“Reportable”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1528 OF 2005

Chandran @ Manichan @ Maniyan … Appellant

Versus

State of Kerala … Respondent

with

Criminal Appeal No.1530 of 2005

Manikantan @ Kochani …Appellant

Versus

State of Kerala & Anr. …Respondents

With

Criminal Appeal No.1531 of 2005

Manoharan …Appellant

Versus

Kerala State Rep. Public Prosecutor …Respondent

With

Criminal Appeal No. 1532 of 2005

Vinod Kumar @ Vinod …Appellant

Versus

State of Kerala      ….Respondent

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With

            Criminal Appeal No.  864 of 2011

           [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 842 of 2006)

Suresh Kumar @ Suresh …Appellant

Versus

State of Kerala …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

1. This  judgment  will  dispose  of  Criminal  Appeal  

No.1528 of 2005 (Chandran @Manichan @ Maniyan v. State  

of Kerala) filed by Chandran (accused No.7), Criminal  

Appeal No.1530 of 2005 (Manikantan @ Kochani v. State of  

Kerala)  filed  by  Manikantan  (original  accused  No.4),  

Criminal  Appeal  No.1531  of  2005  (Manoharan  v.  Kerala  

State  Rep.  by  Public  Prosecutor)  filed  by  Manoharan  

(original  accused  No.30),  Criminal  Appeal  No.1532  of  

2005 (Vinod Kumar @ Vinod v. State of Kerala) filed by  

Vinod Kumar (original accused No.8), SLP (Crl.) 842 of  

2006 (Suresh Kumar @ Suresh v. State of Kerala) filed by  

Suresh  Kumar  (original  accused  No.25)  and  Criminal  

Appeal No.800 of 2006 (Herunessa @ Thatha v. State of  

Kerala) filed by Herunessa (original accused No.1). Out  

of  all  these  appeals,  the  appeal  filed  by  accused  

Herunessa @ Thatha has become infructuous since accused  

No.1, Herunessa is reported to have expired.   

2. Leave granted in SLP (Crl) 842 of 2006.

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3. All the accused-appellants stood convicted by the  

Sessions Judge, Kollam by its judgment dated 16.7.2002  

for  various  offences  punishable  under  Sections  120B,  

302, 307, 326, 328 and 201 read with Section 34 of the  

Indian Penal Code (IPC) as also under Sections 55 (a)  

(g) (h) (i) , 57A and 58 of the Abkari Act.  We need not  

refer to the punishments awarded to all these accused  

persons.  Suffice it to say, that practically all of  

them were convicted for offences under Section 302, IPC  

Section 57A (1) (iii) of the Abkari Act which is a State  

Act for the State of Kerala.  The accused persons under  

those  Sections  were  sentenced  to  suffer  rigorous  

imprisonment  for  life.   They  have  also  been  awarded  

lesser sentences and have been slapped with heavy fines.  

They appealed against this verdict, the conviction and  

the sentences before the Kerala High Court which has set  

aside the conviction for offence under Sections 302 and  

Section 307, IPC, however, maintained the convictions of  

most of the appellants for offence under Section 57A (1)  

(ii) under the Abkari Act along with convictions under  

Sections 324, 326, 328 and 201, IPC as also the other  

Sections  like  Section  55  (h)  and  (i)  and  58  of  the  

Abkari Act.  In short, most of the accused persons were  

directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and,  

as the case may be, rigorous imprisonment for 10 years  

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along with fine.  All these appeals were heard jointly  

since they were against the common judgment.  As many as  

48 accused persons came to be tried before the Sessions  

Judge.  Some of them were acquitted at the stage of  

trial and some others at the appeal stage, leaving the  

above mentioned appellants in the fray who are before  

us.

4. Alcohol has already proved itself to be one of the  

major enemies of the human beings.  However, its grip is  

not loosened in spite of the realization of the evil  

effects of alcohol on the human life.  On the other  

hand, the unholy grip is being tightened day by day.  

Therefore, when the standard and healthy alcohol in the  

form of liquor is not available or is too costly for a  

common man, the poor section of the society goes for  

illicitly  distilled  liquor  which  is  sold  by  the  

bootleggers.  The conscienceless bootleggers – thanks to  

their avarice for money – take full advantage of this  

human weakness and without any compunction or qualms of  

conscience, distill illicit liquor and then to increase  

the  sale and  to gain  astronomical profits  make their  

product more potent at least in taste so as to attract  

the  poor  customers.   Such  poor  customers  invariably  

become the prey of such unholy avarice on the part of  

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the bootleggers and in the process even lose their lives  

at times or suffer such injuries which are irreparable  

like total blindness etc. and that is precisely what has  

happened in this case.

5. On 22.10.2000, in the wee hours,  Sub-Inspector of  

Police,  Paripally  received  information  that  one  

Raghunatha Kurup of Kulathoorkonam and seven others were  

admitted  in  the  Medical  College  Hospital  

Thiruvananthapuram for treatment on account of illness  

caused by consumption of illicit liquor.  He reached the  

Hospital and recorded the first information statement of  

Raghunatha Kurup at 2 a.m.  By that time, one Sasidharan  

who had consumed the illicit liquor had died and two  

others  were lying  in unconscious  condition.  On that  

basis, Sub-Inspector registered Crime No. 268 of 2000  

under Section 302, 307, IPC read with Section 34, IPC  

and under Section 57A of the Abkari Act.  Little did he  

know  the exact  ramifications or  vastness of  the grim  

tragedy  which  was  about  to  take  place.   Three  other  

similar  crimes  were  registered  at  Kottarakkara  police  

station  and  this  was  followed  by  further  crimes  

registered in the same police station being Crime No.809  

of 2000, Crime No.810 of 2000, Crime No.811 of 2000 and  

Crime  No.817  of  2000.   All  these  crimes  were  

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consolidated  with  crime  No.268  of  2000  of  Parippally  

police  station  and  the  information  started  trickling  

regarding  the  consumption  of  spurious  liquor  by  poor  

persons and their admittance to the hospital from within  

Anchal and Pooyappally police station limits.  Similar  

incidents  had  taken  place  within  the  limits  of  

Mangalapuram police station and the crime was registered  

there also.  Investigation machinery quickly responded  

to the happenings and a special investigation team (SIT)  

was  constituted  as  per  the  directions  of  Director  

General  of  Police,  Kerala,  Thiruvananthapuram  on  

25.10.2000 which was to be headed by Shri Sibi Mathews,  

IPS who was the Inspector General of Police.  He was to  

head the team of seven persons, six other persons being  

the  police  officers  of  the  level  of  Inspectors  and  

above.  All these earlier mentioned crimes were taken  

over  for  investigation  by  SIT.   They  started  

investigation in all the concerned police stations where  

the crimes were reported.  It was realized that as many  

as  31  persons  had  lost  their  lives,  six  persons  had  

suffered total blindness in Kollam District whereas more  

than 500 persons suffered serious injuries on account of  

the drinking of the illicit liquor.   

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6. Unfortunately, all this was going on in God’s own  

country, Kerala which was turned into hell by the liquor  

mafia.   Eventually,  investigation  by  the  SIT  was  

completed  and  the  final  report  was  filed  before  the  

Judicial  Magistrate,  1st Class,  Paravoor  on  21.1.2001  

against 47 persons.  After the charge-sheet was filed,  

accused No.48 was also added by a supplementary charge-

sheet.  However, as many as four accused persons, they  

being accused Nos. 34, 36, 39 and 45 died on account of  

consumption of their own medicine, the spurious liquor.  

Accused No.3 had lost his eye sight completely.  Few  

accused  were  absconding,  their  cases  were  split  up.  

Rest  of  the  accused  were  sent  for  trial  before  the  

Sessions Judge before whom a marathon trial took place  

wherein  271 witnesses  were examined,  as many  as 1105  

documents  were  proved  and  relied  upon  and  over  291  

material  objects  were  produced.   The  defence  also  

examined  as  many  as  17  witnesses  and  relied  on  110  

documents being Exhibits D-1 to D-111.   

7. Prosecution alleged that methyl alcohol which is a  

poisonous substance used to be brought from Karnataka  

and mixed with Ethyl alcohol.  At times, this concoction  

was mixed with toddy and other essences resulting in a  

drink called  Kalapani.  The methyl alcohol used to be  

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mixed with ethyl alcohol which was also illegally and  

illicitly procured in order to add potency to the drink  

so that more and more people would purchase the same.  

These sales were made from the regularly licensed toddy  

shops  and  from  other  places.   There  was  well-oiled  

machinery,  huge  in  proportion,  the  main  component  of  

which  was  Chandran  (accused  No.7)  who  was  a  toddy  

contractor.  His brothers, Manikantan (accused No.4) and  

Vinod Kumar (accused No.8) were deputies helping him.  

This group had servants like Balachandran (A-15), the  

Manager.  Even their wives did not lag behind.  There  

were laboratories, assistants and labourers.  There were  

drivers  and  a  fleet  of  vehicles  which  were  used  for  

importing methyl alcohol from Karnataka and then it used  

to be brought to the laboratories maintained by Chandran  

(A-7), Manikantan (A-4) and Vinod Kumar (A-8) where the  

mixing used to take place.  Accused Nos.A-4 (Manikantan  

@  Kochani),  A-7  (Chandran  @  Manichan),  A-8  (Vinod  

Kumar),  A-15  (Balachandran),  A-18  (Usha),  A-19  

(Sugathan),  A-20  (Vijayan),  A-21  (Rassuludeen),  A-22  

(Suresh @ Sankaran) and A-23 (Binu @ Monukuttan) were  

active in firstly procuring the methyl alcohol and then  

mixing  the  same  in  the  laboratories  and  then  

distributing  the  same  in  the  whole  district,  more  

particularly, to the various outlets for sale of toddy.  

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Chandran (A-7) used to control these shops which were  

either in his name or some other names.  It was alleged  

by  the  prosecution  that  all  these  accused  persons  

hatched a criminal conspiracy in or about March, 2000  

prior  to  the  auction  of  toddy  shops  for  the  period  

between 2000-01 and well-oiled machinery was created for  

importing  methyl  alcohol  from  a  place  called  Arihant  

Chemicals,  Bangalore.  Chandran  (A-7)  controlled  toddy  

shop Nos.1 to 26 of Chirayinkil Panchayat so that there  

were  easy outlets  available for  the sale  of spurious  

liquor.  Once methyl alcohol was imported, it used to be  

brought to the huge laboratories constructed for that  

purpose  and  carefully  concealed  which  was  located  at  

Pandakasala.   It  was alleged  by the  prosecution that  

Gunasekharan  (A-17)  purchased  two  barrels  of  methyl  

alcohol as part of the criminal conspiracy from Arihant  

Chemicals, Bangalore and the same was entrusted to Anil  

Kumar (A-16) for import to Kerala for the purpose of its  

mixing with the spirit ethyl alcohol and for sale by  

Manikantan @ Kochani (A-4), Chandran @ Manichan (A-7),  

Vinod  Kumar  (A-8),  Balachandran  (A-15),  Usha  (A-18),  

Sugathan  (A-19),  Vijayan  (A-20),   Rassuludeen  (A-21),  

Suresh @ Sankaran (A-22), Binu @ Monkuttan (A-23).  It  

was brought by Anil Kumar (A-16) in a Fiat car which had  

fake registration number.  This Fiat car was fitted with  

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a secret tank and thus the poisonous methyl alcohol was  

imported  and  was  mixed  with  56,200  litres  of  spirit  

which  was  also  imported  to  Kerala  by  Mahesh  (A-12),  

Salil Raj (A-13), Ashraf (A-14) and Sakthi (A-48). All  

the mixing was done at Pandakasala and then it was given  

for distribution to Manikantan (A-4) who transported it  

through Anil Kumar (A-5), Shibu (A-6), Santhosh @ Kochu  

Santhosh  (A-9),  Santhosh  @  Valiya  Santhosh  (A-10),  

Mohammed  Shaji  @  Shabu  (A-11),  knowing  it  to  be  

injurious to health, through various other vehicles.

8. The  said  methyl  alcohol  which  was  mixed  in  the  

Pandakasala godown meant for toddy shop Nos.1 to 26 of  

Chirayinkil Panchayat and then got distributed by the  

above accused persons who all knew very well that it was  

injurious to health and was fatal.  For this purpose,  

cars bearing registration No. PY01M-6582 and TN-1-R 9283  

and a Van bearing registration No. KLOQ-2787 were used.

9. It  was further  the case  of the  prosecution that  

from this poisonous spirit, 35 litres were taken in a  

car bearing registration No.TN-1-R 9283 on 20.10.2000 at  

about 3.30 p.m. with the assistance of Anil Kumar (A-5)  

and Shibu (A-6) and was given to Herunnesa (A-1), Rajan  

(A-2) and Raju @ Mathilakom Raju (A-3) in the house of  

A-1  and  A-2  at  Kalluvathukkal.   It  was  alleged  that  

1

accused Nos.1 and 2 and 3 diluted the spirit by adding  

water and sold it through their outlets because of which  

18 persons died due to consumption of spurious liquor.  

It was pointed out that two persons lost their eyesight  

and number of others sustained grievous injuries.  It  

was further alleged in the charge that Manikantan (A-4)  

with the help of Anil Kumar (A-5) and Santhosh (A-10)  

transported  10  Kannas  full  of  spurious  liquor  having  

capacity  of  35  litres  in  the  car  bearing  fake  

registration  No.  KL  01M  7444  on  20.10.2000  night  to  

Charuvila  Puthen  Veedu,  Anthamon  Muri  and  Kalyanpuram  

village at Kottarakkara and there the said liquor was  

sold by A-30 with the assistance of A-31 who earlier  

diluted the spurious liquor by adding water at the house  

of A-30 and packed liquor in polythene covers containing  

100 ml each.  The said pouches were also sealed with the  

help of sealing machine.  Then the pouches were loaded  

in  one  Maruti  car  on  the  same  day  and  the  same  was  

entrusted  to A-39,  Latha Kumari.   Even  these accused  

knew the spurious nature of the liquor and its lethal  

effects.  Some liquor out of this was sold to one Soman  

Pillai and CWs 630 to 634 and on that account Latha  

Kumari  and  Soman  Pillai  died  while  others  suffered  

serious injuries.     

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10. It was further alleged by the prosecution that the  

remaining five Kannas full of spurious liquor were then  

transported in the car bearing fake registration No. KL  

01M 7444 with the help of accused Nos. 5 and 10 on the  

same day near the shops of CWs 633 and 664 at Pallikkal  

in Mylom village at about 8.45 p.m. and entrusted the  

same to A-25 who with the help of some other accused  

like Sujith (A-24), Dileep (A-26), Shyjan (A-27), Anil  

Kumar @ Kittu (A-28), Rathy (A-29),  Sashikumar (A-32),  

Shibu  (A-33),  Rajan  (A-34),  Sudhakaran  (A-35),  Pachan  

(A-36), Santhosh (A-37), Samuel (A-38), Sathyan (A-40),  

Soman (A-41) sold the spurious liquor at various places  

in Kottarakkara Taluk at Pallikkal, Kalyanpuram Puthoor  

and Mylom after diluting the same with water.  Because  

of the consumption of this liquor, as many as 7 persons  

died and out of them Rajan (A-34) and Pachan (A-36) also  

died by consuming the same liquor.  Some others lost  

their eye sight and still some others sustained grievous  

injuries.

11. Another round of 35 litres of kannas was taken by  

A-4 with the help of all on 20.10.2000 in the evening to  

Attingal Avanavancherry and was sold to A-42 who along  

with A-47 took the spurious liquor in an auto rickshaw  

driven by A-47 near the CRPF camp in Thiruvananthpuram  

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District and sold it to A-45 who further sold about 14  

litres of spirit to A-44 and 7 litres of spirit to A-46  

on  25.10.2000  in  the  evening.   The  said  liquor  was  

diluted by A-45 with the help of A-43 by mixing water  

and converted it into arrack and further sold it to a  

person called Bhaskaran Kutty Nair.  It is alleged that  

because  of  the  consumption  of  the  same  liquor,  A-45  

himself  died  while  some  others  suffered  grievous  

injuries.

12. The prosecution also alleged that A-44 diluted the  

spirit by adding water and sold it on 26.10.2000 near  

Apollo colony to CWs 433 to 456. They consumed the same  

liquor and sustained grievous injuries and one of them  

lost his eyesight.   

