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PETITIONER: CHARLES SOBRAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE SUPTD., CENTRAL JAIL, TIHAR. NEW DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/08/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1514            1979 SCR  (1) 512  1978 SCC  (4) 104  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC 898  (83,140)  RF         1980 SC2147  (43,63)

ACT:        Powers of the Supreme Court to interfere to right the wrong and  restore the  rule of  law-Constitution  of  India 1950, Art. 136.        Fundamental  Rights-Whether the  prisoners can invoke their  constitutional   rights  under   Part  III   of   the Constitution-Prison justice and Art. 21 of the Constitution- Prison justice is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power  of  the  Court  to  sentence  the  accused-  Judicial discretion vis-a-vis  prison  administration  and  prisoners rights,  explained-  Correctional  confinement  and  Court’s jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE:       The petitioner a convict having to serve two sentences of long  imprisonment, plus  record of  one escape  and  one attempt of  suicide and  interpol. reports  of  many  crimes abroad in addition to several cases pending in India against him, through this writ petition contended that barbarity and inhuman  treatment   have  been   hurled  at  him  and  that intentional discrimination  has been his lot throughout and, therefore sought  the assistance or this Court for directing the  jail   authorities  to  give  him  finer  foreigner  as companions, and to remove him from a high security ward like Ward-l to a more relaxed ward, be invoking the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the Writ Petition the Court, ^        HELD:  (1) Imprisonment  does not  spell farewell  to fundamental rights  although, by  a realistic re-appraisal,, Courts will refuse to recognise the full panoply of Part lII of the  Constitution enjoyed  by a  free  citizen.  Whenever fundamental rights  are flouted  or  legislative  protection ignored to  any prisoner’s prejudice, this Court’s writ will run breaking through stone walls and iron bars, to right the wrong and  restore the  rule of  law. Then the parrot-cry of discipline thrill  not deter, of security will not scare, of discretion will  not dissuade,  the judical  process. For if

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courts ’cave  in’ when  great rights  and sound  within  the sound-proof, sight-proof  precincts of  prison houses  where often disenters  and minorities are caged, Bastilles will be re-enacted.  When  law  ends  tyranny  begins,  and  history whispers, iron  has never  ben the  answer to  the rights of men.[514 H, 515 A-Bl      (2) Art. 21 of the Constitution read with Art. 19(1)(d) and (5)  is capable  of wider  application than the imperial mischief which give its birth and must draw its meaning from the evolving  standards of decency and dignity that mark the progress of  a mature society. Fair procedure is the soul of Art. 21, reasonableness of the restriction is the essence of Art.  19(5)   and  sweeping   discretion  degenerating  into arbitrary   discrimination   is   anthema   for   Art.   14. Constitutional Karuna  is thus  injected into  incarceratory strategy to produce prison justice.[ 515  CD]       Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. & ors. and Charles Gurumukh Sobraj. State of Delhi [1979] I SCR 392 referred to, 513        Kharak  Singh v.  State of  U.P. [1964]  1 SCR  357 ; applied.       (3) Prison justice implies Court’s continuing duty and authority to ensure that the judicial warrant which deprives a person  of his  life or liberty is not exceeded, subverted or stultified.  It is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power  to sentence.  Where a prison practice or internal instruction  places   harsh  restrictions   on  jail   life, breaching guaranteed  rights, the  Court directly  comes in. Every prison  sentence is  a conditioned deprivation of life auld liberty.  with civilized  norms built  in and unlimited trauma interdicted.  In this sense judicial policy of prison practices is  implied in  the sentencing power. The Criminal judiciary have  thus a  duty to guardian their sentences and visit prisons  when necessary.  