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PETITIONER: CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/1956

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1956 AIR  676            1956 SCR  393

ACT:        Sugarcane,  Regulation of Supply and Purchase of-Act  passed        by- State Legislature and notifications issued thereunder by        the State Government-Constitutional validity-If repugnant to        Parliamentary  Acts  and notifications  made  thereunder--If        violative   of  fundamental  rights-Parliament’s  power   of        repeal-Delegation   of  such  power,   if   permissible-U.P.        Sugarcane  (Regulation  of Supply and  Purchase)  Act,  1953        (U.P.   Act  XXIV  of  1953),  ss.  15,  16-U.P.   Sugarcane        Regulation  of  Supply and Purchase  Order,  1954-Industries        (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951)  as        amended  by  Act XXVI of 1953, ss.  18-G,  15,  16-Essential        Commodities Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955), s. 16(1)(b)-Sugarcane        Control  Order, 1955, cl. 7(1)-Constitution of India,  Arts.        14, 19(1)(c), (f) and (g), 31, 301, 304, 254.

HEADNOTE:        The  petitioners challenged the constitutional  validity  of        the  U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase)  Act        of   1953,  and  two  notifications  issued  by  the   State        Government  on September 27, 1954 and November 9, 1955,  the        former under sub-sec. 1(a) read with sub-sec. 2(b) of s.  16        of  the  impugned  Act providing that where  not  less  than        three-fourths   of  the  canegrowers  within  the  area   of        operation  of  a  Canegrowers’  Co-operative  Society   were        members  thereof, the occupier of the factory to which  that        area  is  assigned  should not purchase  or  enter  into  an        agreement  to purchase cane except through that society  and        the  latter  under s. 15 of the Act assigning  to  different        sugarcane  factories specified cane-purchasing  centers  for        supply to them of sugarcane for the crushing season of 1955-        56.   They contended that the impugned Act was  ultra  vires        the        394        State  Legislature, the subject-matter of legislation  being        within   the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Parliament,   and        repugnant  to  Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955  passed  by        Parliament  and that ss. 15 and 16(1)(a) and (2)(b) and  the        two  notifications infringed their fundamental rights  under

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      Arts.  14,  19(1)(c), (f) and (g) and 31  and  violated  the        provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution.        Held, (1) that the impugned Act and the notifications issued        thereunder  were intra vires the State Legislature, did  not        infringe  any  fundamental  rights of  the  petitioners  nor        violated the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution  and        the petitions must be dismissed;        (2)that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane        and  the  notifications thereunder having been  enacted  and        made  by  the Central Government in exercise  of  concurrent        jurisdiction  under  Entry  33 of List III  of  the  Seventh        Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the  Constitution        (Third Amendment) Act of 1954, the State Legislature was not        deprived  of its jurisdiction thereunder and no question  of        legislative  incompetence  of the U.P.  Legislature  or  its        trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in        enacting the impugned Act could arise;        (3)  that  the provisions of the impugned  Act  compared  to        those  of the Central Acts clearly showed that the  impugned        Act  was solely concerned with the regulation of the  supply        and  purchase of sugarcane and in no way trenched  upon  the        exclusive  jurisdiction of the Centre with regard  to  sugar        and the U.P. Legislature was, therefore, quite competent  to        enact it;        (4)  that  no question of repugnancy under Art. 254  of  the        Constitution could arise where Parliamentary Legislation and        State  Legislation occupied different fields and dealt  with        separate  and distinct matters even though of a cognate  and        allied  character, and that where, as in the  present  case,        there  was no inconsistency in the actual terms of the  acts        enacted by Parliament and the State Legislature, the test of        repugnancy  would  be  whether  Parliament  and  the   State        Legislature, in legislating under an entry in the Concurrent        List, exercised their powers over the same subject-matter or        whether  the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to  be        exhaustive so as to cover the entire field;        (5)  that the provisions of s. 18-G of Act LXV of  1951  did        not  cover  sugarcane  nor indicate  the  intention  of  the        Parliament  to cover the entire field of  such  legislation;        the  expression "any article or class of articles  relatable        to  any scheduled industry" used in ss. 18-G, 15 and  16  of        the Act did not refer to raw materials but only to  finished        products   of  the  scheduled  industries  the  supply   and        distribution of which s. 18-G was intended to regulate,  its        whole   object   being  the   equitable   distribution   and        availability of manufactured articles at fair prices and not        to invest the Central Government with the power to legislate        in regard to sugarcane;        395        (6)  that even assuming that sugarcane was such  an  article        and fell within the purview of s. 18-G of the Act, no  order        having been issued by the Central Government thereunder,  no        question of repugnancy could arise, as repugnancy must exist        as a fact and not as a mere possibility and the existence of        such an order would be an essential pre-requisite for it;        (7)  that as the provisions of Act X of 1955, and those’  of        the impugned Act and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply        and  Purchase  Order,  1951, made  thereunder,  relating  to        sugarcane  were mutually exclusive and did not impinge  upon        each  other and the one legislature did not trench upon  the        field  of the other, the Centre remaining silent  where  the        State spoke and the State remaining silent where the  Centre        spoke,  there could be no inconsistency between them and  no        provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made  thereunder        was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act LXV of  1951

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      as  amended  by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of  1955  and  the        Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, issued thereunder;        Clyde  Engineering  Company, Limited v. Cowburn  ([1926]  37        C.L.R.  466), Ex Parte McLean ([1930] 43 C L.R. 472),  Stock        -Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth ([1932] 48 C.L.R. 128), G.  P.        Stewart  v.  B.K. Boy Chaudhury (A.I.R. 1939 Cal.  628)  and        Shyamakant  Lal  v.  Rambhajan Singh  ([1939]  F.C.R.  188),        referred to.        (8) that the power of repeal conferred on Parliament by  the        proviso  to  Art. 254(2) of the Constitution was  a  limited        power and could be exercised only by enacting a law relating        to the matter dealt with by the state law and the state  law        must be one of the kind indicated in the body of Art. 254(2)        itself,  and  as the impugned Act did not fall  within  that        category the proviso did not apply and the impugned Act, the        notifications  made  thereunder  and  the  U.  P.  Sugarcane        Regulation  of  Supply  and  Purchase  Order,  1954,   stood        unrepealed  by s. 16(1)(b) of Act X of 1955 and cl. 7(1)  of        the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made thereunder;        Zaverbhai  Amaidas v. The State of Bombay ([1955]  1  S.C.R.        799), referred to.        (9)  that  the power of repeal conferred by the  proviso  to        Art. 254(2) could be exercised by Parliament alone and could        not   be   delegated   to  an   executive   authority   and,        consequently,  the Central Government acquired no  power  of        repeal under cl. 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955;        (10) that the contention that the impugned Act infringed the        fundamental  right  guaranteed by Art. 14 inasmuch  as  very        wide powers were given to the Cane Commissioner which  could        be   used  in  a  discriminatory  manner  was  without   any        foundation since his powers under s. 15 of the impugned  Act        were  well defined and the Act and Rules  framed  thereunder        gave the canegrowers or a Canegrowers’ Co-operative  Society        or  the  occupier of a factory the right to  appeal  to  the        State Government against any order- passed by him        396        and  thus  provided  a  sufficient  safeguard  against   any        arbitrary exercise of those powers;        (11) that equally unfounded was the contention that the  im-        pugned  Act and the notification dated September  27,  1954,        violated  the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.  19(1)(c)        of  the  Constitution.   Although  the  right  to  form   an        association was a fundamental right, it did not  necessarily        follow  that  its negative, i.e. the right not  to  form  an        association  must also be so, as all rights which an  Indian        citizen had were not fundamental rights.  No canegrower  was        compelled  to  become  a  member  of  the  Canegrowers’  Co-        operative  Society or prevented from resigning therefrom  or        selling his crops elsewhere and, consequently, the  impugned        Act  and  the notification did not violate  his  fundamental        right;        (12) that the powers given to the Cane Commissioner by s. 15        of  the impugned Act to declare reserved or  assigned  areas        were  well defined and controlled by higher authorities  and        by  no means absolute and unguided and were not,  therefore,        bit  by  Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) and  the  notification  dated        November 9, 1955, could not, therefore, be impugned on  that        ground;        (13) that the restriction imposed by the notification  dated        September  27,  1954, on canegrowers in regard  to  sale  of        sugarcane  to  occupiers  of factories in  areas  where  the        membership of the Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society was  not        less  than 75 per cent. of the total number  of  canegrowers        was  a  reasonable  restriction  in  the  public   interest,        designed for the benefit of a large majority of canegrowers,

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      and as such came within the protection of Art. 19(6) and did        not violate Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution;        (14) that the impugned notifications, being intra vires  the        State  Legislature, could not also be challenged under  Art.        31 as none of the petitioners was deprived of his  property,        if any, save by authority of law.        Messrs  Dwarka  Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The  State  of  Uttar        Pradesh and two others ([1954] S.C.R. 803), referred to.        (15) Nor could it be contended that the impugned Act and the        notifications contravened the provisions of Art. 301 of  the        Constitution  in view of the provision of Art. 304(b)  which        made  it  permissible for the State  Legislature  to  impose        reasonable restrictions in the public interest.        Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales ([1950]        A.C.  235) and Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State  of        New South Wales and others ([1955] A.C. 241), referred to.

JUDGMENT:        ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 585, 599,  611,  622,        625,  565, 576 of 1954 and 48, 58, 415, 416 of 1955 and  10,        16, 37, 39 and 47 of 1956.        397        Under  Article  32  of the Constitution  of  India  for  the        enforcement of Fundamental Rights.        G.S.  Pathak,  Rameshwar  Nath  and  K.  R.  Chowdhry,   for        petitioners in Petitions Nos. 10, 37 and 47 of 1956.        J.N.  Bannerji  and  V. S. Sawhney,  for  petitioners  in        Petition No. 622 of 1954.        S.P.  Sinha  and  K.  R.  Chowdhry,  for  petitioners  in        Petition No. 585 of 1954.        B.B.  Tawakley  and  K.  P.  Gupta,  for  petitioners  in        Petitions Nos. 565 and 576 of 1954.        K.R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 599  and        611  of  1954 and 58, 415 and 416 of 1955 and 16 and  39  of        1956.        R.Patnaik and K. R. Chowdhry, for petitioners in Petition        No. 48 of 1955.        R.Patnaik, for petitioners in Petition No. 625 of 1954.        K.L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and  C.        P.  Lal,  for the State of U.P. and the  Cane  Commissioner,        U.P. in all the Petitions.        C.K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,  and  Jagdish        Chandra,  for  the Cane-Growers’  Co-operative   Development        Unions  in Petitions Nos. 585 and 625 of 1954 and 10 and  47        of 1956.        Jagdish   Chandra,   for  the   Cane-Growers’   Co-operative        Development Unions in rest of the petitions except  Petition        No. 37 of 1956.        D.N. Mukerji, for Daurala Sugar Mills (respondent No.  4)        in Petitions Nos. 611 of 1954, 58, 415 and 416 of 1955.        O.N. Srivastava, for Punjab Sugar Mills in Petitions Nos. 48        of 1955 and 47 of 1956.        A.S.  Chawla, for respondent No. 3 in Petition No. 10  of        1956.        Ganpat Rai for respondent No. 9 in Petition No. 10 of 1956.        398        1956.  April 24.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        BHAGWATI   J.-These  Petitions  under  article  32  of   the        Constitution  impugn  the  validity of  the  U.P.  Sugarcane        (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (U.P. Act XXIV        of  1953)  hereinafter  called  the  impugned  Act  and  the        notifications  dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th  November,        1955 issued by the U.P.Government thereunder.

