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PETITIONER: CHEERANTHOODIKA AHMMEDKUTTY AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PARAMBUR MARIAKUTTY UMMA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/02/2000

BENCH: K.T. Thomas & D.P. Mohapatra

JUDGMENT:

Appeal (civil)  3067     of

Thomas J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   Though  the  appellants  in these two  appeals  are  two different  persons  it would be advantageous to  dispose  of these  two appeals together by a common judgment, on account of a common factor involving in both cases.

   When Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 came into force there was  prohibition  in holding land in excess of  the  ceiling limit  fixed  thereunder.   Taluk Land Board is one  of  the authorities  under  the Act to fix the area of the  land  in possession  of  landholders.   One Moosakutty  Haji  made  a declaration  of  the various lands in his possession.   (His widow  is arrayed as respondent No.1 in these appeals  since Moosakutty  Haji had died).  The Taluk Land Board found that the  said  Haji had 877.500 acres of land and on it  premise determined  that  the excess land in his possession  (beyond the  ceiling  limit) was 788.72 acres.  Moosakutty Haji  was directed to surrender the said excess land.

   While so, the appellants in Civil Appeal No.3067 of 1997 (the  office bearers of Vallambram Juma Masjid) put-forth  a claim  that  an  area of 6.82.500 acres of  land  in  Survey No.629 of Wandoor Amsan was erroneously recorded as the land in  the possession of t he said Moosakutty Haji.   According to the appellants, the said land was leased by the landowner to other persons long before the commencement of the Act and in  1984 the Land Tribunal, Wandoor had granted  Certificate of  Purchase  as per Section 72-K of t e Act to the  tenants thereof.   The  tenants  have gifted the said  land  to  the aforementioned  Juma  Masjid  as  per  registered  documents executed in 1986.  Appellants, therefore, contended that the said area should be de-linked from the account of Moosakutty Haji.

   A similar claim was made by the appellants in CA No.8475 of 1997 on the following facts:

   An  area of 1.5 acres in Survey No.357/1 was outstanding on  lease  with  two persons (Krishnan  and  Achuthan)  long before  the  commencement  of  the  Act  and  those  persons assigned their rights in favour of the appellants.  The Land Tribunal  issued  a  Certificate  of Purchase  in  suo  motu proceedings  No.88/97.  Thus the aforesaid 1.5 acres of land

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could  not  have been included in the account of  Moosakutty Haji, according to the appellant.

   It  seems  the  Taluk Board ignored the  Certificate  of Purchase  and  counted  the aforesaid area of  land  in  the account  of  Moosakutty Haji and then determined the  excess land  surrenderable  by  him.  The High  Court  in  revision petition  filed by the appellants u nder Section 105 of  the Act  did  not  interfere with the aforesaid finding  of  the Taluk  Land  Board.  Learned single judge of the High  Court any tenancy prior to 1.4.1964 the Taluk Land Board was right in  not acting on the Certificate of Purchase issued by  the Land  Tribunal.   Under  the circumstances it could  not  be treated  as  conclusive.  Even otherwise has observed  thus: "In  the absence of any material to show it was not accurate on its face."

   Similar  observations  were  made about  the  claim  put forward  by  the  appellant  in   the  other  appeals  also. Ultimately  the  appellants did not succeed in their  claims and  hence they have challenged the order of the High  Court in these appeals filed by special leave.

   Shri  T.L.Vishwanatha  Iyer, learned senior counsel  for the  appellant  contended that learned single judge  of  the High Court has not taken into account the legal implications of  Section 72-K of the Act which rendered a Certificate  of Purchase  as  "conclusive  proof of the  assignment  to  the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the  intermediaries, if any, over the holding or the portion thereon to which the assignment relates."

   When  the enactment enjoined that any evidence would  be treated  as conclusive proof of certain factual position  or legal  hypothesis the law would forbid other evidence to  be adduced  for  the  purpose of contradicting or  varying  the aforesaid conclusiveness.  This is the principle embodied in Section  4 of the Evidence Act, when it defined  "conclusive proof."

   "Conclusive  proof.  - When one fact is declared by this Act  to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall,  on proof  of  that  one fact, regard the other as  proved,  and shall  not  allow  evidence to be given for the  purpose  of disproving it,"

   Of  course, the interdict that the court shall not allow evidence  to  be adduced for the purpose of  disproving  the conclusiveness,  will not prevent a party who alleges  fraud or collusion from establishing that the document is vitiated by  such factors.  Exc ept regarding the said limited sphere the  conclusiveness of the document would remain beyond  the reach of controvertibility.

   In  this  context  a reference can be made  to  Chettiam Veettil  Ammad and another Vs.  Taluk Land Board and  others (AIR 1979 SC 1573) where a two Judge Bench of this Court has observed that "if a certificate of purchase is issued by the Land  Tribunal  to  any s uch person and he  tenders  it  in proceedings  before  the  Taluk  Land Board,  the  Board  is required  by law to treat it as conclusive proof of the fact that  the  right, title and interest of the  landowner  (and intermediary) over the land mentioned in it has bee assigned to  him.  It is however not the requirement of the law  that the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the

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surplus  or other land held by its holder so as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board."

   Learned  Judges then stated that by using the expression "conclusive  proof" it only means that no contrary  evidence shall   be  effective  to   displace  it,  unless  so-called conclusive  proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown.   After referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England (para 28,  Vol.  17 of 4th edn.) it was further observed that  "it will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the  evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on  the  ground  that  it has not been  issued  n  a  proper appreciation  or consideration of the evidence on record  or that  the  Tribunal’s findings suffers from  any  procedural error."

       In  the present case no party has averred  that  the Certificates  of  Purchase  were collusively  obtained.   In fact,  even the authorised officer who was to make a  report under  Section 105-A of the Act mentioned in the report that the  said areas were covered by pertinent to point out  that the  authorised  officer  did  not  even  suggest  that  the certificates were procured collusively.  Even the Taluk Land Board  did not hold that the certificates of purchase were t certificates of purchase referred to above.  It is e product of  any fraud or collusion.  It was unnecessary for the High Court  to have remarked that the certificates were  procured collusively as nobody had alleged them to be so.

   The Taluk Land Board appears to have sidelined those two legally  formidable  conclusive proof while considering  the claims put forward by the appellants.  In the absence of any material  to  doubt the correctness of the  Certificates  of Purchase  learned sing le judge should have given due weight to  those  documents as law enjoins.  At any rate the  party who  relied on the certificates had no burden to prove  that the certificates were issued after due deliberations or that there  was  no collusion or fraud in iss ing the same.   The Taluk  Land  Board and the High Court had put the burden  on the  appellants to substantiate the validity and correctness of  the  certificates.  The said approach is fallacious  and hence unsupportable.

   In  the  result, we allow these appeals and  uphold  the claim  of  the appellants in regard to lands for  which  the claims were made.