.                    C. A. No. 877 of 1979                      K. Parukutty Ammal                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      In the  view we  have taken  on point  No. 2  about the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase, the appeal is allowed  and the  case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal according to law in that respect.                     C.A. No. 878 of 1979                  K. Devaki Amma and others                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      The view  taken by  the High  Court in  regard  to  the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate is not correct for reasons  mentioned by us while dealing with point No. 2. The appeal  is therefore allowed to this extent and the High Court shall re-examine its decision in this respect.                     C.A. No. 879 of 1979                    C. S. Raman Mannadiar                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      While examining  revision petition No. CRP No. 4988/76- C, certificates of purchase came up for consideration in the High Court.  In view of our decision on point No. 2, it will be necessary  for the  High Court  to re-examine the matter. The appeal  is allowed  to this  extent and  it  is  ordered accordingly.                    C.A. No. 2623 of 1977                     P. Kunhilakshmi Amma                             vs.      The Taluk Land Board, Talappily and another      Mr. Warriyar  has argued  that the appellant is a widow and that  the ancestral  lands have  wrongly been treated as her own lands. We 868 have gone through the judgment of the High Court but no such point was raised for its consideration. It cannot be allowed

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to be  raised now  and as  no other point has been argued in this Court, the appeal fails and is dismissed.                    C.A. No. 1015 of 1976              Chettiam Vettil Ammad and another                             vs.           The Taluk Land Board, Badagar and others      It has  been argued by Mr. Warriyar that a child in the womb on  January 1,  1970 is  a member  of  the  family  for purposes of  section 82(1)  (c) of  the Act and the contrary view taken by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Balakrishna Kurup  v. State  of  Kerala  and  another(1)  is incorrect and should be set aside.      Clause (c)  of sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Act provides that  in the  case of  a family  consisting of more than five members, the ceiling area of the land shall be ten standard acres  increased by  one  standard  acre  for  each member in excess of five, subject to the limit prescribed by the clause.  The expression  "family" has  been  defined  in clause (14) of section 2 as follows:-      "family’ means  husband, wife and their unmarried minor children or such of them as exist". And the  expression "minor" has been defined by clause (36A) to mean  "a person  who has not attained the age of eighteen years." So  two postulates  are necessary  for obtaining the benefit of the increase of one standard acre for each member of the  family in  excess of  five, namely,  that the member should be  in  existence,  and  it  should  be  possible  to ascertain that he had not attained the age of eighteen years on the  appointed date. Both these conditions cannot be said to exist  in the  case of  a child  en ventre sa mere and it will not therefore be regarded as a member of the family for purposes of  section 82. We are aware that a child en ventre sa mere  has been regarded in some legal systems as a person "in being" for the purpose of acquisition of property by the child itself,  particularly in  regard to gifts, but section 82 of the Act with which we are concerned does not deal with any such  contingency or  benefit to  the unborn  child. The view taken  by the  High Court  in Balakrishna Karup case is therefore correct and as it has been rightly followed in the appeal before us, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. 869                    C.A. No. 1863 of 1977                C. A. Venkatachallam Chettiar                             vs.            Taluk Land Board, Chittor and another      It has  been argued  by Mr.  Warriyar that the lands in question should  have been  treated as joint family property and if  that had  been done  there would have been no excess land for  surrender. The  claim was advanced on the basis of parol evidence  and was  rejected by  the High  Court. It is therefore a  finding of  fact and  does  not  call  for  re- examination here. The appeal fails and is dismissed.                     C. A. No. 40 of 1977      E. V.  Paul v.  The Taluk  Land Board,  Talappilly  and another.      It is  not disputed  that there is a pine-apple-canning factory on  2.15 acres, and there is a pine-apple plantation on the  adjoining area  of 11 acres. It has been argued that the whole  of 13.15 acres should have been exempted from the ceiling limit as it was a commercial site within the meaning of  section   2(5)  of  the  Act.  But,  according  to  that definition,  "commercial   site"  means   (leaving  out  the inapplicable portion)  any land  which is  used "principally for  the   purposes  of   any  trade,   commerce,  industry, manufacture or  business." A  cross reference to sub-section