13. The  prosecution  alleged  that  the  conspiracy  was  

hatched  in  March,  2000  amongst  all  the  accused  and  

because of the criminal act on the part of the accused  

of mixing poisonous methyl spirit, death of as many as  

31 persons was caused, as many as 266 persons suffered  

grievous injuries while 5 persons lost their eye sight  

completely.  All the accused persons were, therefore,  

charged with the offences under Sections 302, 307, 326,  

328, 201,120B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal  

Code  as  also  under  Section  55  (a)  (g)  (h)  and  (i),  

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Section 57A and Section 58 of Abkari Act.  On the basis  

of this charge, evidence was led of about 270 witnesses.  

The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to  

be tried.   

14. The sessions Judge categorized the accused persons  

in the following manner:

1) those who were involved in the manufacture of the  illicit liquor;  

2) those  who  were  engaged  in  the  distribution  and  transportation of the same;

3) Those  who  were  mainly  engaged  in  the  sale  of  illicit liquor.

15. Accused Nos.13, 17, 31, 32, 37, 40, 43, 46, 27, 48  

were  found  not  guilty.   They  were  straightaway  

acquitted.  Some of the accused persons died during the  

trial.  Those who were convicted by the Sessions Judge  

were awarded sentences depending upon the seriousness of  

the  crime as  per the  classifications which  have been  

shown above.  Naturally, the persons in category (1) and  

category (2) were dealt with severely and most of them  

were awarded the maximum punishment of life imprisonment  

along with heavy fine.  Those accused persons who were  

in category (3) were dealt with a little lightly in the  

sense  that they  were not  given life  imprisonment but  

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imprisonment  ranging  from  3  years  to  10  years  was  

awarded to them.  The convicted accused filed appeals  

before the High Court.  The High Court also acquitted  

few of the accused persons and those whose appeals were  

dismissed have now come before us by way of separate  

appeals which we have indicated in the first paragraph  

of this judgment.  The High Court has considered the  

appeals filed by various accused before it separately.  

We  also  propose  to  do  the  same  thing.   We  have  to  

consider mainly the appeals filed by accused Nos. A-7,  

A-4, A-30, A-8 and Suresh Kumar (A-25) who filed SLP  

(Crl) 842 of 2006.  Before we take up this task, we  

would analyze the impugned judgment of the High Court.

16. To  begin  with,  the  High  Court,  after  quoting  

Sections 8, 55, 57A and 58 of the Kerala Abkari Act,  

proceeded to consider the entire evidence appeal-wise.  

In that, the High Court appreciated the evidence of the  

individual witnesses insofar as they were relevant to  

the particular accused whose appeal was being considered  

as also the documentary evidence as figured against that  

particular  accused.   Therefore,  it  so  happened  that  

sometimes  the  appreciation  of  evidence  of  common  

witnesses is repeated in the High Court’s judgment but  

considering the large number of witnesses, more than 276  

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in all, that was inevitable.  Still, it will be our  

endeavour to avoid the repetition while considering the  

matter at this stage.

17. These appeals are against the concurrent findings  

of fact and, therefore, it is obvious that this Court  

does not enter the area of re-appreciation of evidence.  

That  can  be  done  only  in  case  the  appreciation  is  

substantially defective and the inferences drawn by the  

Courts below could not have been drawn in law.  This  

Court has, time and again, declared that even where the  

Courts  have  acted  upon  inadmissible  evidence  or  have  

left  out of  the consideration  some material  piece of  

evidence, the defence would be entitled to address this  

Court on those issues, and the Court would proceed to  

re-appreciate  the  evidence  and  re-examine  the  factual  

findings  on  that  basis  alone.   We  must,  at  this  

juncture, record that at least  prima facie such is not  

the case here.  On the other hand, we find that the  

evidence has been meticulously appreciated by both the  

Trial  and  the  appellate  Court.   We  also  found  no  

instance of inadmissible evidence having been accepted  

or  some material  evidence having  been ignored  by the  

Courts  below.   The  arguments  mostly  related  to  the  

interpretation of the provisions of Abkari Act as also  

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the  provisions  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (IPC).   The  

common  feature  of  the  arguments  was  that  the  Courts  

below have mis-interpreted the provisions of Abkari Act  

and, more particularly, of Section 57A (1) (i) and (ii)  

as also Section 57A (2) (ii).  It has been again the  

common feature of arguments that the Courts below have  

erred  in  convicting  the  accused  persons  for  offences  

under  those  Sections  as  the  essential  ingredients  of  

those  Sections were  not proved  by the  prosecution as  

against  the accused  persons.  It will  be, therefore,  

proper  to  first  examine  the  scope  of  Section  57A.  

However,  such  scope  will  have  to  be  examined  in  the  

light of some other provisions of the Act as also the  

Statement of Objects and Reasons and the history of the  

Legislation.  Suffice it to say, at this juncture, that  

the original nomenclature of the Act was Cochin Abkari  

Act, Act 1 of 1077 and Abkari Act (Travancore) 4 of  

1073.  These acts provided for the levy of fees for the  

licences  for  manufacture  and  sale  of  liquor  and  

intoxicating drugs.   Three acts were operating, they  

were Cochin Abkari Act, Travancore Abkari Act and Madras  

Abkari  Act.   Since  that  was  causing  difficulty,  an  

Ordinance came to be promulgated on 01.05.1967.  This  

was replaced by a Bill and that is how Abkari Act was  

born.   

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18. Section 2 (6A) of the Act defines ‘arrack’.  It  

means any potable liquor other than toddy, beer, spirits  

of wine, wine, Indian made spirit, foreign liquor and  

any medicinal preparation containing alcohol.  Section 2  

(8)  defines  ‘toddy’  to  mean  fermented  or  unfermented  

juice drawn from a coconut, palmyra, date or any other  

kind  of  palm  tree.   Section  2  (9)  speaks  about  the  

‘spirits’  meaning  any  liquor  containing  alcohol  and  

obtained by distillation. Sub-section (10) provides the  

definition of ‘liquor’ which includes spirits of wine,  

arrack,  spirits,  wine,  toddy,  beer  and  all  liquid  

consisting  of  or  containing  alcohol.   Section  2(12)  

defines country liquor which means toddy or arrack while  

Section 2(13) defines foreign liquor which includes all  

liquor other than country liquor. Thus, it will be seen  

that ‘liquor’ is the broadest concept and engulfs all  

the intoxicating drinks. Section 6 prohibits import of  

liquor  or  intoxicating  drug  being  imported  without  

permission  of  the  Government  authorized  to  give  

permission  in  that  behalf.   Similarly,  Section  7  

prohibits  the  export  of  liquor  or  intoxicating  drug.  

Section 8 is an important Section which speaks for the  

prohibition of manufacture, import, export, transport,  

transit, possession, storage and sale of arrack.  The  

contravention  of  this  Section  is  punishable  with  10  

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years’ imprisonment as also with fine of not less than  

Rs.1 lakh.  Some other provisions relate to the various  

other  prohibitions  including  the  provisions  for  

searches.  Under Section 41A, the offence under this Act  

are  made  cognizable  and  non-bailable.   Section  55  

onwards provides for penalties under the Act for various  

offences.  Section 55 speaks about the illegal import  

and is a general section which speaks about the effects  

of the contravention of the Act or rules or orders made  

thereunder relating to the import, export, manufacture  

of liquor tapping of toddy, drawing of toddy from any  

tree, construction of any distillery, brewery, winery or  

other manufactory in which liquor is manufactured, used,  

or  possession  of  any  materials,  still,  utensils,  

implements or apparatus etc. bottling of liquor for sale  

of  liquor  or  any  intoxicating  drug.   The  punishment  

provided in this Section is 10 years’ imprisonment with  

fine which shall not be less than Rs.1 lakh, excepting  

for clauses (d) and (e), where punishment is of one year  

imprisonment.  This punishment has been brought in by  

way of an amendment by Act 16 of 1997 before which the  

punishment was merely two years and with fine of not  

less  than  Rs.20,000/-.   There  was  a  gruesome  liquor  

tragedy  in  Earnakulam  district  in  the  year  1982  

resulting in loss of eye-sight and physical incapacity  

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in  case  of  several  persons  and,  therefore,  severe  

penalties were provided for those who were responsible  

for  adulteration  of  liquor  and  its  sale.   These  

punishments were made further stringent by the Amendment  

Act  No.12  of  1995.   In  short,  the  stringency  was  

introduced  in  order  to  check  the  sale  of  spurious  

liquor.   The  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  for  

Amendment Act 21 of 1984, 12 of 1995, 4 of 1996 and 16  

of 1997 suggest the reasons why deterrent punishments  

were provided for the offence under the Act.  Original  

Section 57 provided the punishment for adulteration by  

the licenced vendor or manufacturer.   A new Section was  

added by Amendment Act No.21 of 1984 being Section 57A  

which is the most relevant section for our purpose.  The  

Section reads as under:-  

“57A. For adulteration of liquor or intoxicating drug  with  noxious  substances,  etc.-(1)  whoever  mixes  or  permits  to  be  mixed  any  noxious  substance  or  any  substance which is likely to endanger human life or to  cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or  intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable.

(i) if, as a result of such act, grievous hurt is caused  to any person, with imprisonment for a term which shall  not  be  less  than  two  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to  fifty thousand rupees;

(ii) if, as a result of such act, death is caused to any  person,  with  death  or  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  shall not be less than three years but which may extend  to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend  to fifty thousand rupees;

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(iii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term  which shall not be less than one year, but which may  extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to  twenty-five thousand rupees.

Explanation- for the purpose of this section and section  57B the expression ‘grievous hurt’ shall have the same  meaning as in section 320 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  (Central Act 45 of 1860).

(2)  whoever  omits  to  take  reasonable  precautions  to  prevent  the  mixing  of  any  noxious  substance  or  any  substance which is likely to endanger human life or to  cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or  intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, punishable-

(i) if as a result of such omission, grievous hurt is  caused to any person, with imprisonment for a term which  shall not be less than two years but which may extend to  imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to  fifty thousand rupees;

(ii) if as a result of such omission, death is caused to  any person, with imprisonment for a term which shall not  be  less  than  three  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment  for  life,  and  with  the  fine  which  may  extend to fifty thousand rupees;

(iii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term  which shall not be less than one year but which may  extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to  twenty-five thousand rupees.

(3) whoever possesses any liquor or intoxicating drug in  which any substance referred to in sub-section (1) is  mixed, knowing that such substance is mixed with such  liquor  or  intoxicating  drug  shall,  on  conviction,  be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not  be less than one year but may extend to ten years, and  with  fine  which  may  extend  to  twenty-five  thousand  rupees.

(4) notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of  Criminal  Procedure, 1973  (Central Act  2 of  1974), no  person  accused or  convicted of  an offence  under sub- section (1) or sub-section (3) shall, if in custody, be  released on bail or on his own bond, unless –

(a)  the prosecution  has been  given an  opportunity to  oppose the application for such release, and

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(b) where the prosecution opposes the application, the  Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for  believing that he is not guilty of such offence.

(5)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Indian  Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)-

(a) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under  sub section (1) or sub-section (2) the burden of proving  that he has not mixed or permitted to be mixed or, as  the case may be, omitted to take reasonable precautions  to prevent the mixing of, any substance referred to in  that sub-section with any liquor or intoxicating drug  shall be on him;

(b) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under  sub-section (3) for being in possession of any liquor or  intoxicating drug in which any substance referred to in  sub-section (1) is mixed, the burden of proving that he  did not know that such substance was mixed with such  liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him.”

19. A plain reading of the Section would mean that now  

the offence is not limited to the licence holders, but  

refers to anybody who mixes or permits to be mixed any  

noxious substance or any substance which is likely to  

endanger  human  life  with  any  liquor.   The  Section,  

therefore,  is extremely  general.  In addition  to the  

mixing or permitting to be mixed, sub-section (2) brings  

in the dragnet of the offence, a person who omits to  

take reasonable precaution to prevent the mixing of any  

noxious substance.  It is significant to note that if,  

as a result of such act of mixing of the liquor with  

noxious  or  dangerous  substance  death  is  caused,  the  

extreme penalty of death also is provided. Imprisonment  

provided is for a term not less than three years but  

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which may extend to imprisonment for life as also with a  

fine of Rs.50,000/-.  Similar such penalties provided in  

sub-section  2(ii)  and  sub-section  2(iii)  are  also  

relevant providing for residuary cases. Section 3 is the  

punishment for possession of any liquor or intoxicating  

drug which is mixed with noxious substance or dangerous  

drug knowing it to be so.  Sub-section (4) prohibits the  

bail and the conditions for grant thereof.  Sub-section  

(5) which is the most important section, puts the burden  

of proving that the accused has not mixed or permitted  

to  be  mixed  or  has  not  omitted  to  take  reasonable  

precautions  to prevent  the mixing,  is on  the accused  

himself.  Similarly, the burden would be on the accused  

to prove that while he was in possession of such liquor  

mixed with noxious or dangerous substance, he did not  

know  that such  substance was  mixed with  such liquor.  

Section 58 speaks for the possession of illicit liquor.  

At this juncture, we need not go to the other offences  

of the Indian Penal Code like murder, attempt to murder  

etc.  In this case, the charge is predominantly under  

Sections 55 (a), (g), (h), (i) 57A and 58 of the Abkari  

Act.

20. Since  the  burden  to  prove  the  offence  which  

normally  lies  on  the  prosecution  under  the  criminal  

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jurisprudence  was shifted  to the  accused, it  was but  

natural that the constitutional validity of the Section  

came to be challenged.  However, in P.N. Krishna Lal &  

Ors. v. Govt. of Kerala & Anr. reported in 1995 Suppl.  

(2) SCC 187, this Court proceeded to uphold the same.  

While upholding the constitutional validity, the Court  

has in detail explained the mode of proof by prosecution  

and the extent of burden of proof which lies on the  

accused.  The challenge which was made to the validity  

of  the  Section  was  on  the  basis  of  the  Universal  

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International  

Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to  

which  India  is  a  member  which  guarantee  fundamental  

freedom and liberty to the accused.  It was suggested  

that in criminal jurisprudence it was settled law that  

it was on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients  

of the offence with which the accused has been charged.  

It  was  suggested  that  Sub-section  (5)  relieves  the  

prosecution  of  its  duty  to  prove  its  case  beyond  

reasonable doubt which is incumbent under the Code and  

the Evidence Act and makes the accused to disprove the  

prosecution  case.  Thereby,  the  substantive  provisions  

and the burden of proof not only violate the fundamental  

human rights but, also fundamental rights under Articles  

20(3) and 14. The provision was criticized as arbitrary,  

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unjust and unfair and infringing upon the right to life  

and  unjust  procedure  violating  the  guarantee  under  

Article 21 also. The provision was also criticized as  

providing  unconscionable  procedure.   It  was  further  

suggested that though Sections 299 and 300 of IPC make a  

distinction between culpable homicide and murder but the  

Amendment  Act  has  done  away  with  this  salutary  

distinction and mere death of a person by consumption of  

adulterated  arrack,  makes  the  offender  liable  for  

conviction  and  imprisonment  for  life  or  penalty  of  

death. It was further suggested that mere negligence in  

taking  reasonable  precaution  to  prevent  mixing  of  

noxious substance or any other substance with arrack or  

Indian made foreign liquor or intoxicating foreign drug  

was  made  punishable  with  minimum  sentence  was  harsh,  

unjust  and  excessive  punishment  offending  Articles  14  

and 21 of the Constitution of India.  Section 58B which  

was also challenged was severally criticized as being  

unfair  and  unjust.   It  was  further  suggested  that  

presumption envisaged in sub-section (5) of section 57-A  

per se violated the fundamental rights and the Universal  

Declaration.   It  was  further  criticized  that  mere  

possession of adulterated liquor without any intent to  

sell,  to  become  a  presumptive  evidence  to  impose  

punishment  without  the  prosecution  proving  that  the  

2

person in possession was not a bona fide consumer or had  

its possession without animus to sell for consumption  

and  place  the  burden  on  the  accused  to  prove  his  

innocence is procedure, which is unjust and oppressive  

violating  the  cardinal  principles  of  proof  of  crime  

beyond  reasonable  doubt.   The  Section  was  also  

criticized  for  the  excess  of  proportionality  for  

imposition  of  sentence.   Further  the  Section  was  

criticized on the ground that compelling the accused to  

state the facts constituting offence under Section 57A  

by operation of sub-section (5) was opposed to mandate  

of Article 20 (3) amounted to and compelled him to be a  

witness  to prove  his innocence.   While  commenting on  

Article 20 (3), this Court referred to  R.C. Cooper v.  

