REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7284  OF 2008

M. Chandra                                              ………….  Appellant

Versus

M. Thangamuthu & Anr.                                  ………….. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

Facts :

1) In the election to Tamil Nadu Legislature Assembly held  

in   May 2006, Rajapalayam constituency was reserved  

for  members  of  the  Scheduled  Castes.   Appellant,  

respondent No. 1, and eleven others had contested the  

elections.   The  appellant  was  declared  elected.  

Respondent  No.  1  filed  election  petition  inter  alia  

questioning the election  of  the  appellant.   The election  

petition having been allowed by the High Court of Madras,  

this appeal is filed by the appellant.   

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2)   The  Nominations  for  the  Rajapalyam  assembly  

constituency  were  scrutinized  on  21.04.2006  and  after  

scrutiny of the nominations, there were 13 candidates in  

the fray including the appellant and the respondent no.1.  

The appellant contested as a candidate from the AIADMK  

party  and  was  allotted  the  “two  leaves”  symbol.  The  

respondent  no.1  contested  the  election  as  an  

independent candidate and was allotted the “Finger Ring”  

symbol. The election for the said constituency was held  

on 08.05.2006. The result of the election was declared on  

11.05.2006  and  the  appellant  was  declared  as  the  

successful candidate in the elections having secured the  

highest number of votes.  

3)    The respondent no.1 [Election Petitioner]  challenged  

the result of the election by filing election petition under  

Section 81 read with Section 5(a), 100 (1)(a) and 125-A of  

the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951. His prayer  

was  for  declaration  of  the  election  of  the  returned  

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candidate as void and to declare the candidate with the  

next highest number of votes as the successful candidate.  

Contention of the Election Petitioner :

4) The  contention  is  that,  the  Rajapalayam  assembly  

constituency  is  a  reserved  constituency  and  only  

candidates belonging to the Scheduled Caste are eligible  

to  contest  the  elections  from  such  constituency.  

According  to  the  petitioner,  the  respondent  No.1  

(appellant  in  this  appeal)  filed  her  nomination  papers  

claiming herself to be a member of a Scheduled Caste by  

filing  false  declaration  and  suppressing  material  facts.  

According to him, the appellant professes Christianity and  

her  actual  name is  Glory  Chandra  and  she  is  born  to  

Christian  parents.  He  claims  that  the  husband  of  the  

appellant  is  Soosaimanickam  and  he  too  professes  

Christianity.   He  alleges  that  she  studied  in  CSI  High  

School, Batlagundu and not in Government High School,  

Devathanampatty as claimed in her nomination paper and  

as  per  school  records,  she belongs to  Christian  Pallan  

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community. He also claims that the community certificate  

issued by the Tahsildar,  Rajapalayam was procured by  

her, by exercising political clout and suppressing material  

facts and the said certificate was issued to the appellant  

within two days of the receipt of the application. He further  

asserts  that  even  after  the  alleged  conversion  of  the  

respondent,  the voters list  published for the year  1999,  

showed her name to be Glory Chandra. He also places  

reliance on the fact,  that,  the husband of  the appellant  

made  an  application  dated  27.4.1998,  to  the  Bharat  

Sanchar  Nigam  Limited  for  a  new  phone  connection,  

where  his  name  is  stated  as  Soosaimanickam.   The  

petitioner  also  relies  on  the  entries  in  original  Birth  

Register  of  1997,  pertaining  to  the  births  in  

Erumalainaickenpatti Village and they refer to the birth of  

a  girl  child  to  the  respondent,  whose  then  name  is  

referred as Glory Chandra and the child’s father's name is  

referred as Soosaimanickam and their religion referred to  

as  Christianity.   Therefore,  it  is  asserted  that  the  

respondent No. 1 is Christian by birth and continues to  

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profess  Christianity  and  therefore  could  not  have  

contested from a reserved constituency.

Contention of the contesting respondent/appellant:

5) The respondent states that she was born to a Christian  

father  and  Hindu  mother.  Her  father  subsequently  

remarried. Her father deserted her and her mother when  

she was a child. She was brought up by her mother at her  

sister’s house and claims to have severed all ties with her  

father. She claims that she was converted to Hinduism in  

the  Arya  Samaj  in  the  year  1994.  On  23.01.1995  she  

married one Murugan (who had converted to Hinduism in  

the  year  1975)  who  belonged  to  Pallan  caste.  The  

respondent  has  stated  that  her  marriage  with  Murugan  

took place as per the custom and practice in the Hindu  

Pallan  Community  at  her  husband's  house  in  the  

presence of village Nattamai, who took the Tali and gave  

it  to  her  husband  to  tie  it  around  the  neck  of  the  

respondent  and at  the  time of  marriage,  a sum of  Rs.  

250/- was given by the respondent’s husband's family to  

the  community  known  as  Devendrakula  Velalar  

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Samooham. She claims that her community members are  

the members of  Devendrakula Velalar  Samooham. She  

obtained a community  certificate  in  1997,  certifying  the  

fact  that  she belonged to the Hindu Pallan community.  

She specifically states that she did not find it necessary to  

inform the electorate of her conversion as she was born  

and brought up as a Hindu and practiced Hinduism. She  

states  that  she  used  to  worship  Hindu  gods  since  

childhood  in  the  village  temples  and  the  nearby  

Kamatchiamman temple. When she attained puberty, the  

requisite ceremonies were performed according to Hindu  

customs.  She  also  contested  and  won  the  Panchayat  

Ward  no.3  election  held  in  the  year  2001.  In  the  said  

elections no one filed any objection to the nomination filed  

by her. She clarifies that a daughter was born to her on  

20.6.1997  and  not  the  date  mentioned  in  the  Birth  

Register  for  the  year  1997.   She also  denies  that  she  

intentionally  did  not  file  the  Birth  Certificate  of  her  two  

daughters so as to reveal her religion. She also asserts  

that it is her brother Sudhakar Gnanaraj who had studied  

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in Government High School, Devathanampatty, which is a  

co-educational  institution  and  he  assumed  that  the  

respondent  being her  sister,  would  have studied in  the  

same school, and therefore, mentioned the same in the  

declaration filed along with  the nomination papers,  and  

the appellant came to Virudhunagar only on the morning  

of  20.4.2006 which was the last  day for  submitting the  

nomination papers and everything was done in a hurry.  

Her  brother  Sudhakar  Gnanaraj  informed  her  that  he  

prepared the nomination papers and it  is enough if she  

signs, and she signed the declaration in a hurry because  

she had  no reason to  suspect  that  any  mistake would  

have  occurred.  She  further  states  that  it  was  an  

inadvertent error that had crept in and does not help the  

election petitioner in any manner. She also claims that the  

averments in the election petition are false and have been  

brought about by the defeated candidate at the instigation  

of the rival DMK party. In sum and substance she would  

assert that she belongs to scheduled caste and has been  

accepted by the community as such.

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6) The High Court had framed six issues for its consideration and  

decision.  They are:-

  Whether  the  First  respondent/Returned  candidate  

suppressed the material fact that she belongs to Indian  

Christian Pallan Community as per her school records.

  Whether  the  First  respondent/Returned  candidate  

made  a  false  declaration  relating  to  her  community  

status  and  school  education  in  her  nomination  as  

belonging to scheduled caste.

  Whether  the  First  respondent/Returned  candidate  

converted  herself  to  Hinduism  in  1994  through  the  

Arya  Samaj,  Madurai  and  whether  the  same  was  

accepted by the Hindu Pallan Community.

  Whether  the  Election  petitioner  is  entitled  for  a  

declaration  that  the  election  of  the  First  

respondent/Returned candidate is void on the ground  

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that she was not qualified to contest the election in the  

Reserved Constituency.

  Whether  the  Election  petitioner  is  entitled  for  a  

further declaration as duly elected as a member of the  

Tamil  Nadu  Legislative  Assembly  from  No.  209,  

Rajapalayam  (SC)  Assembly  Constituency,  Tamil  

Nadu in the election held on 8.5.2006.

  To what other reliefs the petitioner is entitled to.

Findings of the High Court :  

7) The High Court has observed that in the normal circumstance  

the burden of proof in an election petition lay on the petitioner,  

but, in view of the admission of the respondent, the appellant  

herein, that she was a Christian before converting to Hinduism  

in the year 1994, the burden of proof is shifted and it is for the  

appellant  to  show  that  she  had  renounced  Christianity.  The  

High  Court  after  appreciating  the  evidence,  both  oral  and  

documentary adduced by the respondent/Election petitioner is  

of  the  view  that  the  circumstances  in  which  the  community  

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certificate was granted was highly suspicious, as it was issued  

within two days of the receipt of the application. The court has  

further  stated  that  it  was  likely  that  the  appellant  used  her  

political influence to get the certificate issued in her favour. The  

High Court also has taken strong exception to the fact that the  

original  conversion  certificate  was  not  produced  by  the  

appellant and only a duplicate copy of the same was produced.  

Though  in  her  testimony,  the  appellant  had  stated  that  the  

original  conversion  certificate  was  issued  in  the  evening  on  

27.08.1994 and it was received by her uncle Santhakumar from  

Arya  Samaj,  Madurai  and  remained  in  his  custody.  The  

Certificate was not delivered to her and after the filing of the  

election  petition,  she  asked  her  uncle  Santhakumar  to  hand  

over the certificate to her.  Thereafter,  being informed by her  

uncle about the loss of the original certificate, she requested  

him to obtain a duplicate copy of the certificate and accordingly  

Santhakumar  obtained  Ex.R.13-duplicate  copy  of  conversion  

certificate.   Agreeing  with  most  of  the  contentions  of  the  

election petitioner, the High Court has come to the conclusion  

that the burden of proof placed on appellant was not discharged  

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satisfactorily.   In  conclusion,  the  Court  has  held  that  the  

appellant belongs to Pallan Christian Community and she could  

not  have  contested  the  Assembly  elections  from  reserved  

constituency  and,  therefore,  declared  her  election  as  void.  