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(5) of  section 101  shows that  such a  question has  to be decided after  taking into account the extent of, the amount invested in,  and the  income from,  the portion so used and the remaining portion and the other relevant matters. It has been held that the 11 acres of land did not fall within this definition and  the  finding  of  fact  that  it  is  not  a commercial site  does not  call for interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed.                    C.A. No. 2585 of 1977                        P. J. Vetrivel                             vs.                  State of Kerala and others      We have  made a  reference to this appeal in connection with the  ancillary argument of Mr. Bhandare on point No. 2. It has  been argued  further that  although 1.50  acres  was given on lease to the other appellant who held a certificate of purchase,  the High Court ignored the parole evidence and the certificate  of purchase.  We find however that the High Court did  not interfere  with the finding of the Taluk Land Board  because  there  was  no  lease  deed  and  there  was "absolutely no  material" to prove that the land was held by the tenants.  The two  "demand bills" of the Panchayat dated November 1,  1974 could  not possibly prove that a lease was in existence before September 15, 870 1963. There  is  nothing  on  the  record  to  show  that  a certificate  of   purchase  was  produced  for  the  Board’s consideration,  and   it  is   futile  to   argue  that  its evidentiary value was ignored by the Board. No such argument was advanced  for the  consideration of  the High Court. The other argument  regarding exclusion  of 1.75  acres, on  the basis of  an alleged  gift to  the appellant’s  son, was not urged for  the consideration of the High Court; and does not require consideration by us. The appeal is dismissed.                    C.A. No. 2811 of 1977              Jaya Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.                             vs.           Taluk Land Board, Nedumangad and others      Mr. Bhatt  has argued  that the High Court erred in not granting the  exemption for  the entire  area  as  a  coffee plantation; but  the finding  of fact  in  this  respect  is against the  appellant. The  conversion of the land has also been held to be illegal. On the claim that the land used for growing fuel  was exempt as it fell within the definition of "plantation" under section 2(44) (a) as it was an "ancillary purpose" also,  there is  a  finding  of  fact  against  the Company. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 227 of 1978           The Taluk Land Board Peermade and others                             vs.             Southern India Tea Estates Co. Ltd.      The controversy before us relates to exclusion of "fuel area" and  "rested area" The Company has claimed that it has planted red  gum as  fuel in 924.01 acres as it was required for the "manufacture of tea." The Taluk Board found it to be an exorbitant  claim and  reduced it  to 200  acres, but the High Court  has  restored  the  entire  claim.  The  General Manager of  the Company  has stated  that fire wood is being supplied to  the employees  free of  cost. So  the claim  to plant red  gum all  over is  belied by its General Manager’s statement. Moreover supply of fuel wood cannot be said to be a  purpose  "ancillary  to  the  cultivation  of  plantation crops."  The   Land  Board  has  disallowed  the  claim  for exemption of  136.17 acres,  but it has been allowed in full by the  High Court.  Here  again  the  High  Court  was  not

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justified in  interfering with  the Board’s  finding of fact for there was nothing to show that it was an area from which crop was not gathered at the relevant time. If that had been so, it  might have  been an  area within  the plantation. In fact it appears from the order of the Board that no 871 other  estate  had  made  any  such  claim.  The  appeal  is therefore allowed to the extent that the Board’s decision is restored in both these matters.                    C.A. No. 1309 of 1977             V. G. Kuriakose, Vadakkekara House,                             vs.               The Taluk Land Board and others      Mr. Raghavan  has argued  that the  Land Board erred in excluding only  25 cents on account of road and 55 cents for the house  site and the approach road. These are findings of fact which  have not  been shown to be vitiated by any error of law  or procedure and the High Court has given its reason for refusing  to take  additional evidence  in regard to the alleged dedication  of the road. The appeal has no merit and it is dismissed.                    C.A. No. 2070 of 1977                           Subhadra                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      The appellant  has been  called upon  to surrender 8.75 acres of land and the claim to exclude 6.29 acres on account of a  will of  1963 in favour of the grand daughter has been rejected as  the will  has not been found to be genuine. Mr. Raghavan has  not been  able to show how that finding, which is  essentially   one  of  fact,  can  be  said  to  require reconsideration when  it is  admitted that  the will has not been probated  so far.  The appeal  is without  merit and is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 143 of 1977                    P. A. Sivasubramaniam                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      Mr. Raghavan  has argued  that the High Court has erred in rejecting  the contention  that as  the appellant had two unmarried daughters who had attained majority before January 1, 1970,  they were  entitled to  6 acres each under section 82(1) of  the Act.  But the  two daughters  did not have any share in  the property under their personal law, and the Act did not give it to them. The High Court cannot be blamed for rejecting the claim, and the appeal is dismissed. 872                     C.A. No. 882 of 1978                   Dr. T. R. Chandrasekhar                             vs.               The Taluk Land Board and others      The High  Court has remanded the case in some respects, but the  grievance here  is that  although  the  appellant’s unmarried daughter  Sheela became  a major  in 1969  and was given a  share in  the partition  held on December 15, 1969, that has  not been excluded from the appellant’s holding. We find that  there was  no satisfactory  evidence to prove the partition and  separate  possession  of  the  daughter.  The finding of  fact is therefore against the appellant and does not call for reconsideration here. The appeal is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 883 of 1979                   Smt. Unneema Antherjanam                             vs.               The Taluk Land Board and others      The grievance  of the  appellant is that the Taluk Land