Union of India  reported as  1970 (1) SCC 248 as also  

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569] where  

it was held that freedom could not last long unless it  

was coupled with order, freedom can never exist without  

order and both freedom and order may co-exist.  It was  

observed that Liberty must be controlled in the interest  

of the society but the social interest must never be  

overbearing to justify total deprivation of individual  

liberty.   It  was  then  stated  that  liberty  would  not  

always be an absolute licence but must arm itself within  

the confines of law, In other words, there can be no  

2

liberty  without  social  restraint.  The  Court  also  

observed that the liberty of each citizen is borne of  

and must be subordinated to the liberty of the greatest  

number.  The Court observed that common happiness is an  

end of the society, lest lawlessness and anarchy should  

tamper social wheel and harmony and powerful courses or  

forces would be at work to undermine social welfare and  

order. The Court then observed in paragraph 24 as under:

“The State has the power to prohibit trade or business  which are illegal, immoral or injurious to the health  and welfare of the people. No one has the right to carry  on  any  trade  or  occupation  or  business  which  is  inherently vicious and pernicious and is condemned by  all  civilized  societies.  Equally  no  one  could  claim  entitlement to carry on any trade or business or any  activities  which  are  criminal  and  immoral  or  in  any  articles of goods which are obnoxious and injurious to  the safety and health of general public. There is no  inherent  right  in  crime.  Prohibition  of  trade  or  business of noxious or dangerous substance or goods, by  law is in the interest of social welfare.”

21. Coming to the burden of proof, the Court observed  

that  though  in  civilized  criminal  jurisprudence  the  

accused is presumed to be innocent unless he is found  

guilty and though the burden of proof always is on the  

prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt  

yet the rule gets modulated with the march of time.  The  

Court referred to the absolute right of the state to  

regulate production, transport, storage, possession and  

sale of liquor or intoxicating drug and held that the  

2

accused did not have the absolute right to business or  

trade  of  liquor.   The  Court  also  referred  to  the  

prohibitions regarding mixing of noxious substance with  

liquor or possession thereof and further held that the  

State  possessed the  right to  complete control  on all  

kinds  of  intoxicants.   The  Court  found  that  the  

regulation of sale of potable liquor prevents reckless  

propensity for adulterating liquor to make easy gain at  

the cost of health and precious life of consumer.  The  

Court also noted the object of the Amendment Act which  

was  to  prevent  recurrence  of  large  scale  deaths  or  

grievous  hurt  to  the  consumers  of  adulterated  liquor  

mixed with noxious substance.  Referring to a judgment  

reported as Salabiaku v. Grance [1988] 13 EHRR 379, the  

Court observed that the national legislature would be  

free to strip the Trial Court of any genuine power of  

assessment and deprive the presumption of innocence of  

its  substance,  if  the  words  'according  to  law' were  

construed  exclusively  with  reference  to  domestic  law.  

It  was  held  in  that  case  that  Article  6  (2)  of  the  

Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not refer to  

presumption  of  fact  or  of  law  provided  for  in  the  

criminal law with indifference.  It requires States to  

confine them within reasonable limits which take into  

account the importance of that is at stake and maintain  

2

the rights of the defence.  Providing exceptions or to  

place partial burden on the accused was not violative of  

universal declaration of human rights or even Convention  

on Civil or Political Rights.  The Court then referred  

to the reported decisions in UK, Hong Kong, Malaysia,  

USA, Australia and Canada to find the permissible limits  

of burden of proof of the accused.  The Court referred  

to the decisions in Woolmington v. Director of Public  

Prosecutions,  (1935) A.C. 462; Mancini v. Director of  

Public  Prosecutions,  (1942)  A.C.  1;  Reg.  v.  Edwards  

[1975]  Q.B.  27; Ong  Ah  Chuan  v.  Public  Prosecutor,  

(1981) A.C. 648; Queen v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R, (4th) 200; Ed  

Tumey  v.  State  of  Ohio,  (71)  L.Ed.  749; Morrison  v.  

California, 78 Law. Ed.664; United States v. Gainey, 13,  

Law. Ed. 2nd. p. 658; Barnes v. United States, 412 US  

837;  In  County  Court  of  Ulster,  New  York  v.  Samuel  

Allen, 442 US 140; Herman Solem v. Jerry Buckley Helm,  

463 US 277; Timothy F. Leary v. U.S., 395 US 6, which  

were the foreign Court judgments to the issue of burden  

of proof.  The Court also referred to Sections 5, 6,  

101, 105 and 106 as also to Sections 113A and 114A of  

the Indian Evidence Act and relied on the observations  

made in Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, [1956] SCR  

199.  Further the Court also referred to C.S.D. Swamy v.  

The  State,  [1960]  1  SCR  461 and  commented  on  the  

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presumptions raised under the Prevention of Corruption  

Act.  The Court observed in para 39 as under:

“39.It  is  the  cardinal  rule  of  our  criminal  jurisprudence that the burden in the web of proof of an  offence would always lie upon the prosecution to prove  all  the  facts  constituting  the  ingredients  beyond  reasonable doubt. If there is any reasonable doubt, the  accused  is entitled  to the  benefit of  the reasonable  doubt. At no stage of the prosecution case, the burden  to disprove the fact would rest on the defence. However,  exceptions have been provided in sections 105 and 106 of  the Evidence Act, as stated hereinbefore. Section 113-A  of the Evidence Act raises a presumption as to abatement  of suicide by a married woman by her husband or his  relatives. Similarly section 114-A raises presumption of  absence of consent in a rape case. Several statutes also  provided  evidential  burden  on  the  accused.  On  the  general question of the burden of proof of facts within  special knowledge of the accused, this Court, in Shambu  Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, [1956] SCR 199, laid the  rule thus :-

"Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not abrogate the  well-established  rule  of  criminal  law  that  except  in  very exceptional classes of cases the burden that lies  on the prosecution to prove its case never shifts and  section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution  of  that  burden.  On  the  contrary,  it  seeks  to  meet  certain exceptional cases where it is impossible, or a  proportionately  difficult,  for  the  prosecution  to  establish  facts  which  are  especially  within  the  knowledge of the accused and which can be proved by him  without difficulty or inconvenience."

The Court further observed in para 46:

“46. It is thus settled law even under general criminal  jurisprudence that sections 105 and 106 of the Evidence  Act place a part of the burden of proof on the accused  to prove facts which are within his  knowledge when the  prosecution establishes the ingredients of the offence  charged, the burden shifts on to the accused to prove  certain  facts  within  his  knowledge  or  exceptions  to  which he is entitled to. Based upon the language in the  statute the burden of proof varies. However, the test of  

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proof of preponderance of probabilities is the extended  criminal jurisprudence and the burden of proof is not as  heavy as on the prosecution.  Once the accused succeeds  in showing, by preponderance of probabilities that there  is  reasonable doubt  in his  favour, the  burden shifts  again on to the prosecution to prove the case against  the accused beyond reasonable doubt, if the accused has  to  be  convicted. From  this  conceptual  criminal  jurisprudence, question emerges whether sub-section (5)  placing the burden on the accused of the facts stated  therein would offend Articles 20(3), 21 and 14 of the  Constitution.”   

   (emphasis supplied)

Further in paragraph 52, the Court observed and quoted:

“52.The question of intention bears no relevance to an  offence under section 57-A and equally of culpability or  negligence. It is seen that mixing or permitting to mix  noxious substance or any other substance with liquor or  intoxicated  drug  or  omission  to  take  reasonable  precaution or being in possession without knowledge of  its adulteration for the purpose of unjust enrichment  would be without any regard for loss of precious human  lives or grievous hurt. The legislature has noted the  inadequacy and deficiency in the existing law to meet  the menace of adulteration of liquor etc. and provided  for new offences and directed with mandatory language  protection of the health and precious lives of innocent  consumers. While interpreting the law, the court must be  cognizant  to  the  purpose  of  the  law  and  respect  the  legislative animation and effectuate the law for social  welfare.  The  legislature  enacted  deterrent  social  provisions to combat the degradation of human conduct.  These special provisions are to some extent harsh and  are a departure from normal criminal jurisprudence. But  it is not uncommon in criminal statutes. It is a special  mode  to  tackle  new  situations  created  by  human  proclivity to amass wealth at the alter of human lives.  So it is not right to read down the law.”

22. Ultimately,  in  paragraph  53  the  Court  noted  the  

object of the Amendment Act which was to put down the  

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menace  of  adulteration  of  arrack  etc.  by  prescribing  

deterrent sentences.  It held that the statute cannot be  

struck down on hypothesized individual case.  It also  

noted  that  under  the  Code,  the  accused  has  the  

opportunity before imposing sentence to adduce evidence  

even on sentence and has an opportunity to plead any  

mitigating circumstance in his favour and it would be  

for the trial judge to consider on the facts situation  

in each case the sentence to be imposed.  It held that  

all the accused are to be treated as a class and there  

was reasonable nexus between the offence created and the  

case to be dealt with, the procedure, presumption and  

burden of proof placed on the accused, are not unjust,  

unfair or unreasonable offending Articles 21 and 14.  It  

also held that the provisions did not violate Article 20  

(3) of the Constitution and thus Sections 57A and 57B  

were held to be valid.

23. In this  locus classicus this Court has described  

complete scope of section 57A as a whole with special  

reference to Section 57A (5).  It is in this backdrop of  

this  exposition  of  law  that  the  Courts  below  were  

expected to decide upon the criminality of the accused  

involved.  It will now, therefore, be our task to see  

whether  the  parameters  fixed  by  this  Court  in  the  

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aforementioned judgment have been scrupulously followed  

by the Courts below.  Our answer to this vexed question  

is in the affirmative.

24. Accused No.7

He appears to be the boss who was running this illegal  

business  of  liquor  along  with  his  family  members  

including accused Nos.A-4 and A-8 and even their wives  

were not left behind which is clear from the fact that  

they were arrayed as accused along with others but could  

not be brought to book as they were absconding and hence  

their  cases  were  separated.   It  appears  to  be  an  

admitted  position  that  shop  Nos.  1  to  26  meant  for  

selling toddy were being managed by this accused.  He  

had  the  licence  for  running  those  toddy  shops  in  

Chirayinkil Range.  He had obtained them in the auction  

using his own money. The shops were obtained in the name  

of his wife who was accused No.18 and also a relative  

being accused No.19.  This auction was held for the year  

2000-01, in March, 2000. It was only at that time that  

he realized that he had paid Rs.4 crores which may not  

be possible for him to recover if he sold only toddy  

through these 26 outlets.  The prosecution case is that,  

therefore,  he  started  procuring  illicit  ethyl  alcohol  

and  for  that  purpose  accused  No.4  and  other  accused  

3

being A-12, A-13, and A-48 helped him.  The prosecution  

alleged that methyl alcohol used to be purchased by A-17  

outside the state of Kerala and used to be supplied to  

A16 who delivered it to the godown at Pandaksala bearing  

door  No.  VI/98  of  Chirayinkil  Panchayat.   Pandaksala  

was, in one sense, a factory for the production of the  

spurious liquor as per the prosecution case. There is no  

dispute that Pandaksala godown was owned and controlled  

completely by A-7.  The prosecution alleged against him  

that A-7 was doing the business in liquor in the name of  

a firm called Ushus Traders.  His wife’s name is Usha  

and  her  younger  sister’s  name  is  Ambili  and  it  was  

alleged by the prosecution that his wife’s brother Raju  

also helped him in his business.  There was a large  

organization which becomes clear from the fact that his  

premises  were raided  by the  Income Tax  Department on  

14.10.1999.  PW-127, A. Mohan is the deputy Director of  

Income  Tax who  conducted the  raid along  with others.  

Sworn  statements  were  recorded  from  A-7  as  also  the  

original accused No.15 on that day.  Prosecution proved  

some documents relating to this raid vide Exhibits P-

335, 336, 337 and 338.  The statement of A-7 was marked  

as Exhibit P-339 while that of A-15 as Exhibit P-340.  

Statements  of  others  were  also  recorded  they  being  

Exhibits P-341, 342 and 343.  From these statements and  

3

from the documents, it became clear that a full-fledged  

business in illicit liquor was going on.  Accounts were  

contained  in  Exhibit  P-335  and  P-336.   A  bunch  of  

duplicate stickers was also found vide Exhibit P-338.  

They were of Kerala State Bewerage Corporation allegedly  

signed by the Excise Commissioner.  It came in light  

that  they  used  to  sell  arrack  in  150  litre  cover  

indicated in the accounts as letters PKT or P2 while  

toddy used to be mixed with spirit that was indicated as  

Spl.  The more potent brand which was by adding spirit  

to toddy was named as KP.  The spirit which was brought,  

of  course,  illegally  was  indicated  as  SBT.   Sale  of  

arrack in retail was indicated by MN. The accounts also  

indicated the packets given to the salesmen for sale,  

illegal  gratification  given  to  excise,  police,  

politicians  in  code  language.   The  High  Court  has  

rightly  held  that  this  could  not  bring  to  light  the  

offence under Section 57A.  However, the High Court had  

held that this went on to suggest that there was a huge  

business going on in liquor and at times by mixing toddy  

with ethyl alcohol.

25. High Court had considered the properties owned by  

A-7.   Shri  Radhakrishnan,  learned  Senior  counsel  

appearing  on behalf  of A-7  did not  seriously dispute  

3

these findings.  It is an admitted position that the  

outhouse  of  A-7  to  the  building  numbered  as  door  

No.XIII/656 bearing door No.IV/1248 and a house bearing  

door No.XIII/655 were owned by this accused.   PW-270,  

K.K.  Joswa,  conducted  a  search  in  the  outhouse  vide  

Exhibit P134 and found two tanks of 5 thousand litres  

capacity in the underground cellar of the North-Eastern  

corner of the building.  These tanks were fitted with  

PVC pipes for the purpose of filling and emptying the  

same.  The sample collected from the tanks for chemical  

analysis showed that it was ethyl alcohol.  In a raid by  

PW-249,  Rajan  John  who  was  the  Circle  Inspector  of  

Police,  Kadakkavoor,  broken  parts  of  four  synthetic  

tanks  of  5  thousand  capacity  were  found  as  also  the  

tanks of one thousand litres and synthetic tank of 5  

thousand litres were found and seized.  They were buried  

in the South-Eastern portion of the building.  Multi-

pack machine with two keys was found concealed in the  

Northern-Eastern  part  of  the  building.   PVC  pipe  

connection was seen going to the property of A-7.  The  

High Court has referred to the oral evidence and has  

also  referred  to  number  of  documents  to  show  that  

several buildings were owned, possessed and controlled  

by A-7 and his wife wherefrom A-7 conducted his liquor  

business.  Shri  Radhakrishnan  did  not  seriously  

3

contradict this finding of the High Court.

26. When  the  factory  of  A-7  was  searched  by  PW-

270,K.K.Joswa  on  18.11.2000  vide  Exhibit  P106  he  

detected underground cellar with 18 synthetic tanks of 5  

thousand capacity each arranged in two rows of nine each  

containing illicit liquor.  It is found that all these  

tanks  had  48,600  of  liquor.   PW-71,  C.  Rajan  was  a  

plumber  who  made  meticulous  arrangement  and  pipe  

connection from these synthetic tanks.  All this shows  

the huge volume of business of A-7.   

27. The  High  court  has  further  held  that  the  toddy  

business was carried on in the building where firm Ushus  

Traders was operating.  The toddy godown was just behind  

the  Ushus  office  in  building  bearing  No.CP  III/580.  

The said godown was a licenced one for conducting toddy  

shop Nos.1 to 26 of Chirayinkil village.  Two hidden  

tanks were found vide M.Os 63 and 64 and it is here that  

the liquor activities connected with business were going  

on.  The High Court has held that the registered owners  

Chellamma and Sahadevan were not in the possession of  

premises.  In this search, one tank of 5 thousand litres  

capacity, two tanks of 1 thousand capacity and one tank  

of 2 thousand capacity were seized.  So also from these  

premises the vehicles with fake numbers, they being M.O.  

