http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: CHATURBHAI M. PATEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/1959

BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. IMAM, SYED JAFFER DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  424            1960 SCR  (2) 362  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 922  (13)  RF         1967 SC1512  (63)

ACT: Legislative  Competence-Validity of enactment-Competence  of Central Legislature-Levy of excise duty on tobacco-Pith  and substance of legislation-Central Excises and Salt Act,  1944 (1  of 1944), ss. 6, 8, Rules-Government of India Act,  1935 (26 Geo.  V. Ch. 2), s. 100, Sch. 7, List 1, Entry 45,  List 11, Entries 27, 29.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner who was doing business in tobacco was charged with  the  contravention  of Rules 151(C)  and  226  of  the Central Excise Rules, 1944, framed under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.  The Collector finding the charges to be proved  ordered  confiscation  of the  goods  found  in  the petitioner’s  warehouse and levied duty thereon in  lieu  of confiscation  and also imposed a penalty of RS. 2,000.   The petitioner  challenged  the validity of the  orders  on  the grounds,  inter  alia, that ss. 6 and 8 of the Act  and  the Rules made thereunder were beyond the legislative competence of  the Central legislature in view of the fact that  though the  provisions  of the Act which provided for the  levy  of excise duties might fall within item 45 of List 1 read  with S.  100  of the Government of India Act, 1935,  the  Act  in question  would also be covered by items 27 and 29, of  List 11,  as  the  possession  and trade  in  tobacco  were  also regulated, and would, to that extent, be ultra vires.                      363 Held, that the various provisions of the Central Excises and Salt   Act,  1944,  and  the  Rules  made  thereunder   were essentially  connected  with the levying and  collection  of excise  duty  and in its true nature and character  the  Act remained one under item 45 of List 1 and that the incidental trenching  upon  the provincial field of items 27 or  29  of List 11 would not affect its constitutionality. It  is within the competence of the Central  legislature  to provide  for  matters which may otherwise  fall  within  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

Competence  of  the  Provincial  Legislature  if  they   are necessarily  incidental  to  effective  legislation  by  the Central  legislature on a subject of  legislation  expressly within its power. State  of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 544,  and Cooverjee  Bharucha  v. The Excise  Commissioner  of  Ajmer, [1954] S.C.R. 873, followed. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for  British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111 and Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Quebec, [1947] A.C. 33, relied on.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 9 of 1957. Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for enforcement of fundamental rights. B.   D. Sharma, for the petitioner. C.   K.  Daphtary, Solicitar-General of India R.  H.  Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents. 1959.   December 2. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by KAPUR J.-The petitioner was a wholesale and retail dealer in tobacco at Banaras and also owned a private bonded warehouse for  tobacco  and  held  licences for  the  same.   In  this petition he challenges the legality of certain orders passed by the Collector of Excise, Allahabad, which on appeal  were confirmed and revisions against those orders were  dismissed by  the Central Government.  The petitioner’s warehouse  was checked  by Inspector Das who on finding  some  irregularity sealed  the warehouse on December 8, 1953, and  subsequently took  possession of all the registers and stock  cards.   On December22,1953,  11  1/2  bags of kandi  i.e.  "  stems  of tobacco  ". which were found in the petitioner’s  warehouse, were removed from the warehouse by the Inspector and  stored in some other 364 place.   Against  those orders the petitioner  made  certain representations  to  the Collector and  some  correspondence passed.   On June 15, 1954, the Collector,  Central  Excise, issued  a  notice  to the petitioner to  show  cause  why  a penalty  should not be imposed on him for the  contravention of  Rules 151(C)and 226 of the Central Excise  Rules,  1944, and  why the bags of kandi should not be confiscatted.   The petitioner showed cause, the Collector heard the  petitioner who  had also filed written arguments.  Finding the  charges against   the  petitioner  proved,  the  Collector   ordered confiscation of the bags of kandi, imposed a fine of Rs. 150 and  the duty leviable thereon in lieu of confiscation.   He further imposed a penalty of Rs. 2,000 under rr. 151(C)  and 226  of the Central Excise Rules.  The appeal taken  to  the Central  Board  of Revenue was dismissed as  the  petitioner refused  to deposit the penalty of Rs. 2,000 and a  revision to  the Central Board of Revenue was also dismissed for  the same reason.  This is one of the orders which is  challenged by the petitioner. On  July 29, 1954, the Collector called upon the  petitioner to  produce another surety as the previous  surety  Mohammad Satar  was  not  prepared to act as  such.   The  petitioner states that he thereupon furnished two bonds in Form B-4 and B-5 for Rs. 7,000 and Rs. 10,000 respectively.  As there was a  sum of Rs. 15, 263-8-0 due from him (the  petitioner)  as Excise duty, 373 Mds. of tobaco were attached by the  Excise Department  and  sold  by auction  for  Rs.  6,878-5-0  thus leaving a balance of Rs. 8,385-3-0.  As the Department  made

