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PETITIONER: CHANDER SEKHAR SINGH BOI ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ORISSA ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/11/1971

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. DUA, I.D. ROY, SUBIMAL CHANDRA MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1972 AIR  486            1972 SCR  (2) 279  1972 SCC  (1)  63

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 3LA--‘Modification’, scope of-Applicability of second proviso when provisions regarding ceiling limit are not in force. Courts-Jurisdiction  to  go  into vires  of  provisions  not brought into force. Bhagchar tenure, meaning of.

HEADNOTE: By  the  Orissa  Land Reforms Act,  1965,  the  Orissa  Land Reforms  Act, 1960, was amended by substituting  new  Chaps. III  and  IV  for  the  original  Chaps.   III  and-IV.   By notifications  issued under s. 1(3) of the Act, under  which different  dates  may be appointed by notification  for  the coming  into force of different provisions of the  Act,  the Act and Chap.  III, as amended, were brought into force; but no notification bringing into force the provisions of  Chap. IV   dealing  with  ceiling  was  issued.    The   appellant challenged  the  validity of the Act.  The High  Court  held that  Chap.  III was a valid piece of legislation  but  that Chap.  IV was unconstitutional and invalid. in  appeal  to  this Court it was  contended  (1)  that  the provisions of Chap.  III were invalid because they were  not protected  by  the  provisions. of Art. 31 (A)  (1)  of  the Constitution  as they do not provide for the acquisition  by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the  ex- tinguishment or modification of any such rights; (2) if  the provisions of Chap.  III amounted to acquisition market value was  payable as. compensation under the second proviso to the Article and not the compensation as fixed in s. 28 of the Act; (3) Chap. IV  was ultra vires the provisions of the second proviso  to Art. 31-A(1) of the Constitution. Dismissing the appeal, HELD  : (1) The provisions of Chap.  III of the  Act  modify the  landlord’s  substantive  rights  in  various   respects inasmuch as they enable the determination of resumable  land which the land owner would be entitled to cultivate himself, and  regarding  non-resumable land, the tenant  is  given  a

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right to acquire it on payment of compensation.   Therefore, these  provisions fall within the protection given  by  Art. 31-A(1) of the Constitution. [286 D-F] Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 748 753; 767, followed. (2)  The  second proviso to Art., 31A(1) is  not  applicable because, no ceiling limit within the meaning of the  proviso to Art. 31-A(1) has been fixed,.  Till a notification  under s.  1(3)  of  the  Act  is  issued  bringing  in  force  the provisions of Chap.  IV it cannot be said that there is  any ceiling limit applicable to the appellant under any law  for the  time being in force.  Moreover the essence of  personal cultivation  as used in the proviso is cultivation by or  on behalf of the owner of the land.  The appellant is the owner of  Bhagchar  lands, and Under this  tenure  the  cultivator shares  his  crop with the owner.  A  crop-sharer  does  not cultivate  on  behalf  of the  landlord  and  therefore  the Bhagchar   lands  are  not  under  the  appellant’s   person cultivation. [287 B-D; 288 A-B] 280 (3) The High Court should not have gone into question of the validity of Chap.  IV Courts ordinarily ought not to go into the question of the validity of an Act or a provision of  an Act unless it has been brought into force.  Till then such a question  would  be  academic, because,  no  body  could  be aggrieved  by a provision of law which is dormant and  which cannot be enforced.  Therefore, this Court would not go into the question whether the provisions of Chap.  IV were  ultra vires or not [282 D-F] State  of  Orissa v. Chander Sekhar. [1970]  1  S.C.R.  593, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 854, 1028, 1033 and 1097 of 1966, 1866 to 1867 and 2487 of 1969. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated January 30,  1967 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. Nos. 329 of 1965 etc. Somnath  Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the  appellant (in C.A. No. 854 of 1968) and respondent no. 2 (in C.A.  No. 1867 of 1969). C. B. Agarwala, S. P. Nayar for R. N. Sachthey, for the res- pondent  (in  C.A. No. 854 of 1968) and  the  appellant  (in C.As.  Nos.  1028, 1033 and 1097 of 1968, 1865 to  1867  and 2487 of 1969). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  CJ.   The appellant, Chander Sekhar Singh  Bhoi,  in Civil  Appeal No. 854 of 1968, filed a petition  under  Art. 226 of the Constitution (No.  O.J.C. 329/1965) in the Orissa High Court, challenging the Orissa Land Reforms Act of 1960. herein:after  referred to as the Principal Act (Act  XVI  of 1960)  as amended by the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1965  (Act XIII  of 1965) hereinafter referred to as the Amending  Act. He alleged that he owned about 220 acres of  self-cultivated land and Chat he had about 5 acres of Bhagchar land. This  petition  was  heard  alongwith  a  number  of   other petitions  by  the  High Court, and the high  Court  by  its common  judgment  dated 30th January, 1967 disposed  of  all these petitions.  The High Court came to the conclusion that "Chapter  III  of  the  Amending Act is  a  valid  piece  of legislation  or in other words, it does not suffer from  any invalidity   but   Chapter  IV  of  the  Amending   Act   is unconstitutional  and invalid and accordingly it  is  struck down."  The High Court accordingly allowed the petitions  in