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      The  petitioners  are  sugarcane  growers  in  the   several        villages  of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri,  Gorakhpur  and        Deoria  in  the  State  of  U.P.  numbering  4,724  in   the        aggregate.   Associated  with them are  the  President,  the        Vice-Presidents and the Secretary of an association which is        styled  "the Ganna Utpadak Sangh" which is a rival  body  to        the   Co-operative   Development  Unions   established   and        recognised  under the impugned Act.  The notification  dated        27th  September,  1954,  issued in exercise  of  the  powers        conferred by sub-section 1 (a) read with sub-section 2(b) of        section  16 of the impugned Act ordered that where not  less        than  3/4 of the cane growers of the area of operation of  a        Cane  Growers  Co-operative  Society  are  members  of   the        Society,  the occupier of the factory for which the area  is        assigned  shall  not  purchase or enter  into  agreement  to        purchase  cane  grown by a cane grower except  through  such        Cane  Growers Co-operative Society.  The notification  dated        9th  November,  1955 was issued in exercise  of  the  powers        conferred by section 15 of the impugned Act and reserved  or        assigned to the sugar factories mentioned in column 2 of the        Schedule  annexed thereto the cane purchasing centers  (with        the authorities attached to them) specified against them  in        column  3 for the purpose of supply of sugarcane during  the        crushing  season  1955-56  subject  to  the  conditions  and        explanations  given  therein.   The former  relates  to  the        agency  of  supply  of sugarcane to the  factories  and  the        latter  relates  to  the creation of  zones  for  particular        factories.   All the Petitions except Nos. 0 of 1956 and  37        of 1956 impugn the former notification        399        but  the  grounds of attack against both  are  common.   The        impugned Act is challenged as ultra vires the powers of  the        State  Legislature,  the  subject-matter of  the  Act  being        within  the exclusive field of Parliament and also as  being        repugnant  to  Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955  passed  by        Parliament, and section 15 and section 16 (1) (a) and 2  (b)        and  the notifications issued thereunder are  challenged  as        unconstitutional  inasmuch as they infringe the  fundamental        rights  guaranteed under article 14, article  19(1)(c),  (f)        and (g) and article 31 besides being in violation of article        301 of the Constitution.  All these Petitions involve common        questions of law and may be disposed of by one judgment.        A short history of the legislation enacted by the Centre  as        well  as  the  Province  of U.P.  in  regard  to  sugar  and        sugarcane  will  be  helpful for the  determination  of  the        questions  arising in these Petitions.  On 8th April,  1932,        the   Central   Legislature  passed   the   Sugar   Industry        (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of 1932) to provide for the        fostering  and  development of Sugar Industry  in  India  in        pursuance  of  the policy of  discriminating  protection  of        industries  with  due  regard  to  the  well  being  of  the        community.   As a result of the protection thus  granted  to        the sugar industry, the number of sugar factories which  was        31  prior thereto registered a rapid rise and by  1938  they        were 139 in number.  There was also a large expansion in the        cultivation of sugarcane and millions of cultivators in  the        Province  of  U.P. took to growing sugarcane.  In  order  to        protect  their interests and for the purpose of assuring  to        them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature        enacted on 1st May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act XV  of        1934)  to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended  to        be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or        for factories.  Sugarcane was grown in various Provinces and        the  declaration  of  controlled areas  and  the  fixing  of        minimum price for the purchase of sugarcane intended for use

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      in any factory in any controlled area was of necessity  left        to the Provincial Governments and the Provincial        400        Governments  were  also  empowered to  make  rules  for  the        purpose  of  carrying  into effect the objects  of  the  Act        including,  in  particular, the Organisation of  growers  of        sugarcane  into  Co-operative  Societies  for  the  sale  of        sugarcane to factories.        With  the coming into operation of the Government  of  India        Act,  1935, there was a distribution of  legislative  powers        between   the  Dominion  Legislature  and   the   Provincial        Legislatures  and  agriculture  (Entry No.  20),  trade  and        commerce within the Province (Entry No. 27) and  production,        supply and distribution of goods, development of  industries        subject  to  the  provision  in  List  1  with  respect   to        development  of  certain industries under  Dominion  control        (Entry  No.  29) were included in List  11,  the  Provincial        Legislative  List.   The relevant provision in  List  1  was        contained in Entry No. 34: "Development of industries  where        development under Dominion control is declared to be in  the        public  interest".   As  a result of  this  distribution  of        legislative  powers, the entire subject-matter of Act XV  of        1934  fell within the Provincial Legislative List.   It  was        felt that Act XV of 1934 was not sufficiently  comprehensive        for  dealing with the problems of the sugar industry and  it        was  found  necessary to replace it by a new  measure  which        would  provide for the better Organisation of cane  supplies        to  sugar  factories.  The Governments of  U.P.  and  Bihar,        therefore,  decided  in  consultation  with  each  other  to        introduce   legislation  on  similar  lines  for  both   the        Provinces  which together accounted for nearly 85 per  cent.        of  production  of  sugar in India.   The  U.P.  Legislature        accordingly  enacted on 10th February, 1938 the  U.P.  Sugar        Factories Control Act, 1938 (U.P. Act 1 of 1938) to  provide        for the licensing of the sugar factories and for  regulating        the  supply of sugarcane intended for use in such  factories        and  the  price at which it may be purchased and  for  other        incidental matters.  This Act provided for (a) the licensing        of  sugar  factories, (b) the regulation of  the  supply  of        sugarcane to factories, (c) the minimum price for sugarcane,        (d)  the establishment of Sugar Control Board and  Advisory.        Committee, and (e) a        401        tax on the sale of sugarcane intended for use in  factories,        and  repealed  Act XV of 1934.  This Act was  to  remain  in        force  initially  until 30th June, 1947 but the  period  was        extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P. Act XIII of 1947 and  to        30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950.        The  Second  World  War  intervened  and  an  emergency  was        proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of  the        Government  of  India Act, 1935.  The  Dominion  Legislature        acquired  the  power  to make laws for  the  Provinces  with        respect  to any of the matters enumerated in the  Provincial        Legislative  List.   The result was in effect  to  make  the        Provincial  Legislative List also a  Concurrent  Legislative        List  for the operation of the Dominion Legislature  but  if        any  provision  of  a Provincial law was  repugnant  to  any        provision  of  the  Dominion law made in  exercise  of  that        power,  the Dominion law was to prevail and  the  Provincial        law  was  to be void to the extent of the  repugnancy.   The        proclamation of emergency was to operate until revoked by  a        subsequent  proclamation  and  laws  made  by  the  Dominion        Legislature   as  above  were  to  have  effect  until   the        expiration of a period of six months after the  proclamation        had  ceased  to operate.  The Defence of India Act  and  the

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      Rules  made thereunder occupied the field, sugar was made  a        controlled commodity in the year 1942 and its production and        distribution  as well as the fixation of sugar  prices  were        regulated   by   the  Sugar  Controller   thereafter.    The        proclamation of emergency was revoked on 1st April, 1946 and        the  laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the  field  of        the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect        after  30th  September,  1946.  On  26th  March,  1946,  the        British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and        Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39).  Section        2(1)  (a)  provided  that notwithstanding  anything  in  the        Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature  shall        during  the  period mentioned in section 4 of the  Act  have        power to make laws with respect to the following matters:        "(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within        402        a Province) in, and the production, supply and  distribution        of,   cotton   and  woollen   textiles,   paper   (including        newsprint),  foodstuffs  (including  edible  oil  seeds  and        oils),  petroleum  and petroleum products,  spare  parts  of        mechanically  propelled  vehicles,  coal,  iron,  steel  and        mica;.........."        The period provided in section 4 was the period of one  year        beginning  with  the  date  on  which  the  proclamation  of        emergency ceased to operate or, if the Governor-General by a        public notification directed, a period of 2 years  beginning        with that date.  There was a proviso to that section that if        and so often as a resolution approving the extension of  the        said  period  was passed by both Houses of  Parliament,  the        same  period  shall be extended for a further period  of  12        months from the date on which it would otherwise expire  but        it  was  not to continue in any case for more than  5  years        from the date on which the proclamation of emergency  ceased        to operate.        Acting under the power reserved to it under section  2(1)(a)        aforesaid, the Central Legislature enacted on 19th November,        1946,  the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)  Act,  1946        (Act XXIV of 1946) to provide for the continuance during the        limited  period of powers to control production, supply  and        distribution   of,  and  trade  and  commerce  in,   certain        commodities.  Section 1(3) of the Act provided that it shall        cease  to  have  effect  on the  expiration  of  the  period        mentioned in section 4 of the India (Central Government  and        Legislature) Act, 1946.  In the absence of a notification by        the Governor-General, the Act remained operative until  31st        March,  1947 only.  The Governor-General, however, issued  a        notification  on 3rd March, 1947 continuing its force for  a        period of two years from the date of the cessation of  emer-        gency.   By virtue of this notification, the Act would  have        remained  in  force till 31st March, 1948.   On  18th  July,        1947,  the  Indian  Independence Act was  passed  and  India        became  a  Dominion on 15th August, 1947.  Under  section  9        read  with  section 19(4) of the  Indian  Independence  Act,        1947,  the Governor-General passed an order on 14th  August,        1947 which substituted the        403        words "Dominion Legislature" for "Both Houses of Parliament"        in the proviso to section 4 of India (Central Government and        Legislature)  Act,  1946 and also introduced a  new  section        4(a)  by way of adaptation providing that the powers of  the        Dominion  Legislature shall be exercised by the  Constituent        Assembly.  On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent  Assembly        passed  its first Resolution extending the operation of  the        Act  for  one year up to 31st March, 1949.   On  3rd  March,        1949,  a  second  Resolution  was  passed  by  the  Assembly

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      extending  the life of the Act by one year more up  to  31st        March,  1950.  With the advent. of our Constitution on  26th        January,  1950,  Parliament was invested under  article  369        with power for a period of 5 years from the commencement  of        the Constitution to make laws with respect to the  following        matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List:        "(a)  trade  and  commerce  within  a  State  in,  and   the        production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including        edible oil seeds and oil) ...................."        The  life of the Act was accordingly extended from  time  to        time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed by Parliament.        Act XXIV of 1946 defined an essential commodity to mean  any        of the following classes of commodities:        "(1) Foodstuffs ....................."        Food crops were defined as including crops of sugarcane.        Section  3 of the Act empowered the Central  Government,  so        far  as it appeared to it to be necessary or  expedient  for        maintaining  or  increasing  the  supply  of  any  essential        commodity  or  for securing its equitable  distribution  and        availability  at  fair prices to provide for  regulating  or        prohibiting the production, supply and distribution  thereof        and  trade and commerce therein.  On 7th October, 1950,  the        Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon        it  by section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar  and  Gur        Control Order, 1950, inter alia empowering it to prohibit or        to restrict the export of sugarcane from any area, to direct        that no gur or sugar shall be        404        manufactured  from sugarcane except under and in  accordance        with the conditions specified in the licence issued in  this        behalf and to prohibit or to restrict the despatch of gur or        sugar  from any State or any area therein.  Power  was  also        given to fix minimum price of sugarcane and no person was to        sell  or  agree  to  sell sugarcane to  a  producer  and  no        producer was to purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a        price  lower than that notified thereunder.  This  power  of        fixing  the price of sugarcane was exercised by the  Central        Government from time to time by issuing notifications fixing        the  minimum prices to be paid by the producers of sugar  by        vacuum  pan process or their agents for sugarcane  purchased        by them during the 1950-51 crushing season in various States        including U.P.        On  31st  October, 1951, Parliament enacted  the  Industries        (Development and RegulatiOn) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951)  to        provide  for  the  development  and  regulation  of  certain        industries.  By section 2 of the Act it was declared that it        was  expedient in the public interest that the Union  should        take under its control the industries specified in the First        Schedule  which  included  in item 8  thereof  the  industry        engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar.        The Province of Bihar which, along with U.P. contributed  to        nearly 85 per cent. of production of sugar in India had also        on  its Statute Book the Bihar Sugar Factories  Control  Act        VII  of 1937.  On 10th April, 1938, a joint meeting  of  the        U.P. and the Bihar Sugar Control Boards was held at which it        was  resolved that a Committee be appointed to enquire  into        the  working  of the sugarcane rules and  labour  conditions        prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces.  The        Governments   of   the   U.P.  and   Bihar   accepted   this        recommendation  of the Sugar Control Boards and  accordingly        appointed the Khaitan Committee, (1) to examine the  working        of  the sugarcane rules, (2) to look into the complaints  of        malpractices  received from time to time in connection  with        the  supply  of  sugarcane to the sugar  factories,  (3)  to        enquire  into the labour conditions of the sugar  factories,

