REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   4961      2009 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4457 of 2006]

CHALLAMMA … APPELLANT

Versus

TILAGA & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

Leave granted.

1. K.T.  Subramanya  (the  deceased)  was  employed  with  Karnataka  

Power Corporation (for short, “KPC”)  at Linganamakki.  He took four  

life  insurance policies  from Life Insurance Corporation of  India being  

dated  13.1.1987,  16.2.1987,  31.3.1987,  and  3.6.1988.   Indisputably,  

therein he nominated Challamma, his mother as the beneficiary thereof.  

The  first  respondent  is  said  to  have  entered  into  a  wedlock  with  the  

deceased on 3.12.1984.  Subramanya died on 22.9.1988.  

2. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are said to be the sons of the deceased  

Subramanya and the first respondent herein.   The respondents filed an  

application for grant of succession certificate in their favour in terms of  

Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short, “the Act”) in  

the Court of Civil Judge, Sagar in respect of the scheduled debts.  The  

said application  was marked  as P & S.C.  3/89.   Appellant  admittedly  

being the mother of the deceased filed an application for being impleaded  

as a party therein, which was allowed.  She objected to the grant of the  

said succession certificate contending that the deceased was not married  

at all.  The core question in view of the aforementioned stand taken by  

the  appellant  in  the  said  proceedings  was  as  to  whether  the  first  

respondent was married to the deceased or not.   

3. A large number of witnesses being P.Ws. 1 to 5, namely, Tilaga,  

first respondent herein (P.W.1), Muniyamma, the mother of respondent  

no.1  (P.W.2),  Puttappa,  father  of  the  respondent  No.1  (P.W.3),  Y.M.  

Bangera,  Administrative  Officer,  L.I.C.  of  India,  Sagar  (P.W.4)  and  

Subba  Rao  B.R.,  the  Personnel  Officer  of  the  K.P.C.  (P.W.5)  were  

examined by the respondents in support of their contention that the first  

respondent was married to the deceased..  A large number of documents  

including photographs showing performance of marriage ceremony were  

also  filed.   Inter  alia  on  a  finding  that  the  first  respondent  and  the  

deceased having been residing in  a quarter  together  for  a  period of  3  

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years, 9 months and 19 days and furthermore having arrived at a finding  

of fact that the society accepted them as husband and wife, the learned  

trial judge held that a presumption of valid marriage should be drawn and  

on the basis thereof the application for grant of succession certificate filed  

by the respondents herein was allowed.   

4. Appellant,  aggrieved by and dissatisfied  with  the  said judgment  

and order of the learned Civil Judge, preferred an appeal thereagainst in  

the court of District Judge, Shimoga which was marked as Misc. Appeal  

No. 52 of 1995. The said appeal was eventually transferred to the Court  

of Additional District Judge.  By reason of a judgment and order dated  

1.3.2004, the learned First Appellate Court opined that the appellant was  

entitled to 1/4th share in the estate of the deceased while upholding the  

judgment and order of the learned trial judge that the marriage by and  

between  the  deceased  and  the  first  respondent  was  valid  and  the  

respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were their sons.

5.  Still not satisfied, the appellant preferred Civil Revision Petition  

No.  1115  of  2004  before  the  High  Court  which  by  reason  of  the  

impugned judgment has been dismissed.  

6. Mr. O.P. Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  

appellant would contend that the courts below committed a serious error  

in  passing the  impugned judgments insofar  as  they failed  to take into  

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consideration  the  evidences  brought  on  record  by  the  parties  in  their  

correct perspective.  It was urged that keeping in view the provisions of  

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it was obligatory on the part of the first  

respondent to establish that all the ingredients of a valid marriage were  

proved.  In a case of this nature where the first respondent was a woman  

of easy virtue, it was urged, the presumption of a valid marriage ought  

not to have been drawn.  

7. Mr.  R.S.  Hegde,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment.   

8. First respondent examined herself as P.W.1 before the learned trial  

judge.  In her deposition she not only stated in great details the factum of  

her marriage which took place on 3.12.1984  at Dharmasthala but also  

produced a document styled as an ‘agreement of marriage’ which was  

registered  with  the  office  of  Sub-Registrar,  Sagar  on  13.12.1984.  She  

furthermore produced various documents to show that the deceased had  

insured his  life  with  the  Life  Insurance Corporation  of  India  and also  

under group insurance while in service.  Furthermore some documents  

were  also  brought  on  record  to  show  that  the  deceased  applied  for  

allotment of a house as a married person.   

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Appellant  examined  herself  as  D.W.1.  An  officer  of  the  Life  

Insurance  Corporation  of  India  was  also  examined  to  prove  the  life  

insurance policies.   

9. The  question  as  to  whether  a  valid  marriage  had  taken  place  

between the deceased Subramanya and the first respondent is essentially  

a question of fact.  In arriving at a finding of fact indisputably the learned  

trial  judge  was  not  only  entitled  to  analyze  the  evidences  brought  on  

record by the parties hereto so as to come to a conclusion as to whether  

all the ingredients of a valid marriage as contained in Section 5 of the  

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 stand established or not; a presumption of a  

valid  marriage  having  regard  to  the  fact  that  they  had  been  residing  

together for a long time and has been accepted in the society as husband  

and wife, could also be drawn.   