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

demands  for  the  recovery  of this  balance  of  duty  the petitioner  filed  a civil suit in the court  of  the  First Additional  Civil Judge, Banaras, who issued  an  ad-interim injunction against the Department restraining it to  recover the  amount.   On January 25, 1956,  the  Superintendent  of Excise called upon the petitioner to deposit a cash security of  Rs.  10,000 otherwise his licence would  be  treated  as cancelled under r. 181(1) of the Central Excise Rules.   The petitioner demurred to this and as the outstanding amount of excise duty was not paid the Deputy                             365 Collector  ordered  on  February 13,  1956,  that  till  the deposit  was  made  the petitioner’s  licence  shall  remain inoperative.   The  petitioner took an appeal  against  this order to the Central Board of Revenue which was  dissmissed. The petitioner also filed a petition under  Art. 226  in the Punjab  High Court which was also dismissed and  a  revision against the order of the Deputy Collector making the licence inoperative was dismissed by the Central Board of Revenue on December  20,  1956.   This is the  second  order  which  is challenged. The present petition was filed on January 21, 1957, in which the petitioner prayed (1) that the provisions of ss. 6, 8, 9 and  10 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Act 1  of 1944 (which for the sake of convenience will hereinafter  be termed the Act) and the rr. 140 to 148, 150, 171 to 181, 215 and  226 of the Central Excise Rules made under the  Act  be declared  ultra vires and to issue a writ of  certiorari  or any  other writ to quash the orders passed by the  Collector as confirmed on appeal and revision by the Central Board  of Revenue  and  the Central  Government  respectively.   These orders  have  already been referred to. (2) For  a  writ  of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the fundamental  right  of the petitioner to carry on  trade  in tobacco  or to store tobacco; (3) directing the  respondents to return the goods confiscated by them. For the petitioner three points were raised: (1) that ss.  6 and  8 of the Act and the Rules made thereunder were  beyond the legislative competence of the Central legislature  under the  Constitution Act of 1935; (2) even if they were  within the   legislative  competence  they  impose  excessive   and unreasonable  restraint  on  the fundamental  right  of  the petitioner  to  trade in tobacco and they were  not  in  the interest of the general public and therefore were not  saved by  Art. 19(6); (3) orders passed were ultra vires  the  Act and the Rules made thereunder. Before  we  proceed  to consider the  arguments  raised   on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to examine 47 366 the  scheme of the Act.  Its scope as given in the  preamble is:- "to consolidate and amend the law relating to central-duties of  excise  on goods manufactured  or  produced  in  British India and to salt."   Section-2  of the Act gives the definitions.   Chapter  11 provides  for  levy and collection of duty.   The  two  main sections, i.e., 6 and 8 fall under this Chapter.  Section  6 provides  for certain operations to be subject  to  licences and when quoted it runs as follows: S.  6 " The Central Government may, by notification  in  the official  Gazette,  provide that, from such date as  may  be specified in the notification, no person shall, except under the   authority  and  in  accordance  with  the  terms   and conditions of a licence granted under this Act engage  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