However  with  regard  to  declaring  the  next  candidate  as  

successful, the High Court has stated that the election law in  

this country does not recognize such a recourse to be adopted.  

Submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant:

8) The learned  counsel  Sri  Guru  Krishna  Kumar  would  submit,  

that, a person belonging to a caste enlisted in the Constitution  

(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, would be treated as a person  

belonging  to  such  caste  if  he  professes  Hinduism.   It  is  

contended that the High Court has wrongly placed the burden  

of  proof  on  the  appellant  contrary  to  the  settled  law.   The  

appellant  having  been issued a  community  certificate  in  due  

course in accordance with law which remains in tact, it was not  

open  to  the  High  Court  to  ignore  the  same.   It  is  further  

submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for  

ignoring  relevant  evidence  and  for  wrongly  construing  the  

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evidence contrary to settled principles and is as such perverse.  

It  is  also  contended that  the  Arya Samaj  ceremony that  the  

appellant went through is a reiteration of the appellant that she  

would continue to profess the Hindu faith.   While elaborating  

these contentions, the learned counsel would submit that the  

Constitution  (Scheduled  Castes)  Order,  1950,  sets  out  the  

castes, races and tribes in each State of India and provides that  

a person belonging to any of the castes specified therein be  

deemed  to  be  a  schedule  caste  for  the  purpose  of  the  

constitution.  Paragraph 3 contains a proviso to the effect that  

notwithstanding  anything contained in para 2, no person who  

professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist  

religion  shall  be  deemed to  be  a  member  of  the  scheduled  

caste  and  a  combined  reading  of  paras  2  and  3  of  the  

Presidential  Order would show that  if  a person belongs to a  

caste which is notified in the schedule to the presidential order,  

he/she would have status of a Schedule Caste, provided he/she  

professes Hinduism or one of the other religions specified in  

paragraph  3  of  the  order.   It  is  further  contended  that  the  

expression  ‘Profess’  occurring  in  paragraph  3  of  the  

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Presidential order has been considered by a Constitution Bench  

in  the  case  of  Punjab  Rao  Vs.  D.P.  Mesh  Ram and  others  

(1965) 1 SLR.849.  Therefore, the sine qua-non for a person to  

be  treated  a  Scheduled  Caste  is  that  he  must  practice  the  

Hindu religion.  Reliance is also placed on the decision of this  

court in the case of Perumal Nadar Vs.  Ponnuswamy (1970) 1  

SCC 605 and Gangapal Vs.  Returning Officer (1975) 1 SCC  

589.

9)  While  elaborating  the  contention  that  the  High  Court  has  

wrongly placed the burden of proof on the appellant contrary to  

the well established legal principles, the learned counsel would  

submit, that, the burden of proof is on the election petitioner in  

an  election  petition  and  it  is  his  duty  to  establish  his  case  

beyond  reasonable  doubt.   However,  the  High  Court  in  its  

impugned order has erred in holding that it is on the appellant  

to  prove  the  allegation  and  assertions  made by the  election  

petitioner and since the appellant failed to prove the negative,  

the prayer made in the election petition requires to be granted.  

In  aid  of  this  submission,  the  learned  counsel  relies  on  the  

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decision  of   this   Court  in the case of  J. Chandra Shekhar  

Rao  Vs.  V.  Jagapathi  Rao  1993  Supp.  (2)  SCC  229,  

Harikrishna Lal Vs. Babulal Marandi (2003) 8 SCC 613, Razik  

Ram Vs. Jaswant Singh (1975) 4 SCC 769, Gajanan Krishnaji  

Bapat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Megha (1995) 5 SCC 347, Regu  

Mahesh Vs. Rajendra Pratap Bhany Dev (2004) 1 SCC 46 and  

Jeet Mohinder Vs. Harminder Singh (1999) 9 SCC 386.   

10)  The learned counsel  also contends that  the appellant  having  

been  issued  with  a  Community  Certificate  in  due  course  in  

accordance  with  law,  which  is  not  yet  cancelled  by  any  

competent authority, it was not open to the High Court to ignore  

the same.   It  is  also submitted  that  the judgment  and order  

passed by the High Court requires to be set aside for ignoring  

relevant evidence, and for wrongly construing the evidence on  

record contrary to  settled principles.   It  is  submitted that  the  

High Court was not justified in disbelieving the certificate issued  

by  Arya  Samaj  and  further  ought  not  to  have  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  appellant  failed  to  prove  that  there  was  

conversion from Christianity to Hindu faith.  It is also contended  

that it is settled law that once the parties have been permitted  

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to produce evidence in support of their respective cases and if it  

is  not  their  grievance  that  any  evidence  was  shut  out,  the  

question  of  burden of  proof  looses significance  and remains  

only  academic.   In  aid  of  his  submission,  our  attention  was  

invited to the decision of this Court in the case of Raghunathi &  

Anr.  Vs.  Raju  Ramappa  Shetty  (1991)  Supp.  (2)  SCC 267;  

Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Andhra Bank Financial Services  

Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 94.     

Submission of the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1:-

11)  The learned Senior Counsel Sri K. Rama Moorthy, appearing  

for  Respondent  no.  1  would  submit  that  the  name  of  the  

appellant is Glory Chandra and her name itself suggests that  

she is Christian and professes Christian faith and this is further  

fortified by the fact that she is born to Christian parents.  It is  

further submitted that the appellant studied in CSI High School,  

Batlagundu  and  as  per  her  school  records,  she  belongs  to  

Christian religion and this fact was suppressed by the appellant  

in the nomination papers filed by her.  It is further submitted that  

the parents of the appellant are professing Christianity and the  

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appellant  was  brought  up  as  a  Christian  and  further  the  

marriage of the appellant was as per the Christian religion and  

the husband of the appellant is a member of a Church called  

Thuya  Sahaya  Annai  Alayam.   The  learned  Senior  Counsel  

submitted  that  the  appellant  does  not  belong  to  Scheduled  

Caste, but by using her political clout has procured community  

certificate  from Tahsildar,  Rajapalayam,  as if  she belongs to  

Scheduled Caste Community.  It is also submitted that in the  

absence of specific pleadings, in written statement on an issue,  

no  evidence  can  be  looked  into  in  relation  thereto.   Our  

attention was invited to the decisions of this Court in the case of  

Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana Vs. Sakala Veera  

Raghavaiah  &  Anr.  (1987)  1  SCC  254;  Sri  Venkataramana  

Devaru & Ors. Vs. State of Mysore & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 255;  

Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat & Anr. Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe &  

Ors.  (1995)  5 SCC 347;  Abubakar  Abdul  Inamdar  (dead)  by  

LRs & Ors. Vs. Harun Abdul Inamdar & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 112,  

Gulabrao  Balawantrao  Shinde  &  Ors.  Vs.  Chhabubai  

Balawantrao  Shinde  &  Ors.  (2003)  1  SCC 212  and  Bondar  

Singh & Ors. Vs. Nihal Singh & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 161.    

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Submission of the learned counsel for Respondent No. 2.

12) Shri  R.  Balasubramaniam,  the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  

Respondent  No.  2,  submitted  that  the  election  petitioner  by  

specific  pleadings in  the election  petition  has discharged his  

initial burden that the appellant was born to Christian parents  

and her parents continues to profess Christian faith and even  

her  school  records  would  reveal  that  she  belongs  to  Indian  

Christian Pallan Community and further that she was born and  

brought up as Christian and till date she professed Christianity  

and these assertions are not denied by the appellant and in fact  

that  there  are  specific  admissions  that  she  was  born  and  

brought  up  as  a  Christian,  since  she  was  born  to  Christian  

parents and it is only in the year 1994, she converted herself to  

Hindu faith/Hinduism and if she was a Hindu throughout, then  

there was no reason for her to have gone through yet another  

ritual for her reaffirmation of Hindu faith in Arya Samaj and it is  

also contended that the intention of the convertee would be a  

relevant  factor  in  deciding  the  truth  or  otherwise  of  the  

conversion,  though  the  appellant  pleaded  that  her  ancestors  

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were  Hindus  belonging  to  Pallan  Community,  there  was  

conversion in to Christianity due to various reasons, but later  

she renounced Christianity and converted Hinduism and in the  

absence of supporting evidence to those pleadings, it must be  

held  that  the  appellant  is  the  first  time  convertee  from  

Christianity into Hinduism.  It is further contended that even the  

husband  of  the  appellant  was  a  Christian  and  continues  to  

profess Christianity and it is only in the year 1975 he claims to  

have changed his religion to Hinduism.  It  is  also contended  

that  the  appellant  though  claims  she  has  converted  into  

Hinduism through Arya Samaj, Madurai, she has failed to prove  

her conversion by leading cogent and acceptable evidence and  

therefore  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  disbelieving  her  

evidence.  It  was also contended that  the appellant  failed to  

prove that her marriage was as per Hindu religion.  The learned  

Senior  Counsel  vehemently  contends,  that,  there  are  two  

stages in appellant’s life, namely, prior to conversion and after  

conversion.   According  to  him,  that  in  the  reply  filed  in  the  

election petition,  there is no pleading that she was Hindu by  

birth and that till conversion she was professing Hinduism and  

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that there is no pleading that at any stage she was professing  

Hinduism and or living Hindu way of life or believing in Hindu  

faith.  Therefore, submits that the High Court was justified in  

allowing the election petition filed by Election petitioner.  