The penological  goals which may be  regarded as reasonable justification for restricting the  right   to  move   freely  within  the  confines  of  a penitentiary are  now well  settled. And  if prisoners  have title to  Articles 19,  21 and  14 rights,  subject  to  the limitations,  there   must  be   some  correlation   between depriviation  of   comfort  and  legitimate  function  of  a correctional system. [515 G, 516-E, F-G]             (4  )  Deterrence,  both  specific  and  general rehabilitation,  and   institutional  security   are   vital considerations. Compassion  wherever  possible  and  cruelty only  where   inevitable  is   the   art   of   correctional confinement. When  prison policy advances such a valid goal, the Court will not intervene officiously. But when an inmate is cruelly  restricted in  a manner  which supports  no such relevant purpose,  the restriction  becomes unreasonable and arbitrary,  and   unconstitutionality  is  the  consequence. Traumatic  futility  is  obnoxious  to  pragmatic  legality. Social defence  is the  raison d’etre  of the penal code and bears upon judicial control over prison administration. If a whole atmosphere  of constant  fear  of  violence,  frequent torture and  denial of  opportunity to  improve  oneself  is created or  if medical facilities and basic elements of care and comfort necessary to sustain life are refused, then also the humane jurisdiction of the Court will become operational based on Art.. 19. [516 G-H, 517 D-E]          5) Prisoners  retain all  rights  enjoyed  by  free citizens except  those lost  necessarily as  an incident  of confinement. Rights  enjoyed by  prisoners under Arts 14, 19 and 21  though limited are not static and will rise to human heights when challenging situations arise. [518 A-B]      R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1971] 1 CR 512; Menaka

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Gandhi v. F Union of India & Anr., [1978] 1 CR 248, Mohammad Giasuddin v.  State of  Andhra   pradesh [1978]  I  CR  153; referred to.        (6)   However,  a prison  system  may  make  rational distinctions in making assignments to inmates of vocational, educational and  work  opportunities  available  but  it  is constitutionally impermissible to do so without a functional classification system.  Courts cannot  be  critical  of  the administration  if   it  makes   a  classification   between dangerous prisoners  and ordinary  prisoners. A  distinction between the under trials and convicts is reasonable. In fact lazy relaxation  on security is a professional risk inside a prison. [517 F, (G, 519 B, Cl        ’The petitioner being a foreigner cannot claim rights under Art.  19. Moreover  he is  now a convict and is not in solitary confinement. [519 D] OBSERVATlON:        [The Court must not rush in where the jailor fears to tread. While  the country  may not  make the prison boss the sole sadistic arbiter of incarcerated 514 human, the  community may  be in no mood to handover central prisons to  be  run  by  Courts  Each  instrumentality  must function within its province)

JUDGMENT:       ORlGlNAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 4305 of 1978. Under Article 32 of the Constitution.      N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande. for the Petitioner      Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl. Sol. General and Girish Chandra for the Respondent.      The order of the Court was delivered by       KRISHNA IYER, J. A litigation with a social dimension, even  in a blinkered adversary system, serves a larger cause than the limited  lis before  the court. This petition, with non- specific reliefs, is One  such.        Sobraj,  the petitioner,  by  the  frequency  of  his forensic com  plaints against  incarceratory torture and Dr. Ghatate, his  counsel  by  the  piquancy  of  his  hortative advocacy of  freedom behind bars. have sought to convert the judicial process  from a  constitutional sentinel  of prison justice-which,  emphatically,   it  is-into   a   meticulous auditor-general of  jail cells-which,  pejoratively,  it  is not-although, on  occasions, ’thin partition do their bounds divide‘. Often,  as  here,  the  fountain  of  confusion  in penitentiary jurisprudence is forgetfulness of fundamentals. Once  the   legal  basics   are  stated,  Sobraj,  with  his disingenuous, finical grievances, will be out of court.        What  are the  governing principles, decisionally set down by  this court  in Batra  and  Sobraj?  Has  the  court jurisdiction to  decide prisoners’  charges of  violation of rights  ?   If  it  has,  can  it  meddle  with  the  prison administration and  its problems  of security and discipline from an  ’innocent’ distance  ? Put tersely, both the ’hands off. doctrine  and the ’take over’ theory have been rebuffed as untenable  extremes and  a middle round has been found of intervening  when   constitutional   rights   or   statutory prescriptions are transgressed to the injury of the prisoner and declining  where lesser  matters of  institutional order and man  management,  though  irksome  to  some,  are  alone involved.       Contemporary profusion of prison torture reports makes