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      and (4) to suggest remedial measures for the shortcomings as        405        noted  in (1), (2) and (3) above.  Shibban Lal  Saxena,  the        present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh and one of  the        petitioners  before us was also a member of that  Committee.        That  Committee  submitted its Report in  1940  recommending        inter  alia  abolition  of the dual  system  of  supply  and        creation  of  a  strong  co-operative  Organisation  of  the        sugarcane  growers  themselves as also creation of  a  zonal        system.  The Indian Tariff Board had also, in the meanwhile,        made  its  Report  on the sugar industry in  the  year  1938        commending  the  advantages of a zonal  system.   There  was        further  the  report  of the U. P.  Sugar  Industry  Enquiry        Committee, 1951 called the Swaminathan Committee, which also        recommended the abolition of dual agencies of cane  supplies        to factories and commended the desirability of employing the        agency  of the Co-operative Societies for the  purpose.   It        also  recommended  that the U. P. Act I of  1938  should  be        amended in order to make this regulation possible.  Act  LXV        of  1951  was brought into force with effect from  8th  May,        1952.  In view of the same, certain provisions of U. P.  Act        I  of  1938  became  inoperative.   The  U.P.   Legislature,        therefore,  passed  on  29th  June, 1952  the  U.  P.  Sugar        Factories  Control  Amendment)  Act)  1952,  deleting  those        provisions  and putting the amended Act permanently  on  the        Statute  Book.   The U. P. Act I of 1938, as  thus  amended,        continued in force till, as a result of the prior  enactment        of Act LXV of 1951 and the report of the Indian Tariff Board        on the Sugar Industry as well as the reports of the  Khaitan        Committee and the Swaminathan Committee mentioned above, the        U.  P. Legislature enacted the impugned Act.  The object  of        the enactment was stated to be as follows: "With the promul-        gation  of the Industries (Development and Regulation)  Act,        1951  with effect from 8th May, 1952, the regulation of  the        sugar  industry  has become exclusively a  Central  subject.        The State Governments are now only concerned with the supply        of  sugarcane  to the sugar factories.  The  Bill  is  being        introduced  in order to provide for a rational  distribution        of sugarcane to factories, for its development on organised        406        scientific  lines,  to  protect the interests  of  the  cane        growers  and  of  the  industry  and  to  put  the  new  Act        permanently on the Statute Book" (Vide Statement of  objects        and  reasons  published in the U. P.  Gazette  Extraordinary        dated 15th July, 1953).  This is the impugned Act the  vires        of  which is challenged in these Petitions.  In exercise  of        the  rule-making power conferred by section 28 of  the  Act,        the  U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation  of        Supply  and  Purchase) Rules, 1954.  The  U.  P.  Government        also,  in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16  of        the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and  Purchase        Order,  1954,  which came into effect from  19th  September,        1954.   All  these  related to the supply  and  purchase  of        sugarcane in U.P.        Act  LXV of 1951 was amended by Act XXVI of 1953  which,  by        adding Chapter III(b), invested the Central Government inter        alia  with  power so far as it appeared to it  necessary  or        expedient  for  securing  the  equitable  distribution   and        availability  at  fair prices of any- article  or  class  of        articles  relatable to any scheduled industry to provide  by        notified  order  for regulation of supply  and  distribution        thereof and trade and commerce therein.        On  1st  April,  1955,  Parliament  enacted  the   Essential        Commodities  Act,  1955 (Act X of 1955) to  provide  in  the        interests   of  the  general  public  for  the  control   of

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      production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and        commerce  in, certain commodities.  The essential  commodity        there  was defined to mean any of the following  classes  of        commodities:        "(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds, and oils;           ...........................................        (xi)  any  other  class  of  commodity  which  the   Central        Government may, by notified order declare to be an essential        commodity  for the purposes of this Act, being  a  commodity        with  respect to which Parliament has power to make laws  by        virtue  of Entry 33 in List III in the Seventh  Schedule  to        the Constitution;"        Food crops were defined as inclusive of crops of sugar        407        cane.  Section 3(1) empowered the Central Government, if  it        was of the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to  do        so for maintaining or increasing the supply of any essential        commodity  or  for securing its equitable  distribution  and        availability  at  fair  prices,  to  provide  by  order  for        regulating   or  prohibiting  the  production,  supply   and        distribution   thereof  and  trade  and  commerce   therein.        Section 3(2) (b) inter alia provided for the making of  such        an order for bringing under cultivation any waste or  arable        land  whether  appurtenant  to a building or  not,  for  the        growing  thereon  of  foodcrops generally  or  of  specified        foodcrops.  Section 16 of the Act repealed (a) the Essential        Commodities Ordinance, 1955, and (b) any other law in  force        in any State immediately before the commencement of the  Act        in  so far as such law controlled or authorised the  control        of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and        commerce in, any essential commodity.        In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act,        the Central Government promulgated on 27th August, 1955  the        Sugar  Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control  Order,        1955.   The latter empowered the Central  Government,  after        consultation  with such authorities, bodies or  associations        as  it may deem fit by notification in the official  Gazette        from time to time, to fix the price of sugarcane and  direct        payment thereof and also to regulate the movement of  sugar-        cane.   The  power  to regulate the  movement  of  sugarcane        comprised  the  power to prohibit or restrict  or  otherwise        regulate the export of sugarcane from any area for supply to        different  factories  and the power to direct  that  no  gur        (jaggery)  or  sugar shall be  manufactured  from  sugarcane        except under and in accordance with the conditions specified        in  a licence issued in this behalf Clause 7 of  this  order        provided  that  the  Sugar  and  Gur  Control  Order,  1950,        published by the Government of India in the Ministry of Food        and Agriculture, S.R.O. 735 dated 7th October, 1950, and any        order  made  by  a  State  Government  or  other   authority        regulating   or  prohibiting  the  production,  supply   and        distribution of sugarcane and trade or        408        commerce therein were thereby repealed except as respect  to        things  done  or  omitted to be done under  any  such  order        before the commencement of the order.        These  are the respective Acts and Notifications  passed  by        the Centre as well as the State of U. P. in regard to  sugar        and sugarcane.        Learned  counsel  for the petitioners urged before  us:        (1)  that  the  State of U. P. had no  power  to  enact  the        impugned  Act as the Act is with respect to the  subject  of        industries the control of which by the Union is declared  by        Parliament  by  law to be expedient in the  public  interest        within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I and is,  therefore,

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      within  the exclusive province of Parliament.  The  impugned        Act  is,  therefore,  ultra vires the powers  of  the  State        Legislature  and  is a colourable  exercise  of  legislative        power by the State;        (2)the impugned Act is repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and  Act        X  of  1955 and in the event of the Court holding  that  the        impugned  Act was within the legislative competence  of  the        State Legislature, it is void by reason of such repugnancy;        (3)the  impugned Act stands repealed to the extent  that  it        has  been  repealed by section 16 of Act X of  1955  and  by        clause  7  of  the Sugarcane Control Order,  1955,  made  in        exercise  of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act  X  of        1955;        (4)the   impugned  Act  infringes  the   fundamental   right        guaranteed  by article 14 inasmuch as very wide  powers  are        given  to  the  Cane Commissioner which can  be  used  in  a        discriminatory manner;        (5)the   impugned  Act  and  the  notification  dated   27th        September,  1954, violate the fundamental  right  guaranteed        under  article 19(1) (e) in that the Co-operative  Societies        are  not  voluntary  organisations  but  a  cane  grower  is        compelled  to become a member of the Society before  he  can        sell his sugarcane to a factory;        (6)the  impugned  Act  and the  notifications  infringe  the        fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) and        article 31 of the Constitution;        (7)  the impugned Act is void in that it confers        409        very  wide powers on executive officials and is a  piece  of        delegated legislation; and        (8)  the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade        and  commerce  and thus is violative of article 301  of  the        Constitution.          Re.  (1):  This  contention  relates  to  the  legislative        competence  of  the  U.P. State  Legislature  to  enact  the        impugned  Act.   It  was contended  that,  even  though  the        impugned  Act purported to legislate in regard to  sugarcane        required  for  use in sugar factories, it was, in  pith  and        substance, and in its true nature and effect legislation  in        regard to sugar industry which had been declared by Act  LXV        of 1951 to be an industry the control of which by the  Union        was  expedient  in the public interest and  was,  therefore,        within  the exclusive province of Parliament under Entry  52        of List I. The word ’industry’, it was contended, was a word        of  very  wide import and included not only the  process  of        manufacture  or  production but also all things  which  were        necessarily  incidental to it, viz., the raw  materials  for        the  industry  as  also the products of  that  industry  and        would,   therefore,  include  within  its  connotation   the        production,  supply  and distribution of raw  materials  for        that  industry  which meant sugarcane in relation  to  sugar        industry.   It  was  also contended that in so  far  as  the        impugned  Act purported to legislate in regard to  sugarcane        which was a necessary ingredient in the production of  sugar        it  was  a colourable exercise of legislative power  by  the        State, ostensibly operating in its own field within Entry 27        of List II but really trespassing upon the field of Entry 52        of List I.        It  was contended on behalf of the State on the  other  hand        that.,  after  the  advent of war and  the  proclamation  of        emergency under section 102 of the Government of India  Act,        1935  and  by the combined operation of the  India  (Central        Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and article 369 of the        Constitution taken along with the resolutions of the  Houses        of  Parliament extending the life of Act XXIV of 1946 up  to

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      26th January, 1955 and the Third Constitution Amendment  Act        of 1954 amending Entry 33 of List        410        III, the Central Legislature was operating all along on what        became  in  effect the Concurrent field even  in  regard  to        sugarcane, that the investing of the Central Government with        power to legislate in this sphere of the Provincial List did        not  deprive  the Provincial Legislature of such  power  and        that  both  the  Central Legislature as well  as  the  State        Legislatures  had  legislative competence  to  legislate  in        regard  to  these  fields  which were  for  the  purpose  of        legislative competence translated into Concurrent fields and        that, therefore, the U.P. State Legislature was competent to        enact  the impugned Act which would be valid within its  own        sphere  except for repugnancy with any of the provisions  of        the Central Legislature covering the same field. -        The relevant Entries in the respective Lists of the  Seventh        Schedule to the Constitution are as follows:        List  I, Entry 52: Industries, the control of which  by  the        Union  is declared by Parliament by law to be  expedient  in        the public interest.        List  II, Entry 24: Industries subject to the provisions  of        entry 52 of List 1.        Entry  27:  Production,  supply and  distribution  of  goods        subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III.        List III, Entry 33: As it stood prior to its amendment:-        Trade   and   commerce  in  and   production,   supply   and        distribution  of,  the  products  of  industries  where  the        control  of  such  industries by the Union  is  declared  by        Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.        Entry 33 as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act,        1954: Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply  and        distribution of-        (a)the  products of any industry where the control  of  such        industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be        expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of  the        same kind as such products;        (b)  foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;        411        (c)  cattle    fodder,   including   oilcakes   and    other        concentrates;        (d)  raw  cotton,  whether ginned or unginned,  and  cotton-        seed; and        (e) raw jute.        Production,  supply and distribution of goods was  no  doubt        within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislature but  it        was subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III  which        gave  concurrent powers of legislation to the Union as  well        as  the States in the matter of trade and commerce  in,  and        the production, supply and distribution of, the products  of        industries where the control of such industries by the Union        was  declared  by Parliament by law to be expedient  in  the        public  interest.  The controlled industries were  relegated        to  Entry 52 of List I which was the exclusive  province  of        Parliament  leaving the other industries within Entry 24  of        List  II  which  was the exclusive  province  of  the  State        Legislature.    The  products  of  industries   which   were        comprised  in  Entry 24 of List II were dealt  with  by  the        State  Legislatures  which had under Entry 27 of  that  List        power  to legislate in regard to the production, supply  and        distribution  of  goods, goods according to  the  definition        contained  in article 366(12) including all  raw  materials,        commodities  and  articles.  When, however it  came  to  the        products of the controlled industries comprised in Entry  52        of  List 1, trade and commerce in., and -production,  supply