3

Nos. 83, 84, 85 and 86 were seized from these premises.  

The High Court also referred to analysis of cotton swabs  

collected from this place which showed that there was  

methyl alcohol.  Still another property of 19.5 cents  

shown  as Arayathuruthu  was also  found being  owned by  

Raju who was brother of A-18.  This property was also  

used by A-7 to destroy the evidence by burning plastic  

cans and other items.  Still another property in village  

Sarkara was used by A-7 for illicit business which was  

clear  from  the  documents  seized  by  PW-256,  P.K.  

Kuttappan in the presence of PW-119, Asheraf.  The High  

Court also made reference to other properties which were  

used by A-7 for the purpose of illicit business, which  

properties belonged to mother-in-law of A-7.  The High  

Court rightly came to the conclusion that it was A-7 who  

was  controlling the  whole affair.   It  is significant  

that when trace evidence was collected from the vehicles  

seized  from  the  areas,  in  some  of  the  items  methyl  

alcohol was detected.

28. It is not as if methyl alcohol was restricted only  

to  the  above  mentioned  premises.   However,  from  the  

evidence of PW-256 it has come out that some plastic  

cans were also found in the search conducted by him in  

Thundathhil Purayidom which was in possession of accused  

3

No.7.  The chemical analysis of the contents of those  

cans  showed that  methyl alcohol  was detected  in four  

items.   In  the  toddy  godown  of  A-7  from  

Vanchiyurkadavilla  these  vehicles  were  seen  abandoned  

and from a Maruti car having registration No. PYOIN 463  

methyl alcohol was detected in the samples taken. Methyl  

alcohol was also detected from the mini lorry bearing  

registration No.KL 01 843 belonging to A-7.  Some other  

vehicles were belonging to A-4 who was none else but the  

brother of A-7 and in those vehicles also methyl alcohol  

was  detected.   The  High  Court  has  noted  the  further  

argument that the detection of methyl alcohol from the  

trace  evidence  was  not  possible.   However,  it  has  

further  observed  that  PW-233,  Sindhu,  Assistant  

Director,  Forensic  Sciences  very  clearly  deposed  that  

even if there is evaporation, even after 10 days, it is  

possible to detect the absorbed molecules of a liquid.  

It  was,  therefore,  clear  from  her  evidence  that  the  

scientific  evidence  collected  by  the  prosecution  was  

rightly relied upon by the Courts below and we also find  

no reason to reject that evidence.  Therefore, it is  

clear that methyl alcohol which was the main culprit,  

was not only a dangerously poisonous substance but was  

also  used  in  mixing  the  liquor  which  was  under  the  

control of A-7 who was being helped by his brothers,  

3

servants and relatives.  We will consider separately the  

evidence against A-4 and A-8 who were the brothers of A-

7.  However, one thing was certain that this was a huge  

well-oiled machinery for running the liquor business and  

the enormousness is mind-boggling.  All this suggests  

that A-7 was the captain of the whole team.

29. The High Court has also commented on the evidence  

of PW-61, Dennis A. and PW-57, Thulasidar and has also  

referred to the evidence of officers of BSNL, Escotel  

and BPL for the use of land phones and mobile phones and  

conversation in between A-7 and A-4 as also the others  

including the servants and relatives.  The High Court  

has then proceeded to believe the evidence that the cans  

which  were having  the illicit  liquor duly  mixed with  

methyl alcohol were removed from the godown and for this  

purpose  has relied  upon the  evidence of  C. Somarajan  

(PW-79),  the  cashier  of  the  petrol  pump  as  also  the  

evidence of PW-76, Anfar, the auto rickshaw driver who  

had seen the vehicles which were used for removing the  

liquor.

30. The reason why accused No.7 had to mix the methyl  

alcohol  and/or  methynol  is  not  far  to  see.   It  is  

clarified  from the  evidence of  PW-96, V.  Ajith Kumar  

that A-7 had put the bid of Rs. 4 crores for the 26  

4

toddy shops and even if all the toddy shops had worked  

in their full capacity he could not have recovered even  

half the amount and it was, therefore, that this idea of  

bringing ethyl alcohol, mixing it with methyl alcohol  

and  creating  various  drinks  like  Kalapani etc.  was  

mooted.  The result thereof was for all to see which  

resulted in death of 31 persons.  The High Court has  

correctly observed that the basic reason for bidding for  

26 shops for toddy was to get the legitimate godown for  

toddy.  It is proved that those godowns, instead, were  

used not for storing toddy but for storing ethyl alcohol  

and mixing it with methyl alcohol for making enormous  

profits.  It is not as if A-7 was selling only toddy.  

In  addition  to  that  he  was  creating  various  drinks  

preferably by mixing ethyl alcohol with methyl alcohol.  

Thus, there was a full liquor industry going on under  

his captainship.   

31. The last nail in the coffin is the evidence of PW-

53,  Sunil.   We  have  very  carefully  gone  through  his  

evidence and the High Court has also extensively dealt  

with his evidence.  PW-53 is a close relative of A-7 and  

worked in the godown from March, 2000.  Before that he  

was supplying spirit to A-7 from various places.  He has  

graphically  described  in  his  evidence  as  to  how  the  

4

spirit business was being done inasmuch as he deposed  

that the spirit used to be brought from the tankers and  

used to be collected in the syntex tanks and was filled  

in 35 litres cans.  This spirit was used for making a  

drink called  Kalapani by mixing with essence and some  

toddy.  It was then filled in the cans and dispatched in  

the vehicles.  The evidence of this witness further goes  

on to show the position of godown which was used for the  

storage  of  ethyl  alcohol  and  methyl  alcohol.   He  

referred to methyl alcohol as ‘essence’.  He described  

that the spirit was brought from Karnataka and essence  

used to come on Thursdays in a white Fiat car.  The Fiat  

car had a secrete chamber.  That car was identified as  

M.O.-24.  The tank and the platform were built in the  

back seat and the front seat of the car.  There were  

three  valves  attached  to  the  same  and  35  litres  of  

methyl alcohol i.e. the essence could be carried in the  

said car.  He gave a graphic description of mixture with  

spirit which ultimately was sold.  He specifically named  

A-20,  A-22,  A-23  and  A-21  who  were  supervising  the  

mixing.   In  his  evidence  he  has  also  specifically  

referred that he had seen M.O.-24, the car, importing  

the essence i.e. the methyl alcohol precisely two days  

prior to the liquor tragedy.  He has also named A-16 and  

another boy who were the occupants of the said car.  He  

4

also  suggested  that  he  and  the  other  employees  were  

filling up the essence in 10 cans.  The High Court has  

referred to the further evidence on the part of this  

witness that in the night at about 10.30 p.m. the tanker  

lorry came with spirit and the said spirit was filled in  

the syntex tank and cans.  Those half filled cans were  

then filled with the methyl alcohol meaning thereby it  

was mixed.  He then went on to depose that the employees  

of A-4, namely, A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-10 came there with  

three vehicles and essence and they mixed up the essence  

with the spirit. He claimed that in all 60 cans were  

filled  up  and  were  dispatched  in  three  cars  for  

transporting to various places for sale.  According to  

him he came to know about the Kalluvathaukkal tragedy on  

21.10.2000.  On that day at about 7.30 p.m. A-7 and 15  

came and slapped Vijayan for not properly mixing and A-7  

then  left  the  place  telling  them  to  destroy  the  

evidence.  According to him, thereafter, what was left  

in the syntex tank was poured in the river, un-used cans  

were  removed  and  plastic  covers  were  disposed  of  by  

setting fire.  A-7 had also taken adequate care to send  

away the employees for sometime and it was through him  

that the witness came to know that people had died by  

drinking the spirit supplied by A-4 and his employees  

due to a mistake in mixing by A-20 and A-22.  

4

32. Shri  Radhakrishnan,  learned  Senior  Counsel  very  

seriously  argued  that  even  if  the  evidence  of  this  

witness is entirely accepted, it does not suggest that  

A-7  himself mixed  the methyl  alcohol with  the spirit  

and, therefore, there could be no question of his being  

booked under Section 57A of the Abkari Act.  We have  

already explained the real scope of Section 57A.  For  

being convicted under that Section, it is not necessary  

that the person concerned must himself do the mixing.  

It is obvious that A-7 was the boss.  In fact PW-53  

describes him as the boss.  It is, therefore, obvious  

that everything was done as per his command and if it  

was so, then in order to be convicted under Section 57A,  

the  prosecution  is  not  required  to  prove  that  A-7  

physically  mixed  the  methyl  alcohol  or  the  injurious  

substance with the spirit.  In our opinion, even if A-7  

commanded his servants to mix up, he is equally guilty  

under  the  Section.  In  fact  illegally  importing  ethyl  

alcohol and mixing the same with methanol was a regular  

trading activity on the part of A-7.  The licences for  

running  the  toddy  shops  was  merely  a  facade.  He  had  

undoubtedly put a very tall bid for those licences and  

could not have afforded to continue merely on the basis  

of those 26 toddy shops.  The High Court has rightly  

referred to that part and we approve of the High Court’s  

4

findings  in  that  behalf.   Therefore,  he  gave  his  

business  a  complete  new  turn,  that  is,  instead   of  

selling toddy through those outlets he started selling  

alcoholic drink prepared from ethyl alcohol and methanol  

and that illegally imported both and all this was going  

on with the corrupt cooperation of those who could have  

checked it.  Therefore, it is a proved position from the  

evidence of PW-53 that A-7 was the boss of the illegal  

trade. He got the methanol imported and used his godown  

which he rightfully possessed on account of his licences  

for 26 shops.  Therefore, his knowledge that methanol  

was  being  mixed,  the  fact  that  he  was  running  the  

business along with his hirelings and the further fact  

that he used to be present at the time of the mixing are  

properly  proved  by  the  prosecution  with  the  aid  of  

testimony of PW-53 and are enough for a finding about  

Section 57A (1) (ii).

33. PW-53 very specifically deposed that on 19.10.2000  

around midnight mixing was done by A-20, 21, 22 and 23  

and that methanol was brought by A-16 in the Fiat car  

with secrete chambers and ethyl alcohol was brought by  

PW-48, K. Sivaram in a truck to the Pandaksala godown.  

There can be no doubt that PW-53 was present there and  

had  seen  this.   Shri  Radhakrishnan  tried  to  take  

4

advantage of this evidence suggesting that it was A-20  

to  23  who  were  actually  mixing  methanol  which  was  

delivered by the workers of A-4 from the godown in the  

very same night.  From this, Shri Radhakrishnan tried to  

argue that it was not actually mixed by A-7.  It was  

clear that this mixing took place at Pandaksala godown  

owned by A-7.  Shri Radhakrishnan also pointed out that  

the High Court had held that the accused No.7 was liable  

to be convicted for offence under Section 57A (1) (ii).  

It was also pointed out by him that the High Court had  

observed that he could not be convicted under Section  

57A (1) (i) and (iii).  In short, the contention is that  

since according to the evidence of PW-53, A-7 had not  

himself  mixed  or  did  not  permit  to  be  mixed  noxious  

substance endangering the human life with any liquor or  

intoxicating  drug A-7  could not  be convicted  for the  

offence under Section 57 A 1 (ii) also.   

34. The  argument  is  clearly  fallacious.   We  have  

already pointed out that it was not necessary that A-7  

had physically mixed the methyl alcohol for his being  

convicted.   It  was  actually  done  on  his  command  and  

within his knowlege.  His offence could also come within  

the  definition  on  account  of  the  other  words  of  the  

Section ‘or permits to be mixed’.  While interpreting  

4

these words, namely,  ‘whoever mixes or permits to be  

mixed’ the real import of the words would have to be  

taken into consideration and thereby if A-7 directed his  

servants to mix methanol with methyl alcohol that would  

also be covered within the scope of the words ‘mixes or  

permits to be mixed’ in the Section.  It has already  

come in the evidence that all this mixing was done at  

the  instance  of,  with  the  direction  of  and  to  the  

knowledge of the accused No.7. He was the king pin or  

the main actor on whom the huge business of liquor trade  

rested.   It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  

conviction under section 57A (1) (ii) was in any manner  

incorrect.  Of course that would be only and only if the  

evidence of PW-53 along with other relevant witnesses  

held to be reliable.   

35. There is no reason for us to discard the testimony  

of PW-53 which was read word to word before us by Shri  

Radhakrishnan.   We  find  that  the  evidence  was  most  

natural and was not shaken in any manner in his cross-

examination.   He  has  given  a  complete  graphic  

description of what happened.  He claimed that he was  

working  with  A-7  from  March,  2000  in  the  godown  and  

before that he used to supply spirit in different places  

for A-7.  He gave the names of persons working in the  

4

Pandaksala godown.  He referred to methanol as ‘essence’  

and pointed out that essence was added to the spirit  

collected in syntax tank to make  Kalapani  and then it  

used to be filled in the plastic vessels having capacity  

of 35 litres.  He pointed out that the spirit was poured  

in  the  small  syntax  tanks  and  little  toddy,  water,  

powder etc. were mixed and essence used to be added to  

it and that substance and then it used to be filled in  

the  bottles.  He  gave  graphically  the  details  of  the  

operations and also deposed that apart from the 26 toddy  

shops, his boss was running 75 shops without licences  

and it was a small scale industry.  He asserted that it  

is only the things supplied by the boss which are sold  

in those shops.  He asserted that when the essence was  

mixed in the spirit the vitality would increase.  He  

also described the role of Anil Kumar (A-16) who used to  

bring essence and come only on certain days in month  

mostly on Thursdays.  He also described the Fiat car and  

the secret tank and pointed out that the essence brought  

therein  used  to  be  filled  in  plastic  vessels  having  

capacity of 35 litres through hose and by using hand  

motor and essence used to be added to the spirit in the  

tank and then the concoction used to be supplied for  

sale.  He spoke about the night when the whole operation  

took place and involved A-4, A-22 and A-21.  He pointed  

4

out  that  alcohol  came  in  the  tanker  at  night.   The  

concoction  was  prepared  by  accused  Vijayan,  Suresh,  

Monkuttan and Rasool.  Three cars came thereafter being  

white Maruti Van, red Maruti car and Blue Maruti car.  

After mixing, the cars were sent of.  The said material  

was taken to the dealers of A-7.  He has also spoken as  

to what happened on 21.10.2000 when accused Balachandran  

and A-7 came and A-7 gave a beating to Vijayan asking  

him as to how mixing was not properly done.  He then  

directed the whole remaining material to be poured into  

the river and to destroy the cans.  Accordingly, as per  

the  direction, the  concoction in  the Syntex  tank was  

poured in the river and the cans and the covers were  

burnt and buried under the sand.  He pointed out that  

the essence mixed spirit was taken to the shed belonging  

to  A-7  Attukadavu.   He  spoke  about  the  electronic  

machine,  hand machine  and the  process of  filling the  

concoction in the plastic cans.  He pointed out that on  

that day all the plastic covers were burnt by them.  A-7  

had also directed the witness and the other servants to  

remain  absconding.   In  his  cross-examination,  he  not  

only identified A-7 but called him Boss and Annan, elder  

brother. Some irrelevant questions were put to him which  

he answered suggesting that the property belonged to A-7  

and the godown also belonged to him and the mixing used  

4

to be done there only.   

36. We  have  seen  the  whole  evidence  very  carefully.  

Though  he  was  subjected  to  lengthy  cross-examination,  

the main story about the mixing has not suffered any  

dent.  On the other hand, the operation of mixing was  

explained again in the cross-examination.  He owned up  

that he himself carried Kalapani on number of occasions  

to the various shops of A-7. The evidence given by this  

witness  sounds  truthful  because  he  has  not  tried  to  

justify  himself  nor  has  he  made  any  efforts  to  save  

himself.  Most of the cross-examination was stereotyped,  

limiting to the minor omissions in his statement under  

Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.  Even at the instance of the  

other accused persons, nothing much has come about in  

his cross-examination.  In his cross-examination by A-4,  

he again explained the role of Anil Kumar who brought  

methanol and asserted the role played by A-4.  In the  

cross-examination by A-5, A-6, and A-1 also merely some  

omissions  were  brought  which  were  insignificant.  