(a)  the  production or manufacture or any  process  of  the production  or manufacture of any specified excisable  goods or  of  saltpetre  or of any specified  component  parts  or ingredients of such goods or of specified containers of such goods, or (b) the wholesale purchase or sale (whether on his own  account  or  as a broker or commission  agent)  or  the storage of any excisable goods specified in this behalf,  in part A of the Second Schedule." Section  8  imposes restriction on possession  of  excisable goods.  It is as follows: "From  such date as may be specified in this behalf  by  the Central Government by notification in the official  Gazette, no person shall, except as provided by rules made under this Act, have in his possession any excisable goods specified in this  behalf in Part B of the Second Schedule in  excess  of such  quantity as may be prescribed for the purpose of  this section  as  the  maximum amount of such  goods  or  of  any variety of such goods which may be possessed at any one-time by such a person." Section  9  deals with offences and penalties.   Section  10 gives  to the court the power to order forfeiture.   Section 11 makes provision for recovery of duties due to                             367 Government.    Chapter   VI  deals  with   adjudication   of confiscation  and  penalties specifying the  powers  of  the Collector of Central Excise and appeals against such  orders and  revision  to  the  Central  Government.   Chapter   VII contains  supplementary provisions; s. 37  therein  empowers the Central Government to make rules and in the Schedule the rates  or duties leviable on each class of goods  are  given and tobacco falls in item 9. The question is, as to whether the Act falls within item No. 45  of  List 1 read with s. 100 of the Government  of  India Act.  It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that even though  the imposition of excise duties may fall under  item No.  45  of List 1 of the Constitution Act it is  a  serious encroachment on the territory covered by items 27 and 29  of List 11 of that Act.  The argument raised was that  although the Act imposes duty of excise within item 45 of List 1 and, that  was  one of its objects, it also  regulates  trade  or commerce  and  therefore falls  within  the  above-mentioned items of List 11 and would, to that extent, be ultra  vires. It  was contended that the pith and substance of  a  statute may  cover  two  fields and in support  re  -lied  upon  the following  observation  of Mahajan, C.J.,  in  Cooverjee  B. Bharucha   v.   The  Excise  Commissioner  and   The   Chief Commissioner Ajmer & Ors. (1): " The pith and substance of the regulation is that it raises excise revenue by imposing duties on liquor and intoxicating drugs by different methods and it also regulates the import, export,  transport,  manufacture,  sale  and  possession  of intoxicating liquors." But  that  case did not raise the  question  of  legislative competence ; the point for decision was whether the  statute there  impugned,  infringed the right to carry on  trade  in liquor  and  also whether the auction money was a fee  or  a tax.   It was in that connection that the observation  above quoted was made. It was also argued that if the purpose and object of the Act is  levying of duty of excise then it could not provide  for regulation of trade and reliance was (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 873, 877, 882. 368 placed on King v. Barger (1) where by a majority it was held that  the question in substance was not an exercise  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