Definition of Scheduled Caste :

13)  We may begin to discuss this issue firstly by referring to weighty  

observations  made  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Ganpat  vs.  

Returning Officer, 1975 (1) SCC 589.  “The monstrous course  

of  untouchability  has  got  to  be  eradicated.   It  has  got  be  

eradicated  not  merely  by  making  constitutional  provisions  or  

laws but  also by eradicating it  from the minds and hearts  of  

men.   For  that  it  is  even  more  important  that  members  of  

communities  who  are  untouchables  should  assert  their  

self-respect and fight for their dignity than that members of the  

other communities should forget about it.     

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14)  In order to bring the lower castes on par with the upper castes,  

there are special provisions in the Constitution to ensure that  

equal opportunity was not just in word but also in deed.  

15)  “Scheduled Castes” means such castes, races or tribes or parts  

of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed  

under article 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purpose of the  

Constitution.  For easy reference the said provision is extracted:  

“341. Scheduled Castes. –  (1) The President   may  with  respect  to  any  State  or  Union  territory,  and  where  it  is  a  State,  after   consultation  with  the  Governor  thereof,  by  public notification, specify the castes, races or   tribes  which  shall  for  the  purposes  of  this   Constitution  be  deemed  to  be  Scheduled  Castes  in  relation  to  that  State  or  Union  territory, as the case may be.

(2)  Parliament  may  by  law  include  in  or  exclude  from  the  list  of  Scheduled  Castes  specified in a notification issued under clause  (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group   within  any caste,  race or  tribe,  but  save as  aforesaid a notification issued under the said  clause shall not be varied by any subsequent  notification.”

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16)  Article 341(1) of the Constitution was considered by this Court  

in  the  case  of  S.  Swvigaradoss  Vs.  Zonal  Manager,  F.C.I.  

(1996) 3 SCC 100.  In that case, this Court held as under :-

“Article  341(1)  empowers  the  President  of   India  to  specify,  in  consultation  with  the  Governor  of  the  State,  with  respect  to  the  State or Union Territory, or for a part of the  State, District or region by public notification  specify castes, races or tribes or parts of or  groups within castes, races or tribes which  shall for the purposes of the Constitution be  deemed to be “Scheduled Castes” in relation  to the State or Union Territory as the case  may be.  Clause (2) of Article 341 empowers  Parliament by law to include in or  exclude  from the list of Scheduled Castes specified  in  the  notification  issued under  Clause  (1)  any caste, race or tribe or part of or group  within any caste, race or tribe, but save as   aforesaid a notification issued under the said  clause  shall  not  be  varied  by  any  subsequent notification.  In other words, the  constitutional  mandate  is  that  it  is  the  President who is empowered, in consultation  with the Governor of the State, to specify by  a public notification the caste, race or tribe  or  parts  or  groups  within  castes,  races  or  tribes  which  shall  for  the  purposes  of  the  Constitution  be  deemed  to  be  Scheduled  Castes  in  relation  to  that  State  or  Union  Territory.”  

17) Under  these  provisions,  the  Constitution  (Scheduled  Castes)  

Order  was issued in  1950.   It  sets out  the caste,  races and  

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tribes in each State of India and provides under para 2, that a  

person  belonging  to  any  of  the  caste  specified  therein  be  

deemed  to  be  a  Scheduled  Caste  for  the  purpose  of  the  

Constitution.   Para  3  contains  a  proviso  to  the  effect  that  

notwithstanding anything contained in para 2, no person who  

professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh or Budhist  

religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.  

Reading para 2 and 3 of the Presidential Order would show that  

if a person belongs to a caste which is notified in the Schedule  

to  the  Presidential  Order  he/she would have the status of  a  

Scheduled Caste, provided he/she professes Hinduism or one  

of the other religions specified in paragraph 3 of the Order.

18)  The text of the Order is reproduced below :

“In  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  by  clause (1) of article 341 of the Constitution  of  India,  the  President,  after  consultation  with the Governors and Rajpramukhs of the  States  concerned,  is  pleased  to  make the  following Order namely:

1. This order may be called the Constitution  (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.

2. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the  castes, races or tribes or parts, or groups  

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within,  castes or tribes specified in (Parts   to  (XXII)  of  the  Scheduled  to  this  Order   shall,  in  relation  to  the  States  to  which  those  Parts  respectively  related,  be  deemed to be Scheduled Castes so far as  regards  member  thereof  resident  in   localities  specified  in  relation  to  them  in  those Parts of what Schedule.

3. Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  paragraph 2,  no person who professes a  religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh  or the Buddhists religion shall be deemed  to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.

4. Any reference in this Order to a State or to   a district or other territorial division thereof  shall  be  construed as  a  reference to  the  State, district or other territorial division as  constituted on the 1st day of May, 1976.”

19)  Prior to amendment, Clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled  

Castes)  Order  ,  1950  came up  for  consideration  before  this  

court in the case of Punjabrao v. D.P. Meshram, [(1965) 1 SCR  

849], wherein this court has observed, “what Clause (3) of the  

Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, contemplates is  

that for a person to be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled  

Caste  within  the  meaning  of  that,  he  must  be  one  who  

professes  either  Hindu  or  Sikh  religion.     The  High  Court,  

following  its  earlier  decision  in  Karwade  v.  Shambhakar  

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[AIR1958Bom296]  has  observed,  that  the  meaning  of  the  

phrase "professes a religion" in the aforementioned provision is  

"to enter publicly into a religious state" and that for this purpose  

a mere declaration by person that he has ceased to belong to a  

particular religion and embraced another religion would not be  

sufficient. The meanings of the word "profess" have been given  

thus in Webster's New Word Dictionary : "to avow publicly; to  

make an open declaration of; ....... to declare one's belief in :  

as,  to  profess  Christ.  To  accept  into  a  religious  order."  The  

meanings given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary are more or  

less  the  same.  It  seems to  us  that  the  meaning "to  declare  

one's belief in : as to profess Christ" is one which we have to  

bear in mind while construing the aforesaid order because it is  

this  which bears  upon religious belief  and consequently  also  

upon a change in religious belief.  It  would thus follow that a  

declaration of one's belief must necessarily mean a declaration  

in such a way that it  would be known to those whom it may  

interest. Therefore, if a public declaration is made by a person  

that  he  has  ceased  to  belong  to  his  old  religion  and  has  

accepted another  religion  he will  be  taken as professing the  

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other religion. In the face of such an open declaration it would  

be  idle  to  enquire  further  as  to  whether  the  conversion  to  

another  religion  was  efficacious.  The  word  "profess"  in  the  

Presidential Order appears to have been used in the sense of  

an open declaration or practice by a person of the Hindu (or the  

Sikh) religion. Where, therefore, a person says, on the contrary,  

that he has ceased to be a Hindu he cannot derive any benefit  

from that Order”.

20)  The way we understand the order 1950, and the observation  

made  by  this  court  is,  in  order  to  claim  the  benefits  of  

reservation  under  the  Presidential  Order,  a  person  must  

establish that the caste to which he belongs is notified in the  

Presidential Order and he is not professing a religion different  

from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Budhist.

Conversion of Religion – Burden of Proof :

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21)  It  is  not  in  dispute  that  Hindu Pallan Community  is  notified  

under  the  Presidential  Order  as  Scheduled  Caste.  The  

appellant  claims  that  though her  father  was  a  Christian,  her  

mother  continued  to  profess  the  customs  of  Hindu  Pallan  

Community.  It is her further case that her father deserted her  

mother when she was still a child and her mother brought her  

up as Hindu and her community accepted her and her mother  

as  Hindu.   Now  the  question  is  whether  the  appellant  is  

professing and practicing Hinduism.  The appellant claims that  

though  her  father  is  a  Christian,  her  mother  continues  to  

profess Hindu religion and it is her further case that she was  

born  and  brought  up  as  a  Hindu  by  her  mother  and  she  

continues to  profess Hindu faith  and in  order  to  reaffirm her  

faith  in  Hinduism,  she  has  undergone  rituals  in  Arya  Samaj  

Madurai, and in proof of it she has produced the duplicate copy  

of the certificate.  At the time of hearing of this appeal a lot of  

debate  was  generated  by  both  the  sides  pwith  regard  to  

certificate  of  conversion  issued  by  the  Arya  Samaj.   The  

appellant  in support  her view in her evidence has stated the  

various rituals she followed in the Arya Samaj to reaffirm her  

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faith in Hindu faith, the reason why she is not in a position to  

produce  the  original  certificate  issued  and  the  necessity  for  

production of duplicate certificate.  Since this forms the fulcrum  

of the case, the learned counsel for the respondents pointed  

out so called various discrepancies in the certificate and to say  

the least, the length, breadth, borders, dates, signature in the  

certificate.  We will refer to these, when we discuss the veracity  

of the certificate produced by the appellant to reaffirm her faith  

in Hindu religion which she claims has professed right from her  

childhood.  Before we do that, it is desirable to notice certain  

observation made by this court  in the case of Perumal Nadar v.  

Ponnuswami, [1970 (1) SCC 605.  This court observed :

“6. A person may be a Hindu by birth or by   conversion. A mere theoretical allegiance to   the Hindu faith by a person born in another  faith does not convert him into a Hindu, nor  is  a  bare  declaration  that  he  is  a  Hindu  sufficient to convert him to Hinduism. But a  bona  fide  intention  to  be  converted  to  the  Hindu  faith,  accompanied  by  conduct  unequivocally expressing that intention may  be  sufficient  evidence  of  conversion.  No  formal ceremony of purification or expiation  is necessary to effectuate conversion.