However, considering the whole evidence, this witness is  

creditworthy.   

37. Shri Radhakrishnan, however, pointed out that the  

evidence of this witness is in the nature of evidence of  

an accomplice and has to be red in the light of Section  

5

133 and Section 114B of the Indian Evidence Act and that  

he  also  reiterated  the  settled  principles  that  an  

accomplice  must  be  tested  with  respect  to  his  

reliability and if he is unreliable his evidence cannot  

be the basis of the prosecution case. Learned counsel  

further  argued that  if the  witness is  found reliable  

then  his  evidence  must  be  corroborated  in  material  

particulars.  Learned senior counsel relied on Shankar @  

Gauri Shankar v. State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (4) SCC 478]  

as  also  Rampal  Pithwa  Rahidas  v.State  of  Maharashtra  

(1994)  Suppl.  (2)  SCC  73,  more  particularly,  in  

paragraphs 14 and 15 in the previous case and paragraph  

9 in the latter case.  

38. Shri Radhakrishnan further argued that the witness  

had stated that he was in good terms with A-7 and that  

he did not quarrel with A-7.  This was suggested as a  

strange conduct.  He also pointed out that the witness  

had stated that he had acted under the instructions of  

his boss.  It is seen from the evidence that he was a  

minion of his boss i.e. A-7 and he answered that he gave  

all the answers to the police as per the instructions  

given to him by A-7 there is nothing unnatural in it.  

He  was  a  very  small  fry  as  compared  to  a  mighty  

businessman  like  A-7  and  it  was  suggested  by  Shri  

5

Radhakrishnan  that  his  evidence  did  suggest  that  his  

behaviour was strange.  Shri Radhakrishnan insisted that  

this witness was insisting that he had good relations  

with  A-7  and  yet  he  deposed  against  A-7  and  this,  

amounted  to  strange  behaviour.   Under  the  peculiar  

circumstances of this case considering the position of  

this witness vis-à-vis A-7, we do not think that this  

amounts to a very strange behaviour on account of which  

this  witness should  be stamped  with as  an unreliable  

witness.  Shri Radhakrishnan pointed out that PW-53 was  

under the tutelage of the police from 20th November and  

was tutored by the police.  His Section 164 statement  

seems to have been recorded on 15th January and Section  

161  statement was  prior to  that.  Shri Radhakrishnan  

pointed  out  that  both  his  statements  were  clubbed  

together and there he himself admitted having committed  

the offence under the Abkari Act.  Shri Radhakrishanam,  

therefore, argued that the police should have arrested  

him but the police neither arrested him nor included him  

in  the  array  of  accused.   Instead  the  prosecution  

planted  him  as  a  prosecution  witness.   In  that  the  

learned counsel further argued that the prosecution did  

not also resort to the procedure under section 306 for  

claiming pardon for the witness nor did not prosecution  

join him later on as an accused under section 319 of the  

5

Cr.P.C.  The  learned  counsel  further  argued  that  the  

police were very soft towards PW-53 who was an accused  

in two Abkari cases.  He was also immediately granted  

bail in those cases and, therefore, the prosecution had  

acted it in an unfair manner.  Learned senior counsel  

also suggested that PW-53 was on inimical terms towards  

A-7  and,  therefore,  his  evidence  would  have  to  be  

evaluated with caution.  Shri Radhakrishnan also urged  

that  there  were  number  of  prevarications,  

inconsistencies,  discrepancies,  improvements  and  

omissions  in  the  testimony  of  PW-53  which  were  

highlighted by the learned counsel.  Ultimately it was  

argued  that  his  evidence  was  even  not  materially  

corroborated.  

39. Learned counsel also argued that the evidence of  

PW-53 could not materially prove ingredients of offence,  

namely, mixes or permits to be mixes, under section 57A  

(1)  (i)  at  Pandaksala  godown.   Sudheer,  PW-60  was  

described as a planted witness while Dennis A.(PW-61)  

was said to be a chance witness.  It was also argued  

that at the most A-7 could have been convicted under  

section 55 (a) (g) (h) (i) and 58 of the Abkari Act as  

it was not proved that he had mixed or permitted to mix  

methanol with ethyl alcohol for selling the same in the  

5

market.  Shri Radhakrishnan also argued that though the  

burden  of  proof  under  Section  57A  (5)  was  on  the  

accused, the prosecution has miserably failed to project  

the case of Section57A (1) (i) and (ii) and the accused  

has discharged his burden under Section 55 by adverting  

to the evidence in the case in hand.   

40. Lastly, it was pointed that there was no question  

of any conspiracy and even if there was any conspiracy  

all the links in the conspiracy were snapped by A-13, 14  

and 48. It was pointed out that in fact it was A-17 who  

had  placed  the  order  for  methanol  with  the  chemical  

company and entrusted the two barrels of methanol to A-

16 to import the same to Kerala.  However, A-17 stood  

acquitted.   So  also  A-12,  13,  143  and  48  who  were  

alleged to have brought ethyl alcohol for mixing were  

also  acquitted.  Therefore, it  was suggested  that no  

ethyl alcohol was brought at all and the methanol was  

also not mixed much less at the instance of A-7.  

41. Before we consider the other contentions which we  

have  referred  to  in  the  earlier  paragraphs,  we  must  

first  consider  the  argument  of  Shri  Radhakrishnan  

regarding PW-53 being an accomplice and the so-called  

unfairness on the part of prosecution in not prosecuting  

him or not proceeding under section 306 Cr.P.C.  The  

5

learned  Counsel  was  vociferous  in  further  suggesting  

that  the  evidence  of  this  witness  firstly  is  not  

reliable  as  it  is  not  corroborated  in  material  

particulars as required under section 133 and 114 B of  

the Indian Evidence Act.  We have already pointed out  

that his evidence was generally found to be reliable as  

there is very little in his cross-examination which will  

destroy his testimony or would even affect it in any  

manner.  In fact it was not our task, in the Supreme  

Court to re-appreciate the evidence, particularly, when  

both the Courts below have not only appreciated it but  

have accepted the same after thoroughly discussing the  

intricacies  and  the  small  little  details  of  his  

evidence.  However, we have done that exercise in the  

light of the contention raised that this witness was not  

reliable  and  was  not  corroborated  in  material  

particulars.   In  fact  there  are  very  weighty  

corroborations to the evidence of this witness.  We must  

refer  to  the  evidence  of  PW-60,  Sudheer  who  is  the  

driver.  He deposed that he got acquainted with A-16,  

Anil Kumar and he assured him of a job.  It was at his  

instance that he went to Husur and he was engaged to  

drive the Fiat car which was to collect some material  

from  there  to  Chirayinkeezhu.   He  thus,  went  to  

Chirayankeezhu in the car having registration No. TMY  

5

8746.  He referred to the secret chamber in that car and  

through his conversation with A-16, he also came to know  

that the material that he was carrying in the secret  

chamber was poison.  He referred to the godown of A-7  

which was 6-7 Kms. away from Atitingal Junction.  He  

also met A-7 and said that he used to pay the price of  

the stuff and in his absence, Manikantan @ Kochani (A-4)  

used  to  make  the  payment.  He  referred  to  the  last  

Thursday when claimed that he had brought the stuff to  

Chirayinkeezhu and came to know about the liquor tragedy  

on Sunday when he was in Husur.  He has deposed that the  

stuff  which  he  brought  on  Thursday  in  the  car  was  

unloaded in A-7’s godown and on that day A-7’s workers  

were there.  This evidence is in complete corroboration  

of the evidence of PW-53 in whose presence the car was  

brought  by  A-16,  Anil  Kumar.   He  described  that  the  

stuff  which  was  purchased  used  to  be  filled  in  the  

secret chambers of the car and after the tragedy, he was  

also told by A-16 to leave the place. The witness had  

also identified A-7 and A-16 as also A-4, Kochani.  He  

also identified the Fiat car. It is to be noted that  

when  the  samples  were  taken  from  this  car,  it  was  

positive for methanol.  Shri Radhakrishnan also did not  

contest this position.  Most of his cross-examination is  

irrelevant.  Some irrelevant and inadmissible questions  

5

were  also  put  to  him  in  the  cross-examination  in  

relation to his statement to the police.  It was tried  

to be suggested that the stuff that he had brought in  

that  car  was  not  methanol  or  poison.   However,  his  

evidence on the whole establishes that he had met Anil  

Kumar and was working for him.  Apart from A-7, there  

was cross-examination at the instance of A-17, A-16 and  

A-4.  There will be no question about A-17 since he has  

already  been  acquitted.   However,  we  do  not  find  

anything suspicious in the evidence of this witness even  

in his cross-examination of A-16 and A-4.  This witness  

has been believed by the Trial Court and the appellate  

Court and, in our opinion, the evidence of this witness  

provides complete corroboration to the evidence of PW-

53.  This is apart from the fact that there is another  

piece of evidence which corroborates the evidence of PW-

53 which is to be found in the evidence of K. K. Joshua,  

PW-270.   The  description  given  by  the  Investigating  

Officer, K.K. Joshua on his searches of the places and,  

more particularly, of the places as described by PW-53  

completely tallies. These are also material particulars  

which  would  lend  support  to  the  testimony  of  PW-53.  

Shri Joshua has given the graphic description of all the  

places where the activity of mixing used to go on.  He  

has also spoken about all the six vehicles found on the  

5

spot  and  some  of  which  were  with  fake  registration  

number.   He  has  spoken  about  the  search  at  Tabuk  

Industries  where  a  black  can  having  capacity  of  10  

litres was found and on eastern side of that building  

there was a platform build and near it pump sets and  

hoses were also kept.  He has referred to the liquid  

which  was  collected.   He  has  also  spoken  about  the  

synthetic tank having capacity of five thousand litres  

which was kept on the platform.  He has also referred to  

the  synthetic  tank  with  spirit  found  there.   He  had  

taken samples D-1 to D-18 which were ultimately found  

with  ethyl  alcohol.   He  had  also  searched  the  toddy  

godown in Ushus building which was on the southern side  

of Ushus building at Pandaksala.   He has also spoken  

about the Pattarumadom house of A-7 at Kunthalloor where  

also two underground cellars were found wherefrom also  

he  collected  samples.   He  has  also  referred  to  

Chirayinkil  where cans  were recovered.   On  the whole  

there are number of other corroborations to the evidence  

of PW-53.  The Trial Court and the appellate Court have  

referred  to the  said corroborations  and have  given a  

finding that his evidence was materially corroborated in  

material particulars.  In that view we need not take on  

ourselves  the  task  of  referring  to  all  the  

corroborations.  In paragraph 69 of the judgment of the  

5

appellate  Court,  the  discussion  has  come  about  the  

evidence of this witness and we are satisfied by that.  

The appellate Court has also discussed about the ill-

effects of methanol and has recorded a finding that the  

samples  taken  from  the  place  belonging  to  A-7,  more  

particularly,  the  syntax  tanks,  cans  and  other  

equipments, it was found that there was ethyl alcohol  

and methanol.  We are satisfied with the findings given  

by  the  appellate  court  and  the  Trial  Court  and,  

therefore, we accept the evidence of this witness.

42. The argument raised was that this evidence could  

not  be  taken  into  consideration  and  it  would  be  

inadmissible  because  this  witness,  though  was  an  

accomplice he was neither granted pardon under Section  

306 Cr.P.C. nor was he prosecuted and the prosecution  

unfairly presented him as a witness for the prosecution.  

The  contention  is  clearly  incorrect  in  view  of  the  

decision of this Court in  Laxmipat Choraria & Ors. V.  

State Of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 938]. While commenting  

on this aspect, Hidayatullah, J. observed in paragraph  

13  that  there  were  number  of  decisions  in  the  High  

Courts in which the examination of one of the suspects  

as the witness was not held to be legal and accomplice  

5

evidence  was  received  subject  to  safeguards  as  

admissible evidence in the case. The Court held:

“On the side of the State many cases were cited from the  High Courts in India  in which the examination of one of  the suspects as a witness  was not held to  be illegal  and  accomplice   evidence  was  received  subject  to  safeguards   as  admissible  evidence  in  the  case.   In  those cases, s. 342  of the Code and s. 5 of the Indian  Oaths Act  were  considered and the word 'accused' as  used  in  those  sections  was  held  to  denote  a  person  actually on trial before a court and not  a person who  could have been so tried.  The witness was, of course,  treated  as  an  accomplice.   The  evidence  of  such  an  accomplice was received with necessary caution in those  cases. These cases  have  all been  mentioned  in  In re  Kandaswami  Gounder(2), and it is not necessary to refer  to them  in detail here.  The leading cases are: Queen  Emperor  v.Mona  Puna  (3),  Banu  Singh  v.  Emperor(4),  Keshav  Vasudeo Kortikar v. Emperor(5 ) , Empress v.  Durant(6)  Akhoy Kumar  Mookerjee v. Emperor(7), A.  V.  Joseph v. Emperor() Amdumiyan  and others v. Crown(8),  Galagher v. Emperor(10), and  Emperor  v. Har Prasad,  Bhargava(11).  In these cases (and several others cited  and, relied upon in them) it has been consistently held  that the evidence of an accomplice may be read although  he could have been tried jointly with the accused.  In  some of these cases the evidence was re-ceived although  the  procedure of  s. 337,  Criminal Procedure  Code was  applicable but was not followed.  It is not necessary to  deal  with  this  question  any  further  because  the  consensus of opinion in India is that the competency of  an  accomplice is  not destroyed  because he  could have  been tried jointly with the accused but was not and was  instead made to give evidence in the case.  Section 5 of  the Indian Oaths Act and s. 342 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure do not stand in the way of such a procedure.”

The Court finally observed:

“It  is  not  necessary  to  deal  with  this  question  any  further  because the  consensus of  opinion in  India is  that the competency of an accomplice is not destroyed  because  he  could  have  been  tried  jointly  with  the  accused  but  was  not  and  was  instead  made  to  give  evidence in the  case.”

6

The Court has also observed in paragraph 11:

The position that emerges is this : No pardon could be  tendered to Ethyl Wong because the pertinent provisions  did not apply. Nor could she be prevented from making a  disclosure, if  she  was so minded.  The prosecution was  not  bound  to prosecute  her, if  they  thought  that  her  evidence was necessary  to  break  a smugglers'  ring.   Ethyl  Wong  was protected  by  s. 132 (proviso)  of the Indian  Evidence Act even if she gave evidence  incriminating  herself.   She  was  a  competent  witness  although  her  evidence  could  only  be received  with  the caution  necessary  in  all  accomplice evidence.  The expression 'criminal proceeding' in the exclusionary  clause of s. 5 of the Indian Oaths Act  cannot be used  to widen the meaning of the word accused.  The same  expression  is  used  in  the  proviso  to  S.  132  of  the  Indian Evidence  Act  and there it means a criminal  trial  and not investigation. The same meaning must be  given  to  the exclusionary clause of s. 5 of the Indian  Oaths Act to make it -conform to the provisions in pari  materia to be found in Ss. 342, 342A of the Code and s.  132 of the Indian  Evidence Act.   The  expression is  also  not  rendered superfluous  because if given the  meaning accepted by us it limits, the operation   of the  exclusionary   clause   to   criminal prosecution as  opposed  to investigations  and   civil proceedings.  It is to be noticed that although the  English Criminal  Evidence  Act,  1898,  which  (omitting  the   immaterial  words) provides  that "Every person charged   with an  offence......   shall  be  a  competent  witness  for  the  defence  at   every  stage  of  the  proceedings"  was  not  interpreted  as conferring a right on the prisoner of  giving evidence on his own  behalf  before  the grand  jury  or  in   other   words,   it  received  a  limited  meaning; see Queen v. Rhodes (1899) 1 QB 77.”

This case would bring about the legal position that even  

if the prosecution did not prosecute PW-53 and used his  

evidence only as an accomplice, it was perfectly legal.  

The  evidence  of  such  witness  subject  to  the  usual  

caution was admissible evidence.  The contention of Shri  

6

Radha Krishnnan that his evidence would be inadmissible  

because he was not granted pardon or he was not made  

accused  would,  thus,  be  of  no  consequence  and  is  

rejected.  In this backdrop, after considering the whole  

material and the findings of the Trial Court and the  

appellate Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the  

Trial  Court  and  the  appellate  Court  were  right  in  

convicting A-7.   