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      and  distribution of, these goods became the  subject-matter        of  Entry 33 of List III -and both Parliament and the  State        Legislatures   had  jurisdiction  to  legislate  in   regard        thereto.   The  amendment  of Entry 33 of List  III  by  the        Constitution.  Third Amendment Act, 1954, only enlarged  the        scope   of  that  Entry  without  in  any  manner   whatever        detracting from the legislative competence of Parliament and        the  State Legislatures to legislate in regard to the  same.        If  the matters had stood there, the sugar industry being  a        controlled industry, legislation in regard to the same would        have  been  in  the exclusive  province  of  Parliament  and        production, supply and distribution of the product of  sugar        industry,        412        viz.,  sugar  as a finished product would have  been  within        Entry  33  of List III: Sugarcane would certainly  not  have        been comprised within Entry 33 of List III as it was not the        product  of sugar industry which was a controlled  industry.        It  was only after the amendment of Entry 33 of List III  by        the Constitution -Third Amendment Act, 1954 that  foodstuffs        including  edible  oilseeds  and oils came  to  be  included        within that List and it was possible to legislate in. regard        to sugarcane, having recourse to Entry 33 of List III.  Save        for that, sugarcane, being goods. fell directly within Entry        27 of List 11 and was within the exclusive jurisdiction’  of        the State Legislatures.  Production, supply and distribution        of  sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of  the        State  Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature  would  be,        without  anything more, competent to legislate in regard  to        the same and the impugned Act would be intra vires the State        Legislature.        The  argument, however, was that the word ’industry’  was  a        word of wide import and should be construed as including not        only  the  process  of manufacture or  production  but  also        activities  antecedent  thereto such as acquisition  of  raw        materials  and  subsequent thereto such as disposal  of  the        finished   products  of  that  industry.   The  process   of        acquiring  raw  materials  was  an  integral  part  of   the        industrial  process  and  was, therefore,  included  in  the        connotation  of  the word ’industry’ and  when  the  Central        Legislature  was  invested with the power  to  legislate  in        regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry  by        Entry  52 of List.  I, that legislative power included  also        the power to legislate in regard to the raw material of  the        sugar  industry,  that  is sugarcane,  and  the  production,        supply  and distribution of sugarcane was, by reason of  its        being the necessary ingredient in the process of manufacture        or production of sugar, within the legislative competence of        the Central Legislature.  Each entry in the Lists which is a        category  or head of the subject-matter of legislation  must        be  construed  not in a narrow or restricted  sense  but  as        widely as possible so as to extend to all ancillary        413        or  subsidiary  matters which can fairly and  reasonably  be        said to be comprehended in it (Vide The United Provinces  v.        Mst.   Atiqa  Begum and Others(1),  Thakur  Jagannath  Baksh        Singh v. The United Provinces (2), and Megh Raj and  Another        v.  Allah Rakhia and Others(3)), and the topic  ’industries’        should, therefore, be construed to include the raw materials        which  are the necessary ingredients thereof and which  form        an integral part of the industrial process.        Our attention was drawn in this connection to the definition        of  ’industry’  in section 2(j) of the  Industrial  Disputes        Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947):         "Industry"   means   any  business,   trade,   undertaking,

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      manufacture  or  calling  of  employers  and  includes   any        calling,  service,  employment,  bandicraft,  or  industrial        occupation or avocation of workmen"        and  also  to the wide construction which was put  upon  the        term   ’industry’  in  the  Australian   Insurance   Staffs’        Federation  v.  The Accident Underwriters’  Association  and        Others(4)  where it was construed to include "all  forms  of        employment  in which large number of persons  are  employed,        the  sudden  cessation  of whose  work  might  prejudicially        affect  the  orderly conduct of the ordinary  operations  of        civil life".  A similarly wide interpretation was put on the        word  ’industry’  by  our Court in D. N. Banerji  v.  P.  R.        Mukherjee  and  Others(5) where the dispute  was  between  a        Municipality  and its employees.  These  interpretations  of        the  term  ’industry’, however, do not help  us  because  in        defining the word ’industry’ in the Industrial Disputes Act,        1947,  as  also  in putting the  wide  construction  on  the        term  industry’  in [1923] 33 C.L.R. 517, as  well  as  1953        S.C.R.  302,  they were concerned mainly with  the  question        whether  an industrial dispute arose between  employers  and        employees.   Whether  a particular concern came  within  the        definition  of an ’employer’ was determined with respect  to        the criterion ultimately adopted        (1)  [1940] F.C.R. 110, 134. (2) [1946] F C R. 111, 119. (3)        [1947] F.C.R. 77. (4) [19231 33 C.L.R. 517,        (5)  [1953] S.C R. 302.        414        which  was  that  the sudden cessation of  such  work  might        prejudicially  affect  the orderly conduct of  the  ordinary        operations of civil life and the withdrawal of service would        be detrimental to the industrial system of the community and        might result in its dislocation.  What we are concerned with        here is not the wide construction to be put on the term ’in-        dustry’ as such but whether the raw materials of an industry        which  form an integral part of the process are  within  the        topic  of ’industry’ which forms the subject-matter of  Item        52  of List I as ancillary or subsidiary matters  which  can        fairly  or  reasonably be said to be  comprehended  in  that        topic and whether the Central Legislature while  legislating        upon sugar industry could, acting within the sphere of Entry        52 of List 1, as well legislate upon sugarcane.        If   both  the  Central  Legislature  and   the   Provincial        Legislatures  were entitled to legislate in regard  to  this        subject of production, supply and distribution of sugarcane,        there  would arise no question of legislative competence  of        the  Provincial Legislature in the matter of having  enacted        the impugned Act.  The conflict, if any, arose by reason  of        the  interpretation  which was sought to be put on  the  two        Entries,  Entry 52 of List I and Entry 27 of List II put  in        juxtaposition  with each other.  It was suggested that  Item        52  of  List I comprised not only legislation in  regard  to        sugar industry but also in regard to sugarcane which was  an        essential  ingredient  of  the  industrial  process  of  the        manufacture  or  production  of sugar  and  was,  therefore,        ancillary  to  it  and was covered  within  the  topic.   If        legislation  with regard to sugarcane thus came  within  the        exclusive   province   of  the  Central   Legislature,   the        Provincial  Legislature was not entitled to  legislate  upon        the  same  by having resort to Entry 27 of List 11  and  the        impugned  Act  was, therefore, ultra  vires  the  Provincial        Legislature.   There  was an apparent conflict  between  the        legislative  powers  of the Centre and of the  Provinces  in        this  respect  which conflict could not have  been  intended        and,  therefore,  a reconciliation was to  be  attempted  by        reading the two provisions together and by inter-

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      415        preting and where necessary modifying the language of one by        that of the other.  Reliance was placed on the  observations        of the Judicial Committee in The Citizens Insurance  Company        of Canada v. William Parsons(1):        "In  these  cases  it is the duty  of  the  Courts,  however        difficult  it  may be, to ascertain in what degree,  and  to        what  extent, authority to deal with matters falling  within        these classes of subjects exists in each legislature, and to        define  in  the particular case before them  the  limits  of        their  respective  powers.   It  could  not  have  been  the        intention  that  a conflict should exist; and, in  order  to        prevent  such  a  result,  the two  sections  must  be  read        together,  and the language of one interpreted,  and,  where        necessary,  modified, by that of the other.  In this way  it        may,  in  most  cases,  be found possible  to  arrive  at  a        reasonable and practical construction of the language of the        sections,  so  as to reconcile the respective  powers  which        they contain, and give effect to all of them.  In performing        this  difficult duty, it will be a wise course for those  on        whom it is thrown, to decide each case which arises as  best        they   can,   without   entering  more   largely   upon   an        interpretation  of  the statute than is  necessary  for  the        decision  of the particular question in hand". and  also  at        page 113:        "It  is enough for the decision of the present case  to  say        that,  in  their view, its authority to  legislate  for  the        regulation  of  trade and commerce does not  comprehend  the        power  to  regulate  by  legislation  the  contracts  of   a        particular  business or trade, such as the business of  fire        insurance   in   a  single  province............   "   These        observations  were quoted with approval by Gwyer, C.  J.  in        Re:  The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of  Motor  Spirit        and  Lubricants  Taxation Act, 1938 (Central  Provinces  and        Berar Act No. XI V of 1938) (2) and it was further held that        the  general  power ought not to be construed as to  make  a        nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act  and        operating  in the same field.  The same duty of  reconciling        apparently conflicting provisions was reiterated in        (1) [1881] L R. 7 A.C. 96,108.        (2) [1939] F.C.R. 18, 39.        416        Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras(1):        "But  it appears to them that it is right first to  consider        whether  a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by  giving        to  the language of the Federal Legislative List  a  meaning        which,  if less wide than it might in another context  bear,        is  yet  one that can properly be given to it,  and  equally        giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative List  a        meaning which it can properly bear".        Reliance was also placed on the observations of Gwyer, C. J.        quoted in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan(2):        "As interpreted by the Judicial Committee, the British North        America Act presents an exact analogy to the India Act, even        to  the  overriding  provisions in  section  100(1)  of  the        latter:  "The rule of construction is that general  language        in the heads of section 92 yields to particular  expressions        in  section 91, where the latter are unambiguous": per  Lord        Haldane  in  Great West Saddlery Co. v.  The  King(3).   The        principles  laid  down by the Judicial Committee in  a  long        series  of  decisions  for the  interpretation  of  the  two        sections  of the British North America Act may therefore  be        accepted  as  a  guide for  the  interpretation  of  similar        provisions in the Government of India Act."        and  it  was contended that Entry 27 of List  II  should  be

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      construed  in  a general manner as applying  to  production,        supply and distribution of goods in general and Entry 52  of        List I should be construed as comprehending within its scope        ancillary  matters in relation to the controlled  industries        thus excluding production, supply and distribution of  goods        which would be thus comprised within it as ancillary matters        from  the  sphere  of Entry 27 of List  II.   If  this  con-        struction  was adopted it would avoid the apparent  conflict        between  the two Entries and would reconcile the  powers  of        the  Provincial  Legislatures  with  those  of  the  Central        Legislature.    It  was,  therefore,  contended   that   the        Legislation in regard to sugarcane        (1) [1945] F.C R. 179, 191.  (2) [1940] F.C.R. 188, 201.                         (3) [1921] 2 A.G. 91, 116.        417        should  be  considered as ancillary to  the  legislation  in        regard to sugar industry which is a controlled industry  and        comprised  within Entry 52 of List I and should be  excluded        from  Entry 27 of List II which should be read  as  covering        only those categories which did not fall within Entry 52  of        List  I  even  though on a wide construction  of  the  words        "production, supply and distribution of goods" they would be        capable of covering the same.  If this construction was  put        upon  these two Entries, it would follow that  the  subject-        matter  of the impugned Act was within the exclusive  juris-        diction of Parliament being comprised in Entry 52 of List  I        and was ultra vires the U.P. State Legislature.  The  answer        of  the State of U.P. was two-fold: (1) after the advent  of        the Second World War and all throughout up to 1955 when  Act        X  of  1955  was  enacted  by  Parliament,  the  Centre  was        operating upon the Concurrent field of legislation and  that        whatever  legislation in regard to sugarcane was enacted  by        the  Centre as part of its legislative activities in  regard        to  sugar  was  not  under Entry 52 of List  I  but  was  in        exercise   of  its  legislative  powers   under   Concurrent        jurisdiction, and (2) that the impugned Act merely  confined        itself  to  legislation in regard to sugarcane and  did  not        purport   to  legislate  in  regard  to  sugar   which   was        exclusively dealt with by the Centre.  There was, therefore,        no  trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction of  the  Centre        and  the impugned Act was within the legislative  competence        of the State Legislature.        As has been noted above, the entire subject-matter of Act XV        of  1934  came within the Provincial Legislative List  on  a        distribution  of  legislative  powers  effected  under   the        Government  of  India  Act, 1935 and  the  U.P.  Legislature        enacted  the U.P. Act I of 1938 covering the same field  and        repealing  Act XV of 1934.  Entry 27 of List II  related  to        production, supply and distribution of goods and development        of  industries  except in regard to  controlled  industries,        and,  in  so  far  as in 1938 sugar  was  not  a  controlled        industry,  the U.P. Legislature enacted provisions  for  the        licensing  of  the sugar factories and  for  regulating  the        price and supply of sugarcane intended for use in        418        such factories.  With the advent of War and the proclamation        of  emergency under section 102 of the Government  of  India        Act,  1935, the Centre was invested with the power  to  make        laws  for the Provinces with respect to any of  the  matters        enumerated  in  the  Provincial  Legislative  List  and  the        Central  Legislature as well as the Provincial  Legislatures        were  thus enabled to enact measures  exercising  concurrent        jurisdiction  in  regard  to the topics  enumerated  in  the        Provincial  Legislative  List.  The emergency was  about  to        come  to  an  end on the 1st April,  1946  and  the  British