8. In  Goona  Durgaprasada  Rao  v.  Goona  Sudarasanaswami Mockett,  J.,   observed  that  no  gesture  or  declaration  

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may change a man’s religion, but when on  the facts it appears that a man did change  his  religion and was accepted by his  co- religionists as having changed his religion  and lived and died in that religion, absence  of some formality cannot negative what is  an actual fact. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.,   observed that a Hindu who had converted  himself  to  the  Christian  faith  returned  to  Hinduism  and  contracted  a  second  marriage during the life-time of his first wife   and  remained  and  died  a  Hindu  having  been accepted as such by the community  and co-religionists without demur. Absence  of evidence of rituals relating to conversion  cannot justify the Court in treating him as  having remained a Christian.”

22)  In the case of Ganpat v. Returning Officer, (1975) 1 SCC 589,  

it was observed:

“11. In  this  connection  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  Hinduism  is  a  very  broad  based religion. In fact some people take the  view that  it  is  not  a  religion  at  all  on  the   ground that there is no one founder and no  one  sacred  book  for  the  Hindus.  This,  of   course, is a very narrow view merely based  on the comparison between Hinduism on the  one side and Islam and Christianity on the  other. But one knows that Hinduism through  the  ages  has  absorbed  or  accommodated  many different practices, religious as well as  secular, and also different faiths. One of the  witnesses has described that he considered  Buddha as the eleventh Avtar…… Hinduism  is so tolerant and Hindu religious practices  so varied and eclectic that one would find it   difficult  to say whether one is practising or  professing Hindu religion or not.”

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23) In Kothapalli Narasayya vs. Jammana Jogi AIR 1976 SC 937, it  

is stated:-

“These cases show that the consistent view  taken  in  this  country  from  the  time  Administrator-General  of  Madras  v.  Anandachari  was  decided,  that  is,  since  1886,  has  been  that  on  reconversion  to   Hinduism, a person can once again become  a member of the caste in which he was born  and to which he belonged before conversion  to  another  religion,  if  the  members  of  the  caste accept him as a member. There is no  reason  either  on  principle  or  on  authority   which  should  compel  us  to  disregard  this   view  which  has  prevailed  for  almost  a  century and lay down a different rule on the  subject.  If  a  person  who  has  embraced  another  religion  can  be  reconverted  to  Hinduism, there is no rational principle why  he should not be able to come back to his  caste, if the other members of the caste are  prepared  to  readmit  him  as  a  member.  It   stands to reason that he should be able to   come  back  to  the  fold  to  which  he  once  belonged, provided of course the community  is  willing  to  take  him  within  the  fold....  A  Mahar  or  a  Koli  or  a  Mala  would  not  be  recognised  as  anything  but  a  Mahar  or  a  Koli  or  a  Mala  after  reconversion  to  Hinduism  and  he  would  suffer  from  the  same social and economic disabilities from  which he suffered before he was converted  to another religion. It  is,  therefore,  obvious  that  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  Constitution  (Scheduled  Castes)  Order,   1950  would  be  advanced  rather  than  

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retarded  by  taking  the  view  that  on  reconversion  to  Hinduism,  a  person  can  once  again  become  a  member  of  the  Scheduled Caste to which he belonged prior  to his conversion. We accordingly agree with   the  view taken  by  the  High  Court  that  on  reconversion  to  Hinduism,  the  first   respondent  could  once  again  revert  to  his   original  Adi  Dravida  caste  if  he  was  accepted as such by the other members of   the caste.”

24) In S. Anbalagan vs. B. Devarajan and others (1984) 2 SCC  

112, it is observed:-

“These  precedents,  particularly  those  from  South  India,  clearly  establish  that  no  particular  ceremony  is  prescribed  for  reconversion to Hinduism of  a person who  had  earlier  embraced  another  religion.   Unless  the  practice  of  the  caste  makes  it   necessary,  no  expiatory  rites  need  be  performed  and,  ordinarily,  he  regains  his  caste unless the community does not accept   him. In fact,  it  may not be accurate to say  that  he regains  his  caste;  it  may be more  accurate to say that he never lost his caste  in  the  first  instance  when  he  embraced  another  religion.  The  practice  of  caste  however  irrational  it  may  appear  to  our   reason  and  however  repugnant  it  may  appear to our moral and social sense, is so  deep-rooted  in  the  Indian  people  that  its   mark  does  not  seem  to  disappear  on  conversion  to  a  different  religion.  If  it   disappears,  it  disappears  only  to  reappear  on reconversion. The mark of caste does not  seem to  really  disappear  even  after  some  generations after conversion.”

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25) In Kailash Sonkar vs. Smt. Maya Devi [(1984) 2 SCC 91], this  

court  speaking  through  FAZAL  ALI,  J.  made  the  following  

observation.

“In  our  opinion,  there  is  one aspect  which  does not appear to have been dealt with by  any of the cases discussed by us. Suppose,  A,  a  member  of  the  scheduled  caste,  is  converted  to  Christianity  and  marries  a  Christian girl and a daughter is born to him  who,  according  to  the  tenets  of  Christian  religion, is baptised and educated. After she  has  attained  the  age  of  discretion  she  decides  of  her  own volition  to  re-embrace  Hinduism, should in such a case revival of   the  caste  depend  on  the  views  of  the  members  of  the  community  of  the  caste  concerned  or  would  it  automatically  revive  on her reconversion if the same is genuine  and  followed  by  the  necessary  rites  and  ceremonies? In other words, is it  not open  for B (the daughter) to say that because she  was born of Christian parents their  religion  cannot be thrust on her when after attaining  the  age  of  discretion  and  gaining  some  knowledge of the world affairs, she decides  to revert to her old religion.  It was not her   fault that she was born of Christian parents  and baptised at a time when she was still a   minor and knew nothing about the religion.   Therefore,  should  the  revival  of  the  caste  depend on the whim or will of the members  of the community of her original caste or she  would  lose  her  caste  for  ever  merely  because  fortunately  or  unfortunately  she  was  born  in  a  Christian  family?  With  due  respect,  our  confirmed  opinion  is  that  although the views of  the members of  the  community  would  be  an  important  factor,   their views should not be allowed to (sic) a  complete  loss  of  the  caste  to  which  B  belonged. Indeed, if too much stress is laid  on  the  views  of  the  members  of  the  

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community the same may lead to dangerous  exploitation.

But from that it does not necessarily follow  as an invariable rule that whenever a person  renounces Hinduism and embraces another  religious faith, he automatically ceases to be  a member of the caste in which he was born  and  to  which  he  belonged  prior  to  his  conversion…. If the structure of the caste is  such  that  its  members  must  necessarily   belong  to  Hindu  religion,  a  member,  who  ceases to be a Hindu, would go out of the   caste, because no non-Hindu can be in the  caste according to its rules and regulations.   Where, on the other hand, having regard to   its  structure,  as  it  has  evolved  over  the  years,  a  caste  may  consist  not  only  of   persons  professing  Hindu  religion  but  also  persons  professing  some other  religion  as  well, conversion from Hinduism to that other  religion  may  not  involve  loss  of  caste,   because  even  persons  professing  such  other  religion  can  be  members  of  the  caste....  This  is  indeed  not  an  infrequent  phenomenon in South India where, in some  of  the  castes,  even  after  conversion  to  Christianity,  a  person  is  regarded  as  continuing to belong to the caste.”

26) In C.M. Arumugam vs. S. Rajgopal and Others (1976) 1 SCC  

863; the following observation is made by this Court.

“These cases show that the consistent view  taken  in  this  country  from  the  time  Administrator-General  of  Madras  v.  Anandachari  was  decided,  that  is,  since  1886,  has  been  that  on  reconversion  to   Hinduism, a person can once again, become  a member of the caste in which he was born  and to which he belonged before conversion  to  another  religion,  if  the  members  of  the  

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caste accept him as a member. There is no  reason  either  on  principle  or  on  authority   which  should  compel  us  to  disregard  this   view  which  has  prevailed  for  almost  a  century and lay down a different rule on the  subject.  If  a  person  who  has  embraced  another  religion  can  be  reconverted  to  Hinduism, there is no rational principle why  he should not be able to come back to his  caste, if the other members of the caste are  prepared  to  readmit  him  as  a  member.  It   stands to reason that he should be able to   come  back  to  the  fold  to  which  he  once  belonged, provided of course the community  is willing to take him within the fold. It is the   orthodox Hindu society still  dominated to a  large  extent,  particularly  in  rural  areas,  by  medievalistic  outlook  and  status-oriented  approach  which  attaches  social  and  economic disabilities to a person belonging  to a scheduled caste and that is why certain   favoured  treatment  is  given  to  him by  the  Constitution. Once such a person ceases to  be  a  Hindu  and  becomes  a  Christian,  the  social  and  economic  disabilities  arising  because of Hindu religion cease and hence  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  give  him  protection and for this reason he is deemed  not  to  belong  to  a  scheduled  caste.  But  when  he  is  reconverted  to  Hinduism,  the  social and economic disabilities once again  revive and become attached to him because  these are disabilities inflicted by Hinduism.”

