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PETITIONER: CHEMICALS & FIBRES OF INDIA LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.   G. BHOIR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1975

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BHAGWATI, P.N. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1660            1975 SCR  415  1975 SCC  (4) 332  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC2025  (6)

ACT: Industrial   Disputes   Act,  1947,  Sections  2A   and   23 (b)--"During   the   pendency   of   proceedings",   meaning of--Reference  pending  before Labour Court  in  respect  of matter  falling  under S. 2A--Strike by  other  Workmen,  if barred.

HEADNOTE: On  14th August, 1972 the Government of Maharashtra  made  a reference  to  the  Labour Court under s.  10(1)(c)  of  the Industrial Disputes Act of an industrial dispute in  respect of the dismissal by the appellant of one of its employees N. S.  Bobhate.   On 25th August 1972 the  appellant  dismissed three  other  workers,  Dastoor, Shome and  Soman  after  an enquiry and this led to a strike in the appellant’s factory. Towards the end of October 1972 the Company discharged about 312  of its employees and filed 12 applications  before  the industrial  Tribunal  for approval of such  discharge  as  a reference  was  pending before it.   The  appellant  pleaded before  the  Tribunal  that  the strike  was  illegal  as  a reference  was pending in respect of Bobhate  and  therefore the  discharge of its workers by the appellant was in  order and  approval  should be granted.  On August  30,  1973  the Tribunal  rejected  all the applications  for  approval  and these  appeals  have been filed in pursuance  of  a  Special Leave granted by this Court It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the  whole of the machinery under the Act is available in the case of a -reference  relating  to  an  individual  workman  and  once something which is not an industrial dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute all the necessary implications of such a deeming provision should be given effect to.  On the other hand,  contention on behalf of the workmen was that, if  the intention was to make the whole of the machinery of the  Act available  even  in the case of pendency of the case  of  an individual  workman before a Labour Court or  Tribunal  what would  have been done is to add the words "and includes  any dispute  or  difference between a workman and  his  employer connected  with or arising out of the discharge,  dismissal,

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retrenchment or termination of the services of that  workman notwithstanding  that  no  other workman nor  any  union  of workmen is a party to the dispute" to clause (k) of sec.  2. IL  was  further contended that the  dispute  Or  difference between  the  individual workman and hi%  employer  is  only deemed  to  be an industrial dispute and that it is  not  in fact  an  industrial  dispute.  In the  case  of  a  deeming provision  no greater effect should be given to it  than  is necessary for the purpose for which it is enacted. Dismissing the appeals, HELD  : (i) The important words in S. 23(b) of the  Act  are "during  the  pendency  of  proceedings."  Even  though  the dispute between the employer and the employees might  relate to  a  case of a single workman the provisions of  s.  23(b) would apply if the single workman’s cause has been  espoused by a labour union which need not necessarily comprise of all the employees of the concerned employer. [418 A-B] (ii) Even  though the proceedings pending before the  Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal might relate to certain matters  only, there cannot be a strike or lock-out even  in relation  to  matters  other than those  which  are  pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. [418 B-C] 416 Provat kumar v. W. T. C. Parker, AIR 1950 Cal. 116 and State of Bihar v. Deodar Jha, AIR 1958 Patna 51, approved. (iii)     In enacting S. 2A the intention of the legislature was that an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose service,,, were otherwise  terminated should  be given relief without it being necessary  for  the relationship  between  the employer and the  whole  body  of employees  being attracted to that dispute and  the  dispute becoming  a generalised one between labour on the  one  hand and the employer on the other. [418H, 419A] (iv) The  provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act  clearly bring  out the elaborate nature of the proceedings  relating to conciliation, arbitration, settlement, inquiry and  ward. The  intention  behind  all these  provisions  is  to  avoid strikes  and  lock-outs  as  far as  possible  not  only  by bringing  the parties together but also by referring  points of dispute between them, either voluntarily or otherwise for decision by Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals. Strikes  are not banned even in the case of  public  utility services.   The  ban  on  strikes  is  subject  to   certain limitations.   There  is no doubt that  the  Act  recognises strikes  as a legitimate weapon in the matter of  industrial relations.   The prohibition of strikes during the  pendency of  proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or  National Tribunal  under  sec.  23  was, in  the  Act  as  originally enacted, confined only to disputes between the employer  and the general body of employees and not to individual workmen. It is in that context that section 23 should be interpreted. ID  the case of an industrial dispute between in  individual workman  and the employer the whole elaborate  machinery  of the  Industrial  Disputes Act may not be necessary  lest  it Would  be like using sledge hammer to kill a  flea’.   While there  is  justification  for preventing  a  strike  when  a dispute between the employer and the general body of workmen is pending adjudication or resolution, it would be too  Much to hold that the legislature intended that it lid should  be put on all Strikes just because the case of a single workman was  pending.   That the general body of  labour  should  be prevented from resorting to strike where they had chosen  to espouse  the  cause of a single workman  understandable  and reasonable.  Even if the employer and workmen are parties to