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      Parliament,  therefore,  on  26th March,  1946,  passed  the        India. (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under        which,  notwithstanding anything in the Government of  India        Act,  1935,  the  Central Legislature was,  for  the  period        specified in section 4 thereof, invested with the powers  to        make laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and the        production,  supply and distribution of  foodstuffs,  edible        oilseeds and oils and this provision in effect continued the        power  which  had  been vested in  the  Central  Legislature        during the emergency under section 102 of the Government  of        India Act, 1935.  The period mentioned in section 4 of  this        Act  was extended from time to time up to 31st March,  1950.        It  was  in  pursuance  of these  powers  that  the  Central        Legislature enacted Act XXIV of 1946 on 16th November, 1946.        The  essential  commodities  therein  comprised  inter  alia        foodstuffs  which would include sugar as well  as  sugarcane        and  both  sugar and sugarcane, therefore, came  within  the        jurisdiction of the Centre.  Act XXIV of 1946 was  continued        in force up to 31st March, 1950 under the terms of section 4        of  India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946  by        the notification of the GovernorGeneral and the  resolutions        passed  by  both  the Houses of Parliament  but  before  the        expiration  of  this extended period  the  Constitution  was        inaugurated  and under article 369 Parliament  was  invested        with the power to make laws inter alia with respect to trade        and  commerce  within  a State and  production,  supply  and        distribution of foodstuffs, edible oilseeds        419        and  oils as if they were enumerated in the concurrent  list        and it was by virtue of this power that Act XXIV of 1946 was        extended  up  to  26th January, 1955 by  diverse  pieces  of        legislation enacted by Parliament.  Sugar and sugarcane thus        continued within the jurisdiction of the Centre right up  to        26th  January, 1955.  When Entry 33 of List III was  amended        by  the Constitution Third Amendment Act,  1954,  foodstuffs        including edible oilseeds and oils were included therein and        both   Parliament  and  the  State   Legislatures   acquired        concurrent   jurisdiction  to  legislate  over   sugar   and        sugarcane  Tradeand commercein, and production,  supply  and        distribution  of,  sugar and sugarcane thus could  be  dealt        with by Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures  and        it  was  in exercise of this  jurisdiction  that  Parliament        enacted  Act X of 1955.  The list of  essential  commodities        defined  in  section  2 of  the  Act  comprised  foodstuffs,        including edible oilseeds and oils, cattlefodder, raw cotton        and cotton-seed and raw jute which were items (b), (c),  (d)        -and  (e)  in Entry 33 of List III and the products  of  the        controlled  industries,  coal,  textiles,  iron  and  steel,        paper, petroleum and petroleum products and any other  class        of   commodity   which  the  Central   Government   may   by        notification  or order declare to be an essential  commodity        for  the purposes of the Act being a commodity with  respect        to  which  Parliament has power to make laws  by  virtue  of        Entry  33  of  List  III of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the        Constitution,  which  were  amongst  the  products  of   the        controlled industries specified in the First Schedule to Act        LXV  of 1951.  It follows that Act X of 1955 was enacted  by        Parliament  in exercise of the legislative powers  conferred        upon  it  by  Entry 33 of List III and was  an  exercise  of        concurrent jurisdiction.        It  is  clear, therefore, that all the Acts  and  the  noti-        fications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar        and  sugarcane  were enacted in exercise of  the  concurrent        jurisdiction.  The exercise of such concurrent  jurisdiction        would  not  deprive the Provincial Legislatures  of  similar

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      powers which they had under the Provincial Legislative  List        and there would, there-        420        fore,  be  no question of legislative incompetence  qua  the        Provincial  Legislatures  in  regard to  similar  pieces  of        legislation   enacted   by  the  latter.    The   Provincial        Legislatures  as  well as the Central Legislature  would  be        competent  to  enact  such  pieces  of  legislation  and  no        question  of  legislative competence would arise.   It  also        follows  as  a necessary corollary that, even  though  sugar        industry  was  a  controlled industry, none  of  these  Acts        enacted  by the Centre was in exercise of  its  jurisdiction        under Entry 52 of List 1. Industry in the wide sense of  the        term would be capable of comprising three different aspects:        (1)  raw  materials which are an integral part  of  the  in-        dustrial   process,  (2)  the  process  of  manufacture   or        production, and (3) the distribution of the products of  the        industry.   The raw materials would be goods which would  be        comprised   in  Entry  27  of  List  II.   The  process   of        manufacture or production would be comprised in Entry 24  of        List II except where the industry was a controlled  industry        when  it  would  fall  within Entry 52 of  List  I  and  the        products of the industry would also be comprised in Entry 27        of  List  II  except where they were  the  products  of  the        controlled  industries when they would fall within Entry  33        of  List  111.  This being the position, it cannot  be  said        that  the  legislation which was enacted by  the  Centre  in        regard to sugar and sugarcane could fall within Entry 52  of        List I. Before sugar industry became a controlled  industry,        both  sugar  and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of  List  II        but,  after a declaration was made by Parliament in 1951  by        Act LXV of 1951, sugar industry became a controlled industry        and the product of that industry, viz., sugar was  comprised        in  Entry 33 of List III taking it out of Entry 27  of  List        II.’  Even  so,  the  Centre  as  well  as  the   Provincial        Legislatures  had concurrent jurisdiction in regard  to  the        same.  In no event could the legislation in regard to  sugar        and  sugarcane be thus included within Entry 52 of  List  1.        The pith and substance argument also cannot be imported here        for the simple reason that, when both the Centre as well  as        the  State  Legislatures were operating  in  the  concurrent        field,        421        there  was  no question of any trespass upon  the  exclusive        jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry 52 of List  1,        the only question which survived being whether, putting both        the  pieces  of legislation enacted by the  Centre  and  the        State  Legislature  together, there was  any  repugnancy,  a        contention which will be dealt with hereafter.        A  more effective answer is furnished by comparison  of  the        terms  of the U.P. Act I of 1938 with those of the  impugned        Act.  Whereas the U.P. Act I of 1938 covered both  sugarcane        and sugar within its compass, the impugned Act was  confined        only  to sugarcane, thus relegating sugar to  the  exclusive        jurisdiction of the Centre thereby eliminating all  argument        with  regard to the encroachment by the U.P. State  Legisla-        ture on the field occupied by the Centre.  The U.P. Act I of        1938  provided  for  the establishment of  a  Sugar  Control        Board, the Sugar Commissioner, the Sugar Commission and  the        Cane Commissioner.The  impugned   Act  provided  for   the        establishmentof a      Sugarcane    Board.    The    Sugar        Commissionerwas  named  as such but his  functions  under        rules 106and 107 were confined to getting information which        would  lead to the regulation of the supply and purchase  of        sugarcane  required  for  use in  sugar  factories  and  had

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      nothing  to do with the production or the disposal of  sugar        produced  in  the factories.  The Sugar Commission  was  not        provided  for  but the Cane Commissioner was  the  authority        invested  with  all the powers in regard to the  supply  and        purchase  of sugarcane.  The Inspectors appointed under  the        U.P.  Act I of 1938 had no doubt powers to  examine  records        maintained at the factories showing the amount of  sugarcane        purchased  and  crushed but they were there with a  view  to        check  the  production or manufacture of sugar  whereas  the        Inspectors  appointed under the impugned Act were,  by  rule        20,  to  confine their activities to the regulation  of  the        supply and purchase of sugarcane without having anything  to        do with the further process of the manufacture or production        of sugar.  Chapter 3 of U.P. Act I of 1938, dealing with the        construction and extension of sugar factories, licens 55        422        ing of factories for crushing sugarcane, fixing of the price        of  sugar,  etc., was deleted from the  impugned  Act.   The        power   of   licensing  new  industrial   undertakings   was        thereafter exercised by the Centre under Act LXV of 1951  as        amended  by Act XXVI of 1953, vide sections 1 1 (a), 12  and        13,  and  the  power  of fixation  of  price  of  sugar  was        exercised by the Centre under section 3 of Act XXIV of  1946        by  issuing the Sugar Control Order, 1950.  Even  the  power        reserved  to the State Government to fix minimum  prices  of        sugarcane under Chapter V of U.P. Act I of 1938 was  deleted        from the impugned Act the same being exercised by the Centre        under clause 3 of Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950,  issued        by it in exercise of the powers conferred under section 3 of        Act  XXIV  of  1946.  The prices fixed by  the  Centre  were        adopted by the State Government and the only thing which the        State  Government  required  under  rule  94  was  that  the        occupier  of a factory or the purchasing agent should  cause        to be put up at each purchasing centre a notice showing  the        minimum  price of cane fixed by the Government meanig  there        by the centre.  The State Government also incorporated these        prices  which were notified by the Centre from time to  time        in  the  forms of the agreements which were  to  be  entered        between  the  cane growers, the  cane  growers  co-operative        societies, the factories and their purchasing agents for the        supply  and  purchase of sugarcane as provided in  the  U.P.        Sugarcane  Supply  and  Purchase  Order,  1954.   The   only        provision which was retained by the State Government in  the        impugned Act for the protection of the sugarcane growers was        that contained in section 17 which provided for the  payment        of  price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory  to  the        sugarcane growers.  It could be recovered from such occupier        as  if it were an arrear of land revenue.   This  comparison        goes to show that the impugned Act merely confined itself to        the  regulation  of  the supply and  purchase  of  sugarcane        required  for  use in sugar factories and  did  not  concern        itself at all with the controlling or licensing of the sugar        factories,  with the production or manufacture. of sugar  or        with the        423        trade  and  commerce  in, and  the  production,  supply  and        distribution  of,  sugar.   If that was  so,  there  was  no        question whatever of its trenching upon the jurisdiction  of        the  Centre  in  regard  to  sugar  industry  which  was   a        controlled  industry within Entry 52 of List I and the  U.P.        Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to        sugarcane  and  had  legislative  competence  to  enact  the        impugned Act.        Re.  (2): It was next contended that the provisions  of  the        impugned Act were repugnant to the provisions of Act LXV  of