27) We must  remember,  as  observed  by  this  Court  in  Ganpat’s  

case,  Hinduism is  not  a  religion  with  one  God  or  one  Holy  

Scripture. The practices of Hindus vary from region to region,  

place to place. The Gods worshipped, the customs, Traditions,  

Practice,  rituals  etc,  they  all  differ,  yet  all  these  people  are  

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Hindus.  The  determination  of  the  religious  acceptance  of  a  

person must be not be made on his name or his birth. When a  

person intends  to  profess  Hinduism,  and he does all  that  is  

required by the practices of Hinduism in the region or by the  

caste to which he belongs, and he is accepted as a Hindu by all  

persons around him.

28) Hinduism appears to be very complex religion.  It is like a centre  

of gravity doll which always regain its upright position however  

much  it  may  be  upset.  Hinduism  does  not  have  a  single  

founder, a single book, a singe church or even a single way of  

life.   Hinduism  is  not  the  caste  system  and  its  hierarchies,  

though the system is a part of its social arrangement, based on  

the division of  labour.   Hinduism does not  preach or  uphold  

untouchability, though the Hindu Society has practiced it, firstly  

due to reasons of  public  health and later,  due to prejudices.  

(copied in tits and bits from the book  facets of Hinduism by Sri  

Swami Harshananda).

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29) It is a settled principle of law that to prove a  conversion from  

one religion to another, two elements need to be satisfied. First,  

there has to be a conversion and second acceptance into the  

community to which the person converted. It is obvious that the  

need of a conversion cannot be altogether done away with.  

30) The  appellant  had  examined  herself  as  RW3.   In  her  

examination  in  chief,  she  has  categorically  stated,  that  as  a  

Hindu,  in  her  household  they  are  celebrating  festivals  like  

Pongal, Vinayaka-Chaturthi etc.  She has also stated  that since  

her birth she has been living as a Hindu and following Hindu  

customs and tradition and her relatives are also treating her as  

Hindu and all her relatives are Hindus.  She has also stated that  

she has not gone to any Church and she does not know about  

Christianity  and  that  form  of  worship.    In  her  constituency  

people knew her only as Chandra and not as Glory Chandra.  

She has also stated that she contested in the elections held for  

Rajapalyam  Panchayat  Union  Council  from  reserved  

constituency  and  nobody  raised  any  objection.   It  has  also  

come in her evidence that she wanted to reaffirm her faith in  

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Hinduism and therefore she approached Arya Samaj, Madurai  

and after making her go through all the rituals, the Arya Samaj,  

Madurai  issued  a  certificate  of  reconversion  to  Hinduism  

bearing Serial No. E56 dated 27.8.1994 (Ex. R13) and the same  

was received by her uncle Santnakumar and it is only when the  

election petition was filed, on her enquiry she was told that the  

original certificate that was received by him has been lost and  

therefore  she  requested  him to  obtain  duplicate  copy of  the  

certificate.  It has also come in her evidence that her marriage  

was  performed  as  per  Hindu  customs  and  her  husband  is  

Murugan, who also belongs to Hindu Pallan Community.  She  

asserts that she lived as Hindu and continue to live as Hindu by  

following  Hindu  Customs  and  Traditions.   She  has  faced  a  

lengthy  cross  examination.   The  learned  senior  counsel  Sri  

Ramamurthy has taken us through the entire evidence.  We are  

afraid that whether anything worthwhile has been brought on  

record to discredit the veracity of the evidence of the appellant  

and  in  fact  whatever  suggestion  that  was  put  to  falsify  the  

conversion  certificate  issued  by  Arya  Samaj,  Madurai,  the  

witness has denied all those suggestions.  The learned counsel  

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for the appellant contended that it is well settled that there is no  

requirement in law of producing any clinching evidence on any  

formal ceremony of conversion to Hinduism.  Our attention in  

drawn to the observations made by this Court in Perumal Nadar  

vs. Ponnuswamy (1970) 1 SCC 605; Per contra, the learned  

senior counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that the  

appellant has not proved her claim of reconversion to Hinduism  

by  producing  primary  evidence  viz.,  the  original  conversion  

certificate  issued  by  Arya  Samaj.   The  High  Court  while  

considering this issue has noticed that the appellant failed to  

produce the original certificate issued by Arya Samaj, Madurai  

and  further  has  not  examined  Santnakumar,  who  was  

supposed to have received and retained the original certificate  

issued by the Arya Samaj  and the original  records have not  

been summoned from Arya Samaj  and  no  steps  have  been  

taken to summon the responsible person from Arya Samaj to  

prove that the appellant underwent conversion. Therefore, the  

claim made by her about her reconversion cannot be accepted.  

We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court.  It is true  

that  a  party  who  wishes  to  rely  upon  the  contents  of  a  

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document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and  

only  in  the  exceptional  cases  will  secondary  evidence  be  

admissible.  However,  if  secondary evidence is admissible,  it  

may  be  adduced  in  any  form  in  which  it  may  be  available,  

whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by  

oral  evidence  of  the  contents  or  in  another  form.   The  

secondary  evidence  must  be  authenticated  by  foundational  

evidence that  the  alleged copy is  in  fact  a  true  copy of  the  

original.   It  should be emphasized that the exceptions to the  

rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in  

a  case  where  a  party  is  genuinely  unable  to  produce  the  

original through no fault of that party.  In the instant case, it is  

the specific case of the appellant that in the year 1994 that is  

much before the Assembly elections which was held in the year  

2006, she had undergone all the rituals in Arya Samaj only for  

the purpose of reaffirmation of Hindu faith and the conversion  

certificate  issued  by  Arya  Samaj  was  received  and  

acknowledged  by  her  uncle  Santnakumar  who  had  

accompanied her.  It is also her specific case that she did not  

take back the certificate from her uncle, since she was of the  

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view the same may not be required for her purpose.  It is only  

when the election petition was filed, it order to proof her case of  

reaffirmation of her faith in Hinduism, she came to know that  

her  uncle  has  lost  the  certificate,  which  necessitated  her  to  

obtain  a  duplicate  copy  of  conversion  certificate  from  Arya  

Samaj,  Madurai.   This  part  of  her  evidence  is  not  even  

challenged  by  the  petitioner.   In  fact  the  contents  of  the  

documents  would  clearly  establish  that  it  was  issued for  the  

second time on the request made by the appellant, after she  

was told by her uncle Santnakumar that the original certificate  

received by him in the year 1994 is lost by him.  In our view, a  

perusal  of  the  conversion  certificate  (Ex.  R13)  would  amply  

demonstrate  that  the  appellant  has  successfully  proved  her  

claim of  re-affirmation of  Hindu faith by undergoing rituals of  

conversion in the Arya Samaj, Madurai.

31) The High Court has placed reliance on the decision of this court  

in the case of Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju v. Nimmaka Jaya  

Raju and Ors. (AIR 2006 SC 543), to place the burden of proof  

3

on the  appellant  itself.  The relevant  portion  of  the  judgment  

reads:-

“15.  Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  made  a  strenuous  attempt  to  contend that the learned Judge of the High  Court  had  wrongly  placed  the  burden  of   proof in the case. We cannot agree. The trial   judge  has  rightly  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  the  initial  burden  was  on  the  election  petitioner  to  establish  his  plea  that  the  appellant  did  not  belong  to  a  Scheduled  Tribe.  Though  in  a  prior  statement,  an  assertion in one's own interest, may not be  evidence,  a  prior  statement,  adverse  to  one's interest would be evidence. In fact, it   would  be  the  best  evidence  the  opposite  party  can  rely  upon.  Therefore,  in  the  present  case,  where  the  appellant  is   pleading  that  he  is  a  Konda  Dora,  the  statement in the series of  documents,  pre- constitution and post constitution, executed  by his ancestors and members of his family   including  himself  describing  themselves  as  'Kshatriyas',  would  operate  as  admissions  against  the  interest  of  the  appellant  in  the  present  case.  These  admissions  also  strengthened the admission of the appellant   that in his school leaving certificate also, he  is described as a 'Kshatriya' and his paternal   uncle's son is also described as a 'Kshatriya'   in  his  school  leaving  certificate  and  that  uncle's son was also held to be a 'Kshatriya'   on  an  enquiry  made  in  that  behalf.   Therefore,  in  our  view,  the  trial  judge was  correct in holding that the election petitioner  had discharged the initial burden placed on  him and the burden shifted to the appellant   

4

to establish that he belonged to the 'Konda  Dora' Tribe.”

32) On  a  careful  perusal  of  the  judgment,  it  is  possible  to  

distinguish  the  present  case  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  and  

circumstances. In the above mentioned case, which the High  

Court  has  relied  upon,  there  was  no  conversion  from  one  

religion  to  another.  The  question  was  whether  the  person  

belongs to Kshatriya Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. The question  

relates  to  caste  within  a  religion  as  opposed  to  the  present  

case,  where there has been conversion from one religion to  

another.  Therefore the reasoning given by the High Court  to  

reverse and discharge the burden of proof is erroneous and the  

burden of proof should lie on the election petitioner to prove  

that the appellant still professes Christianity.   

33) We,  therefore  express  our  disapproval  to  the  findings  of  the  

High Court on this issue.

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34) The appellant, in support of her case, has examined Sengaiah  

alias  Chinna  Sangaiah-RW4,  Rasu-RW5,  Govindan-RW6,  

Paulraj-RW7, and RW10-Surulimuthu.   

35) Mr.  Sengaiah  (RW  4)  belongs  to  the  same  village  as  the  

appellant. He has deposed that he knows the appellant as she  

was born and brought up in his village.  It has also come in his  

evidence that the family deity of the appellant is Palichiamman.  

