ITEM NO.1                 COURT NO.11               SECTION XI

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS                      Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).10483/2007

(From the judgement and order dated 13/03/2007 in  CMWP No. 2868/2004  of The HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD)

CHAIRMAN, D.A.,RANI LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANK             Petitioner(s)

                     VERSUS

JAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.                     Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for directions and prayer for interim relief )) (for final disposal)

Date: 26/03/2009  This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MARKANDEY KATJU         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. SUDERSHAN REDDY

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Adv. Mr. T.S.Sabasish, Adv.for

                    M/S K.L. Mehta & Co.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Ajay Veer Singh, Adv.for Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta,Adv.

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

Leave granted.

The Appeal is partly allowed in terms of the signed order.  No order as to costs.  

(Parveen Kr. Chawla) Court Master

(Indu Satija) Court Master

[Signed Order is placed on the File]

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1921 OF 2009  (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.10483 of 2007)

Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank ..Appellant

versus

Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Others ..Respondents

O R D E R

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

This  Appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated

13.3.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ

Petition No.2868 of 2004, whereby and whereunder the High Court has allowed the

writ  petition  and quashed  the  order dated  23.4.2003  passed by the  Disciplinary

Authority  and  the  resolution  of  the  Board  of  Directors  dated  4.9.2003  as

communicated by Board's letter dated 3.10.2003.

It appears that there was some allegation against respondent No.1 on the

basis of which he was charge-sheeted; an enquiry was held and he was found guilty

and he was given the punishment of fixing his pay scale at Rs.7780/- by reducing the

increment of time scale by 15 under regulation

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38(1) (Kha-II) of Chapter IV of the Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Officers

and Employees Service Rules, 2000 (for short 'the Rules').

Aggrieved  and  dissatisfied  by  the  order  of  the  Disciplinary Authority

dated  23.4.2003,  respondent  No.1  filed  an  appeal  before the  appellate  authority

(Board of Directors) on 13.6.2003 which was dismissed by the appellate authority on

4.9.2003 without giving any reasons whatsoever.

Aggrieved against  the  order of the appellate  authority  dated  4.9.2003,

respondent No.1 filed a writ petition  in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

The High Court by the impugned order has allowed the writ petition filed

by  respondent  No.1  and  set  aside  the  orders  of  the  appellate  authority  and

disciplinary authority on the ground that the order of the appellate authority dated

4.9.2003 did not contain any reasons.

Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on

a decision of this Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Haipur & Others vs.

Prabhu Dayal Grover reported in (1995) 6 SCC 279 and contended that an order of

affirmation does not require any reasons.

In our opinion,  an  order of affirmation need not  contain  as  elaborate

reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation

need not  

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contain any reasons whatsoever.  In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover's

case(supra)  has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of

mind.  Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by

some reasons, at least in brief,  mentioned in the order of the appellate authority.

Hence,  we  cannot  accept  the  proposition  that  an  order of  affirmation need  not

contain any reasons at all.  That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief,

so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while

affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. The view we are taking was also

taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT 2008 (2) SC

253 (vide para 19), and in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR

1966 SC 671, siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR

1976 SC 1785 (vide para 6), etc.  

In the present case, since the appellate authority's order does not contain

any reaons, it does not show any application of mind.

The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of

this Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC

594, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities.

Unless reasons are disclosed,  

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how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not?  Also,

giving  of  reasons  minimizes  chances  of  arbitrariness.   Hence,  it  is  an  essential

requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed

in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.

No doubt,  in S.N.Mukherjee's case (supra),  it  has been observed (vide

para 36) that:

“..The appellate or revisional authority,  if it  affirms such an order,  need  not  give  separate  reasons  if  the  appellate  or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.”

The above observation,  in  our opinion,  really means that  the order of

affirmance need not contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the

original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need

not be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that

appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they

agree with the view of the lower authority.

For the same reason,  the decision of this  Court in  State of Madras vs.

Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 (vide para 15) has also to be understood as explained

by us above.

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Hence,  we  agree  with  the  High  Court  that  reasons  should  have  been

contained in the appellate authority's  order, but  we cannot  understand why the

High  Court  has  set  aside  the  order of  the  disciplinary authority,  in  addition  to

setting aside the appellate order.  

Hence, this appeal is partly allowed and the impugned judgment of the

High Court to the extent that it has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority

is set aside,  and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide the

appeal filed by respondent No.1 afresh in accordance with law after affording an

opportunity  of  being  heard to  respondent  No.1  and also by  passing  a  speaking

order.  The said appeal shall be decided very expeditiously. No order as to costs.

.......................J. [MARKANDEY KATJU]

NEW DELHI; ........................J. MARCH 26, 2009. [B.SUDERSHAN REDDY]