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a reference the decision therein binds them even though they may  have  said  they were not interested  in  it.   But  if strikes  are to be prohibited merely because the case of  an individual  workman  was pending, whose case  had  not  been espoused by the general body of the workmen, there can never be any even for justiciable grounds [421 E-422A] Bellapur  Collieries v. Presiding Office)-, [1972] 3  S.C.R. 805  relied  on Commissioner of Income tax  v.  Teja  Singh, [1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 394 and East End Dewillings Co. Ltd. v.  Finsbury  Borough  Council, [1952] AC  109  at  p.  132, referred to. (v)  It  is  not  correct to say that clause (b)  of  S.  23 provides  a  blanket  can  on  strikes  if  proceedings  are pending.   Even  in respect of clause  (b)  come  limitation should  be,  read  confining  it  to  the  parties  to   the proceedings either actually or constructively as in the case of  a  Union espousing the cause of an  individual  workman. [422-H]. Workmen  of  Dimakuchi  Tea  Estate  v.  The  Management  of Dimakuchi  Tea  Estate, [1958] S.C.R. 1156, and  The  Bombay Union of Journalists v. The ’Hindu’ Bombay, [1962] 3  S.C.R. 893, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  16331644 of 1973 Appeals  by  special  leave from the order  dated  the  30th August,  1973  of the Industrial  Tribunal,  Maharashtra  in Application No. (IT) 316 of 1972. Y.   S.  Chitale,  A.  K.  Seti, P. D.  Damania  and  B.  R. Agarwala, ’or the appellant. 417 V.   S.  Desai,  S.  T. Desai, Naunit Lai, D.  H.  Buch  and Lalita  Kohli,  for  the respondents (In  appeal  No.  1634, respondent no. 1 in appeals Nos. 1633, 1635-38 & 1640-43 and respondent  no.  1 and 2 in Appeal No. 1639 and  respondents no. 1-3 in Civil Appeal No. 1644. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The question that arises in the appeals  is the  implication  of section 2A of the  Industrial  Disputes Act.   On  14th August, 1972 the Government  of  Maharashtra made a reference to the Labour Court under section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act in  respect of the  dismissal by  the  appellant of one of its employees S.  Bobhate.   On 25th  August,  1972  the appellants  dismissed  three  other workers, Dastoor, Shome and Soman after an enquiry and  this led to a strike in the appellant’s factory.  Towards the end of  October  1972 the Company discharged about  312  of  its employees  and filed 12 applications before  the  Industrial Tribunal  for approval such discharge on the ground  that  a reference  was  pending  before it.  The  appellant  pleaded before the Tribunal that the strike was illegals a reference was  pending  in  respect  of  Bobhate  and  therefore   the discharge  of its workers by the appellant was in order  and approval should be granted.  On August 30, 1973 the Tribunal rejected all the applications for approval and these appeals have  been file, in pursuance of a Special Leave granted  by this Court. Though reference was made to the repeated calls on behalf of the  employer  to  the strikers to return to  work  and  the refusal of the workmen to return to work, the sole point for determination is whether when a reference is pending  before the  Labour  Court  in respect of  a  matter  falling  under