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Board has  revised its  earlier order  and raised the excess land for  surrender from 7.66 acres to 11.09 acres. But that is permissible under section 85(9) of the Act. The Board has justified the  correction  with  reference  to  the  reports already on  the record  and it has not been argued before us that they  were not  read correctly or that that excess land has been  incorrectly determined.  It may  be mentioned that the Collector  and  the  Tahsildars  were  authorised  under section 105A  (1) to  make the reports which were lost sight of when  the first  determination of  surplus land was made, and all  that the  Board has done is to rectify the mistake. There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 362 of 1978                            Mammad                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      It has  been argued by Mr. Harindranath that Mammad son of Mohammad  Kutty was a major on January 1, 1970 and he was wrongly taken  to be  a minor  for the  determination of the ceiling area.  But we find from the High Court’s order dated July 5,  1976 that  Mohammad Kutty  had himself mentioned in the statement  which he filed about his holding that his son Mammad was  a minor on that date. It is therefore clear that the attempt  to show  that he was a major on January 1, 1970 was an  after thought, and it has rightly been rejected. The appeal is dismissed. 873                     C.A. No. 881 of 1979                     Kodoth Krishnan Nair                             vs.          The Taluk Land Board, Kasargod and others      Mr. Harindranath has argued that the house, cattleshed, tank, well  and outhouse  should have  been exempted. But no such argument  was advanced  in the High Court and it cannot be agitated here. The other argument that the land which was on lease  with C.  Ouseph should  have been  allowed  to  be surrendered, is  also futile  in view  of the findings about the alleged lease. The appeal is dismissed.                    C.A. No. 2587 of 1977                        Thomas Kuriyan                             vs.         The Tahsildar, Taliparamba Taluk, and others      It has  been argued  that out  of the  30 acres of land which was  taken on  lease on  May 2,  1962, from  Haji, one Palakkat Varkey  was in  possession of  13  acres  which  he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration.  It has  however been found as a fact that the alleged  tenancy of Varkey had not been established, and there is  nothing wrong  if the plea to that effect has been rejected. The appeal is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 895 of 1979                  Kuttikrishnan and another                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      We  have  dealt  with  the  evidentiary  value  of  the purchase certificate while examining point No. 2 which has a bearing on  this appeal. The appeal is therefore allowed and the case  is sent  back to the High Court for fresh disposal in this respect, according to the law.                     C.A. No. 894 of 1979                       K. Kesava Pillai                             vs.               The State of Kerala and another      The only  argument which  has been  advanced before  us relates  to   the  question   whether  the   finding   about

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unculturable waste  land is  correct. That  is a  finding of fact which  has not been shown to have been vitiated for any reason. The appeal is dismissed. 874                     C.A. No. 870 of 1979                        Kurian Thomas                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      It has  been argued  by Mr.  Sudhakaran  that  although certificates of  purchase had  been obtained  by some of the tenants, they  were not taken into consideration by the Land Board and  the High Court. We find that no such argument was advanced in  the Board  or before  the High Court and, as it happens, there is nothing to show that even the existence of the certificate of purchase was brought to the notice of the Board or  the High  Court. All  that was  urged in  the High Court was  that out  of  30  acres  acquired  in  1962,  the appellant got  possession of  only 17  acres, and that there was a lease of some land in favour of Avirah Joseph in 1962. These were  questions of  fact which  the High Court rightly refused to  re-examine. There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.                C.A. Nos. 873 and 874 of 1979                            Kandu                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      The  controversy   relates  to   the  three  gift-deeds executed after  January 1,  1970. The High Court has refused to exclude  the gifted  lands, and  in view  of this Court’s decision in  Gangadharan’s case,  (supra) that  decision  is correct as  transfers made  after January 1, 1970 have to be ignored even  if they  are of the excepted variety mentioned in  section  84  of  the  Act.  The  appeals  fail  and  are dismissed.                     C.A. No. 875 of 1979                    T. Devidas and others                             vs.           Taluk Land Board, Talappilly and others      It has been argued by Mr. Rammurthy that the High Court erred in  upholding the  Taluk Land  Board’s view  that  the properties received by the deceased Nanikutty Amma under the partition deed  of 1117  belonged to  her exclusively as the property really  belonged to  the  "tavazhi"  consisting  of herself, her  daughter and  the lineal descendants. The High Court has  examined the document concerned and held that the properties were  private properties of the executants of the document. This  is a  finding of  fact and  there is nothing wrong  with  the  view  that  the  property  which  fell  to Nanikutty’s share was her own property. There is no merit in the appeal and it dismissed. 875                    C.A. No. 1019 of 1979       P. V. Thomas v. The State of Kerala and others.      The appellant  was directed  by the Taluk Land Board to surrender 18.93  acres of  land. His  grievance was that the land in  R.S. No.  1/2 was  a private  forest until  it  was converted into  rubber plantation.  The Board  held that the conversion took  place after April 1, 1964. As in a document of December 12, 1963 the land was a private forest, the High Court remanded  the case  for  further  enquiry.  The  Board reexamined  the   evidence  and   found   that   there   was satisfactory evidence  to prove  that the  land  was  not  a private forest  as on  April 1,  1964. The  High  Court  has upheld that finding after examining the document of 1963. In view of  that finding  of fact,  there is  no merit  in this