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      1951 and Act X of 1955 which were enacted by Parliament and,        therefore, the law made by Parliament should prevail and the        impugned  Act  should, to the extent of the  repugnancy,  be        void.   Before dealing with this contention it is  necessary        to clear the ground by defining the exact connotation of the        term  "repugnancy".  Repugnancy falls to be considered  when        the  law  made by Parliament and the law made by  the  State        Legislature  occupy  the same field because, if  both  these        pieces  of  legislation  deal  with  separate  and  distinct        matters though of a cognate and allied character, repugnancy        does  not arise.  So far as our Constitution  is  concerned,        repugnancy is dealt with in article 254 which provides:        "254. (1) If any provision of a law made by the  Legislature        of  a State is repugnant to any provision of a law  made  by        Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any        provision  of  an existing law with respect to  one  of  the        matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject  to        the  provisions of clause (2), the law made  by  Parliament,        whether passed before or after the law made by the  Legisla-        ture  of  such State, or, as the case may be,  the  existing        law,  shall prevail and the law made by the  Legislature  of        the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.        (2)Where a law made by the Legislature of a State  specified        in  Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with  respect  to        one  of  the  matters  enumerated  in  the  Concurrent  List        contains  any  provision repugnant to the provisions  of  an        earlier law made by        424        Parliament  or an existing law with respect to that  matter,        then,  the  law  so made by the Legislature  of  such  State        shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of  the        President  and  has  received his assent,  prevail  in  that        State:        Provided   that  nothing  in  this  clause   shall   prevent        Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to        the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying        or  repealing  the  law so made by the  Legislature  of  the        State".        We  are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any,  arising        by  reason  of  both Parliament and  the  State  Legislature        having  operated  in the same field in respect of  a  matter        enumerated   in  the  Concurrent  List,   i.e.,   foodstuffs        comprised in Entry 33 of List III and we are, therefore, not        called upon to express any opinion on the controversy  which        was  raised  in  regard to the exact  scope  and  extent  of        article 254(1) in regard to "a law made by Parliament  which        Parliament  is  competent  to enact",  as  to  ’whether  the        legislative  power of Parliament therein refers to  List  I)        List  III and the residuary power of legislation  vested  in        Parliament  under article 248 or is confined merely  to  the        matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (Vide A.I.R.  1942        Cal.  587 contra, Per Sulaiman, J. in 1940 F.C.R. 185 at  p.        226).        Nicholas  in his Australian Constitution, 2nd ed.,  p.  303,        refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy:-        (1)There  may  be inconsistency in the actual terms  of  the        competing  statutes (R. v. Brisbane Licensing Court,  [1920]        28 C.L.R. 23).        (2)Though  there may be no direct conflict, a State law  may        be inoperative because the Commonwealth law, or the award of        the  Commonwealth  Court,  is  intended  to  be  a  complete        exhaustive  code  (Clyde Engineering Co.  Ltd.  v.  Cowburn,        [1926] 37 C.L.R. 466).        (3)  Even in the absence of intention a conflict may   arise        when  both  State and Commonwealth seek  to  exercise  their

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      powers  over  the same subject matter  (Victoria  v.  Common        wealth, [1937] 58 C.L.R. 618; Wenn        425        v.   Attorney-General   (Vict.),  [1948]  77   C.L.R.   84).        Isaacs, J. in Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v.        Cowburn(1)   laid   down  one  test  of   inconsistency   as        conclusive: "If, however, a competent legislature  expressly        or  implicitly  evinces  its intention to  cover  the  whole        field.,  that  is a conclusive test of  inconsistency  where        another Legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon  the        same field".        Dixon, J. elaborated this theme in Ex parte McLean(2):        "When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the  Parliament        of  a  State  each  legislate  upon  the  same  subject  and        prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make  laws        which  are  inconsistent, notwithstanding that the  rule  of        conduct is identical which each prescribes, and section  109        applies.   That  this is so is settled, at  least  when  the        sanctions they impose are diverse.  But the reason is  that,        by prescribing the rule to be observed, the Federal  statute        shows  an intention to cover the subject matter and  provide        what  the  law upon it shall be.  If it  appeared  that  the        Federal   law  was  intended  to  be  supplementary  to   or        cumulative  upon State law, then no inconsistency  would  be        exhibited  in  imposing  the same duties  or  in  inflicting        different penalties.  The inconsistency does not lie in  the        mere  co-existence  of  two laws which  are  susceptible  of        simultaneous  obedience.  It depends upon the  intention  of        the  paramount  Legislature  to express  by  its  enactment,        completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be  the        law governing the particular conduct or matter to which  its        attention  is  directed.  When a Federal  statute  discloses        such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of        a State to govern the same conduct or matter".        To the same effect are the observations of Evatt, J.   in        Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth(3):        "It  is now established, therefore, that State  and  Federal        laws may be inconsistent, although obedience to both laws is        possible.  There may even be incon-        (1)  [1926] 87 C.L.R  466, 489.  (2)  [1980] 48 C.L.R.  472,        483.                       (3) [1932] 48 C.L.R. 128, 147.        426        sistency  although  each law imposes the very same  duty  of        obedience.   These  conclusions  have,  in  the  main,  been        reached,  by ascribing "inconsistency" to a State  law,  not        because  the Federal law directly invalidates  or  conflicts        with  it, but because the Federal law is said to "cover  the        field".   This is a very ambiguous phrase,  because  subject        matters   of   legislation  bear   little   resemblance   to        geographical  areas.   It  is  no more  than  a  cliche  for        expressing  the fact that, by reason of the  subject  matter        dealt  with,  and  the method of dealing with  it,  and  the        nature  and multiplicity of the regulations prescribed,  the        Federal authority has adopted a plan or scheme which will be        hindered  and  obstructed  if  any  additional   regulations        whatever  are  prescribed  upon the  subject  by  any  other        authority; if, in other words, the subject is either touched        or trenched upon by State authority".        The  Calcutta  High  Court in G. P. Stewart  v.  B.  K.  Roy        Chaudhury(1)  bad  occasion  to  consider  the  meaning   of        repugnancy  and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered the judgment  of        the Court observed at page 632:        "It  is  sometimes said that two laws cannot be said  to  be        properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between

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      them, as when one says ’do" and the other "don’t", there  is        no  true  repugnancy,  according  to this  view,  if  it  is        possible to obey both the laws.  For reasons which we  shall        set  forth  presently, we think that this is  too  narrow  a        test: there may well be cases of repugnancy where both  laws        say "don’t" but in different ways.  For example, one law may        say,  "No  person shall sell liquor by retail, that  is,  in        quantities of less than five gallons at a time" and  another        law  may say, "No person shall sell liquor by  retail,  that        is,  in  quantities  of less than ten gallons  at  a  time".        Here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying        the more stringent of the two, namely the second one; yet it        is  equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for  to        the  extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey  one  of        them,   the  other,  though  not  actually   disobeyed,   is        nullified".        The learned Judge then discussed the various auth-        (1)  A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 628.        427        orities which laid down the test of repugnancy in Australia,        Canada, and England and concluded at page 634:        "The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the        Canadian  cases,  seems  therefore to be the  same  as  that        enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian 44 hour case  (37        C.L.R.  466) if the dominant law has expressly or  impliedly        evinced  its  intention  to cover the whole  field,  then  a        subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore        inoperative.   Whether and to what extent in a  given  case,        the dominant law evinces such an intention must  necessarily        depend on the language of the particular law".        Sulaiman,  J. in Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan  Singh(1)  thus        laid  down  the  principle  of  construction  in  regard  to        repugnancy:        "When  the question is whether a Provincial  legislation  is        repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its        repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be        on  the party attacking its validity.  There ought to  be  a        presumption  in  favour of its validity,  and  every  effort        should be made to reconcile them and construe both so as  to        avoid  their being repugnant to each other; and care  should        be  taken  to see whether the two do not really  operate  in        different fields without encroachment.  Further,  repugnancy        must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a  possibility.        Their Lordships can discover no adequate grounds for holding        that  there  exists  repugnancy  between  the  two  laws  in        districts of the Province of Ontario where the  prohibitions        of  the  Canadian  Act are not and may never  be  in  force:        (Attorney-General  for Ontario v. Attorney-General  for  the        Dominion ) (2) ".        In  the  instant  case, there. is no  question  of  any  in-        consistency  in  the  actual terms of the  Acts  enacted  by        Parliament  and the impugned Act.  The only  questions  that        arise  are  whether  Parliament and  the  State  Legislature        sought to exercise their powers over the same subject-matter        or whether the laws enacted        (1) [1939] F.C.R. 188, 212.        (2) [1896] A.C. 348, 369-70,        428        by Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code        or,  in  other  words, expressly  or  impliedly  evinced  an        intention to cover the whole field.  It would be  necessary,        therefore,  to compare the provisions of Act LXV of 1951  as        amended  by  Act XXVI of 1953, Act X of 1955 and  the  Sugar        Control  Order,  1955 issued thereunder with  those  of  the        impugned  Act  and U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of  Supply  and

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      Purchase Order, 1954 passed thereunder.        Act  LXV of 1951 was an Act to provide for  the  development        and regulation of certain industries the control of which by        the  Union  was declared by the Act to be expedient  in  the        public  interest  and  it embraced  the  various  industries        mentioned  in the First Schedule to the Act.   The  industry        engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar was one of        such industries and under the Act the Union acquired control        over  the-same.  The Act provided for the establishment  and        constitution of a Central Advisory Council for the  purposes        of  advising  it on matters concerning the  development  and        regulation  of the scheduled industries.  It  also  provided        for  the  establishment  and  constitution  of   Development        Councils  for any scheduled industry or group  of  scheduled        industries.   It  further  provided for  the  regulation  of        scheduled industries by registration of existing  industrial        undertakings  and licensing of new  industrial  undertakings        and  causing  investigations  to be made  in  the  scheduled        industries  or  industrial undertakings.   These  provisions        were evidently intended to control the scheduled  industries        and  if  the  sugar  industry  was  one  of  the   scheduled        industries the control there of involved the development and        regulation  of the sugar industry and the  registration  and        the licensing as also investigation into the affairs of  the        undertakings  which  were  engaged  in  the  production   or        manufacture of sugar.  It did not involve the regulation  of        the supply and purchase of sugarcane which, though it formed        an integral part of the process of manufacture of sugar. was        merely  the  raw material for the industry and as  such  not        within the purview of the Act.  If the, Act had remained  as        originally enacted the        429        provisions  of  the Act would not have been  in  any  manner        whatever  repugnant to the provisions of U.P. Act I of  1938        because both the Acts covered different fields.  Act XXVI of        1953, however, introduced certain amendments in the Act. the        relevant amendment for our purpose being section 18-G  which        provided as follows:-        "18-G.   Power to control supply,distribution, price,  etc.,        of certain articles.-        (1)  The  Central  Government, so far as it  appears  to  it        necessary   or   expedient  for   securing   the   equitable        distribution and availability at fair prices of any  article        or  class of articles relatable to any  scheduled  industry,        may,   notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any   other        provision  of  this  Act, by  notified  order,  provide  for        regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and        commerce therein.        "..........................................................."        Explanation.In  this  section, the  expression  ’article  or        class  of  articles’  relatable to  any  scheduled  industry        includes  any  article or class of  articles  imported  into        India  which  is of the same nature or  description  as  the        article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the        scheduled industry".        Sugar industry being one of the scheduled industries, it was        contended for the petitioners that sugarcane was an  article        relatable  to the sugar industry and was, therefore,  within        the  scope  of section 18-G and the Central  Government  was        thus authorised by notified order to provide for  regulating        the  supply and distribution thereof and trade and  commerce        therein.   If that was so, it was next contended, the  field        of  legislation in regard to sugarcane was covered  by  this        provision   of  the  Act  and  was  taken  away   from   the        jurisdiction  of  the State -Legislatures,  the  avowed  in-

