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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4163-4165 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP © Nos. 4997- 4999 of 2005)  

Chandrashekhar & Ors.                                                .. Appellant(s)

 versus

Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer         …. Respondent(s)  

(With C.A.Nos.4166-4176/09 @ SLP ©  No. 7636-7646/2005,   C.A.No.4177 /2009 @ SLP ©  No.7711/2009 and    and C.A.No.4178/2009 @ SLP © No.15151/2009 CC. No. 1416/2007)

J U D G M  E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals by special leave arise from the related judgments of  

the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore viz.,  

judgment  dated  14th of  August,  2003  in  MFA  No.  1409/2003  and  

batch, judgment dated 27th of August, 2003 in MFA No. 1341/2003  

and  batch,  judgment  dated  10th of  November,  2003  in  MFA  No.  

5664/2003 and batch, and judgment dated 16th of June, 2006 in MFA  

No. 5309/2004. On 14th of August, 2003 the High Court, dismissing  

MFA No.  1409/2003 and batch,  had fixed the market  value of  the

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lands  acquired  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  (hereinafter  

referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  at  Rs.23/-  per  square  feet  which  was  

contested by both the respondents as well  as the appellants.  This  

decision was relied upon in all the other decisions mentioned above  

that have come up for appeals in the present special leave petitions.

3. Since the decision dated 14th of August, 2003 was relied upon in all  

other judgments appealed against and the issues are based on the  

same material facts, the facts in appeal arising out of S.L.P. No.(s)  

4997-4999/2005  are  sufficient  to  decide  the  questions  of  law  that  

have arisen in all these appeals.  

4. On 5th of  March, 1998, the lands of the appellant were notified for  

acquisition  under  Section  4  (1)  of  the  Act,  for  establishment  of  

rehabilitation centre for the ousters of Kanabur and Jainapur Village  

submerged due to construction of Upper Krishna Project. On 15th of  

August, 1998, Notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act was issued.  

On  1st of  March,  1999,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  (hereinafter  

referred to ‘LAO’) passed an award determining the compensation @  

Rs. 54, 500/- per acre and possession of the land was taken by the  

respondent  on  31st of  March,  1999.  Consequent  to  Reference

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Application by the appellants, the LAO referred the matter to the Civil  

Court  for  determination  and  adjudication  of  correct  market  value  

payable  for  the  acquired  lands.  The  II  Addl.  Civil  Judge,  Bijapur,  

allowed the petitions and came to the conclusion that the acquired  

lands were similar in nature to comparable lands acquired by LAO @  

Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft. for the purpose of ring road, and so the lands in  

question must be valued on the same terms. However, the Civil Court  

resorted to further deductions and held the market value of the said  

lands to be only Rs.17/- per Sq. Ft. on 4th of November and 6th of  

November, 2002 respectively. The final amount worked out to Rs.7,  

40,500/- per Acre. It was submitted that as per the Valuation Report  

dated 5th of August, 2002, submitted by PW2, Retired Superintending  

Engineer  (PWD),  Consulting  Engineer  and  Registered  Approved  

Valuer in respect of the acquired lands, the market value of the lands  

in question had worked out to Rs.73.50/- per Sq. Ft.

5. On 21st of March, 2003, the Respondent LAO filed Misc. First Appeal  

before  the High Court  of  Karnataka for  reduction  of  compensation  

awarded by the Civil Court and the present appellants appealed for  

enhancement  of  compensation.  On 14th of  August,  2003,  the High  

Court  held that the market value of the lands would be more than  

Rs.32.20/- per Sq. Ft., yet it restricted the amount to Rs.23/- only, in

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view of the deficit  in the Court  Fee paid by the appellants in their  

Cross-Objections, without affording the appellants to pay the balance  

Court Fee. This decision of the High Court was relied upon in all the  

other  judgments  already  mentioned  as  far  as  the  question  of  

compensation amount is concerned, that have been appealed against  

and the decision here shall  have a common effect  on all  the said  

judgments.

6. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that decision of  

the High Court  not to grant enhanced compensation at the rate of  

Rs.32.10/-  per  Sq.  Ft.  on  the  mere  technical  ground  that  the  

appellants had restricted their claim to Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft. due to their  

inability to pay Court Fee was fallacious. In this regard the learned  

counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to the judgment in  

Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh     [(1985) 3 SCC 737]  

wherein it  has been laid down that a rightful  claim of the claimant  

cannot  be defeated on technical  ground of want of requisite Court  

Fee. The relevant portion of the said order and judgment of the High  

Court may be referred to for proper decision of these appeals. This  

Court observed in the aforesaid decision as follows :

“3. We are of the view that when the learned Single Judge  and  the  Division  Bench  took  the  view  that  the  claimants

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whose land was acquired by the State of Punjab under the   notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were  entitled  to  enhanced  compensation  and  the  case  of  the  appellants stood on the same footing, the appellants should  have been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit court   fee  so  that,  like  other  claimants,  they  could  also  get   enhanced compensation at the same rate as the others. The  learned  Single  Judge  and  the  Division  Bench  should  not  have,  in  our  opinion,  adopted  a  technical  approach  and  denied  the  benefit  of  enhanced  compensation  to  the  appellants  merely  because  they  had  not  initially  paid  the  proper amount of court fee. It must be remembered that this   was  not  a  dispute  between  two  private  citizens  where  it   would be quite just and legitimate to confine the claimant to   the claim made by him and not  to award him any higher   amount than that claimed though even in such a case there   may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed  can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an  amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here   was  a  claim  made  by  the  appellants  against  the  State  Government  for  compensation for  acquisition of  their  land  and  under  the  law,  the  State  was  bound  to  pay  to  the  appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of   the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the   learned  single  Judge and  the  Division Bench,  the  market   value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  or  the  Additional  District   Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have  been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so  determined.  To  deny  this  benefit  to  the  appellants  would  tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire   the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true   market value. There may be cases where, as for instance,   under  agrarian reform legislation,  the holder  of  land may,   legitimately,  as  a  matter  of  social  justice  with  a  view  to  eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and  bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land  which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in   excess  of  the  ceiling  area  with  payment  of  little  compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is   acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not  be  fair  and  just  to  deprive  the  holder  of  his  land  without   payment of the true market value when the law, in so many  terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The  

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State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen   and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where   tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or   where  the  State  Government  would  otherwise  be  irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat  the legitimate and just claim of the citizen We are, therefore,   of the view that, in the present case, the Division Bench as   well  as the learned single Judge should have allowed the  appellants to pay up the deficit  court  fee and awarded to   them compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by  them.”

We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by this  

court, as noted herein above, in the above judgment. A perusal of the  

decision of the High Court in the present case gives a similar impression  

as was observed in the above judgment, viz. once the court has taken  

the view that the claimants (appellants in the present case) were entitled  

to enhance compensation they should not be denied the same on the  

mere  technical  ground  of  non  payment  of  the  court  fees  and  an  

opportunity must be given for payment of the same.      

7. After examining the decision of the High Court, we are of the view that  

the court has recognised the high value of the lands of the appellants  

and  have  accordingly  justified  the  same.  The  High  Court  has  

observed  that  the  locus  and  potentiality  of  the  acquired  land  with  

reference to evidence laid before the Civil  court  and that evidence  

was held to be a clear and clinching proof of the high potential of the  

acquired  land.  The  High  Court  further  observed  that  allowing  

escalation at the rate of 10% p.a. for four years, the actual market

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value of the acquired land would have been Rs.32.10/- per Sq. Ft.  

The High Court also took into consideration the awards passed by the  

Civil Court in LAC No.180/1998 and LAC No.23/1998 and observed  

that the entitlement of the appellants in the present case would be far  

more than the rate of Rs. 32.10/- per Sq. Ft. However the High Court  

then  relied  on  the  fact  that  the  appellants  had  failed  to  mobilize  

money towards court fee and so the claim was restricted to Rs.23/-  

per Sq. Ft. Nevertheless, the High Court was of the opinion that State  

should  be  fair  and  reasonable  in  compensating  the  uprooted  

agriculturists and it  should not be permitted to make unlawful gain  

while exercising eminent domain power under the Act or any other  

statute.

8. Thus, we are of the clear opinion that the High Court seems to be at  

fault  in view of the established law emanating from the decision in  

Bhag Singh (supra) as far  as the restriction of  the compensation  

amount to Rs.23/- on the mere technical ground of non- payment of  

the court  fees is concerned.  However,  the learned counsel  for  the  

respondent has drawn our attention to the decision in Buta Singh v.  

Union of India     [(1995) 5 SCC 283], wherein a Constitution Bench of  

this Court had affirmed and approved the law laid down in Scheduled  

Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India     [(1991) 1

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SCC 174]. The Constitution Bench held the opinion that the decision  

in  Chand  Kaur  v.  Union  of  India     [(1994)  4  SCC  663]  was  per  

incuriam  the  decision  of  this  court  in  Scheduled  Caste  Coop.  