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section 2A any strike by the other workers would be illegal. That  is  the only ground on which Special  leave  has  been granted.   Under section 24 of the Industrial Disputes  Act, in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of this case, a strike  shall be illegal if it is commenced or  declared  in contravention  of  section  22 or section 23.   We  are  not concerned  with section 22 in this case though at one  stage that  seems to have been one of the grounds  for  contending that  the strike was illegal.  Section 23. insofar as it  is relevant for the purposes of this case, reads as follows:               "23.   No  workman  who  is  employed  in  any               industrial establishment shall go on strike in               breach of contract and no employer of any such               workman shall declare a lock-out.               (a)................................................. ..               (b)   during   the  pendency  of   proceedings               before  a Labour Court, Tribunal  or  National               Tribunal  and two months after the  conclusion               of such proceedings;               (bb)               (c)   during any period in which a  settlement               or award is in operation, in respect of any of               the  matters  covered  by  the  settlement  or               award.               418 The important words are "during the pendency of  Undoubtedly a  proceeding was pending before the Labour Court  and  that was  in respect of the dismissal of Bobhate.  Did this  make the strike by the workmen of the appellant illegal though at least.  in  its  origin the strike had nothing  to  do  with Bobhate’s  case ? It was common ground that even though  the dispute between the employer and the employees might  relate to  a  case of a single workman the  provisions  of  section 23(b)  would  apply if the single workman’s cause  has  been espoused  by  a  labour union  which  need  not  necessarily comprise  of  all the employees of the  concerned  employer. ’The  decisions  of  some High Courts  establish  that  even though  the  proceedings pending before  the  Labour  Court, Tribunal,  or  National  Tribunal might  relate  to  certain matters  only, there cannot be a strike or lock-out even  in relation  to  matters  other than those  which  are  pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal (,See Provat Kumar v. W.T.C. Parkar, AIR 1950 Cal. 116, and  State of Bihar v. Deodar Jha, AIR 1958 Patna 51).  We express  our agreement  with  this view.  But the question is:  does  the fact  that a proceeding is pending before a Labour Court  in respect of an individual workman bar the- other workers from resorting  to a strike" 2A of the Industrial  Disputes  Act, which came into effect on 1-12-1965 965 reads as follows:               "2A.     Where   any   employer    discharges,               dismisses, retrenches or otherwise  terminates               the  services  of an individual  workman,  any               dispute or difference between that workman and               his  employer connected with, or  arising  out               of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or               termination   shall   be  deemed  to   be   an               industrial  dispute notwithstanding,  that  no               other  workman nor any union of workmen  is  a               party to the dispute."               An  industrial dispute is defined  in  section               2(k) as follows:               "(K) ’industrial dispute’ means any dispute or               difference between employers and employers, or               between  employers  and  workmen,  or  between

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             workmen  and workman, which is connected  with               the employment or non-employment or the  terms               of  employment or with the conditions of   any               person." It is in interpreting this clause that it has been held that even where the dispute relates to a single workman it is  an industrial dispute  if  that  dispute  is  espoused  by  the general body of the employees.     Before  the  introduction of section 2A an individual work-man who     was discharged, dismissed  or  retrenched or whose services  were  otherwise terminated  and  whose case was not espoused by  any  labour union  or by a substantial number of workmen had no  remedy. It  was  to deal with that contingency that section  2A  was enacted.  We would therefore be justified in concluding that in enacting section 2A the intention of the legislature  was that an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed  or retrenched  or  whose  services  were  otherwise  terminated should  be given relief without it being necessary  for  the relationship between the employer and the whole 419 body  of employees being attracted to that dispute  and  the dispute becoming a generalised one between labour on the one hand  and the employer on the other.  If this point of  view is kept clear in mind the solution of the problem before  us becomes simple. In  the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Bill  which resulted in the enactment of section 2A it is stated :               "In   construing  the  scope   of   industrial               dispute,  Courts  have taken the view  that  a               dispute between an employer and an  individual               workman  cannot per se be an  industrial  dis-               pute, but it may become one if it is taken  up               by  a  union or a number of workmen  making  a               common  cause  with the  aggrieved  individual               workman.  In view of this, cases of individual               dismissals  and discharges cannot be taken  up               for conciliation,or arbitration or referred to               adjudication  under  the  Industrial  Disputes               Act, unless they are sponsored by a union or a               number of workmen.  It is now proposed to make               the  much cry under the Act available in  such               cases." This  is  relied upon by the employer to  contend  that  the whole of the machinery under the Industrial-Disputes Act  is available  even  in the case of a reference relating  to  an individual workman.  On the other hand it is urged on behalf of  the workmen that if the intention was to make the  whole of  the machinery of the Industrial Disputes  Act  available even  in the case of pendency of the case of  an  individual workman before a Labour Court ’or a Tribunal what would have been  done is to add the words "and includes any dispute  or difference between a workman and his employer connected with or arising out of the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment  or termination of the services of that workman  notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the  dispute"  to  clause (k) of section 2.  It  is  further contended  that  the  dispute  or  difference  between   the individual workman and his employer is only deemed to be  an industrial dispute and that it is not in fact an  industrial dispute.   It  is contended on behalf of the  employer  that once something which is not an industrial dispute is  deemed to be an industrial dispute all the necessary implications’. of  such a deeming provision should be given effect  to  and the mind should not be allowed to boggle in working out such implications  (See East end Dwellings Co. Ltd.  v.  Finsbury