power  of  taxation  and if it was,  the  statute  would  be invalid  as  being  in  contravention  of   S.  55  ’of  the Constitution  Act of Australia.  The minority, however,  was of  the opinion that the reserved powers of the  States  are those which remain after full effect was given to the powers granted to the Commonwealth. In support of the argument that the Act did not only  relate to  levying  of  excise duties  but  also  regulated  trade, reference  was made to rr. 174 to 182 of the Central  Excise Rules  which relate to licensing.  Particular  reliance  was placed on r. 176(2) imposing a licence fee which in the case of  tobacco is as much as Rs’ 100.  Reference was also  made to  r.  181 which deals with revocation  and  suspension  of licences and empowers the Licensing Department to revoke  or suspend a licence under certain circumstances.  The rule  is as follows:- R.   181 " (1) Any licence granted under. these Rules may be revoked  or  suspended  by the licensing  authority  if  the holder,  or  any  person in his employ,  is  found  to  have committed a breach of the conditions thereof, or any of  the provisions of the Act or these Rules (or has been  convicted of an offence under s. 161, read with s. 109 or with s.  116 of the Indian Penal Code). (2)............................ (3).............................. Counsel  then drew our attention to r. 182 which relates  to matches  Only  but which places limitation on the  issue  of licences for the manufacture of matches. The next set of Rules which were relied upon were rr. 140 to 148  in  regard to warehousing and then  our  attention  was drawn to rr. 210 to 215 relating to penalties,  confiscation and  appeals.  In regard to the latter set of Rules  it  was submitted that they laid down no procedure and did not  make any provision for issuing of notice to licensees or  hearing them or their witnesses before imposing penalties.  From all this (1)  (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41.                             369 the conclusion which counsel wished us to draw was that  the Act read with Rules shows that the pith and substance is not merely  levying  an excise duty but the  possession  of  and trade  in  tobacco  was also  regulated  and  therefore  the subject  matter of the Act did not fall  exclusively  in the legislative field covered by List 1 but it trenched upon the provincial  field  of legislation and must be held  to  fall under List 11 also. In  every  case  where  the  legislative  competence  of   a legislature   in  regard  to  a  particular   enactment   is challenged  with  reference to the entries  in  the  various lists  it is necessary to examine the pith and substance  of the Act and if the matter comes substantially within an item in the Central List it is not deemed to come within an entry in the Provincial list even though "the classes of  subjects looked  at singly overlap in many respects".  It  is  within the  competence  of the Central legislature to  provide  for matters  which may otherwise fall within the  competence  of the   Provincial   legislature  if  they   are   necessarily incidental   to   effective  legislation  by   the   Central legislature on a subject of legislation expressly within its power.   Attorney-General for Canada  v.  Attorney-General,’ for  British  Columbia (1); Attorney-General for  Canada  v. Attorney-General  for Quebec (2).  In Gallagher v. Lynn  (3) it was held that if the true nature and character of an  Act is to protect the health of the inhabitants then even though it  may  incidentally affect trade, it is not enacted  "  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

respect of " trade.  Moreover it is a fundamental  principle of  constitutional  law  that everything  necessary  to  the exercise, of a power is included in the grant of the  power. Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Ajmer (4). The  item which falls for consideration in the present  case is No. 45 of List 1 which is as follows: " Duties of excise on tobacco and other good,%  manufactured or produced in India except (a)  alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b)  opium,  Indian  hemp  and  other  narcotic  drugs   and narcotics; non-narcotic drugs; (1)  [1930] A.C. 111, 118. (2)  [1947] A.C. 33, 43. (3)  [1937] A.C. 863. (4)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735, 749. 370 (c)  medical and toilet preparations containing alcohol,  or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry." The  other  items  which have to  be  considered  are  items Nos. 27, 29 and 31 of List 11 which are as follows :- Item 27.  "Trade and commerce within the Province ;  markets and fairs; money lending and money lenders." Item  29.   "Production, supply and distribution  of  goods; development of industries, subject to the provisions in List 1  with  respect to the development  of  certain  industries under Federal control." The question for decision is whether the Act in question  is a  law with respect to the matters enumerated in item 45  of List  1  or to the matters enumerated in item 27 and  29  of List  11.   In other words does it, in pith  and  substance, relate  to duties of excise on tobacco as contained in  item 45  or it falls within the boundaries of items 27 and 29  of the  provincial list and if it falls within the  former,  is its  validity affected by its incidental trespass  into  the territory  reserved  for  provincial  legislation.   In  the interpretation  of  the  scope of  these  items  the  widest possible amplitude must be given to the words used and  each general  word  must  be  held  to  extend  to  ancillary  or subsidiary   matters  which  can  fairly  be  said   to   be comprehended  in it.  United Provinces v.Mst. Atiqa Begum  & Ors.  (1);  Navinchandra  Mafatlal  v.The  Commissioner   of Incometax (2); The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (5).  In Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswamy Goundan (4)  Sir Maurice  Gwyer,  C.J.,  dealing  with  items  in  the  Lists observed: "  It  must  inevitably  happen  from  time  to  time   that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list,  touches  also on a subject in another list,  and  the different  provisions  of the enactment may  be  so  closely intertwined  that  blind  adherence  to  a  strictly  verbal interpretation  would result in a large number  of  statutes being declared invalid because (1)  [1940] F.C.R. 111. (2)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829, 833, 836. (3)  [1959] S.C.R. 379, 391, 393. (4)  [1940] F.C.R. 188, 201.                             371 the Legislature enacting them may appear to have  legislated in a forbidden sphere." We  agree  as  did  the  Privy  Council  in  Prafulla  Kumar Mukherjee  and  Ors. v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. (1)  and  this Court did in State of Rajasihan v. G. Chawla (2) that   this passage correctly describes the ground on which the rule  is founded  and  in  our  opinion it is  a  correct  method  of interpreting  the  words of the various items in  the  Lists