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part and directed the State not to give effect to the provi- sions of Chapter IV of the Amending Act. The   State   filed  a  number  of  appeals   against   that judgment  .and  this  Court  (Shah  and  Vaidialingam,  JJ.) allowed the appeals 281 and  set aside the order passed by the High Court  declaring Chapter  IV  of Act XIII of 1965 amending Act  XVI  of  1960 ultra vires (State of Orissa v. Chander Sekhar) (1).   Civil Appeals No. 1028, 1033 & 1907/1968, 1865-67 & 2487/1969  are by the State of Orissa (hereinafter referred to as the State appeals)  but these could not be heard by this  Court  (Shah and Vaidialingam, JJ.). The present appeal (C.A. No. 854  of 1968) was also not heard with the other appeals.               In Civil  appeal No. 854 of 1968 the appellant               urged               (1)  That  the  High Court  erred  in  holding               Chapter III of the Act as inserted by Act XIII               of 1965 in Act XVI of 1960 intra vires; and               (2) That Chapter IV as inserted by Act XIII of               1965  in  Act XVI of 1960 is ultra  vires  the               provisions  of the second proviso to Art.  31-               A(1) of the Constitution. In  the  other  appeals the State urged  that  the  previous decision be followed and the judgment of the High Court  set aside.  On behalf of the respondent in C.A. No. 1867 of 1969 it is urged that the judgment of this Court is erroneous and needs reconsideration.  We may mention that the  respondents in the other appeals have not entered appearance. The  Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, received the  assent  of the President on October 17, 1960 and was published first in the extraordinary issue of the Orissa Gazette dated November 11,  1960.   The object of the legislation is given  in  the preamble which reads :               "WHEREAS   it   is  necessary   to   enact   a               progressive  legislation relating to  agrarian               reforms  and  land tenures consequent  on  the               gradual abolition of intermediary interest;               AND  WHEREAS it is expedient to confer  better               rights on agriculturists to ensure increase in               food  production  in  the  manner  hereinafter               appearing."               Section 1 (3) of the Act provides:               "It shall come into force in whole or in part,               on  such date or dates as the  Government  may               from time to time by notification appoint, and               different dates may be appointed for different               provisions of this Act." On  June  20, 1964 by virtue  of  Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, the Orissa Land Reforms Act. 1960 was (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 593. 282 included  in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution  as  entry 52.  On August 11, 1965 the Orissa Land Reforms Amending Act 1965 (Act XIII of 1965) received the assent of the President and  was first published in the extraordinary issue  of  the Orissa Gazette dated 17th August, 1965.  By the Amending Act various provisions of the Principal Act were amended and  in particular  for  the  original Chapters III and  IV  of  the Principal Act new Chapters III and IV were substituted. On September 25, 1965, a notification under Sec. 1(3) of the Principal Act was issued bringing the Act into force  except Chapters  III  and IV.  A further  notification  was  issued under  Section 1(3) of the Act bringing Chapter III  of  the Act as amended into force.  No notification has as yet  been