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      tention being to cover the whole field of such  legislation.        It was, however, urged on behalf of the State of U. P.  that        articles  relatable  to scheduled  industry  comprised  only        those  finished  products which were of the same  nature  or        description as the article or class of articles manufactured        or  produced in the scheduled industry and did not  comprise        the raw materials for        430        the  scheduled industry.  Reliance was placed in support  of        this  contention on the terms of the explanation to  section        18-G as also to sections 15 and 16 of the Act where the same        words  "any article or class of articles relatable  to  that        industry" were used.  In our opinion, the contention of  the        State is sound.  The structure of the whole Act LXV of  1951        related  to the development and regulation of the  scheduled        industries  and all the provisions which were  contained  in        the Act including those which were introduced therein by Act        XXVI  of 1953 were designed for effectuating  that  purpose.        It  is significant to note that, even in section  18-G,  the        regulation  which  was intended was that of the  supply  and        distribution  of the article or class of articles  relatable        to  the  scheduled  industry and  the  production  of  those        articles  was  not sought to be regulated at all.   The  raw        materials  would certainly be essential ingredients  in  the        process of manufacture or production of the articles in  the        scheduled  industry but would not be of the same  nature  or        description as the article or class of articles manufactured        or  produced  therein,.  The whole object  of  enactment  of        section  18-G was to secure the equitable  distribution  and        availability at fair prices of such articles which by  rela-        tion  thereof  to  the article or class  of  articles  manu-        factured or produced in the scheduled industry would  affect        such   manufacture   or  production  or   the   supply   and        distribution  thereof  or trade and commerce  therein.   Not        only were the article or class of articles relatable to  the        scheduled  industry  which were themselves  manufactured  or        produced  in  this country sought to be controlled  in  this        manner  but also the articles or class of articles  imported        into  India which were of the same nature or description  as        the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in        the  scheduled industry, so that all these articles  whether        indigenous  or imported would be controlled by  the  Central        Government by regulating the supply and distribution thereof        and  trade and commerce therein with a view to  develop  and        regulate  and thus control the scheduled industries  in  the        public interest.  See-        431        tion  15  of  the  Act  provided  that  where  the   Central        Government  was  of  the opinion that,  in  respect  of  any        scheduled industry or industrial undertaking there had  been        or  was  likely to be a substantial fall in  the  volume  of        production  in respect of any article or class  of  articles        relatable  to that industry or manufactured or  produced  in        the industrial undertakings for which, having regard to  the        economic conditions prevailing, there was no  justification,        it  may  make  or  cause  to  be  made  full  and   complete        investigations  into  the circumstances of  the  case.   If,        after making or causing to be made any such  investigations,        the  Central  Government  was satisfied  that  action  under        section 16 was desirable it was to issue such directions  to        the industrial undertakings concerned as may be  appropriate        for  regulating  production  of  any  article  or  class  of        articles  of  any  industrial  undertakings  or  fixing  the        standard    of   production,   requiring   the    industrial        undertakings to take such steps as are considered  necessary

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      to  stimulate the development of the industry to  which  the        undertakings relate, prohibiting the industrial undertakings        from  resorting to any act or practice which may reduce  its        production  capacity and economic value and controlling  the        prices  and  regulating the distribution of any  article  or        class  of  articles  which has been  the  subject-matter  of        investigation.    If  any  article  or  class  of   articles        relatable  to that industry could thus be the  subjectmatter        of investigation and if appropriate directions in the manner        indicated in section 16 could be given in relation  thereto,        it  is obvious that it would not be within the  province  of        the  scheduled industry or industrial undertakings  to  take        such  steps  in regard to the controlling of the  prices  or        regulating  the distribution of these articles or  class  of        articles unless they were within the sphere of the scheduled        industries  or industrial undertakings.  Raw  materials  for        the  manufacture  or production of the article or  class  of        articles  in the scheduled industry would certainly  not  be        within this sphere and they would not be able to control the        prices  or  regulate  the distribution  thereof  within  the        meaning of section 16.        432        These  articles  or  class  of  articles  relatable  to  the        scheduled  industry, therefore, were finished  products  and        not  raw materials for the manufacture or production of  the        articles  or  class of articles in the  scheduled  industry.        They  were  finished products of a cognate  character  which        would  be  manufactured or produced in the very  process  of        manufacture or production in the course of carrying on  that        scheduled  industry.  The raw materials would certainly  not        be included within this category and sugarcane which is  the        raw  material  for the manufacture or  production  of  sugar        could,  therefore,  not be included in the category  of  the        articles  or  class  of  articles  relatable  to  the  sugar        industry.  Section 18-G, therefore, did not cover the  field        of sugarcane and the Central Government was not empowered by        the  introduction  of section 18-G by Act XXVI  of  1953  to        legislate  in regard to sugarcane.  The field  of  sugarcane        was not covered by Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of        1953   and   the  legislative  powers  of   the   Provincial        Legislatures in regard to sugarcane were not affected by  it        in  any manner whatever.  If the two fields  were  different        and  the Central legislation did not intend at all to  cover        that  field, the field was clear for the operation of  State        legislation  and there was no repugnancy at all between  Act        LXV of 1951 and the impugned Act.        Even  assuming  that sugarcane was an article  or  class  of        articles relatable to the sugar industry within the  meaning        of  section 18-G of Act LXV of 1951, it is to be noted  that        no order was issued by the Central Government in exercise of        the  powers vested in it under that section and no  question        of  repugnancy could ever arise because, as has  been  noted        above,  repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend  merely        on a possibility.  The possibility of an order under section        18-G  being  issued by the Central Government would  not  be        enough.   The  existence  of  such an  order  would  be  the        essential  prerequisite  before any  repugnancy  could  ever        arise.        Act  X of 1955 included within the definition  of  essential        commodity food stuffs which we have seen above would include        sugar as well as sugarcane.  This        433        Act was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the  concurrent        legislative  power under Entry 33 of List III as amended  by        the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954.  Foodcrops  were

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      there  defined as including crops of sugarcane  and  section        3(1)  gave  the  Central Government powers  to  control  the        production, supply and distribution of essential commodities        and trade and commerce therein for maintaining or increasing        the  supplies  thereof  or  for  securing  their   equitable        distribution  and  availability  at  fair  prices.   Section        3(2)(b)  empowered the Central Government to  provide  inter        alia for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land        whether appurtenant to a building or not for growing thereon        of  foodcrops generally or specified foodcrops  and  section        3(2)(c)  gave the Central Government power  for  controlling        the price at which any essential commodity may be bought  or        sold.   These  provisions would certainly bring  within  the        scope   of  Central  legislation  the  regulation   of   the        production of sugarcane as also the controlling of the price        at which sugarcane may be bought or sold, and in addition to        the  Sugar  Control  Order, 1955 which  was  issued  by  the        Central Government on 27th August, 1955, it also issued  the        Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing it        with  the  power to fix the price of  sugarcane  and  direct        payment  thereof as also the power to regulate the  movement        of sugarcane.        Parliament  Was  well within its powers  in  legislating  in        regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was also well        within  its powers in issuing the Sugarcane  Control  Order,        1955  in the manner it did because all this was in  exercise        of  the  concurrent power of legislation under Entry  33  of        List  III.   That, however, did not affect  the  legislative        competence  of the U. P. State Legislature to enact the  law        in regard to sugarcane and the only question which  remained        to  be  considered  was whether  there  was  any  repugnancy        between the provisions of the Central legislation and the U.        P.  State  legislation  in this behalf.  As  we  have  noted        above,  the U. P. State Government. did not at  all  provide        for the fixation of minimum        434        prices  for sugarcane nor did it provide for the  regulation        of  movement  of  sugarcane  as  was  done  by  the  Central        Government  in clauses (3) and (4) of the Sugarcane  Control        Order,  1955.  The impugned Act did not make  any  provision        for  the same and the only provision in regard to the  price        of  sugarcane which was to be found in the U.  P.  Sugarcane        Rules, 1954, was contained in Rule 94 which provided that  a        notice  of  suitable size in clear bold  lines  showing  the        minimum price of cane fixed by the Government and the  rates        at which the cane is being purchased by the centre was to be        put  up by an occupier of a factory or the purchasing  agent        as the case may be at each purchasing centre.  The price  of        cane fixed by Government here only meant the price fixed  by        the  appropriate  Government  which  would  be  the  Central        Government,  under clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control  Order,        1955, because in fact the U. P. State Government never fixed        the  price  of sugarcane to be purchased by  the  factories.        Even the provisions in behalf of the agreements contained in        clauses 3 and 4 of the U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of  Supply        and Parchase Order, 1954, provided that the price was to  be        the  minimum price to be notified by the Government  subject        to  such  deductions,  if any, as may  be  notified  by  the        Government  from  time to time meaning thereby  the  Central        Government,  the State Government not having made  any  pro-        vision in that behalf at any time whatever.  The  provisions        thus made by the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, did not find        their  place  either in the impugned Act or the  Rules  made        thereunder  or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of  Supply  and        Purchase Order, 1954, and the provision contained in section

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      17 of the impugned Act in regard to the payment of sugarcane        price  and recovery thereof as if it was an arrear  of  land        revenue  did  not find its place in  the  Sugarcane  Control        Order,  1955.   These provisions, therefore,  were  mutually        exclusive  and did not impinge upon each other  there  being        thus  no trenching upon the field of one Legislature by  the        other.   Our attention was drawn to the  several  provisions        contained in the        435        Sugarcane  Control  Order,  1955  and  the  U.P.   Sugarcane        Regulation  of  Supply  and Purchase  Order,  1954  and  the        agreements annexed thereto and it was pointed out that  they        differed  in  material particulars, the  provisions  of  the        latter being more stringent than those of the former.  It is        not  necessary to refer to these provisions in  any  detail.        Suffice it to say that none of these provisions do  overlap,        the  Centre  being  silent  with  regard  to  some  of   the        provisions  which  have been enacted by the  State  and  the        State  being  silent with regard to some of  the  Provisions        which  have been enacted by the Centre.  There is no  repug-        nancy whatever between these provisions and the impugned Act        and  the Rules framed thereunder as also the U.P.  Sugarcane        Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not  trench        upon  the field covered by Act X of 1955.  There being no  -        repugnancy  at  all, therefore., no question arises  of  the        operation  of  article  254(2) of the  Constitution  and  no        provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made  thereunder        is invalidated by any provision contained in Act LXV of 1951        as  amended  by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of  1955  and  the        Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued thereunder.        Re. (3): It was then contended that the impugned Act  stands        repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by  section        16  of Act X of 1955 and clause 7 of the  Sugarcane  Control        Order.,  1955  made in exercise of the powers  conferred  by        section 3 of Act X of 1955.        Section 16 of Act X of 1955 reads as under:        "16. (1) The following laws are hereby repealed:-        (a)  the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955;        (b)  any other law in force in any State immediately  before        the commencement of this Act in so far as such law  controls        or  authorises  the control of the  production,  supply  and        distribution  of, and trade and commerce in,  any  essential        commodity".        It is submitted that the impugned Act was "any other law" in        force  in  the  State  of  U.  P.  immediately  before   the        commencement  of Act X of 1955 and stood repealed in so  far        as it controlled or authorised the        436        control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade        and  commerce  in,  sugarcane  which  was  comprised  within        foodstuffs  an  essential  commodity under Act  X  of  1955.        Clause  7  of  the Sugarcane Control  Order,  1955  made  in        exercise  of  the powers conferred by section 3 of  the  Act        provided:        "7.  (1)  The Sugar and Gur Control Order,  1950,  published        with  the  Government of India in the Ministry of  Food  and        Agriculture S.R.O. No. 735, dated the 7th October, 1950, and        any  order  made by a State Government  or  other  authority        regulating   or  prohibiting  the  production,  supply   and        distribution of sugarcane and trade or commerce therein  are        hereby repealed, except as respect things done or omitted to        be done under any such order before the commencement of this        order".        It is submitted that the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply        and  Purchase  Order, 1954, made by the U.P.  Government  in