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

read with s. 100 of the Constitution Act.  Hidayatullah, J., in State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla(2) said at p. 546 :- " It is equally well-settled that the power to legislate  on a  topic  of  legislation  carries  with  it  the  power  to legislate  on  an ancillary matter which can be said  to  be reasonably included in the power given." We now proceed to determine the true nature and character or the  pith and substance of the Act.  It is a fiscal  measure to  levy  and  realise  duty  on  tobacco.   The  method  of realising duty must be left to the wisdom of the legislature taking  each  individual  trade and  its  peculiarities  and difficulties which arise in that matter.  Various provisions of  the Act and the Rules show that the authorities  are  on the  track  of the movement of tobacco from the time  it  is grown to the time it is manufactured and sold in the  market and  the  various provisions of the Act and the  Rules  made thereunder  have been considered necessary for  effectuating the  purpose of the Act.  Rules made under the Act also  are directed  for achieving the same objective.  Chapter  IV  in the  Rules  deals  with unmanufactured  products.   Rule  15 therein  requires  the  growers to  make  a  declaration  in respect of all land upon which tobacco is to be grown.  Rule 17  which  requires curing to be done on  the  declared  and approved  premises  is also a step in  the  same  direction. Under  Rule 18 a security can be demanded from a grower  and curer,  Rules  19, 20 and 21 deal with  liability  to  duty, exemption from duty of certain kinds of tobacco for personal use, books to be kept by growers and curers and the (1) [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 23, 41. (2) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 544.           372 manner of keeping the entries in the books.Rule  31  deals with transport of tobacco from thegrower to   the  premises of a curer and from the premises of a curer   to a public or a  private warehouse.  Chapter V of the    rules  deals with manufactured  tobacco  and  how  that  is  to  be  kept   in warehouses.  Similarly at every stage   whether the  tobacco is in unmanufactured stage or      manufactured        stage provisions have been made in the Rules to keep a watch  over the  movement  of  tobacco. All these Rules  show  that  the object of the Act is to make collection of excise duties  on tobacco  effective  and  the  levying  of  fees  is  only  a collection  of money for the upkeep of supervision over  the movement  of  tobacco for the purpose of excise  duty.   The system   of  licensing  of  bonded  warehouses  was   always considered  to be a part of effective control of evasion  of tax  in  England  and  Parliament must  be  deemed  to  have contemplated  the  inclusion of this  power.   Besides,  the levying  of  licence  fees is itself  a  form  of  taxation. Cooverji B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner of Ajmer (1) and would in this case be within the legislative  competence of  the Central legislature whose powers of taxation  should not be restricted so as to exclude the raising of revenue by imposing  licensing fees. In the State of Madras  v.  Gannon Dunkerley  & Co. (2) the following passage from  the  Broken Hill South Ltd. v.  Commmissioner of Taxation (N.S. W.) (3): " In any investigation of the constitutional powers of these great  Dominion legislatures, it is not proper that a  Court should  deny  to  such a legislature the  right  of  solving taxation  problems unfettered by a priori  legal  categories which often derive from the exercise of legislative power in the  same constitutional writ " was quoted with approval  by Venkatarama  Aiyar,  J.,  and  if it  is  only  a  fee,  its constitutionality  cannot be challenged because of  item  69 relating  to  fees  on matters in List 1.  Counsel  for  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