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it necessary  to drive home the obvious, to shake prison top brass from the callous complacency of unaccountable autonomy within that  walled off  world of  human held incommunicado. Whenever  fundamental  rights  are  flouted  or  legislative protection  ignored,   to  any  prisoner’s  prejudice,  this Court’s writ will run, breaking through stone walls and iron bars, to  right the  wrong and restore the rule of law. Then the 515 parrot-cry of  discipline will  not deter,  of security will not scare  of   discretion will  not dissuade,  the judicial process. For  if courts  ’cave in"  when  great  rights  are gouged within  the  sound-proof,  sight-proof  precincts  of prison houses,  where, often,  dissenters and minorities are caged, Bastilles  will be  re-enacted. When  law and tyranny begins: and history whispers, iron has never been the answer to the  rights of men. Therefore we affirm that imprisonment does not spell farewell to fundamental rights although, by a realistic re-appraisal,  courts will refuse to recognise the full panoply of Part III enjoyed by a citizen.        This  proposition was  not contested  by the  learned Additional Solicitor General Sri Soli Sorabjee. Nor does its soundness depend,  for us,  upon the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Art. 21,  read with  Art. 19(1)  (d) and (5), is  capable of  wider  application  than  the  imperial mischief which gave its birth and must draw Its meaning from the evolving  standards of decency and dignity that mark the progress of  a mature  society, as  Batra  and  Sobraj  have underscored and  the American  judges have highlighted. Fair procedure is  the soul  of Art.  21, reasonableness  of  the restriction is  the  essence  of  Art.  19(S)  and  sweeping discretion degenerating  into  arbitrary  discrimination  is anathema for Art. 14. Constitutional kurana is thus injected into incarceratory  strategy to  produce prison justice. And as an  annotation of  Art. 21,  this Court  has adopted,  in Kharak Singh’s  case(I) that  expanded connotation of ’life’ given by Field, J. which we quote as reminder:              "Something more than mere animal existence. the           inhibition against  its deprivation extends to all           those  limbs   and  faculties  by  which  life  is           enjoyed.  The   provision  equally  prohibits  the           mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm           or leg,  or the  putting out  of an  eye,  or  the           destruction of any other organ of the body through           which the soul communicates with the outer world".        The  next axiom  of prison  justice  is  the  court’s continuing duty  and authority  to ensure  that the judicial warrant which  deprives a  person of  his life or liberty is not exceeded, subverted or stultified lt is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power to sentence.        The  U.S. Courts  have intensified their oversight of State penal  facilities reflecting a heightened concern with the  extent   to  which   the  ills  that  plague  so-called correctional institutions  violate basic  rights. points out Edward S. Crowin. (2). Although. the learned author, and.      (1)  [1964] I SCR 357.      (2)  Supplement   to    Edward   S.    Corwin’s    "The           constitution’ and  What it  means Today; 1976 Edn.           p. 245. 516 indeed, the  decisions show  that reliance  is placed on the Eighth: Amendment, as we have earlier pointed out. the same. sensitized attention and protective process emanate from the humane provisions of Part III of our Constitution.        Viewed  differently, supposing,  a court  sentences a

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person to  simple imprisonment  or  assigns  him  ’B’  class treatment  and   the   jail   authorities   unwittingly   or vindictively put  him under rigorous imprisonment or subject him to ’C’ class treatment, does it not show contempt of the court’s authority and deprivation of liberty beyond a degree validated by  the court warrant ? Likewise, where a prisoner is subjected  to brutality,  exploiting the  fact that he is helplessly within  the custody  of the  Jail Administration, does it  not deprive  the prisoner  of his  life and liberty beyond the  prescribed limits  set by the court ? Yet again, where conditions  within a  prison  are  such  that  inmates incarcerated therein  will inevitably and necessarily become more sociapathic  than they  were prior  to the sentence, is not the  court’ punitive purpose, charged with healing hope, stultified by  the prison  authorities ?  