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issued under Section 1(3) of the Act bringing the provisions of Chapter IV into force.  This fact was also noticed in the judgment  of  this  Court  in State  of  Orissa  v.  Chander Sekhar(1) but the Court nevertheless went into the  question of validity of Chapter IV of the Act as amended because  the High Court had held Chapter IV to be ultra vires. It  seems to us that the Courts ordinarily ought not  to  go into  the question of the validity of an Act or a  provision of an Act unless it has been brought into force.  Till then, such  a  question  would  be  academic.   No  body  can  ’be aggrieved  by a provision of law which is dormant and  which cannot  be enforced.  The Constitution has provided  for  an advisory opinion being given by the Supreme Court, when  the question  is of such a nature and of such public  importance that  it is expedient to obtain the opinion of  the  Supreme Court.   The  High Court should not have  embarked  upon  an academic  question.  In view of this we are not inclined  to go  into the question whether the provisions of  Chapter  IV were  rightly  held to be intra vires by  this  Court.   The respondents in the State appeals can raise this question  if so  advised when the notification is issued under Section  1 (3) of the Act bringing Chapter IV into force.  However, the appellant  Chander Sekhar Singh was a party to the  decision in State of Orissa v. Chander Sekhar(1) and that judgment is binding on him.  He cannot ask us to review the judgment  in this manner. In  order  to  appreciate the  contentions  of  the  learned counsel on the question of the validity of the provisions of Chapter  III  of  the  Act it is  necessary  to  notice  the relevant  provisions  of the Act bearing on  this  question. The following definitions were brought to our notice (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 593. 283 "2(5)  ’Ceiling area’ means an extent of land equivalent  to twenty standard acres;" "2(17) ’Landlord means a person immediately under whom  land is held by a raiyat or a tenant; Explanation I--A raiyat or a tenant shall be deemed to be  a landlord  in relation to the tenant or  tenants  immediately under him; Explanation  II--Government  shall  be  deemed  to  be   the landlord  in respect of the lands held directly  under  them either by a raiyat or a temporary lessee or a tenant;" "2(22)   ’personal   cultivation’   with   its   grammatical variations  and  cognate expressions means to  cultivate  on one’s own account-- (a)  by one’s own labour; or (b)  by the labour of any member of one’s family; or (c) by servants or hired labour on wages, payable in cash or in  kind,  but  not  in crop  share,  under  one’s  personal supervision  or  the personal supervision of any  member  of ones family;" "2(30) ’standard acre’ means the unit of measurement of land equivalent  to one acre of Class Il and, or one acre  and  a half of Class II land, or three acres of Class III land,  or four acres of Class TV land;" "2(31) ’tenant’ means a person who has no rights in the land of  another  but under the system generally known  as  Bhag, Sanja or Kata or such similar expression or under any  other system, law, contract, custom or usage personally cultivates such  land on payment of rent in cash or in kind or in  both or on condition of delivery to that person- (a)  either a share of the produce of such land; or (b)  the estimated value of a portion of the crop raised  on the land; or

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(c)  a fixed quantity of produce irrespective of  the  yield from the land; or (d) produce or its estimated value partly in any of the ways described above and partly in another;" 5-L500 Sup C 1/72 284 Chapter  II deals with Raiyats and Tenants.  The heading  of Chapter   III   is   "Resumption  of   Land   for   Personal Cultivation."  Section 24(1) gives a right to  the  landlord and  the  tenant to have the,  resumable  and  non-resumable lands  determined in accordance with the provisions  of  the Chapter.  The expression "resumable land", by virtue of  the Explanation,  refers  to  land  which  can  be  resumed  for personal  cultivation by a landlord from a tenant.   We  are not concerned with S. 24(2).  Section 25 fixes the extent of the resumable land which shall not be more than one-half  of the  lands in respect of each tenant, measured  in  standard acres  only.   Section  26 enables the landlord  to  make  a selection  under  S.  25  and apply  on  the  basis  of  the selection  to the Revenue Officer in the  prescribed  manner and form.  It also enables a tenant to apply to the  Revenue Officer within the period of three months in the  prescribed form and manner.  Under S. 27 the Revenue Officer determines the particulars of the resumable lands and the non-resumable lands.   Section  28 provides that  while  deciding  matters under  s.  27  the  Revenue  Officer  shall  determine,  the compensation  in respect of the non-resumable lands  payable in  the  prescribed  manner by the  tenant  which  shall  be determined in accordance with sub-ss. (2) and (3) of S.  28. Sub-section  (2)  enables the compensation to be  fixed  and paid  in annual instalments mentioned therein.   Sub-s.  (3) provides for compensation for wells, tanks and structures of a  permanent nature at the market value thereof to  be  paid along with the compensation under sub-s. (2).  Under S.  29, after  the disposal of appeal, if any, the  Revenue  Officer has  to  issue a certificate in the prescribed form  to  the landlord and also to the tenant specifying all matters to be determined  under ss. 27 and 28.  He is further directed  to send  a copy of such certificate to the authority  competent to maintain the record-of-rights.  Section 30 provides  that the tenant shall with effect from the beginning of the  year next  following  the date of the issue  of  the  certificate under section 29 become a raiyat in respect of the land  for which  compensation  has been determined under  section  28. Sub-section  (2)  provides  that  the  instalments  of   the compensation amount together with interest due thereon shall remain  a first charge on the land to which it  relates  and shall  be recoverable to the Revenue Officer by  the  person entitled  thereto.   Section 31(1) deals  with  the  persons entitled to receive compensation, and under sub-s. (2), with effect  from the date the tenant becomes a raiyat  under  S. 30,  he holds the land free from all encumbrances,  and  the rights of all persons (not being Government or a landholder) mediately or immediately under whom the land was being  held shall  stand  extinguished  and the  encumbrances,  if  any, created  by  such  persons in respect  of  the.  land  shall thereafter  attach  to  the other  lands  of  the  landlord. Section 32 provides that the certificate issued under S.  29 shall be conclusive proof the correctness of 285 the contents thereof in respect of all disputes between  the tenant  and the persons whose rights stand  extinguished  in pursuance of s. 31. Section 33 provides for determination of fair  and  equitable  rent for non-resumable  land  and  the persons to whom it is payable.  Section 34 provides that  on