43. At this juncture itself we must also refer to the  

Trial  Court’s  judgment  which  has  painstakingly  dealt  

with the huge evidence led on behalf of the prosecution  

against all the accused.  We appreciate the efforts and  

the  interest  shown  by  the  Trial  Court  in  carefully  

analyzing and appreciating the evidence of as many as  

271 witnesses as also 1105 documents and 291 material  

objects.   Apart  from  the  evidence  of  investigation  

witness  from  the  police  department,  several  injured  

witnessed were examined who were injured on account of  

drinking of the illicit liquor prepared and sold through  

agencies of A-7.  The other batch of the witnesses are  

the attesting witnesses to the mahazars, the inventories  

and  officers  of  the  telephone  department  who  were  

examined to prove the telephone calls made from various  

telephones to the accused as also the accused persons  

6

using  the  mobile  phones.   Officers  of  the  mobile  

companies were also examined.  PWs-197 to 203, 216 and  

218 were doctors who conducted the autopsy of the 31  

unfortunate  men  who  died  because  of  consumption  of  

spurious liquor.  Other doctors who treated the patients  

and the doctors who issued the injury certificates were  

also examined.  We must mention PWs-233 and 253 who were  

the  expert  from  forensic  science  laboratory,  

Thiruvananthapuram.   Original  accused  No.27  turned  

approver and was examined as PW-173.  Apart from these  

persons,  S.  Anil  Kumar  (PW-251),  M.  Madhu  (PW-257),  

Pramod Kumar (PW-260) and PWs-263 to 278 were members of  

the  special investigating  team.  As has  already been  

stated,  1101  documents  were  proved  including  the  

mahazars,  investigation  papers  like  inquest  reports,  

seizure mahazars, account books, building tax assessment  

registers,  room  rent  registers,  medical  certificates,  

chemical analysis reports etc.  We must appreciate the  

Herculean effort on the part of the investigating agency  

for collecting the evidence as also the efforts shown by  

the Sessions Judge.  Amongst the material objects which  

came before the Court and were observed and commented  

upon by it include the pouch filling machine, vessels,  

synthetic cans, plastic cans, bottles etc.  The Trial  

Court  returned  the  finding  that  firstly  it  was  

6

established by the prosecution that the deaths injuries  

of  the victims  were caused  because of  consumption of  

spurious liquor with methyl alcohol.  The Trial Court  

further recorded a finding that number of the accused  

persons sold the same.  The Sessions Judge has dealt  

with the deaths of all the 31 persons and on the basis  

of  the  inquest  report  as  also  the  evidence  of  other  

witnesses came to the conclusion that all these deaths  

were caused due to the drinking of illicit liquor mixed  

with methyl alcohol. The medical certificates as also  

the  post-mortem  reports  have  been  meticulously  dealt  

with para-wise with the evidence of the witness proving  

such certificates as also the evidence of the doctors.  

The  Sessions  Judge  then  went  on  to  appreciate  the  

evidence  of  the  relatives  of  those  persons  who  lost  

their  lives.   The  prosecution  examined  about  33  

witnesses on this question.  The Sessions Judge went on  

to accept the evidence of all these witnesses regarding  

the reason of the death of their kith and kin.  On the  

question  of  S.32,  Evidence  Act  the  Trial  court  has  

relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh  

v. State of Himachal Pradesh [1997 (4) SCC 161] as also  

Smt.  Laxmi  v.  Om  Prakash [AIR 2001  SC  2383].  The  

Sessions Judge also discussed the evidence of the few of  

those witnesses who had actually consumed the spurious  

6

liquor and suffered injuries because of that.  All these  

witnesses, number of which is substantial, deposed about  

the ill-effects felt after drinking from the shops where  

liquor provided by A-7 and carried by the other accused  

persons like A-4, A-8, A-25 and A-30, used to be sold.  

On the basis of these witnesses and also on the basis of  

the  doctors  who  conducted  the  post-mortem,  the  Trial  

Court had no difficulty to arrive at the conclusion that  

injuries suffered by persons including the accused as  

also the deaths were occasioned because of the drinking  

of the spurious and illicit liquor. The Sessions Judge  

ultimately gave a finding that it is only after drinking  

the illicit liquor that the concerned persons developed  

symptoms characteristics of methanol poisoning.  

44. The Sessions judge went on to discuss the evidence  

regarding the conspiracy of A-7 with the other accused  

persons.  For ascertaining the role of A-7, the Sessions  

Judge then referred to the evidence of A. Mohan (PW-

127), Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) as  

also the sworn statements of A-7 to A-15 recorded on  

14.10.1999 under Section 131 of the Income Tax Act.  The  

Sessions  Judge  on  the  basis  of  all  this  voluminous  

evidence recorded the finding on the way the business of  

A-7 was being managed.  His examination and the replies  

6

given to the various questions were also considered by  

the  Sessions  Judge  wherein  he  admitted  about  liquor  

business and his dealing with the Income Tax Department  

as also the accounts, the huge profits that he made from  

this business.  He also accepted that his two brothers  

Sunil Dutt and Murleedharan were his partners and that  

the accounts were written by Balachandran (A-15).  It  

was an admitted position that A-7 was in this business  

right from 1984 to 1991 which he continued for seven  

years and thereby started again in 1997-1998 and that A-

7  conducted  16  shops  and  his  brothers  conducted  10  

shops.  After dealing with the evidence regarding the  

accounts  as  also  the  various  statements  made  in  the  

income  tax  enquiries,  the  Trial  Court  went  on  to  

appreciate the other material regarding the purchase of  

shops. The Sessions Judge has then given the complete  

finding  regarding  the  business  of  A-7  and  the  other  

accused.  These accounts very significantly include the  

monies paid to the police officers of various ranks as  

also the excise officers and including.  All this was  

indicated in the accounts in the code language.  The  

internal arrangements of the business with other accused  

persons  were  also  discussed  and  also  the  financial  

aspects.  He has also discussed about he incriminating  

circumstances.  Accused No.7 had employed 33 salesmen  

6

and  18  toddy  tapers  who  were  members  of  the  Union.  

According to the Sessions Judge these employees used to  

keep  away  from  the  business  and  would  only  receive  

salary and allowances.  All the toddy collected used to  

be kept in the godowns of A-7 which were raided by the  

police officers.  The Session Judge then in paragraph  

220 of his judgment has recorded a finding on the basis  

of  the  documents  and  the  accounts  that  A-7  had  

meticulously  managed  his  toddy  business  which  was  of  

huge  magnitude.  The  Sessions  Judge  also  recorded  a  

finding that A-7 made huge profits of over 9.5 crores  

within  a  span  of  four  months.   By  doing  the  toddy  

business alone he could not have earned even 1 per cent  

of the bid amount of Rs.4 crores.  The Sessions Judge  

then  dealt  with  the  properties  including  the  godowns  

which were raided and from where samples were collected.  

We  have  discussed  regarding  the  properties  in  the  

earlier part of the judgment and so we need not repeat  

the same.   

45. The Sessions Judge as also referred to the material  

objects found in some of these properties and has also  

referred to the fact that methanol was detected in the  

vehicles found parked in this plot.  Accused No.7 was  

also found to be frequent purchaser of polythene pouches  

6

from the evidence of K.S. Harish Kumar (PW-264), C.G.  

Perera (PW-78) and Exhibit P-83 of mahazar.  Similar is  

the  evidence  of  Peter  Jacob  (PW-81)  referred  by  the  

Sessions Judge.  The Sessions Judge then referred to the  

incriminating  articles  seized  from  the  very  premises  

occupied  by A-7  analysis of  which gave  indication of  

nature  of  his  business.   These  premises  include  

Sreekrishna Tabuk Industries. After referring to various  

sections, the Trial Court traced the role of A-7 and  

other accused persons like A-4.  His vehicles were found  

to be fitted with additional spring leaves and it was  

obvious that they were being used for carrying spurious  

liquor.  The Sessions Judge also recorded Exhibit P-855  

and 859 which were search lists and Exhibit P-860 which  

is the mahazar prepared by him in this regard.  Some of  

the items seized by this search list showed traces of  

methyl alcohol. Exhibit P-861 was relied upon for this.  

The Sessions Judge refuted the contention raised by the  

counsel  of  A-7  that  considering  the  scientific  

properties of methyl alcohol it was impossible for them  

to find the trace in some of the vehicles or in the cans  

etc.  as  they  would  have  evaporated.   For  this,  the  

Sessions  Judge  relied  on  evidence  of  PW-233,  Sindhu,  

Assistant  Director  of  Forensic  Science  Laboratory  who  

had collected the trace evidence.  Her assertion that  

6

methyl alcohol could be traced even after ten days could  

not be shaken and was rightly accepted by the Sessions  

Judge.  Her evidence that methyl alcohol was found in  

the  three  chambers  fitted  in  the  car  bearing  

registration  No.  TMY  8748  cannot  be  assailed  on  any  

count.  From all this voluminous evidence ultimately the  

Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that A-4, A-8, A-

25, 30, and others were the close associates of accused  

No.7 and were also involved in the illicit manufacture  

and transport of arrack.  The sessions Judge also held  

that some accused were involved in manufacture of the  

illicit  arrack.  We  have  carefully  gone  through  the  

evidence referred to by the Sessions Judge and endorse  

his judgment.   

46. We have deliberately referred to the judgment in  

details as one of the arguments by Shri Radhakrishnan  

against  the  High  Court’s  judgment  was  that  the  High  

Court has dealt with the whole matter in a perfunctory  

manner and that it has not considered the findings by  

the Trial Court nor has the High Court dealt with the  

main  objections  raised  in  their  defence.   We  are  

satisfied with the judgment of the Trial Court insofar  

as  this  accused  is  concerned  and  the  High  Court  has  

6

rightly confirmed the same.  We accordingly dismiss the  

appeal filed by A-7.

47. We shall now consider the appeal filed by accused  

No.8, Vinod Kumar.  He has been convicted for offences  

under Sections 324, 326 and 328 of the Indian Penal Code  

as also for the offence under section 57 A (1) (ii) of  

the Abkari Act and has been sentenced to undergo life  

imprisonment along with the fine of Rs.50,000/-.  Has  

also been separately convicted under Section 57A (1) (i)  

as also under Section 55 (a) (i) and Section 58 of the  

Abkari Act.  His conviction insofar as offences under  

Sections 302 and 57A (1) (iii) are concerned, the High  

Court  has  set  aside  the  same.   There  is  a  specific  

finding in respect of his conviction under Section 120B  

IPC.  The main evidence relied upon by the Courts below  

against  this  accused  is  PW-257,  Mr.  M.  Madhu  who  

conducted search being search mahajar Exhibit P.135.  It  

is the contention of the prosecution that a search was  

conducted  of a  house which  was under  construction at  

that time and it belonged to A-8.  It is claimed that  

plastic cans MO-32 and MO-39 to 43 vehicles were found  

in the premises.  Exhibit P-782 which is the chemical  

analysis report suggests that traces of methyl alcohol  

and ethyl alcohol were detected in the cans as also in  

7

the  samples  taken  from  floor  of  the  vehicles  found  

parked in the said premises.   The prosecution has come  

out  with  a  case  that  since  his  house  was  being  

constructed, A-8 took a house in front of this house,  

namely, Roshini on rent.  This house was also searched  

and Exhibit P-111 was executed whereby a mono block pump  

set and a telephone bill was recovered.  Fake number  

plates being MOs 83 to 86 were seized from the premises  

under  Exhibit  P-191.   Some  of  these  number  plates  

related  to  some  of  the  vehicles  recovered  from  the  

premises  i.e.  the  plot  where  the  house  was  being  

constructed.  Exhibit  P-135  is  the  search  mahazar  and  

report relied on in this regard.   

48. It is to be understood that A-8 is the real brother  

of A-7 and it is the contention of the prosecution that  

A-8 was fully involved in the said business of illicit  

liquor which was headed by his brother, A-7. The High  

Court in paragraph 81 of its judgment has held that the  

evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution  sufficiently  

established his complicity in the crime.  The High Court  

has also relied on Section 58 A (5) of the Abkari Act  

which casts a burden on the accused to prove that he had  

not mixed or permitted to be mixed any noxious substance  

with  the  liquor.   According  to  the  High  Court  such  

7

burden has not been discharged.  It was tried to be  

argued by Senior counsel Shri V. Giri that there is no  

veracity  to the  evidence relating  to the  presence of  

methyl  alcohol  in  the  floors  of  the  cars  or  in  the  

material  objects  found  in  the  search  on  30.10.2000.  

Shri  Giri  further  strenuously  asserted  that  even  if  

Exhibit P-135 and the testimony of PW-257 and PW-253 are  

accepted still the accused could not have been booked  

for offence under section 57 A (1) (ii) of the Abkari  

Act.  He suggested that there is no evidence to show  

that the accused had either mixed or permitted to be  

mixed any noxious substance.  The learned Senior counsel  

also  argued  that  the  accused  must  himself  know  that  

whatever  is  being  mixed  with  the  liquor  is  itself  a  

noxious substance which has the potential of endangering  

the human life and it is only when he mixes it in spite  

of  the  said  knowledge  then  alone  the  offence  under  

section 57A(1) (ii) could be established.  The learned  

counsel was at pains to argue that there is nothing to  

prove that A-8 had any such idea that methanol is a  

noxious substance.  The learned counsel then pointed out  

that  there  is  no  direct  witness  to  depose  about  the  

steps taken by this accused for mixing methyl alcohol  

with  ethyl  alcohol  or  as  the  case  may  be  toddy  for  

making  Kalapani.   The  learned  counsel  further  argued  

7

that the evidence of PW-53 is of no consequence as it  

does not suggest that A-8 was aware of the mixing for  

noxious substance like methyl alcohol.  He, therefore,  

urged that there is no evidence even remotely to connect  

A-8 with the mixing of noxious substance.  Relying on  

the language of Section 57 A(1) (ii) it is the argument  

that it is only where the accused is a licencee under  

the Abkari Act and if any noxious substance is detected  

from any sample taken from any of the outlets operated  

by him then alone the burden of proving that he had  

neither mixed nor permitted to be mixed will be that of  

the accused.    However, in the case like the present  

one there would have to be positive evidence to connect  

the accused with the actual act of mixing.  According to  

the learned counsel, merely because methyl alcohol was  

detected from the traces of evidence collected from the  

cans and the cars which was seized on 30.10.2000 that by  

itself could not be sufficient to attract Section 58A(1)  

(ii).  It could only indicate the involvement of the  

accused in transportation of the noxious substance mixed  

with ethyl alcohol.  Learned counsel further contended  

that the evidence regarding the telephone calls having  

been made from the said number to the house or other  

places belonging to or under the control of A-7 which  

the prosecution sought to prove by producing a telephone  

7

bill  in  the  name  of  Shyamala  Kumari  was  also  of  no  

consequence.  The learned counsel argued that being the  

younger brother of A-7 there is nothing wrong if he made  

calls.   The  learned  counsel  further  argued  that  the  

prosecution  has  relied  on  the  fact  that  the  number  

plates  were  recovered  from  a  shed  situated  near  

Pandaksala  godown  actually  belonged  to  some  of  the  

vehicles  which  were  found  in  the  house  under  

construction belonging to A-8.  It has been held by the  

Courts below that the fact that loose unattached number  

plates  were actually  recovered from  the godown  and a  

shed under the control of A-7 would show that A-8 was an  

active participant in the business conducted by A-7 and  

that he should, therefore, be treated as part of the  

conspiracy  allegedly  hatched  by  A-7.   However,  the  

learned counsel pointed out that firstly, the disclosure  

statement  is  inadmissible  and  secondly,  the  said  

discovery was extremely unnatural and artificial.  The  

counsel pointed out that even if the said recovery is to  

the accepted it would be of no consequence insofar as  

the offence under Section 57A (1) (ii) is concerned.  At  

the most, it would show that A-8 was a participant in  

the business and for that A-8 could be booked for the  

offence under Section 55.  However, it will be totally  

insufficient  for  booking  him  for  the  offence  under  

7

section 57 A (1) (ii).   