of course, where a prison  practice   or  internal   instruction  places  harsh restrictions on jail life, breaching, guaranteed rights. the court  directly   comes  in.  Every  prison  sentence  is  a conditioned deprivation  of life and liberty, with civilised norms built  in and  unlimited trauma  interdicted. In  this sense, judicial  policing of  prison practices is implied in the sentencing  power. The  Criminal judiciary  have thus  a duty to  guardian their  sentences  and  visit  prisons  hen necessarily. Many  of them  do not  know  or  exercise  this obligation.        Another  jurisdictional facet  may be touched upon in view of  the widely worded relief sought to treat Sobraj ’in a human  and dignified  manner, keeping  in view the adverse effect of‘  his confinement  upon his  mental  and  physical conditions .  The penological goals which may be regarded as reasonable justification  For restricting  the right to move freely within  the confines  of a penitentiary are now well- settled. And   if prisoners have title to Article 19, 21 and 14 rights,  subject to  the limitation  we  have  indicated, there  must  be  some  correlation  between  deprivation  of freedom and  the  legitimate  functions  of  a  correctional system. It  is now  well-settled, as  a stream of rulings of courts proves,  that deterrence,  both specific and general, rehabilitation  and   institutional   security   are   vital considerations. Compassion  wherever  possible  and  cruelty only  where   inevitable  is   the   art   of   correctional confinement. When  prison policy advances such a valid goal, the court will not intervene officiously. 517        This  overall attitude was incorporated as a standard by- the  American National  Advisory Commission  on  Crimine Justice Standards and Goals:-           ’..... A  rehabilitative purpose is or ought to be           implicit in  every sentence  of an offender unless           ordered otherwise by the sentencing court’’.(l)           The U.S. Supreme Court summed up:                "In a series of decisions this court has held           that, even  though  the  governmental  purpose  be           legitimate anti  substantial, that  purpose cannot           be  pursued   by   means   that   broadly   stifle           fundamental personal liberties when the and can by           more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative           abridgment must  be viewed  in the  light of  less           drastic  means   for  achieving,  the  same  basic           purpose."(’)        But  when an inmate is cruelly restricted in a manner which supports  no such  relevant  purpose  the  restriction becomes unreasonable  and arbitrary  and unconstitutionality is the  consequence. Traumatic  ‘ futility  is obnoxious  to pragmatic legality.  Social defence  is the  raison  of  the

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penal code  and bears  upon  judicial  control  over  prison administration. If  a whole  atmosphere of  constant fear of violence, frequent  torture and  denial  of  opportunity  to improve oneself  is created  or if  medical  facilities  and basic elements  of care  arid comfort  necessary to  sustain life are  refused then  also the  humane jurisdiction of the court will  become operational  based on  Art. 19  ’.  Other forms of  brutal  unreasonableness  and  anti-rehabilitative attitude violative of constitutionality may be thought of in n penal  system but  we  wish  to  lay  down  only  a  broad guideline that  where policies.  with a  ’Zoological touch’, which do  not serve  valid penal  objectives are  pursued in penitentiaries so  as to  inflict conditions so unreasonable as  to  frustrate  the  ability  of  inmates  to  engage  in rehabilitations. the  court  is  not  helpless.  However  as prison system  may  make  rational  distinctions  in  making assignments to  inmates of vocational. educational Land work opportunities   available   but   it   is   constitutionally impermissible to  do sc without as functional classification system. The mere fact that a prisoner is poor or rich, high- born or  ill bred, is certainly irrational as a differential ill a secular socialist high republic’. Since the petitioner charges the  jail staff  with barbaric and inhuman treatment in  prison  we  are  called  upon  to  delineate  the  broad boundaries  of   judicial  jurisdiction   vis  a-vis  prison administration and prisoner’s rights.        (I)  "To solve  The age-old  Problem of  crime" Roger Lanphear; J. D. p-19      (2) Ibid pr 21 518        The court is reluctant to intervene in the day-to-day operation of the State penal system; but undue harshness and avoidable  tantrums,  under  the  guise  of  discipline  and security, gain  no immunity from court writs. The reason is, prisoners  retain all rights enjoyed by free citizens except those  lost  necessarily  as  an  incident  of  confinement. Moreover, the rights enjoyed by prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and  21, though  limited, are not static and will rise to human heights  when challenging  situations arise. Cooper(1) and  Menaka   Gandhi(2)  have  thus  compulsive  consequence benignant to prisoners.        The petitioner in the present case has contended that barbaric and  inhuman treatment  have been hurled at him and that intentional discrimination has been his lot throughout. These allegations  invited us  to  examine  the  limits  and purpose of  judicial jurisdiction  but we  have to apply the principles so laid down to the facts of the present case.        Starry  abstractions do  not make sense except in the context of  concrete facts.  That is  why we  agree with the propositions Of  law urged  by Dr. Ghatate but disagree with the distress  and discrimination  his  client  wails  about. True, confrontedm  with cruel conditions of confinement, the court has  an expanded role. True, the light to life is more than mere  animal existence,  or  vegetable  subsistence.(3) True, the worth of the human person and dignity and divinity of every  individual inform  articles 19  and 21  even in  a prison  setting.   True,   constitutional   provisions   and municipal  laws   must  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the normative laws  of nations, wherever possible and a prisoner does not forfeit his Part lII rights. But that are the facts here ?        Charles Sobraj is no longer an under-trial. having to serve two sentence of long imprisonment. He is given all the amenities of .1 ’B’ class prisoner. He goes on hunger strike but medical  men take  care of  him. Ward  I,  where  he  is

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lodged, gives him the facilities of wards XIll and XIV where he wants  to he  moved. He has  record of one escape and one attempt at  suicide and  Interpol  reports  of  many  crimes abroad. There  are several  cases pending  in India  against him. Even  so, the barbarity of bat fetters inflicted on him lay a  qualmless jail  staff was  abandoned under  orders of this Court.  Now. he  seeks the other extreme of of coddling as if  a jail  were a  country club  or good  hotel. Give me finer foreigners  as  companions.  he  demands.  Don’t  keep convict cooks and warders as      (1) [1971] l SCR Sl2.      (2) [1978] l SCR 248        (3)  Mohammed Giasuddin  v. State  of Andhra  Pradeh. [1978] 1 SCR 153 519 jailmated in  my cell  he  rails.  Remove  me  from  a  high security   ward like Ward I to a more relaxed ward like Ward 14 or  13, he  solicits. These delicate and genteel requests from a  prisoner with  his record  and potential were turned down  by   the  Superintendent  and  the  reasons  for  such rejection, based  on security,  rules and  allergy of  other inmates to  be his  risky fellow-inmates have been stated on oath. We  cannot be  critical of  the Administration  if  it makes  a  classification  between  dangerous  prisoners  and ordinary prisoners.  In the present case, the Superintendent swears, and  it is  undisputed, that  the petitioner  is not under  solitary   confinement.  We   further  aver   that  a distinction between  under-trials and convicts is reasonable and  the   petitioner  is  now  a  convict.  In  fact,  lazy relaxation on  security is  a  professional  risk  inside  a prison.        The  court must not rush in where the jailor fears to tread. While  the country  may not  make the prison boss the sole sadistic  arbiter of incarcerated humans, the community may be  in no mood to hand over central prisons to be run by courts.  Each   instrumentality  must  sanction  within  its province. We  have no  hesitation to  hold that while Sobraj has done  litigative  service  for  prison  reform,  he  has signally  failed  to  substantiate  any  legal  injury.  We, therefore, dismiss  the writ  petition, making it clear that strictly speaking  the petitioner  being a  foreigner cannot claim rights  under Art.  19, but  we have discussed at some length the import of Articles 14, 19 and 21 because they are interlaced and  in any  case apply  to  Indian  citizens.  , Petition dismissed. S.R.                                     Petition dismisses. 520