She also used to worship Hindu Gods from her childhood in the  

village  temples  and  the  nearby  Kamatchiamman  temple.  A  

ceremony  was  also  performed  on  the  appellant  reaching  

puberty according to their caste customs and this was attended  

by  his  wife.  The  witness  also  states  that  the  appellant’s  

betrothal ceremony also took place as per the customs of the  

Hindu Pallan community. This was attended by him. However  

he did not attend the marriage of the appellant. But he further  

deposes  that  the  appellant  used  to  attend  several  family  

functions organized by him.  In the cross-examination he has  

admitted  the  suggestion  that  the  marriage  between  

Santhoshpackiam  (appellant’s  mother)  and  Navakumar  

4

(appellant’s father) was performed as per Christian religion.  In  

our  view,  the  only  admission  made  by  this  witness  in  his  

evidence would  not  tilt  the  balance  in  favour  of  the  election  

petitioner.  It is the case of the appellant also that her father  

was a Christian and her mother was a Hindu.  May be at the  

instance of her father, marriage could have been performed in a  

Church.  As we have already observed, the appellant not only  

in her pleadings but also in her evidence states that her father  

separated from her mother and her mother continued to profess  

Hindu religion and the Hindu Pallan Community accepted her  

as such.

36) Mr. Rasu was examined as RW 5. He was the poojari in the  

Sundaranatchiamman temple situated in the Ayyankollakondan  

village. He knew the husband of the appellant as he was the  

native  of  the  same  village.  He  clarifies  that  he  had  the  

knowledge  that  the  parties  to  the  marriage  were  professing  

Christianity and later converted to Hinduism. He deposes that  

the  marriage  of  the  appellant  took  place  in  front  of  her  

husband’s  house  as  per  Hindu  customs.  On the  day  of  the  

4

marriage, the appellant and her husband came to the temple  

carrying garlands and pooja to the deity was conducted by RW  

5. After this, the plate of garlands was returned and the bride  

and the  bridegroom proceeded towards the  marriage pandal  

near the house of the appellant’s husband where the marriage  

was  performed.  He also  deposes that  the appellant  and her  

husband  worship  the  Sundaranatchiamman  deity.  He  had  

signed the  marriage  certificate  along with  one Mr.  Govindan  

who had signed in his capacity as the Village Nattamai. He also  

claims that before filing her nomination papers for the Assembly  

elections in May 2006, the appellant and her husband came to  

the  Sundaranatchiamman  temple  and  worshipped  the  deity.  

This witness is cross-examined by the election petitioner, but  

nothing  useful  is  elicited.   Therefore,  his  evidence  goes  

unchallenged.

37)  Mr.  Govindan  was  examined  as  RW  6.  He  states  that  he  

attended the marriage of the appellant. He went on to describe  

the rituals and the ceremonies that took place during the course  

of the marriage. He also mentions that he invited the appellant  

4

to his house for his daughter’s puberty ceremony on account of  

her  being  a  member  of  the  community.   Though  he  was  

subjected to lengthy cross-examination, the election petitioner  

could not elicit which discredit his evidence.

38) Mr.  S.  Paulraj  was  examined  as  RW 7.  In  his  evidence  he  

states  that  he  belongs  to  Hindu Pallan  Community.  He also  

asserts  that  the  appellant  also  belongs  to  Hindu  Pallan  

Community.  He has stated that he had attended the betrothal  

ceremony of the appellant which was performed at her maternal  

uncle Surulimuthu’s house as per Hindu rites and customs. He  

also stated that he had gone to the new house of the appellant.  

According  to  him,  at  the  entrance  of  her  house  at  Thendral  

Nagar, Rajapalayam, there is a picture of Lord Vinayaga printed  

on a tile affixed on the wall. Her pooja room also also contains  

pictures  of  many  Hindu  gods.  He  also  stated  that  RW  4  -  

Sengaiah did not attend the marriage of the appellant and it is  

his wife and daughter who attended the marriage.   The only  

admission  by  him  in  the  cross-examination  was  

Santhoshpackiam married Navakumar and their marriage took  

4

place in CSI School, Erumalainaickenpatti Village.  In our view,  

this so called admission would not assist the election petitioner  

to prove that the appellant is a Christian and is continuing to  

follow Christian faith.

39)  Mr.  Surulimuthu,  the  maternal  uncle  of  the  appellant  was  

examined  as  RW 10.  He  confirms  that  the  marriage  of  the  

parents of the appellant was performed as per Christianity.   He  

has confirmed that the appellant’s father left the appellant, her  

mother and her two younger brothers to marry another woman.  

He  has  also  stated  that  the  appellant,  her  mother  and  her  

younger brothers were taken care of by his father and lived in  

their  household.  He  has  stated  that  from  childhood  the  

appellant practiced Hinduism, visited temples, etc.  He states  

that his family deity is Palichiamman and the community deity is  

Kaliamman.  He  also  goes  on  to  state  that  the  appellant  

worships Palichiamman, Vinayagar and Kamatchiamman in the  

village. He stated that it was he who took the appellant to the  

Arya  Samaj  to  change  her  name  to  Chandra.  He  also  

conducted the marriage of the appellant in Ayyankollakondan  

4

village as per  the customs and traditions prevailing  in  Hindu  

Pallan Community.  This witness in the cross-examination has  

again stated that the marriage of the appellant’s parents was  

performed as per Christianity.  The admission of this  witness is  

put against the appellant by contending that the appellant in her  

evidence has made a false statement, that the marriage of her  

parents was performed as per Hindu customs.  In our view, at  

the time of the marriage of her parents, appellant was not even  

born  and not  even conceived in  the  womb of  her  mother  to  

overhear the conversation which was possible only in our Hindu  

mythology.  Her statement  that she has heard from her mother  

and her relatives and this admission, if we may so, cannot be  

put against the appellant that she is making false assertion.

40) Election petitioner has examined himself as PW 1.  In support  

of his allegations and assertions made in the election petition  

he  has  examined  T.P.  Paulaswamy-PW2,  Rajaiya-PW3,  

Rajendran-PW4,  Mrs.  D.  Jaymanorama-PW5 and Arumugan-

PW6.  T.P Paulaswamy-PW2 is the Village Secretary of DMK  

Party  in  Ganapathy  Sundaranatchiyapuram.   Paulaswamy in  

4

his  cross  examination  states  that  the  father-in-law  of  the  

appellant is a member of Christian church. He also goes on to  

state that the name of the appellant clearly indicates that she  

professes Christianity. But later rather inexplicably, he states “I  

do not know as to which religion the first respondent no.1 and  

her  family  members  are  professing.  At  the  instance  of  the  

election petitioner, I have come as a witness today.”  He further  

states that he does not know the mother of the appellant and  

has not visited the residence of the appellant. He further states  

that he has never been to the residence of Murugan (husband  

of  the appellant)  and does not  know the father-in-law of  the  

appellant. He does however concede that Murugan works for  

Harijan  Welfare  Department  of  the  Government.  He  further  

states  that  he  has  not  visited  the  church  where  Murugan’s  

father (appellant’s father-in-law) was the Head of the church.  

He  also  confesses  he  has  no  document  to  prove  that  

Murugan’s father belonged to any church.  It must be noted that  

in the testimony of Paulaswamy, he claims that Murugan is a  

Christian, but has admitted that he contested in the bye election  

from  Ward  No.  3  in  Rajapalayam  Panchayat  Union  Council  

4

which was reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled  

Castes,  which  fell  vacant  when Murugan  resigned  from that  

seat. It is not clear to us how Murugan contested from this seat,  

if  it  was  reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes,  if,  as  Paulaswamy  

says,  he was a Christian.  This is a clear contradiction in his  

testimony.  He clearly specifies in his deposition that he was  

unhappy that the second respondent lost in the election.

41) Rajaiya-PW3, in his evidence admits that he is a member of the  

DMK Party.  He  has  stated  that  the  appellant  contested  the  

election in the name of Glory Chandra. He has further stated  

that the name of the appellant’s husband is Soosaimanickam  

and he was invited to the wedding of the appellant. He attended  

the reception which according to him took place in a church  

near the appellant’s husband’s house. First he testifies that the  

father-in-law of  the appellant  was  a  ‘Nattamai’  of  the  church  

(village head) and then states that he does not know exactly  

about the religious practice according to which the marriage of  

the appellant  took place.  According to  him,  the name of  the  

mother  of  the  appellant  is  Mrs.  Baikkam who  is  a  Christian  

4

Pallan. But then he states that he has not seen any certificate  

which shows her to be a Christian. Prior to the appellant coming  

to his village for her marriage, he had no knowledge about the  

appellant.  Before  that  he  had  no  knowledge  about  her  

schooling or the place or manner of living of the appellant or her  

parents. He does not have any proof to state that the appellant  

professes  Christianity.  He  further  asserts  that  in  the  region,  

conversion  from  Hinduism  to  Christianity  and  vice  versa  

happens frequently. He further stated that he knew no details  

about Mr. Navakumar (appellant’s father).  

42)  Another important evidence which the Election petitioner has  

taken aid of is the birth register of the children of the appellant  

for the year 1997, where the name of the father of the child has  

been  described  as  Soosaimanickam  and  the  name  of  the  

mother  has been described as Glory  and the religion shows  

Christianity. All the relevant entries were listed in Ex. P 10.  In  

his  testimony,  Mr.  M.K  Rajendran,  PW4,  Deputy  Tahsildar,  

Periyakulam,  Theni  District  clearly  states  that  none  of  the  

entries  in  the  Ex.  P  10  register  have  been  entered  on  the  

5

reporting  of  births  by  the  parents.  This  is  a  very  important  

admission on the part of the witness as this indicates that may  

be not many people had the knowledge of the conversion of the  

appellant and her husband. The entry cannot be relied upon by  

the  respondent  no.1  as  it  is  mainly  based  on  hearsay  

knowledge;  because  of  the  fact  that  the  parents  had  

themselves not reported the birth of the child.  In the present  

case, the child birth was reported by the Village Head Nurse.  