It  is  true,  as  has  been  contended  by  Mr.  Chaturvedi,  that  the  

appellant  had  brought  on  record  certain  documents  to  show  that  the  

deceased in the year 1986 while applying for his employment in Mysore  

Power Corporation showed his status as ‘single, but a specific finding of  

fact  had  been  arrived  at  by  the  courts  below  that  all  the  subsequent  

documents clearly showed that not only the deceased married the first  

respondent  but  also he sought  for allotment  of  a  quarter  as  a married  

person.   It  is  of  some  significance  to  notice  that  one  Subba  Rao,  a  

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personnel  officer  of  the  KPC  while  examining  himself  as  P.W.5  

categorically stated that in terms of the rules for allotment of quarter by  

the company commonly known as ‘Township Committee Rules’ quarters  

were allotted to married persons only and clubbed accommodation were  

provided to the bachelors.    

10. It is beyond any cavil of doubt that in determining the question of  

valid marriage, the conduct of the deceased in a case of this nature would  

be of some relevance.  If on the aforementioned premise, the learned trial  

judge has arrived at a finding that the deceased Subramanya had married  

the  first  respondent,  no  exception  thereto  can  be  taken.   A  long  

cohabitation  and  acceptance  of  the  society  of  a  man  and  woman  as  

husband and wife goes a long way in establishing a valid marriage.  

In Tulsa v. Durghatiya [(2008) 4 SCC 520], this court held:

“11. At  this  juncture  reference  may  be  made  to  Section 114 of the Evidence Act,  1872 (in short  “the  Evidence  Act”).  The  provision  refers  to  common course of natural events, human conduct  and private business. The court may presume the  existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have  occurred.  Reading  the  provisions  of  Sections  50  and 114 of the Evidence Act together, it  is clear  that the act of marriage can be presumed from the  common course of natural events and the conduct  of parties as they are borne out by the facts of a  particular case.

12. A  number  of  judicial  pronouncements  have  been made on this aspect of the matter. The Privy  

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Council, on two occasions, considered the scope of  the  presumption  that  could  be  drawn  as  to  the  relationship  of  marriage  between  two  persons  living  together.  In  first  of  them  i.e.  Andrahennedige  Dinohamy v.  Wijetunge  Liyanapatabendige Balahamy. Their Lordships of  the  Privy  Council  laid  down  the  general  proposition that: (AIR p. 187)

“… where a man and woman are proved to have  lived  together  as  man  and  wife,  the  law  will  presume,  unless  the  contrary  be  clearly  proved,  that they were living together in consequence of a  valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.”

13. In Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Mohd. Ibrahim Khan  Their Lordships of the Privy Council  once again  laid down that: (AIR p. 138)

“The  law  presumes  in  favour  of  marriage  and  against  concubinage,  when a  man  and a  woman  have  cohabited  continuously  for  a  number  of  years.”

14. It was held that such a presumption could be  drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

It  is  also  well  settled  that  a  presumption  of  a  valid  marriage  

although is a rebuttable one, it is for the other party to establish the same.  

{See Ranganath Parmeshwar Panditrao Modi v. Eknath Gajanan Kulkarni  

[(1996)  7  SCC 681],  and  Sobha Hymavathi  Devi v. Setti  Gangadhara  

Swamy [(2005) 2 SCC 244]}.   

Such a presumption can be validly raised having regard to Section  

50 of the Indian Evidence Act. [See Tulsa (supra)]

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A heavy burden, thus, lies on the person who seeks to prove that no  

marriage has taken place.

11. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of.  

Section 39 of the Insurance Act,  1938 enables the holder  of a policy,  

while  effecting  the  same,  to  nominate  a  person  to  whom the  money  

secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death.  The effect of  

such  nomination  was  considered  by  this  Court  in  Vishin  N.  

Khanchandani  &  Anr.  Vs.  Vidya  Lachmandas  Khanchandani  &  Anr.  

[(2000) 6 SCC 724] wherein the law has been laid down in the following  

terms:

“….The  nomination  only  indicated  the  hand  which was authorised to receive the amount on  the  payment  of  which  the  insurer  got  a  valid  discharge of its liability under the policy. The  policy-holder  continued to  have an interest  in  the policy during his lifetime and the nominee  acquired no sort of interest in the policy during  the lifetime of the policy-holder. On the death  of the policy-holder, the amount payable under  the policy became part of his estate which was  governed by the law of succession applicable to  him. Such succession may be testamentary  or  intestate. Section 39 did not operate as a third  kind of succession which could be styled as a  statutory  testament.  A  nominee  could  not  be  treated as being equivalent to an heir or legatee.  The amount of interest under the policy could,  therefore, be claimed by the heirs of the assured  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  succession  governing them.”

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In  Smt. Sarbati Devi & Anr.  vs.  Smt. Usha Devi [(1984) 1 SCC  

424], this Court held:

“4. At the outset it should be mentioned that  except the decision of the Allahabad High Court  in  Kesari  Devi v.  Dharma  Dev on  which  reliance  was  placed  by  the  High  Court  in  dismissing  the  appeal  before  it  and  the  two  decisions of the Delhi High Court in  S. Fauza  Singh v.  Kuldip  Sing and  Uma  Sehgal v.  Dwarka Dass Sehgal in all other decisions cited  before  us  the  view taken  is  that  the  nominee  under  Section  39  of  the  Act  is  nothing  more  than an agent to receive the money due under a  life  insurance  policy  in  the  circumstances  similar to those in the present case and that the  money  remains  the  property  of  the  assured  during his lifetime and on his death forms part  of  his  estate  subject  to  the  law of  succession  applicable to him….”

12. In view of the fact that the appellant was one of the heirs and legal  

representatives of the deceased Subramanya, there cannot be any doubt  

whatsoever that she had been rightly held to be entitled to 1/4th share in  

the estate of the deceased Subramanya.  

13. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs.  

Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs.5,000/-.

……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

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..…………………………..…J.     [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi; July 31, 2009

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