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the determination of the resumable lands the tenant on  such land   shall  cease  to  have  the  right  to  continue   in cultivation  thereof with effect from the date of expiry  of the year next following the date of issue of the certificate under  s. 29.  Section 35 provides for the contingency  when both the landlord and the tenant in respect of any land fail to  apply  in accordance with the provisions of S.  26,  and enables the Revenue Officer to determine resumable and  non- resumable lands and other matters required to be  determined under ss. 27 and 28.  Section 36 provides for eviction of  a landlord  and a tenant who fail to personally cultivate  the land without sufficient cause. The learned counsel challenged the provisions of Chapter III on the ground that they are not protected by the  provisions of  Art.  31A(1)  because  they  do  not  provide  for   the acquisition  by  the State, of any estate or of  any  rights therein  or the extinguishment or modification of  any  such rights.   He  said  that  the  creation  of  a  similar  and identical  right  in  another person  does,  not  amount  to extinguishment  of such rights.  According to him,  a  right must  vanish by the provisions of the Act before it  can  be said   to  be  extinguished.   We  see  no  force  in   this contention.  A similar argument was addressed to this  Court in  Atma  Ram v. State of Punjab(1).  This  Court  was  then dealing  with the provisions of the Punjab Security of  Land Tenure  Act,  1953.  The provisions of the Punjab  Act  were summarised by this Court ,thus :               "Thus,  the Act seeks to limit the area  which               may  be, held by a land-owner for the  purpose               of   self-cultivation,   thereby,    releasing               "surplus  area" which may be utilized for  the               purpose  of  resettling ejected  tenants,  and                             affording  an  opportunity  to  the  t enant  to               become  the land-owner himself on  payment  of               the  purchase-price which, if anything,  would               be less than the market value." The  argument addressed to us was answered by Sinha, J.,  as he then was, thus :               "In  this  connection, it was  further  argued               that  extinguishment of a right does not  mean               substitution of another person in that  right,               but total annihilation of that right.  In  our               opinion,  it is not necessary to discuss  this               rather metaphysical argument, because, in our (1) [1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 748; 753; 767. 286               opinion, it is enough for the purpose of  this               case  to hold that the provisions of the  Act,               amount  to  modification  of  the  landowner’s               rights in the lands comprised in his  "estate"               or  "holding".   The Act  modifies  the  land-               owner’s  substantive rights, particularly,  in               three  respects, as indicated  above,  namely,               (1)  it  modifies his right  of  settling  his               lands on any terms and to any one he  chooses:               (2)  it  modifies, if it does  not  altogether               extinguish,his right to cultivate the "surplus               area" as understood under the Act; and (3)  it               modifies his right of transfer in so far as it               obliges him to sell lands not at his own price               but  at a price fixed under the  statute,  and               not  to any one but to specified  persons,  in               accordance with the provisions of the Act, set