She also states that she knows neither Soosaimanickam nor  

Glory.

43)  We now move over to the deposition of Mr. S. Arumugan- PW6  

presently working as Tahsildar, Rajapalayam. According to his  

deposition,  the  husband  of  the  appellant  applied  for  a  

permanent  community  certificate  from  Adi  Dravidar  Welfare  

Department, vide application dated 27.3.1997 (Ex. P 13).  The  

application was received by the Tahsildar’s office on 2.4.1997.  

He clearly states that he did not receive Ex. P 13. At that point  

of  time  he  was  Junior  Assistant  at  different  place.  On  the  

backside of the said application there are written endorsements  

5

of the Village Administrative Officer, Ayyankollkondan Revenue  

Inspector,  Ayyankollkondan  and  Tahsildar,  Rajapalayam.  All  

the endorsements state that the appellant  is from the “Hindu  

Pallan” backward class. The Village Administrative Officer had  

recorded the statement of the witnesses which have been duly  

certified  by  him.   The  respondent  no.1  has  pointed  out  to  

certain discrepancies in the grant of the community certificate.  

There  has  been  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  Tahsildar,  

Rajapalayam had not put his signature to the endorsement of  

the  Deputy  Tahsildar  where  he  had  written  to  the  Revenue  

Inspector, Ayyankollkondan, asking for proof with respect to the  

appellant’s  caste.  Later  no  documents  evidencing  the  

community  of  the  appellant  were  produced.  In  these  

circumstances, it would have been worthwhile to call the then  

Tahsildar, Rajapalayam and examine him as a witness and also  

the Village Administrative Officer. The Election petitioner also  

contends that the certificate was issued on 4.4.1997 within 2  

days of  receipt  which was enough to raise doubts  as to the  

veracity of the said certificate. Also as per the deposition of the  

present  Tahsildar,  there  is  no  prescribed  format  for  the  

5

issuance of a community certificate. In such a situation it will be  

difficult to establish whether there has been any discrepancy in  

the  issuance  of  the  certificate.  There  was  no  cancellation  

endorsement  on the application  for  the  certificate.  It  has not  

been brought  on record by the Election petitioner  by way of  

evidence  or  by  questioning  the  relevant  authorities,  as  to  

whether there was proper enquiry before the endorsement was  

made by the revenue authorities.

44) Mr. V.P Ranjan-RW1 (the original respondent no.2) was also  

examined as a witness. He is also member of the rival DMK  

party. He had obtained a copy of the voters list for Andipatty  

assembly constituency for the year 1999 by filing an application  

under the Right to Information Act. In Ex. R1, serial no. 865, the  

voter’s name has been mentioned as “Glory Chandra”. This fact  

is referred to by the respondent as being a definite proof that  

the appellant is still  professing Christianity.  However his own  

admission, it is not mentioned in Ex. R1 that the appellant is a  

Christian.  He  further  states  that  he  has  not  denied  in  his  

counter  that  the marriage of  the appellant  was as per Hindu  

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customary  rites.  He  also  clarifies  that  he  has  not  stated  

anywhere that the marriage of the appellant took place as per  

Christianity.  He  clearly  states  that  he  does  not  know  much  

about any of the friends or the family of the appellant and her  

husband.  

45)  We move over  to  the  testimony  of  the  K.V Balasubrmaniam  

(R.W 2), who is the General Manager, Bharat Sanchar Nigam  

Limited, Virudhumagar Telecom District. The Election petitioner  

has contended that the application of a telephone connection  

made by the husband of  the appellant  showed his  name as  

Soosaimanickam.  The  application  was  made  in  27.4.1998.  

There was no name and photograph affixed to the application.  

More importantly, as per the deposition of R.W 2 there is no  

column showing religion or caste of the applicant. Also he has  

not seen the applicant put his signature on the form. As clarified  

by him, there is no rule that only the owner of the property can  

apply for the telephone connection. Even the tenant can apply  

for  the  telephone  connection.  Therefore  it  is  possible  that  

someone  on  behalf  of  the  appellant’s  husband  might  have  

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come to fill  the application. There is no bar against it  as the  

customer  service  centre  is  open  to  the  general  public  for  

registering new telephone connection.

46)   After perusal of the deposition of witnesses of both sides, the  

following relevant points emerge.

47) The contentions of the election petitioner is that parents of the  

appellant are Christians and their marriage was performed in a  

Church according to the traditions followed by Christians.  This  

assertion of the election petitioner is denied by the appellant  

both in her counter statement and in the evidence.  She has  

admitted  that  her  father  Navakumar  was  Christian  but  her  

mother was Hindu throughout and the marriage of her parents  

took  place  as  per  the  customs  prevailing  in  Hindu  Pallan  

community.  It is true that in the counter statement filed she has  

stated that though she was following Hindu customs, traditions,  

ceremonies and the other customs prevailing in Hindu Pallan  

Community in order to reaffirm her faith in Hinduism, she went  

through various rituals in Arya Samaj, Madurai on 27.08.1994.  

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Apart from this, she has also stated that her husband Murugan  

got converted into Hinduism in the year 1975 and their marriage  

took place in the year 1995 according to Hindu tradition and  

custom.  It looks to us that an honest and true statement made  

by the appellant that she has undergone the rituals in the Arya  

Samaj for the re-affirmation of her faith in Hindu religion has put  

her in a black spot and the same has persuaded the learned  

Judge  who  decided  the  lis  between  the  parties  to  shift  the  

burden of proof.  In our view, the pleadings and the evidence  

adduced in support of the same requires to be read conjointly  

and not by applying the hypertechnical  approach of  reading  

between the lines to arrive at a finding against a candidate in an  

election petition who has support of the majority of the people in  

the constituency.  This approach in our opinion would defeat  

the  entire  election  process.   Hypertechnically  requires  to  be  

eschewed and the ground realities requires to be kept in view  

while deciding these types of cases.  We hasten to add, that  

this approach need not be adopted when an election petition is  

filed on the grounds of corruption, inciting people on the ground  

of particular religion etc.  In the instant case, merely because  

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the appellant  had stated in her counter  affidavit  that  she got  

converted into Christian faith in the year 1994 in Arya Samaj,  

Madurai,  after  following  the  required  essential  rituals,  the  

learned Judge while deciding the lis between the parties has  

shifted the burden of proof on the appellant to disprove that she  

is not a Christian but a person practicing Hindu faith and the  

community has accepted her as a person belonging to Hindu  

Pallan Community.  This reasoning of the learned Judge runs  

counter  to  the  settled  legal  principles.   We  say  so  for  the  

reason, that in an election petition   the burden of proof lies on  

the person who accuses that the elected person who had the  

support of the majority of the electorates still does not deserve  

to represent them in the State Assembly.  We reiterate that in  

the present case, the appellant candidly accepts that her father  

Navakumar  is  a  Christian,  but  her  mother  who  is  separated  

from him never practiced Christian faith but continued to follow  

Hindu religion even after her marriage.  The election petitioner  

has  not  produced  any  acceptable  evidence  to  disprove  the  

evidence  adduced  by  the  appellant  and  her  witnesses.  

Therefore, issue of parentage which was sought to be projected  

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as a factor which would prove that the appellant is a Christian  

and brought up as a Christian cannot be accepted.  Reference  

can be made to the decision of this Court in  the case of Kailash  

Sonkar Vs. Mayadevi  [(1984) 2 SCC 91]      

“32.  Another  aspect  which  one  must  not   forget  is  that  when a  child  is  born  neither  has  he  any  religion  nor  is  he  capable  of   choosing  one  until  he  reaches  the  age  of  discretion  and  acquires  proper  understanding  of  the  situation.  Hence,  the  mere fact  that  the parents  of  a  child,  who  were  Christians,  would  in  ordinary  course  get the usual baptism certificate and perform  other ceremonies without the child knowing  what  is being done but  after  the child  has  grown  up  and  becomes  fully  mature  and  able to decide his future, he ought not to be  bound by what his parents may have done.  Therefore, in such cases, it is the intention  of the convertee which would determine the  revival  of  the  caste.  If  by  his  clear  and  conclusive conduct the person reconverts to   his old faith and abjures the new religion in  unequivocal  terms,  his  caste  automatically   revives.                  33.  Another  dominant  factor  to  determine  the  revival  of  the  caste  of  a  convert  from  Christianity to his old religion would be that   in cases of election to the State Assemblies  or  the  Parliament  where  under  the  Presidential  Order a particular constituency  is reserved for a member of the scheduled  caste  or  tribe  and  the  electorate  gives  a  majority verdict in his favour, then this would  be doubtless proof positive of the fact that  

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his community has accepted him back to his  old fold and this would result in a revival of   the  original  caste  to  which  the  said  candidate belonged.

48) The other minor issue which was argued was that in the school  

records,  it  is  recorded  that  the  appellant  belongs  to  Indian  

Christian  Pallan  community  and  she  studied  in  CSI  School,  

Baltagundu but  in the declaration filed along with nomination  

papers,  it  is  stated  that  she  studied  in  Govt.  High  School,  

Devathananpatti and, therefore, she has made false declaration  

and therefore she was ineligible to contest from the reserved  

constituency.  The appellant in her counter affidavit and also in  

her  evidence  has  explained  that  the  discrepancy  in  the  

declaration form filled by her brother, who was assisting her in  

filing the nomination papers.  We have perused the stand of the  

election petitioner and the evidence of  the appellant.   In our  

view, the discrepancy pointed out by the election petitioner has  

been properly explained by the appellant and in our view, this  

by  itself  cannot  be  a  ground  to  hold  that  the  appellant  was  

ineligible to contest from the reserved constituency.