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Borough  Council, 1952 AC 109 at p.132 and  Commissioner  of Income-tax  v. Teja Singh, 1959 Supp. (1) SCR 394).  On  the other hand it is urged on behalf of the workmen that in  the case  of  a deeming provision no greater  effect  should  be given  to it than is necessary for the purpose for which  it is  enacted.  Both these contentions are amply supported  by authority and the duty of this Court is to see what  exactly are  the necessary implications of +,he  deeming  provision. We should say, however, that it does not make any difference to  the  decision  of  this  question  whether  the  deeming provision is in the form of a separate section like  section 2A  as in the present case or is part of the  definition  of the  industrial dispute itself as is suggested it should  be on behalf of the workmen. 420 We  should first ’of all have a broad idea of the scheme  of the  Act.  The Act as framed originally was not  enacted  to deal  with the case of individual dispute.  It was  intended to  deal with the problems arising between the employers  on the  one hand and the general body of workmen on  the  other though not necessarily the majority of the workmen.  Section 3  of  the  Act  provides  for  the  constitution  of  Works Committee  to promote measures for securing  and  preserving amity  and good relations between the employer and  workmen. Section 4 provides for appointment of conciliation  officers charged  with  the duty of mediating in  and  promoting  the settlement   of  industrial  disputes  (the  definition   of ’industrial  dispute’  in section 2(k) may be here  kept  in mind).  Section 5 provides for the constitution of Boards of Conciliation  for  promoting the settlement  of’  industrial disputes.  Section 6 provides for constitution of Courts  of Inquiry  for  inquiring  into any  matter  appearing  to  be connected  with  or  relevant  to  an  industrial   dispute. Section 7 provides for constitution of Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes.    Section 7A  provides for constitution of Industrial Tribunals for the  adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified    in the  Second  and  Third Schedules to the  Act.   Section  7B provides  for constitution of National Industrial  Tribunals for  the  adjudication  of  industrial  disputes   involving questions  of  national importance or  in  which  industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be  interested in or affected by.  Section 10  provides  for reference  of industrial disputes whether they exist or  are apprehended  to  Boards  of  Conciliation  for  promoting  a settlement,  or  to  a  Labour Court  or  to  an  Industrial Tribunal  for adjudication or even to ’a National  Tribunal. It  also  provides  for parties  to  an  industrial  dispute applying  whether jointly or separately for a  reference  of the  dispute  to  a Conciliation Board,  Court  of  Inquiry, Labour  Court,  Tribunal  or  National  Tribunal.   Where  a dispute  has been so referred the appropriate Government  is enabled  to prohibit the continuance of any strike  or  lock out.   Section  10A  provides  for  employers  and   workmen agreeing  to ’refer their disputes to arbitration  before  a dispute  has  been  referred under section 10  to  a  Labour Court,  Tribunal or National Tribunal.  Section 12  provides for  the  duties  of  Conciliation  Officers.   Section   13 provides  for the duties of Boards of Conciliation,  section 14 for the duties of the Court of Inquiry and section 15 for the   duties  of  Labour  Courts,  Tribunals  and   National Tribunals.  Section 12 (1) says that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen  otherwise than  in  the  course of conciliation  proceeding  shall  be binding on the parties to the agreement.  Section 18(3) says

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that  a settlement arrived at in the course of  conciliation proceedings shall be binding on:               (a)   all parties to the industrial dispute;               (b)   all other parties summoned to appear  in               the  proceedings  as parties to  the  dispute,               unless  the Board, arbitrator,  Labour  Court,               Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case  may               be,  records  the opinion that  they  were  so               summoned without proper cause;               421               (c)   where a party referred to In clause  (a)               or  clause  (b)  is an  employer,  his  heirs,               successors  or  assigns  in  respect  of   the               establishment to which the dispute relates.               (d)   Where a party referred to in clause  (a)               or clause               (b)   is composed of workmen, all persons  who               were employed in the establishment or part  of               the  establishment,  as the case  may  be,  to               which  the dispute relates on the date of  the               dispute  and  all  persons  who   subsequently               become  employed  in  that  establishment   or               part." Section  22 provides that there shall be Do strike or  lock- out  in a public utility service.  Section 23 bars a  strike or lock-out during the pendency of conciliation  proceedings before  a  Board, pendency ,of proceedings before  a  Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and during the pendency of  arbitration  proceedings before an  arbitrator  as  also during  any  period  in which a settlement or  award  is  in operation.   Section 24 provides that a strike  or  lock-out shall  be  illegal if it is commenced  in  contravention  of section 22 or 23 or in contravention of an order made  under subsection (3) of section 10 or sub-section (4A) of  section 10A. These  provisions  bring out tile elaborate  nature  of  the proceedings    relating   to   conciliation,    arbitration, settlement,  inquiry  and award.  The intention  behind  all these provisions is to avoid strikes and lock-outs as far as possible not only by bringing the parties together but  also by  referring points of dispute between them, either  volun- tarily   or  otherwise,  for  decision  by  Labour   Courts, Tribunals  and National Tribunals.  Strikes are  not  banned even  in  the case of public utility services.  The  ban  on strikes  is  subject to certain limitations.   There  is  no doubt that the Act recognises strikes as a legitimate weapon in the matter of industrial relations.  We need not  concern ourselves  about aberration like gheraos, or  go-slow.   The prohibition  of strikes during the pendency  of  proceedings before  a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal  under section  23 was, in the Act as originally enacted,  confined only  to disputes between the employer and the general  body of  employees and not to individual workmen.  It is in  that context that section 23 should be interpreted.  In the  case of  an industrial dispute between an individual workman  and the employer the whole elaborate machinery earlier set forth of the Industrial Disputes Act may not be necessary lest  it would  be like using a sledge-hammer to kill a flea.   While there  is  justification  for preventing  a  strike  when  a dispute  between  the  ,employer and  the  general  body  of workmen  is pending adjudication or resolution, it would  be too much to expect that the legislature intended that a  lid should  be  put on all strikes just because the  case  of  a single workman was pending.  That the general body of labour should be prevented from resorting to strike where they  had