petitioner  relied  upon  r. 181.  This  rule  may  have  an indirect effect of depriving an owner of a bonded  warehouse from the (1)  [1954]  S.C.R. 873, 877, 822.  (2) [1959]  S.C.R.  379, 391, 393. (3) (1936-37) 56 C.L.R. 337, 379. 373 privilege of keeping such a warehouse but that does not mean that  the object and purpose of the Act is  not  imposition, collection and realisation of duty of excise.  This rule  is a  means  of making the realisation of  duty  effective  and necessarily   incidental   to  effectual   legislation   for collection   of  duties.  Attorney-General  for  Canada   v. Attorney-General  for British Columbia (1).  Looking at  the scheme  of the Act, its object and purpose, its true  nature and  character and the pith and substance the conclusion  is inevitable   that  the  Act  was  within   the   legislative competence of the Central legislature and although there may be   certain  matters  otherwise  within   the   legislative competence   of   the  provincial   legislature   they   are necessarily  incidental  to  effective  legislation  by  the Central legislature.  The various provisions of the Act  and the Rules made thereunder were, in our opinion,  essentially connected  with the levying & collection of excise duty  and in  its true nature and character the Act remains  one  that falls  under item 45 of List 1 and the incidental  trenching upon the provincial field of items 27 or 29 would not affect its constitutionality because the extent of invasion of  the provincial field may be a circumstance to determine the true pith and substance but once that question is determined  the Act, in our opinion, would fall on the side of Central field and  not  that  of the  provincial  field.   Prafulla  Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. ("). It  was  then contended that the restrictions  imposed  were unreasonable  and  therefore not saved by Art.  19(6).   The basis  of this argument was that there is no procedure  laid down  in  the  provisions  for  levying  penalties  nor  any provision  made  for notice or the taking  of  evidence  and power of confiscation was given to persons who could not  be termed  unbiased.  If the tribunal is to act  judicially  it must  confirm to the principles of natural justice  of  audi alteram  partem and there is no dispute that in the  instant case there was no breach of this rule.  Not only this, there is  a  right of appeal and a revision is also  provided  and both these remedies the petitioner availed himself of.  The (1)  [1930] A.C. 111, 118. 48 (2) [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 23, 41, 374 argument of unreasonable restriction because of this  ground must  also fail. Lastly,  it  was contended that the two main  orders  passed were  ultra vires because in the first case  the  petitioner was  asked  to  deposit the penalty before  his   appeal  or revision could be heard and reliance was     placed       on Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of      Madhya  Pradesh (1).   But  it is difficult to see how  that  case  applies. There was no illegal imposition on the petitioner nor is  it shown  that anything was threatened to be  realised  without the  authority  of  law.   In regard  to  the  second  order Mohammad Satar had ceased to be the petitioner’s surety  and therefore  in terms of the proviso to r. 140 of  the  Excise Rules which was as follows :- "  Provided  that  in  the event  of  death,  insolvency  or inefficiency  of the surety or where the amount of the  bond

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

is inadequate, the collector may in his discretion demand  a fresh bond; and may, if the security furnished for a bond is not adequate, demand additional security." The  Collector was acting within his powers if he asked  for the  deposit of cash security of Rs. 10,000.  This is not  a matter  with  which  we can, in the  circumstances  of  this case,’ interfere.  It was also urged that the orders  passed were  mala  fide  but no such allegation  was  made  in  the petition nor is it shown as to why the orders are mala fide. In  our  opinion this petition is without substance  and  is therefore dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1122. 375