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49) In so far as issuance of community certificate to the appellant,  

in our view the evidence of PW6 amply demonstrates that due  

procedure  was  followed  while  issuing  the  Community  

Certificate.   The High Court,  in  our  considered view has not  

properly  appreciated  PW6  evidence  while  doubting  the  

genuineness  of  the  Community  Certificate  produced  by  the  

appellant.  Therefore, we do not approve the reasoning of the  

High Court on this issue.  We also add that the learned senior  

counsel  for  contesting  respondent  in  this  appeal  relied  on  

certain observations made by this Court in the case of Kumari  

Madhuri  Patil  &  Anr.  Vs.  Addl.  Commissioner,  Tribal  

Development & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 241; GM, Indian Bank Vs.  

R.  Rani  &  Anr.  (2007)  12  SCC  796;  R.  Palanimuthu  Vs.  

Returning  Officer  &  Ors.  (1984)  Supp.  SCC  77;  John  

Valiamattom  &  Anr.  Vs.  Union  of  India  (2003)  6  SCC  611;  

Meera  Kanwaria  Vs.  Sunitha  &  Ors.  (2006)  1  SCC  344;  

Swagigar Doss Vs. Zonal Manager, FCI (supra), Desh Raj Vs.  

Bodh Raj (2008) 2 SCC 186.  In our considered view, these  

decisions  were  rendered  by  this  Court  in  different  context  

altogether.  Reference to the facts in those cases and the law  

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laid down therein, in our opinion, we would be unnecessarily  

adding few more pages to this Judgment.  We desist ourselves  

from doing so.

50)  Reliance placed on the birth records, entries in the telephone  

application and voters list cannot be the sole ground for proving  

that the appellant is professing Christianity. As stated above,  

the records could have been made by people other than the  

appellant  or  her  husband.  As  far  as  the  birth  register  is  

concerned,  it  is  clear  that  the birth  was  reported  not  by the  

parents, but the Village Head Nurse. Similarly, it is very likely  

that after her conversion, the appellant never went ahead and  

changed the name appearing in the voter’s list.  Also it  is not  

mentioned in the voter’s list  as to what religion the appellant  

professes.  There  is  a  common  pattern  arising  that  all  the  

witnesses  of  the  Election  petitioner  as  well  as  the  original  

respondent no.2 are affiliated to the rival party DMK in some  

capacity  or  the  other  as  opposed  to  the  appellant  who  

represented  the  AIADMK  party.  The  Election  petitioner  has  

relied heavily on the testimony of the witnesses Mrs. Deivathai,  

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T.P  Paulasamy  and  Rajaiya  to  prove  that  the  appellant  

continues to profess Christianity. However the testimony of all  

the three witnesses are highly contradictory and hearsay. All  

the three witnesses have come to know about the religion of the  

appellant and her husband from other people. Admittedly, none  

of  them  have  come  in  close  contact  with  the  appellant,  

appellant’s husband and both their families in any form. They  

have not  produced any proof  or  document  to  prove that  the  

appellant professes Christianity.  

Requirements of Petition under Representation of Peoples Act :

51) Section 83 of the Representation of Peoples Act,  1951 deals  

with the contents of an election petition. Section 83 (1) of the  

Act reads:-

“An election petition:-

(a)shall  contain a concise statement of the  material  facts  on  which  the  petitioner  relies;

(b)shall  set  forth  full  particulars  of  any  corrupt  practice  that  the  petitioner  alleges, including as full  a statement as  possible  of  the  names  of  the  parties  

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alleged to  have committed such corrupt   practice  and  the  date  and  place  of  the  commission of each such practice; and

(c)shall  be  signed  by  the  petitioner  and  verified in the  manner laid down in the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  for  the  verification of pleadings.”

52) It is a settled legal position that an election petition must clearly  

and  unambiguously  set  out  all  the  material  facts  which  the  

petitioner is to rely upon during the trial, and it must reveal a  

clear  and  complete  picture  of  the  circumstances  and  should  

disclose  a  definite  cause  of  action.   In  the  absence  of  the  

above, an election petition can be summarily dismissed. To see  

whether material facts have been duly disclosed or whether a  

cause of action arises, we need to look at the averment and  

pleadings taken up by the party.  

53) In the case of V.S Achutanandan v. P.J Francis [(1999) 2 SCR  

99], it was held that  failure to plead material facts is fatal to the  

election  petition  and  no  amendment  of  the  pleadings  is  

permissible to introduce such material facts after the time limit  

prescribed for filing the election petition.

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54) One cannot file an election petition based on frivolous grounds.  

The facts presented must be clear, concise and unambiguous.  

All the above cases and provisions, though do not deal directly  

with the issues in this case, they go on to emphasize that an  

election  result,  where  the  people  elect  their  representatives  

cannot be taken lightly.  For an election result to be annulled,  

there  must  be  positive  evidence  to  prove  illegality  of  the  

election. The natural corollary is that the person who files an  

election petition, must have a clear and definite case, to prove  

that the election was illegal. Therefore the burden of proof shall  

lie on the petitioner filing the election petition.  

55)  An  election  petition  challenging  the  election  of  a  returned  

candidate on the grounds of corrupt practices is not a criminal  

proceeding;  but  it  is  no less than a criminal  proceeding with  

regard to the proof required to be furnished to the Court by the  

Petitioner  [See  J.  Chandrashekara  Rao  v.  V.  Jagapati  Rao,  

1993  Supp (2)  SCC 229].  Though,  in  the  present  case,  the  

charges are not  those of  corrupt  practices,  they are not  any  

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lesser in terms of seriousness; hence the burden of proof is on  

the  election  petitioner  to  prove  the  charges  he  has  made  

beyond reasonable doubt. This is done so that the purity of the  

election process is maintained.

56) The testimony of the witnesses for the Election petitioner does  

not qualify the test laid down in the Evidence Act, to make the  

evidence admissible.  It does not inspire any confidence. The  

evidence is clearly hearsay. As stated above, the opinion of the  

High Court is heavily relied on the fact that the burden of proof  

had been discharged and shifted to the appellant to prove that  

she had indeed renounced Christianity. We do not approve with  

the reasoning of the High Court to adopt this line of thinking.  

The burden of proof lay squarely on the Election petitioner to  

show  that  the  appellant  indeed  practiced  and  professed  

Christianity.   In  any  event,  the  evidence  put  forward  by the  

appellant  is  consistent  and  reliable  as  it  has  relied  on  the  

testimony of people who have actually visited the house of the  

appellant or attended her wedding or been in close proximity  

with her and her husband’s family.  

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57)  Assuming  for  a  moment  that  the  High  Court  is  justified  in  

shifting the burden of proof on the appellant, we are of the view  

that the appellant by adducing cogent and reliable evidence has  

discharged the same. The appellant’s testimony is consistent  

with the documentary evidence produced by her.  The evidence  

of Shri Sengaiah (RW 4) and S. Paulraj (RW 7) also support the  

facts stated by the appellant. The fact that the appellant was a  

trustee of  the  Mayurarathaswamy Temple  at  Rajapalayam is  

supported by the testimonies of Shri. P. Magesh (RW 8) and  

Shri. K. Paramasivam (RW 9).  Though the appellant has not  

produced the original conversion certificate, there is no reason  

to  disbelieve  the  duplicate  that  she  has  submitted,  as  the  

petitioner  has  failed  to  provide  a  reasoned  rebuttal  to  the  

evidence adduced by the appellant, to proof her case.  

Validity of community Certificate & Evidence Act :

58)  There  is  nothing  on  record  to  show  that  the  community  

certificate was issued illegally or in contravention of the valid  

procedure. The Election petitioner should have examined the  

person in charge while the certificate was being issued to bring  

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to  light  any  alleged  malpractice  in  the  issuance  of  the  said  

certificate.    The  validity  of  the  issuance  of  the  community  

certificate  is  presumed  unless  shown  otherwise  by  the  

respondent no.1, who clearly failed to do so. It is also baffling to  

note that the conversion certificate from the Arya Samaj was  

not examined in detail by the respondents inspite of the High  

Court making a strong observation in this regard. No proof by  

way of documents or oral evidence was provided to show how  

the certificate was granted and what procedure was followed. It  

is also pertinent to mention that no one raised any objection to  

the appellant filing her nomination for the Assembly elections in  

2006 from the reserved constituency. All the issues have been  

raised  after  the  appellant  won  the  election  from  the  

Rajapalayam constituency. As pointed by the High Court, it is  

not necessary to read too much into contributions made into  

religious bodies and institutions as it is open for people outside  

the  particular  community  also.  Hence  based  purely  on  the  

evidence before this court and the observations made by us in  

this regard, the Election petitioner has not been able to prove  

conclusively  that  the  appellant  professes  Christianity.  The  

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evidence  produced  is,  contradictory  and  smacks  of  political  

rivalry.  

59)  In light of these findings, we need not go into the other issues.  

60) In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned  

order passed by the High Court.  No order as to costs.

                                                               ………………………………J.                                                    [ D.K.  JAIN ]

………………………………J.  [ H.L. DATTU ]

New Delhi, September 07, 2010.

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