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,chosen  to  espouse  the  cause  of  a  single  workman  is understandable and reasonable.  ’it has even been held  that if  the employer and workmen are parties to a reference  the decision therein binds them 422 even  though they may have said they were not interested  in it (Baillarpur Collieries v. Presiding Officer, 1972 (3) SCR 805).   But if strikes are to be prohibited  merely  because the  case of an individual workman was pending,  whose  case had  not been espoused by the general body of  the  workmen, there can never be any strike even for justifiable  grounds. A strike is a necessary safety valve in industrial relations when  properly resorted to.  To accede to the contention  of the  employer in this case would be in effect acceding to  a contention  that there should never be a strike.   While  we realise  the  importance of the  maintenance  of  industrial peace,  it  cannot  be  secured by  putting  a  lid  on  the legitimate grievances of the general body of labour  because the dispute relating to an individual workman under s.2A  is pending.   That might mean that the boiling  cauldron  might burst.   In that case the general body of workmen  would  be legitimately aggrieved that they are prevented from striking because  an  individual’s case was pending-with  which  they were  not concerned.  It is not enough in this situation  to say  that  it  is always open to the Government  to  make  a reference  under  section  10.  It may or  may  not  happen. Furthermore,  the  matters that could be pending  before   a Labour Court under section 23 under the Second Schedule are:               1.    The  propriety or legality of  an  order               passed by an               employer under the standing orders;               2.    The  application and  interpretation  of               standing orders;               3.    Discharge   or  dismissal   of   workmen               including reinstatement of, or grant of relief               to, workmen-wrongfully dismissed;               4.    Withdrawal  of any customary  concession               or privilege;               5.    Illegality  or otherwise of a strike  or               lockout; and               6.    All  matters other than those  specified               in the Third               Schedule. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an  employer under  the  standing orders very often might  refer  to  all individual  workman and that should not be made  the  reason for  preventing  labour from giving vent to  its  legitimate grievances in a legitimate way. Our  attention is drawn to the contrast between  clause  (c) and  (d)  of section 23 and it is argued  that  while  under clause  (c) there is a limitation in respect of  matters  in relation to which there cannot be a strike, there is no such limitation  under  clause  (b)  and  therefore  clause   (b) provides  a  blanket  ban  on  strikes  if  proceedings  are pending.   It  is  not possible to  give  such  an  extended meaning to  that provision.  As we have pointed out, even in respect  of  clause  (b)  some  limitation  should  be  read confining  it  to  the parties  to  the  proceedings  either actually  or  constructively,  as in the  case  of  a  union espousing  the cause of an individual workman.  Nobody,  for instance, can argue that because proceedings are pending  in relation  to  one  industrial  establishment  owned  by   an employer,  there  can  be no strike  in  another  industrial establishment owned by that 423

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employer because there are no words of limitation In  clause (b).  See Workman of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. The  Management of  Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCR 1156, where it  was  held that the ’any person’ cannot be given its ordinary  meaning. See  also  The Union of Journalists v. The  ’Hindu’  Bombay, 1962 (3) SCR 893. We;  are therefore of opinion that the proper point of  view from  which  to  look  at the problem  is  to  give  limited application to the fact of the introduction of section 2A in the  Industrial Disputes Act and to hold that  the  pendency of. a dispute between an individual workman as such and  the employer does not attract the provisions of section 23. The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs. V. M. K.                        Appeals dismissed. 10 SC/75-28 424