(supra). The court in Chand Kaur (supra) had relied on the law laid  

down by Bhag Singh (supra) while granting two months time to the  

appellants in that case to make up the deficiency in the court fee in  

the  LPAs  which  had  been  filed  by  them.  Thus,  in  Buta  Singh  

(supra), the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  court  pointed  out  that  the  

decision in  Chand Kaur (supra) had failed to take into account the  

law  laid  down  in  Scheduled  Caste  Coop.  (supra) which  was  a  

subsequent decision to that of Bhag Singh (supra) and thus, the law  

as laid down by Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra) was held to be the  

correct one.  

9. Since we have already perused the judgment in Bhag Singh (supra),  

now we need to examine the judgment in  Scheduled Caste Coop.  

(supra) and find out whether, in fact, the Constitution Bench judgment  

of  Buta  Singh  (supra) had  rendered  the  law laid  down in  Bhag  

Singh (supra) null and void. A perusal of the decision in Scheduled  

Caste Coop. (supra) gives us the impression that the court had in  

fact  agreed to the views expressed by this Court  in   Bhag Singh

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(supra), as can be observed in the following lines on  Bhag Singh  

(supra):

“...the appellants had restricted their claim in the first appeal  to  the  High  Court  by  paying  lesser  court  fee.  After  the  judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,  the  appellants  realised that they were entitled to the benefit  of enhanced  compensation  which  was  denied  to  them  as  they  had  restricted their claim by paying a lesser court fee. They kept   the matter alive by filing a Letters Patent Appeal along with  several  others  who too  were  dissatisfied  with  the amount   awarded by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of   the High Court affirmed the judgment of the learned Single  Judge in  regard  to  the  rate  of  compensation  for  the  land  comprising the belt  having proximity  to  the road,  but  with   regard to the land situate in the owner belt, it enhanced the  compensation  to  Rs.38.720/-  per  acre  as  stated  earlier.   Since the Division Bench also restricted the benefit  of  the  enhanced  compensation  to  claimants  who  had  paid  the  proper court fee, the appeal preferred by the appellants was  dismissed. The appellants did not rest there but carried the   matter to this Court by way of special leave. It will be clear   from  the  above  facts  that  unlike  the  present  petitioner- society the appellants in that case kept the matter alive...   This Court pointed out that since the case was not between  two private parties and the claim was directed against the  Government for payment of compensation for expropriated  land the State Government was bound to pay compensation   on the basis of the marked value of the acquired land and if   according to the judgments of the learned Single Judge and  the Division Bench the market value was higher than that  awarded by the Collector or the reference court there was no  reason to deny to the appellants the benefit of payment of  that  market  value  because  to  deny  the  same  would  tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire   land  at  a  rate  below  the  market  value.  On  this  line  of   reasoning this Court allowed the appellants to pay the deficit   court fee and receive compensation at the higher rate.”

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in  Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra) is materially different from the  

law established by this court in  Bhag Singh (supra) since both the  

decisions dealt with different matters and moreover the  Scheduled  

Caste Coop. (supra) decision has in fact recognised the validity of  

the law laid down in  Bhag Singh (supra). Therefore, we are of the  

opinion that  following the judgment of  Bhag Singh (supra) in the  

present  case  shall  not  be  in  conflict  with  the  opinion  of  the  

Constitution  Bench  decision  in  the  case  of  Buta  Singh  (supra).  

Thus, in our opinion, it is settled that the High Court should not have  

deprived the appellants of their rightful claim on the technical ground  

of want of requisite Court Fees and an opportunity should have been  

afforded to them for payment of the deficit Court Fee. This position is  

also  supported by the  decision  of  this  court  in  a  recent  case viz.  

Bhimasha  v.  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  [(2008)  10  SCC  

797] wherein it has been  held that the High Court should have, after  

taking note of the facts of the case and the market value determined  

by it, awarded the higher compensation subject to the payment of the  

balance court fee.  

14. Since we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was not  

justified in denying the appellants compensation @ Rs.32.10/- pr Sq.  

Ft. after having recorded its finding that the value of the required land

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would be not less than @ Rs.32.10/- pr Sq. Ft. on a mere technical  

ground that the Court Fee paid by the appellants would entitle them  

to  compensation  of  only  Rs.23/-  per  Sq.  Ft.,  we  now proceed  to  

consider  the  other  submissions  of  the  appellants.  The  learned  

counsel  for  the appellant  submitted that  since the High Court  had  

awarded compensation @       Rs.100.50/- per Sq. Ft. in MFA No.  

2366/2003  (LAC)  C/W  MFA  CR.OB.  No.  52/2004  [Asst.  