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             out  above.  Thus, there cannot be  the  least               doubt  that  the provisions of the  Act,  very               substantially modify the landowner’s rights to               hold and dispose of his property in any estate               or a portion thereof.  It is, therefore, clear               that  the  provisions  of Art.  31A  save  the               impugned  Act  from any attack  based  on  the               provisions  of  Arts.  14, 19 and  31  of  the               Constitution." It  seems  to us that this Act also modifies  the  landlords substantive  rights  in  various  respects  inasmuch  as  it enables the determination of resumable land which the  land- owner would’ be entitled to cultivate himself and  regarding the  non-resumable  land the tenant is given  the  right  to acquire  it on payment of compensation.  This  falls  within the protection given by Art. 31A(1). The  learned counsel then referred to the second proviso  to Art. 31A(1) which reads :               "provided further that where any law makes any               provision for the acquisition by the State  of               any  estate  and  where  any  land   comprised               therein is held by a person under his personal               cultivation,  it shall not be lawful  for  the               State  to acquire any portion of such land  as                             is  within the ceiling limit applicabl e to  him               under  any law for the time being in force  or               any building or structure standing thereon  or               appurtenant  thereto, unless the law  relating               to  the acquisition of such land, building  or               structure provides for payment of compensation               at  a  rate which shall not be less  than  the               market value thereof." Relying  on the majority judgment in Ajit Singh v. State  of Punjab(1),  he  said  that the  provisions  of  Chapter  III amounted (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 142. 287 to acquisition and accordingly the market value was  payable as  compensation  under  the second  proviso,  and  not  the compensation as fixed in S. 28.  He urged that five acres of Bhagchar  land  are  lands under  his  personal  cultivation within  the meaning of the words "personal  cultivation"  in the  second  proviso.   He further  said  that  although  no notification  under  s.  1(3) of the  Act  had  been  issued bringing  the  provisions of Chapter IV,  which  dealt  with ceiling  the  ceiling limit applicable to him would  be  the ceiling limit as provided in Chapter IV. It seems to us that there is no ceiling limit applicable  to him  within  the  meaning  of the  proviso  because  till  a notification under s. 1 (3) is issued it cannot be said that there  is any ceiling limit applicable to him under any  law for the time being in force.  Further it does not seem to us that  the  5  acres of land mentioned above  are  under  his personal   cultivation.   We  have  already  set   out   the definition of the words, "personal cultivation".  Mr. C.  B. Agarwala  has drawn our attention to similar definitions  in various Acts. In The United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1959 "Khudkasht"  means land  (other than Sir) cultivated by a landlord,  as  under- proprietor  or  a  permanent tenure-holder  as  such  either himself or by servants or by hired labour. In  the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, "Khudkasht"  has  been defined thus :               "  ’Khudkasht’  means land  (other  than  Sir)

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             cultivated  by a proprietor either by  himself               or by servants or by hired labour,-               (a) at the commencement of this Act, or               (b)  at  any time during the  period  of  five               years  immediately before the commencement  of               this Act, whether or not it was so  cultivated               at  such  commencement, provided that  it  has               not,   at  any  time  after  having  been   so               cultivated, been let out to a tenant." In the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 "Khas possession" means               " ’Khas possession’ used with reference to the               possession of a proprietor or to tenure-holder                             of   any   land  used   for   agricult ural   or               horticultural purposes means the possession of               such    proprietor   or    tenure-holder    by               cultivating   such   land   or   carrying   on               horticultural operations thereon himself  with               his  own  stock or by his own servants  or  by               hired labour or with hired stock." 288 In  our view the words ’personal cultivation" in the  Second proviso  to  Art. 31A(1) must bear a similar  meaning.   The essence of "personal cultivation" seems to be cultivation by or  on behalf of the owner of the land.  It is  quite  clear that  under  the tenure known as  Bhagchar,  the  cultivator shares his crop with the owner.  So, when he grows the  crop he  grows  it  in his own right and not  on  behalf  of  any person.   Therefore,  it is difficult to hold that  a  crop- sharer cultivates on behalf of the landlord. In  the  result  we hold that the High Court  was  right  in holding  that Chapter III of the Act is valid.   We  further hold  that  the  High Court should not have  gone  into  the question  of the validity of Chapter IV and  we  accordingly set aside that part of the judgment. In  the result, Civil Appeal No. 854 of 1968  is  dismissed, but  there will be no order as to costs.  The other  appeals are allowed, and the writ petitions filed by the respondents in the State appeals are dismissed.  There will be no  order as to costs in these appeals. V.P.S. 289