Lastly, the learned counsel argued that there is no  

clear  finding  for  the  complicity  under  Section  120B,  

Indian  Penal  Code.   According  to  the  learned  senior  

counsel the gist of crime though alleged has not been  

proved at all and even if it is presumed that accused  

knew that methyl alcohol was being imported, it will be  

too much to presume that he knew about the mixing of the  

same with alcohol.  The learned counsel argued that the  

agreement for the conspiracy, as the case may be, has  

not been proved at all and merely because there is a  

burden on the accused under Section 57A (5), that cannot  

be  used for  proving offence  under section  120B, IPC.  

The counsel then made extensive comments on the law laid  

down  in  P.N.  Krishna  Lal  v.  Govt.  of  Kerala [1995  

suppl.(2) SCC 187].  His whole stress was on paragraph  

39 as also paragraph 46.  The learned counsel pointed  

out that a strictly literal interpretation of the rule  

was  not  possible  because  it  would  virtually  dispense  

with any burden on the prosecution to prove the offence.  

Leaned counsel argued that the initial burden of proving  

always would lie on the prosecution which should suggest  

the involvement of the accused in mixing of the noxious  

7

substance.  It is only then that it will be the burden  

of the accused to prove otherwise.

49. We shall now consider all these contentions in the  

light  of  the  findings  by  the  Trial  Court  and  the  

appellate Court.  We have already considered the nature  

of burden of proof on the prosecution as also on the  

defence  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  judgment  while  

considering  the  case  of  A-7.   The  question  of  said  

burden has been discussed thoroughly in  Krishna Lal’s  

case (cited supra).  There can be no dispute that the  

prosecution has the initial burden to suggest that the  

accused person was involved in the business of illicit  

liquor and that he knew the nature thereof.  It is only  

then that the burden would shift to the accused to prove  

that he had no means to know about the nature of the  

business or the fact that the liquor was being mixed  

with noxious substance like methanol.  Now here in the  

present case, the accused is the real brother of A-7 and  

there are number of other circumstances to suggest that  

he was actively engaged in the business.  The High Court  

as  also  the  Trial  Court  thoroughly  discussed  and  

considered  the  evidence  and  all  the  circumstances  

therein.   In  fact  in  the  light  of  these  concurrent  

findings,  we  need  not  discuss  the  whole  evidence.  

7

However,  it  is  clear  from  the  evidence  of  discovery  

regarding the fake number plates that accused No.8 was  

neck deep into the business of spurious liquor.  He was  

an active member in carrying the said spurious liquor  

and the fact that a vehicle under his possession found  

from  his  premises  had  the  trace  of  methanol  is  

sufficient to hold that he had the necessary knowledge  

that methanol played a major part in the business which  

was headed by his real brother A-7 and in which he was  

an active partner.  The contentions raised by Shri Giri  

that he may at the most be booked for transporting the  

spurious liquor is also not correct because if that is  

established  then  his  active  participation  in  the  

business  also  comes  to  the  forefront.   Thereby  his  

knowledge that the liquor was being mixed with methanol  

has also to be presumed.   There was no necessity for  

keeping  the  fake  unattached  number  plates  in  his  

premises and the whole objective is clear of shielding  

the cars by attaching fake number plates to them.  In  

paragraph 80, the High Court thoroughly discussed about  

vehicle  PYO1  M  2464  which  was  sold  by  PW-68,  S.  

Vasudevan  and  was  found  in  the  possession  of  this  

accused.  The High Court has also discussed about the  

transaction of his house, namely, Roshini which was in  

front  of the  half built  house where  obnoxious liquor  

7

trade was going on.  He had also taken a good care to  

un-authorizedly obtain the telephone number 620069 from  

Shyamala Kumari, PW-73.  It has referred to the evidence  

of  PW-260,  Pramod  Kumar  who  had  proved  the  recovery  

mahazar  Exhibit  P-191.   The  evidence  of  PW-68,  S.  

Vasudevan was also referred to by him.  He also urged  

that the house did not belong to A-8.  We have already  

referred to the circumstance that A-8 had taken a house  

right in front of the aforementioned half built house  

and it was at his instance that the real number plates  

of the car which had the traces of methanol were found.  

We, therefore, find no reason to discard the evidence of  

this discovery.   

50. As if this was not sufficient according to PW-49,  

S. Shiju, who was the driver of A-8, liquor would be  

brought from the house of A-7 in the maruti car to be  

carried  to  the  places  such  as  Adoor,  Ezhukone  and  

Pathanapuram.  It is this witness who established the  

nexus of A-8 with the two cars PY01 M 2464 and PY01 N  

1014,   MOs 41 and 43, respectively.  Therefore, it is  

obvious that this accused was engaged in the business of  

manufacture, storing, sale and supply of illicit liquor  

along with A-7 which resulted in liquor tragedy.  It is  

obvious that this accused was well aware of the nature  

7

of  the  business  as  he  was  thoroughly  into  it.  

Therefore,  the offence  under section  57A (1)  (i) and  

(ii) as also the other offences under Sections 324, 326  

and 328 read with Section 34, IPC have been rightly held  

proved  against  him.   We  are  not  impressed  with  the  

argument of Shri Giri that the discovery was unnatural  

and was farcical since both the Courts have held the  

said discovery to have been proved.   Again his frequent  

calls to his brother would cut both ways and would also  

show that he was actively involved in the business.  As  

we have already shown from our earlier discussion that  

it  is  not  necessary  that  the  accused  had  to  mix  or  

permit to be mixed the noxious substance himself.  He  

could be booked on the same basis as A-7 has been booked  

by us on the same logic.  Again we are not prepared to  

accept the argument of Shri Giri that A-8 had no idea  

that  methanol  is  a  noxious  substance.   If  a  huge  

business was going on and methanol was being imported  

along with ethyl alcohol in huge quantity and if the car  

which  brought the  methanol was  in his  possession and  

further if the methanol is established to be a noxious  

substance, it would be a travesty to hold that A-8 did  

not know that methanol was obnoxious substance.  It is  

also  well  established  that  this  accused  could  be  

convicted with the aid of Section 120B, IPC and also  

7

independently of the offence under Section 57 A (1) (ii)  

as he was not only the part of the business but had  

actively taken part in it.  That by itself is sufficient  

to hold that he had the knowledge about the mixing of  

the  ethyl  alcohol  with  the  noxious  substance  like  

methanol  and  in  spite  of  it,continued.   His  offence  

would be covered fully in the phraseology ‘or permits to  

be mixed’.  We accordingly, confirm his conviction.   

51. Shri  Giri  suggested  that  the  chemical  analyzer  

report was not put to the accused and took us through  

the  examination  of  the  accused.   In  fact  vide  the  

question numbers 51, 63, 131, 141,143, 219, 220, 221,  

224, 263, 691, 692, 706 and 709 and, more particularly,  

question  No.624  all  circumstances  regarding  

incriminating  circumstances  have  been  put  to  this  

witness.  Therefore, this argument of Shri Giri has to  

be rejected.  

52. Lastly, Shri Giri also argued about the sentence  

and contended that at the most this accused could be  

booked for the offence under section 55 (g) and (h).  

There can be no doubt that he can be booked for those  

offences, however, in our opinion, the Trial Court and  

the appellate Court have not committed any illegality in  

booking  him  under  section  57A  (1)  (ii)  also.  

8

Considering the number of deaths caused on account of  

the business in which this accused was neck deep, we do  

not  think  that  any  leniency  can  be  shown.    We  

accordingly dismiss the appeal of A-8.

53. This takes us to the case of A-4, who is another  

brother of A-7 and A-8.  In fact the part played by A-4,  

Manikantan @ Kochani is not less than the part played by  

A-8, if not more.  His connection with the business and  

A-7  is  deposed  by  A.  Raju  (PW-40),  an  auto  rickshaw  

driver who had seen A-4 coming out of the house of A-1  

in a red maruti car.  His business connections have been  

deposed to by M.M. Ibrahim (PW-65) and it is proved from  

the  evidence  of  PW-37  that  he  also  arranged  for  the  

finance of Rs. 30 lakhs at the instance of A-1.  He was  

also identified by S. Dharmapalan (PW-36) as a person  

going to the house of A-1 with spirit in car.  It is  

very  important  to  note  here  that  appeal  by  A-1  has  

abated on account of her death.  It was A-1, who was the  

retail distributor of liquor.  Allegedly her shop was  

for  sale  of  toddy  but  it  has  come  in  evidence  that  

liquor used to be supplied from her house.  Few injured  

witnesses have been examined who were the customers of  

liquor saying that on the fateful day the liquor tested  

a little different.  PW-53 in his evidence specifically  

8

involved this accused suggesting that the methanol was  

first brought in the plastic vessels and then mixed with  

spirit kept in the tank and thereafter it was supplied  

for sale.  He specifically stated that this was done  

under the leadership of A-4 along with few others.  He  

has specifically deposed that on the fateful day, MO24  

car came to the godown of A-7 between 10 to 11 O’clock  

in the morning and that was being driven by Anil Kumar  

A-16.  He further deposed that the essence i.e. methanol  

was  filled  in  10  plastic  vessels  and  they  were  kept  

inside the godown. At that time, probably ethyl alcohol  

had not come and it was told to them that spirit load  

would come.  He further deposed that the tanker of ethyl  

alcohol came at about 11 O’ clock in the night, the  

driver of which was Shakthi from Tamil Nadu.  It was  

then mixed by the workers of A-4 with the ethyl alcohol.  

He then suggested that the liquor was then dispatched in  

three  vehicles  to  the  dealers  at  Attukadavu  and  

Pulimuttukadavu.  Even after the tragedy happened, he  

deposed  about  the  operations  to  destroy  the  spurious  

liquor.  In the cross examination at the instance of  

this  accused,  beyond  putting  an  innocuous  suggestion  

that he was telling lies, there was nothing much. The  

accused was tried to be painted as the chief link of  

Kayamkulam lobby to which he specifically answered that  

8

it was Anil Kumar who used to do the same.  This accused  

was also involved by V. Harikumar (PW-167) who also knew  

this accused along with four other accused persons who  

were the driver of A-4.  According to this witness, they  

used  to  purchase  flowers  to  put  in  their  cars.   S.  

Vasudeven  (PW-68)  who  is  the  vehicle  broker  also  

recognized  A-4,  A-7  and  A-8  and  deposed  that  he  had  

effected sale of the car to A-8 and arranged two cars  

for the manager of A-7.  However, the money for all this  

was provided by A-4.  The High Court has also referred  

to the evidence of T. Shyjan (PW-173) an accomplice to  

show  the involvement  of A-4.  Even Usha  (PW-62) spoke  

about the adjacent building being rented out in the name  

of A-4.  The search list Exhibit P-112 which was proved  

and produced by PW-270, various articles were seized and  

samples collected showed the ethyl alcohol and methyl  

alcohol which fact got proved by Exhibit P-782.  These  

objects were MO-26 four blue cans and MO-27, 12 white  

cans.   He  along  with  his  brother  raised  loans  from  

Chirayinkil Service Cooperative Society, obviously for  

running  the  business  along  with  A-7.  He  stood  as  a  

guarantor for A-7.  Exhibits P-74 (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)  

were  proved  for  that  purpose.   The  High  Court  has  

discussed about his house properties from where number  

of cans were seized.  It has also come in the evidence  

8

that  the  samples  collected  from  the  floor  of  these  

buildings showed the presence of methanol. Thus, it is  

clear that this witness was thoroughly in the business  

like his brothers A-7 and A-8.  It is, therefore, clear  

that this was nothing but a conspiracy to run a patently  

illegal business along with his two brothers and others.  

It was argued by Shri Dave that the case against this  

appellant stands on the same footing as A-5 and A-11  

and,  therefore,  he  deserved  to  be  given  the  same  

punishment.  We do not agree.  A-5 and A-11 along with  

A-6 and A-10 are proved to have physically transported  

the mixed substance to various places.  However, they  

are not the persons who took active part in the business  

as its proprietors as A-4 did.  In fact A-4 was at the  

helm  of  the  affairs  unlike  those  accused  who  merely  

transported the liquor.  The case of A-4, therefore, is  

quite different.  It was argued that he himself had not  

transported the noxious substance which was done by A-

15.  That may not be so, but he was practically managing  

the whole show.  It has rightly been held by the Trial  

Court and the appellate court that A-5 was a worker of  

A-4  and  took  active  part  in  the  transportation  of  

methanol.  We do not accept the argument of Shri Dave  

that his case was comparable to that of A-5 and such a  

contention has rightly not been accepted by the trial  

8

and  the  appellate  Court.   His  involvement  in  the  

business is so deep that it was clear that he was a  

conspirator and it was in pursuance of conspiracy that  

the whole liquor business which essentially involved the  

mixing  of  methanol  with  the  ethyl  alcohol  was  being  

conducted.  Shri Dave tried to dub the evidence of PW-53  

as a general evidence which argument does not impress  

us.  We have already commented upon the evidence of PW-

53.   

54. Shri Dave then dubbed Section 57A as a draconian  

piece of legislation.  Relying on the language of the  

whole  section,  Shri  Dave  contended  like  the  other  

learned  counsels  that  the  act  of  mixing  the  noxious  

substance has to be proved for  being punished under  

this section.  We have already commented upon the real  

import of Section 57A of the Abkari Act.  The language  

of Section 57 A (1) is wide enough as we have already  

commented in the earlier part of the judgment and A-4  

will fit in the broad language.  Shri Dave argued that  

the  section  does  not  use  the  word  ‘knowledge’  or  

‘knowingly’.  He also argued that mens rea to be read in  

all the offences unless the legislature has expressly or  

by  necessary  implications  excluded  mens  rea as  the  

ingredient of offence.  Reading the language of Section  

8

57 A (1) as it is, it is more than proved that all these  

accused  persons  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  do  the  

illegal liquor business and in order to succeed in their  

business, took recourse to mixing methanol with ethyl  

alcohol and brought out a new type of spurious liquor.  

In order to increase the potency of the drink and in  

order to probably give taste, they mixed the methanol.  

Once ethyl alcohol is proved to be a noxious drug, if  

they  are  found  to  be  mixing  or  permitting  mixing  

methanol with ethyl alcohol then the offence would be  

complete whether they had the knowledge regarding the  

qualities of methanol or not.  That is apart from the  

fact that in this case itself to say that the accused  

did not know about the properties of methanol would be  

wrong.  If that had been so they would not have been  

running between Hosur and Kerala to bring methanol in  

the cars which had fake registration numbers and secrete  

chambers. As many as 7 reported decisions were relied  

upon by Shri Dave for the question of mens rea.  We have  

nothing against the principles laid down thereunder but  

we must point out that in none of the seven cases relied  

upon  by  the  learned  counsel  the  case  related  to  an  

offence like Section 57 A (1).  The whole discussion on  

mens  rea,  therefore,  is  of  no  consequence.   The  

following cases were relied on:

8

1) Lim Chin Aik v. Reginam [1963] 1 All ER 223

2) State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, 1965 (1)  SCR 123

3) Sweet v. Parsley [1969] 1 All Er 347

4) State of Gujarat v. Acharya D. Pandey & Ors. (1970)  3 SCC 183

5) Sanjay Dutt v. State Through CBI (1994) 5 SCC 410

6) Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI) (1997) 8 SCC  732

7) B  (a  minor)  v.  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  [2000] 1 All 833

55. There  can  be  no  question  about  the  absence  of  

conspiracy.  The whole business itself was a conspiracy.  

It  may  not  be  the  conspiracy  to  mix  the  noxious  

substance but the fact of the matter is that in order to  

succeed in the business which itself was a conspiracy  

they mixed or allowed to be mixed methanol and used it  

so freely that ultimately 31 persons lost their lives.  

We are not at all impressed by the argument regarding  

knowledge.  Shri Dave also referred to the case of P.N.  

Krishna Lal (cited supra).  The argument was that if  

Section  57A  (v)  is  to  be  worked  out  in  its  literal  

manner  then  it  is  the  defence  which  would  lead  the  

evidence  of  disproving.   The  argument  is  clearly  

incorrect.  We have already explained the responsibility  

on the prosecution in the earlier part of the judgment.  