Commissioner  &  the  LAO,  Bijapur  v  Tukaram  S/o.  Shivaram  

Zinjade, arising out of LAC No. 180/1998], the appellants should also  

be awarded compensation at the same rate affording an opportunity  

to them to pay the deficit court fee. In this regard our attention was  

drawn  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Pal  Singh  v.  UT  of  

Chandigarh [AIR 1993 SC 225].

15. In  the  case  of  Pal  Singh  (supra),  this  court  had  examined  the  

question whether  a judgment of a court  in a land acquisition case  

determining  the  market  value  of  a  land  in  the  vicinity  of  acquired  

lands, even though not inter-parties, was admissible in evidence in a  

subsequent case, either as an instance or one from which the market  

value of the acquired land could be deduced or inferred. The court  

had analyzed the same and expressed the following opinion:

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“5. No doubt, a judgment of a court in a land acquisition case  determining the market value of a land in the vicinity of the  acquired  lands,  even  though  not  inter  Partes,  could  be  admitted in evidence either as an instance or one from which  the market value of the acquired land could be deduced or   inferred as has been held by the Calcutta High Court in H.K.   Mallick’s  case  [H.K.  Mallick  v.  State  of  West  Bengal  (79  Calcutta Weekly Notes 378)] based on the authority of the   Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State  v. Indian General Steam Navigation and Railway Co. 1909  I.LR. 36 Cal. 967, where the Judicial Committee did refuse  to interfere with High Court judgment in a land acquisition   case based on previous awards, holding that no question of   principle was involved in it.”                   

So it seems that the court in principle recognised the admissibility  

of such previous decisions in a subsequent case as far as the market  

value of the acquired land was concerned. However, the court further  

held that:

“…But  what  cannot  be overlooked is,  that  for  a  judgment   relating to value of land to be admitted in evidence either as   an instance or as one from which the market value of the  acquired land could be inferred or deduced, must have been  a previous judgment of Court  and as an instance, it  must  have been proved by the person relying upon such judgment   by adducing evidence aliunde that due regard being given to  all  attendant  facts  and circumstances,  it  could furnish the  basis  for  determining  the  market  value  of  the  acquired  land...”

16. Thus,  for  a  judgment  relating  to  value  of  land  to  be  admitted  in  

evidence either as an instance or as one from which the market value

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of the acquired land could be inferred or deduced, must have been a  

previous judgment of that same court and this requirement is fulfilled  

in the present case. However, the requirement was that it must have  

been proved by the person relying upon such judgment by adducing  

evidence  aliunde  and  that  due  regard  being  given  to  all  other  

attendant  facts  and  circumstances  it  could  furnish  the  basis  for  

determining the market value of the acquired land, is in our opinion  

the more important test for admission of such previous decision of the  

High Court for determination of the market value of the land acquired  

in the present case. On a perusal of the materials submitted before  

us by the appellants, we must conclude that the appellants had failed  

to satisfactorily furnish the basis for determining the market value of  

the acquired land according to the decision of the same High Court in  

Assistant Commissioner & the LAO (supra) at Rs.100.50/-. Per sq. ft.  

Thus, we conclude that this plea of the appellants is not acceptable in  

the present case.  

17.In  view of  our  discussions made herein  above and in  view of  the  

decisions cited herein earlier, we are of the view that the decisions of  

the High Court impugned in these appeals on the termination of the  

market value of the lands of the appellants are set aside. We fix the  

market value of the acquired lands of the appellants at Rs.32.10/- per

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sq. ft. However the rest of the decision of the High Court is affirmed.  

In  other  words the appellants are entitled to  30% solatium on the  

enhanced compensation and interest accrued on it.  The appellants  

are also entitled to 12% additional  market  value on the enhanced  

compensation  from  the  date  of  issuance  of  the  notification  under  

Section 4 (1) of the Act, till the date of dispossession or till the date of  

award, whichever is earlier. Moreover they are also entitled to interest  

@ 9% on the enhanced compensation amount from the date of taking  

possession or award for a period of one year and thereafter @ 15%  

till the amount is deposited. The compensation already paid by the  

LAO  shall  be  deducted.  It  is  made  clear  that  the  enhanced  

compensation  which  has  now  been  directed  to  be  paid  to  the  

appellants shall be paid if the appellants shall deposit the requisite  

court fees on the aforesaid enhanced amount within four months from  

the date of supply of a copy of this order to the courts below.

18.These appeals are thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There  

will be no order as to the costs.      

………………………J.

[Tarun Chatterjee]

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New Delhi; ……………………..J.

July 08, 2009. [V.S.Sirpurkar]