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appeal and it is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 890 of 1979   K. C. Thomas v. The Taluk Land Board, Vaikam and others      Mr. Nambiyar  has argued  that the  High Court erred in upholding the  finding of the Taluk Land Board that the land in question  was not forest but "paramba" and its conversion into "plantation"  after April  1, 1964  had to  be  ignored under section  82(4) of  the Act.  But that  is a finding of fact, which  has not  been shown  to have been vitiated, and does  not   call  for   interference  here.  The  appeal  is dismissed.                     C.A. No. 885 of 1979                  K. P. Mohammad and others                             vs.         Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna and others      The Taluk  Land Board  made its  order on  November 21, 1975 determining the extent of the land to be surrendered by the appellant. He applied to the Board much after the period of 60  days prescribed  in sub-section  (8) of section 85 to have that  order set  aside. No  real attempt  was  made  to explain the  delay and  the  High  Court  therefore  rightly upheld the  Board’s decision that the application was barred by limitation. The appeal fails and is dismissed.                    C. A. No. 886 of 1979                 P. M. Kunhammed and another                             vs.             Taluk Land Board, Qulandy and others      The Taluk  Land Board’s  earlier order was set aside by the High  Court to  the extent  mentioned in its order dated November 16,  1976 and  the Board was directed to dispose of the matter afresh. The Board allowed relief to the extent of 53.59 acres by exempting it as rubber 876 plantation. But  it disallowed the claim that 3.41 acres was arecanut garden in a part of the rubber plantation as it was interspersed with  in the  boundary of  the  rubber  estate, because it  was found  from the  report  of  the  authorised officer that  this was  not so.  The High  Court  has  given satisfactory reasons  for that view and there is no occasion for us  to interfere with that finding. The appeal fails and is dismissed.                    C. A. No. 903 of 1979                        T. V. Krishnan                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      The main  controversy was  that relating to the date of birth of the daughter of the appellant. The Taluk Land Board has held  that she  was minor  on January  1, 1970 and was a member of  the appellant’s  family. That  finding  has  been based on  the entries  in the  school certificate,  and as a certified copy  of the  birth register  was not produced, it cannot be  said that  the High  Court erred  in refusing  to disturb the Board’s finding. The appeal is dismissed.                  C.A. Nos. 574-575 of 1978                      Ravi Karuna Karan                             vs.           The Taluk Land Board, Quilon and others      Special  leave   in  these  appeals  has  been  granted "limited to  the question  of  urban  lands  measuring  7.19 acres." The  Board gave  its finding  in this  matter  after making the necessary enquiries and "visiting" the lands. The High Court has stated in its order dated October 11, 1976 on the review  petition that the question of "non-applicability of the  Act to non-agricultural lands" was not urged for its consideration. As  it is  essentially a question of fact, it

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does not  require consideration  in this  Court. The appeals fail and are dismissed.                    C. A. No. 2584 of 1977               Smt. Varghese Marium and another                             vs.               The Taluk Land Board and others      The evidentiary  value of the purchase certificate came up for consideration in this case in the High Court. In view of our  decision on  point No.  2, the appeal is allowed and the case  is sent  back to the High Court for fresh disposal in this respect according to law. 877                    C. A. No. 2586 of 1977                       P. M. Kuruvilla                             vs.                The State of Kerala and others      In view  of our  decision on point No. 2, the appeal is allowed and  the case  is sent  back to  the High  Court for fresh disposal  according to  the  law  in  so  far  as  the question of  exclusion of 23.57 acres of land in Trikhadambe village is concerned.      In the  result  C.  A.  Nos.  869/79,  876/79,  877/79, 878/79, 879/79,  224/78, 895/79,  2564/77  and  2586/77  are allowed to the extent mentioned above. All the other appeals fail and are dismissed. The parties are left to pay and bear their own costs. N. K. A. 878