8

In our view, in this case the prosecution has discharged  

its  primary  burden.   The  accused  persons,  more  

particularly, these three brothers have not offered any  

evidence so as to discharge the burden put against them  

under section 57A (1) (v).  In this case the prosecution  

has clearly proved that there was a noxious substance  

which was likely to endanger the human life.  Secondly,  

they have proved that substance was mixed, permitted to  

be mixed and was being regularly mixed with liquor. They  

have  thirdly  proved  that  the  persons  mixing  had  the  

knowledge that methanol was a dangerous substance that  

aspect  would  be  clear  from  the  fact  that  after  the  

tragedy  A-7  went  and  punished  his  servants  and  

remonstrated  them  for  ‘not  properly’ mixing  methanol  

with ethyl alcohol.  Lastly, it is proved that as a  

result of mixing of methanol with the liquor and as a  

result of consuming such liquor as many as 31 persons  

lost their lives and number of others suffered grievous  

injuries.  We reject the argument of Shri Dave that the  

initial burden was not proved by the prosecution which  

we  confirm the  finding of  conviction and  sentence as  

imposed  against  A-4.     We  accordingly  dismiss  the  

appeal filed by A-4.   

8

56. This takes us to the SLP (Crl.) 842 of 2006 of A-25  

represented by senior Counsel Shri Shekhar in which we  

have granted leave to appeal.  The argument of learned  

senior counsel was almost on the same lines with that of  

Shri  Dave  and  Shri  Giri  insofar  as  the  contentions  

regarding the burden of proof and the interpretation of  

Section 57 A (1) were concerned.  It is well proved by  

the prosecution that this A-25 was a major link used to  

purchase liquor from A-4 and he was the one to used to  

distribute the same.  Learned counsel argued that this  

accused had no control over this business and he was  

merely transporting the spurious liquor and, therefore,  

he should have been booked under section 57 A (1) (iii).  

A-25  was selling  liquor in  retail through  A-32, A-35  

etc.  A-25 and A-10 were the employees of A-4 who were  

supplying the liquor to A-21.  Thus, he was getting the  

readymade  liquor.   As  per  the  evidence  of  P.  

Thulaseedharan (PW-131), because of the liquor sold to  

his father on 21.10.2000 at 11 pm that his father was  

admitted in the hospital.  Name of the father is Pachan.  

In fact, as per the evidence of PW-131, he was told by  

his father that he had consumed little from the liquor  

entrusted to him by A-24 for sale.  Thereafter, he felt  

headache and abdominal pain.  The prosecution suggests  

8

that later on he died.  As per the evidence of P. Ramu  

(PW-163), his father used to drink the liquor supplied  

by A-25 and he had also seen on the fateful day, his  

father consuming alcohol supplied by A-25.  Thus, his  

father who died was himself a further supplier of the  

drink,  which  was  used  to  be  supplied  by  A-25.   The  

liquor sold on that day tasted differently, which was  

the evidence of M. Ponappan (PW-133).  He had, however,  

purchased the liquor from A-32.  When he enquired about  

the  reason,  he  was  told  that  it  was  liquor  of  A-7  

brought  through  A-25.   Evidence  of  T.  Chandrasekhara  

Babu  (PW-146)  is  also  to  the  same  tune.   PW-173  is  

another witness who is an accomplice.  He claimed to  

have known A-25.  He was used to be given a canister  

whenever he became indebted.  He used to sell 35 litres  

of liquor in that canister.  Thus, it is established  

that A-25 used to take the liquor manufactured by A-7  

and the same used to be supplied to him by A-4 and the  

same was distributed by him further.  Obviously, this  

witness used to sell the liquor supplied by A-25 at a  

higher price of Rs.20/- per litre and he purchased the  

liquor from A-25 twice or thrice in a week.  It was for  

the last time that he purchased the liquor from A-25 on  

20.10.2000  as  he  told  that  he  waited  near  Pallikkal  

temple near milma booth and after 10 or 15 minutes, A-5  

9

and  A-25  came  there  in  a  blue  Maruti  Car  and  five  

canisters  of  liquor  were  unloaded  there.   It  was  

distributed amongst A-24, A-6, A-29 and A-28.  It was A-

25 who asked A-32 to destroy the balance of liquor after  

the tragedy.  The prosecution alleged, as the High Court  

has noted, that he absconded and he was arrested from  

K.S.R.T.C.  Bus stand  on 11.12.2000.   The  Trial Court  

thoroughly  discussed  his  evidence.   It  was  contended  

before the Trial Court that evidence of PW-173 could not  

be accepted as he was given pardon only towards the fag  

end of the case. The Trial Court and the High Court have  

found  nothing  wrong  with  the  grant  of  pardon  under  

Sections 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C.  The Trial Court has  

correctly appreciated the legal position that evidence  

of  PW-173  could  not  be  accepted  unless  it  is  

corroborated by other witnesses.  A finding is recorded  

that the evidence of PW-173 was corroborated by PWs-131,  

133  and  163  insofar  as  the  role  played  by  A-25  is  

concerned.  Thus, the sale on the part of A-25 and his  

active participation in the business run by A-4 and A-7  

was  clearly  brought  out.   He  was  convicted  for  the  

offence under Sections 57A(2)(i) and was heavily fined  

for Rs.50,000/-, Rs.25,000/- and Rs.2 lakhs on different  

counts including Section 55(a)(i) as also under Section  

58 of the Abkari Act.  He was, thus, in a position for  

9

distributors and it has come out in the evidence that  

the  liquor  sold  by  sub-distributors  killed  number  of  

persons.  The sub-distributors were none, but A-37, A-35  

and A-41.  It was the chain of distribution of liquor  

mixed with methyl alcohol.  It is obvious that he was in  

possession of the poisoned liquor and does not seem to  

have  taken  care  that  it  was  not  mixed  with  methyl  

alcohol.  It was urged by the learned counsel appearing  

that there was no evidence on record to suggest that A-

25 had anything to do with the mixing of the methylene  

with  the  liquor.   It  was  suggested  that  he  had  no  

control over the operation and he was a mere distributor  

and sold the liquor as he received from A-4.  There is  

no doubt that this accused was acquitted of the offence  

under Section 120B, IPC by the Trial Court and there is  

no appeal against it.  The conviction of this accused is  

for offence punishable under Section 57A(2) and on that  

account, he has been awarded life imprisonment.  Shri  

V.Shekhar, learned senior counsel contended that since  

this witness was not a conspirator and had nothing to do  

with the business of A-7 and was merely a distributor,  

the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment  is  excessive.   As  

against this, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf  

of the State contended that this accused cannot escape  

the conviction under Section 57A(2).  The learned senior  

9

counsel  urged  that  if  this  accused  was  selling  the  

liquor,  then  it  was  for  him  to  take  the  reasonable  

precaution to see that the liquor that he sells is not  

mixed with toxic substance.  There can be no dispute  

that this witness had no control over the business run  

by A-7 and, therefore, he was rightly acquitted for the  

offence  under  Section  120B,  IPC  i.e.  conspiracy.  

However,  it cannot  be said  that his  conviction under  

Section 57A(2) is incorrect on that count.  We also find  

from the evidence of P.S. John (PW-252) that there was a  

search in the house of this accused on 23.10.2010 vide  

Exhibit P-803 and a bottle was seized which was mixed  

with  ethyl  and  methyl.   This  was  substantiated  by  

Chemical Analysis Report (Exhibit P-784).  He was also  

in  possession  of  pure  methyl  alcohol,  which  is  

substantiated by Exhibit P-417, a disclosure made by him  

to M.G. Manilal (PW-269) as per Exhibit P-1019.  Even  

this was found to be methyl alcohol.  Once this fact  

regarding the possession of methyl alcohol is proved, A-

25 cannot argue that the possession of methyl alcohol  

was only incidental.  There is no reason for keeping  

methyl alcohol with him.  After all, he was not going to  

use it as a deodorant or perfume.  This may suggest that  

he had a hand in mixing the alcohol with methyl alcohol,  

but there is no evidence for that and he has not been  

9

convicted  for the  offence under  Section 57A(1).   The  

words “omits to take reasonable precaution” would cast a  

duty on him to see that the liquor that he sells is not  

mixed  with  poisonous  substance.   Again,  under  sub-

Section (5) of Section 57A, he was bound to prove that  

he had taken reasonable precaution, as contemplated in  

sub-Section (2).  There is no evidence to the contrary  

nor has the accused discharged his burden in any manner.  

In our opinion, therefore, his conviction for offence  

punishable under Section 57A(2) is justified.  However,  

we agree with Shri V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel,  

who suggests that he should not be punished with life  

imprisonment.  We find that this accused is convicted  

for offence punishable under Section 55 as also under  

Section 58, the maximum punishment for which Section is  

10 years and that he has already undergone more than 10  

years  of  imprisonment.   The  statement  made  by  the  

learned senior counsel that the accused had undergone  

more  than 10  years of  imprisonment was  not seriously  

controverted.   In  our  view,  therefore,  this  accused  

should have been dealt with not at par with A-7, A-4 and  

A-8  at least  insofar as  the punishment  is concerned.  

We,  therefore,  deem  it  fit  while  confirming  his  

conviction  for  the  other  offences  and  the  sentences  

therefor  to  bring  down  the  sentence  from  life  

9

imprisonment to what is undergone by him (relying on the  

statement made by the learned senior counsel that the  

accused  has  undergone  more  than  10  years  of  

imprisonment).   Insofar  as the  punishment of  fine is  

concerned, we do not interfere and confirm the sentence  

of fines.

57. We  accordingly  dismiss  his  appeal  with  the  

modification in the sentence as indicated.

58. This takes us to the Criminal Appeal No. 1531 of  

2005  filed  by  A-30.   His  case  more  or  the  less  is  

identical with Suresh (A-25).  As per the prosecution  

version, this accused had filled the liquor supplied by  

A-4 through A-5 and A-10 in covers and on the fateful  

night on 20.10.2000, he carried the same in Car bearing  

registration No. PT01M 8122 to the residence of A-39 and  

she, in turn, sold the same to the customers.  It is  

ironical  that  A-39  herself  also  consumed  liquor  and  

died, so also one Soman Pilai and several others had  

sustained  injuries.  The evidence  of PW-153  is clear  

enough, who complained that the liquor was found to be  

stronger and when he asked what the matter was, it was  

pressed by A-39 that the liquor was supplied by A-30.  

In fact, as per the evidence of a. Gopi (PW-153), he had  

himself found A-30 bringing the liquor.  Similar is the  

9

evidence  of N.  Prasad (PW-154)  who felt  uneasy after  

drinking the liquor at 12 in the noon on 20.10.2000.  He  

was required to be hospitalized.  Even he has deposed  

that A-39 used to sell the liquor which was supplied to  

her by A-30 and A-31.  He has also seen the liquor being  

supplied.  In fact, he also spoke about the happenings  

on 20.10.2000.  G. Raghavan Pillai (PW-164), the father  

of  A-39  had  also  consumed  the  liquor  and  he  also  

suffered.  He also established the connection of A-30.  

Thus, there is enough evidence to establish that on the  

fateful  day,  A-30  accompanied  by  A-31  supplied  three  

bundles of covers, each having 100 covers.  He has made  

a disclosure statement that alcohol was poured in the  

closet of a latrine recently constructed on the eastern  

side of the Senior Orthodox Church.  The liquid in this  

closet which was having smell of liquor was collected  

and it was established that it contained methyl alcohol.  

M.O.  256  is  the  sample  while  Exhibit  P1001  is  the  

chemical analysis report.  One Badaruddin (PW-172) also  

spoke about the role played by A-30 who purchased the  

new car under hire purchase agreement.  This was none  

else but car bearing registration No. PT01M 8122.  He  

also discovered a sealing machine from the residence of  

one  Sukumaran  (PW-181).   M.O.  97  was  that  sealing  

machine, which seizure was proved by S. Bhaskaran (PW-

9

175).  This accused offered himself as a defence witness  

and admitted therein that the car was owned by him and  

since there was default in payment of the hire purchase  

installments, the car was seized by the financer.  It is  

found  by  the  High  Court  that  his  house  was  near  to  

Senior Orthodox Church near to rubber plantation.  He  

claimed  that  he  was  made  accused  because  of  the  

political enmity.  There can be no dispute that there is  

enough evidence to show that A-30 was involved in the  

procurement of liquor from A-4.  He then packed it in  

the covers and supplied to A-39.  The High Court has not  

found him guilty under Section 304 or Section 307, IPC.  

Instead, the High Court has booked him for offence under  

Section  57A(2)(ii),  Section  55(a),  (h)  and  (i)  and  

Section  58  of  the  Abkari  Act.   Ms.  Malini,  learned  

counsel very earnestly urged that his conviction should  

not be maintained under Section 57A(2)(ii) as he did not  

have  knowledge  and  he  was  not  concerned  with  the  

preparation  of  the  spurious  liquor.   We  reject  the  

contention on the same reasoning that we have given for  

rejecting the similar contentions raised on behalf of A-

25.  The role played by both is almost the same.  We  

also  reject the  contention raised  that he  could have  

been booked only under Sections 55(a), (h) and (i) and  

also under Section 58.  The learned counsel has also  

9

prayed for leniency.  For the same reasons that we have  

given  in  respect  of  A-25,  we  take  the  same  view  in  

respect of this accused also.  The learned counsel made  

a statement that this accused was also behind the bars  

for  more  than  10  years,  which  contention  was  not  

seriously disputed by Shri J.C. Gupta, learned counsel  

appearing on behalf of the Government.  We, therefore,  

set  aside  his  life  imprisonment  and  bring  down  the  

sentence  to what  has been  undergone.  We accordingly  

dismiss the appeal filed by A-30 with the modification  

in the sentence as indicated.

59. Before we part with this case, we must note some  

very disturbing facts which have been revealed from the  

voluminous  evidence  by  the  prosecution.   Here  was  a  

person  who  was  unabashedly  running  his  empire  of  

spurious liquor trade and for that purpose had purchased  

politicians including the public representatives, police  

officers  and  other  officers  belonging  to  the  Excise  

Department.   The  trade  was  going  unabated.  

Unfortunately, it is the elite of the society or the  

“haves” of the society who never purchase this kind of  

spurious liquor for the obvious reasons.  It is only the  

poor section of the society which becomes the prey of  

such obnoxious trade and ultimately suffers.  As many as  

9

31  persons  have  lost  their  lives,  about  5  or  more  

persons  have  lost  their  eye-site  forever  and  several  

others have suffered in their health on account of the  

injuries caused to them.  It is only by an accident that  

the mixing was not done properly on the fateful day in  

the sense that the liquor mixed did prove to be fatal or  

injurious.  But that does not mean when it was mixed on  

other day for months together that it was not injurious.  

The use of methanol was a dangerous proposition.  It  

only shows that the human avarice could create hell in  

God’s own country Kerala. We are not only perturbed by  

the enormousness of the tragedy but the enormousness of  

the liquor trade run by A-7 and that was under the so-

called vigilant eyes of those who had duty to stop it.  

The  avarice  is  not  only  on  the  part  of  the  accused  

persons, but also on the part of those who benefit from  

this horrible business.  Though 10 years have passed,  

the reverberations of this grin tragedy have not become  

silent.  We hope and expect that the Kerala Government  

takes  up  this  issue  and  takes  definite  steps  for  

overhauling the system.  We are worried about the rotten  

system that allowed such trade not only to continue, but  

to  thrive.   It  will  be,  therefore,  for  the  

administrators  and  the  Government  to  take  positive  

steps, firstly, to overhaul the system by weeding out  

9

the corrupts by punishing those who are responsible for  

the whole system looking sideways.  We do not know as to  

whether such an exercise is taken up, but if it has not  

been taken up the government is directed to take such  

steps.  We do not think that the things would come under  

control unless such exercise is taken, so as to save the  

poor man from such ghastly disaster.

60. Again before parting, we appreciate the assistance  

that we have had from all the defence counsel as also  

from Shri A. Sharan and Shri J.C. Gupta, learned Senior  

Counsel, who appeared for the prosecution.  We must make  

a special reference to the assistance that the Court got  

from  Shri Mohan  Raj, Assistant  to the  Special Public  

Prosecutor before the trial Court, who, at our request,  

spared  his  substantial  time  and  labour  for  assisting  

this Court.  We dispose of all the appeals accordingly.  

................J.       [V.S. Sirpurkar]

................J.

    [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi;

April 4, 2011

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