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      exercise  of  the  powers conferred by  section  16  of  the        impugned  Act  is  repealed in so far  as  it  regulates  or        prohibits   the  production,  supply  and  distribution   of        sugarcane   or  trade  and  commerce  therein.   These   are        provisions  for the express repeal of the impugned  Act  and        the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase  Order,        1954,  and  if  the contention of the  petitioners  in  this        behalf were accepted it would have the effect of  nullifying        the  provisions  of the impugned Act and also  the  impugned        notifications  which  have been issued in  exercise  of  the        powers conferred by sections 15 and 16 of the Act.        As  regards  section 16 of Act X of 1955, the  validity  and        effect  thereof depends upon the construction to be  put  on        article  254(2)  and the proviso  thereto.   Article  254(2)        deals  with repugnancy between the provisions of a law  made        by the State Legislature and those of an earlier law made by        Parliament  or  an existing law with respect to one  of  the        matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and provides  that        the  law so made by the State Legislature shall, if  it  has        been reserved for the consideration of the President and has        received his assent, prevail in the State.  A        437        proviso, however, has been attached thereto which says  that        "nothing  in  article 254(2) shall prevent  Parliament  from        enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter        including  a law adding to, amending, varying  or  repealing        the  law  so  made by the  State  Legislature".   Ordinarily        Parliament  would not have the power to repeal a law  passed        by  the  State  Legislature even though it  be  a  law  with        respect  to one of the matters enumerated in the  Concurrent        List.  Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935  did        not  contain any such power.  As was observed by this  Court        in  Zaverbhai  Amaidas  v.  The  State  of  Bombay(1),  this        provision  contained in article 254(2) "is in  substance,  a        reproduction  of section 107 (2) of the Government of  India        Act, 1935, the concluding portion whereof being incorporated        in a proviso with further additions.  Discussing the  nature        of  the  power  of  the  Dominion  Legislature,  Canada,  in        relation  to  that  of  the  Provincial  Legislature,  in  a        situation  similar  to  that under  section  107(2)  of  the        Government  of India Act, it was observed by Lord Watson  in        Attorney-General   for Ontario v. Attorney General  for  the        Dominion(2), that though a law enacted by the Parliament  of        Canada  and within its competence would override  Provincial        legislation covering ’he same field, the Dominion Parliament        had no authority conferred upon it under the Constitution to        enact  a statute repealing directly any Provincial  statute.        That  would appear to have been the position  under  section        107(2) of the Government of India Act with reference to  the        subjects  mentioned  in the Concurrent List.   Now,  by  the        proviso to. article 254(2) the Constitution has enlarged the        powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can        do  what  the Central Legislature could  not  under  section        107(2)  of  the  Government of India Act, and  enact  a  law        addihg  to,  amending,  varying or repealing a  law  of  the        State,  when  it  relates  to  a  matter  mentioned  in  the        Concurrent  List.   The  position then  is  that  under  the        Constitution  Parliament  can, acting under the  proviso  to        article 254(2), repeal a State law".        (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 799, 806.    (2) [1896] A.C. 348,        57        438        it  is argued for the state of U.P. that, under the  proviso        to  article 254(2),the power to repeal a law passed  by  the        State  Legislature is incidental to enacting a law  relating

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      to   the  same  matter  as  is  dealt  with  in  the   State        legislation,  and that a statute which merely repeals a  law        passed by the State Legislature without enacting substantive        provisions  on the subject would not be within the  proviso,        as it could not have been the intention of the  Constitution        that in a topic within the concurrent sphere of  legislation        there  should be a vacuum.  There is considerable  force  in        this  contention, and there is much to be said for the  view        that a repeal simpliciter is not within the proviso. But  it        is  unnecessary to base our decision on this point,  as  the        petitioners  must, in our opinion, fail on  another  ground.        While   the  proviso  to  article  254(2)  does  confer   on        Parliament  a  power  to repeal a law passed  by  the  State        Legislature, that power is, under the terms of the  proviso,        subject to certain limitations.  It is limited to enacting a        law  with  respect to the same matter adding  to,  amending,        varying  or repealing a "law so made by the State  Legiisla-        ture".  The law referred to here is the law mentioned in the        body  of  article  254(2).  It is a law made  by  the  State        Legislature  with  reference to a matter in  the  Concurrent        List containing provisions repugnant to an earlier law  made        by Parliament and with the consent of the President.  It  is        only  such a law that could be altered, amended or  repealed        under  the proviso.  The impugned Act is not a law  relating        to   any  matter,  which  is  the  subject  of  an   earlier        legislation by Parliament.  It is a substantive law covering        a  field not occupied by Parliament, and no question of  its        containing any provisions inconsistent with a law enacted by        Parliament  could  therefore  arise.  To  such  a  law,  the        proviso has no application and section 16 (1)(b) of Act X of        1955  and clause 7(1) of the Sugarcane Control  Order,  1955        must, in this view, be held to be invalid.        There is also a further objection to which clause 7 (1)  of        the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 is open.  The        439        power  of  repeal,  if any, was  vested  in  Parliament  and        Parliament   alone   could  exercise  it  by   enacting   an        appropriate  provision in regard thereto.  Parliament  could        not   delegate  this  power  of  repeal  to  any   executive        authority.  Such delegation, if made, would be void and  the        Central  Government had no power, therefore, to  repeal  any        order made by the State Government in exercise of the powers        conferred  upon it by section 16 of the impugned  Act.   The        U.P.  Sugarcane  Regulation of Supply  and  Purchase  Order,        1954,  could  not,  therefore, be validly  repealed  by  the        Central Government as was purported to be done by clause (7)        of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, and that repeal was of        no effect with the result that the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation        of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 stood unaffected thereby.        The  result, therefore, is that there was no repeal  of  the        impugned Act or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply  and        Purchase  Order, 1954 by section 16 of Act X of 1955  or  by        clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 as contended        by the petitioners.        Re.  (4):  It  is pointed out  that  the  Cane  Commissioner        declares  the reserved or assigned areas for the  factories,        and  also  transfers particular areas from  one  factory  to        another.   He is also in sole charge and management of  Cane        Growers  Co-operative Societies.  It is contended  that  the        powers  thus  conferred upon him are so wide that  they  are        capable  of being exercised in a discriminatory  manner  and        therefore  the impugned Act infringes the fundamental  right        guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. Section 15  of        the Act provides:-        "15.  (1) Without prejudice to any order made  under  clause

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      (d)  of sub-section (2) of section 16 the Cane  Commissioner        may,  after  consulting  the  Factory  and  Canegrowers  Co-        operative Society in the manner to be prescribed-        (a)reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved  area),        and        (b)assign any area (hereinafter called an assigned area),        440        for  the  purpose  of the supply of cane  to  a  factory  in        accordance  with  the  provisions of  section  16  during  a        particular  crushing  season and may likewise  at  any  time        cancel  such  order or alter the boundaries of  an  area  so        reserved or assigned.        (2)  Where any area has been declared as reserved area for a        factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so  directed        by  the  Cane Commissioner, purchase all the cane  grown  in        that area, which is offered for sale to the factory.        (3)  Where any area has been declared as assigned area for a        factory,  the occupier of such factory shall  purchase  such        quantity of cane grown in that area and offered for sale  to        the factory, as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner.        (4)  An appeal shall lie to the State Government against the        order  of  the Cane Commissioner  passed  under  sub-section        (1)".        Rule  22  of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation  of  Supply  and        Purchase)  Rules,  1954,  made by  the  U.P.  Government  in        exercise  of the rule-making power conferred by  section  28        (2) of the Act however lays down the factors which are to be        taken  into  consideration  by  the  Cane  Commissioner   in        reserving  an area for or assigning an area to a factory  or        determining  the  quantity of cane to be purchased  from  an        area by a factory:        (a)  the distance of the area from the factory,        (b)  facilities for transport of cane from the area,        (c)  the  quality  of  cane supplied from the  area  to  the        factory in previous years,        (d) previous reservation      and assignment orders,        (e) the quantity of cane to be crushed in the factory,        (f  the arrangements made by the factory in  previous  years        for payment of cess, cane price and commission, and        (g)  the views of the Canegroweria’ Co-operative Society  of        the area.        441        Chapter  11 of the Rules provides for the management of  the        Canegrowers’ Co-operative Societies by the Cane Commissioner        and their supervision by him.        Rule 63 of that chapter however provides--        "Rule   63.-An   appeal  against  an  order  of   the   Cane        Commissioner under the provisions of this Chapter shall  lie        to the State Government within one month of the date of  the        communication  of  the order to the  Society  or  management        concerned".        It  will  be  thus seen that the powers given  to  the  Cane        Commissioner under section 15 are well defined and have  got        to   be  exercised  within  the  limits   prescribed   after        consulting  the factories and  the  Canegrowers’Co-operative        Societies  (Vide  section 15(1)) and any order made  by  the        Cane  Commissioner thereunder is liable to an appeal to  the        State  Government  at the instance of  the  party  aggrieved        (Vide section 15(4)).  The same is the position in regard to        the  orders made by the Cane Commissioner in the  course  of        his management and supervision of the Canegrowers’ Co-opera-        tive  Societies and any order made by him in regard  thereto        is subject to appeal to the State Government at the instance        of  the  party  aggrieved (Vide Rule 63).  If  this  is  the        position, it cannot be urged that wide powers are  conferred

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      on  the  Cane  Commissioner which can be used by  him  in  a        discriminatory manner so as to violate the fundamental right        guaranteed   under  article  14.   Any  cane  grower  or   a        Canegrowers’  Cooperative  Society  or  the  occupier  of  a        factory  can,  if  aggrieved, take an appeal  to  the  State        Government against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner        and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided in the        Act  and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise  of  those        powers  by the Cane Commissioner and takes them out  of  the        ban of article 14.        Re. (5): It is next contended that the impugned Act and  the        notification   dated  27th  September,  1954   violate   the        fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (c)  which        is  the right to form associations or unions.  It  is  urged        that the Cane Growers Co-        442        operative  Societies are not voluntary organisations  but  a        cane  grower is compelled to become a member of the  Society        before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory.  The right to        form  associations or unions is a positive right but in  the        positive right it is urged there is necessarily implied  the        negative aspect which means that a citizen has the right not        to  form associations or unions and cannot be  compelled  to        become  a  member of an association or a union  or  a  Cane-        growers’  Co-operative Society before be can sell his  goods        to the owner of a factory.  Reliance is placed in support of        this contention on the following passage in the judgment  of        the  Madras  High Court in Indian  Metal  and  Metallurgical        Corporation V. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Another(1):-        "In  this  case,  however,  we are  concerned  with  a  much        narrower  question,  namely, whether an award  made  by  the        Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Industrial  Disputes        Act  and published by the Government in accordance with  the        provisions  of  the  Act can direct  the  management  of  an        industry to continue to carry on any business against  their        will.  If a citizen has got a right to carry on business, we        think it follows that, he must be at liberty not to carry it        on  if he so chooses.  A person can no more be compelled  to        carry  on  a  business than a person  can  be  compelled  to        acquire  or  hold property........ Mr.  Bhasyam  was  really        unable to convince us how any one can be compelled to  carry        on  a business against his will and yet be said to  enjoy  a        right to carry on a business".        The   following  passage  from  Strong  on  ’American   Con-        stitutional  Law’, page 774, taken from the judgment of  Mr.        Justice  Murphy in West Virginia State Board v.  Barnette(2)        is also relied upon--        "The freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the        Constitution against State action includes both the right to        speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at  all,        except in so far as essential operations of government.  may        require it for the        (1) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 98, 101.        (2) 819 U.S 624, 646.        443        preservation  of  an  orderly society,-as  in  the  case  of        compulsion to give evidence in court".        It is urged that, if the right to carry on business  carries        with  it  by necessary implication a right not to  carry  on        business,  if the right to speak freely carries with  it  by        necessary implication the right to refrain from speaking  at        all,  the right to form associations or unions also  carries        with  it  by  necessary implication the right  not  to  form        associations  or unions.  In the first place, assuming  that        the right to form an association implies a right not to form

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      an  association, it does not follow that the negative  right        must also be regarded as a fundamental right.  The  citizens        of  India  have many rights which have not  been  given  the        sanctity  of fundamental rights and there is nothing  absurd        or   uncommon  if  the  positive  right  alone  is  made   a        fundamental right.  The whole fallacy in the argument  urged        on  behalf of the petitioners lies in this that  it  ignores        that  there  is no compulsion at all on any cane  grower  to        become  a member of the Canegrowers’  Co-operative  Society.        The  very definition of a cane grower given in the  impugned        Act talks of "a person who cultivates cane either by himself        or  by members of his family or by hired labour and  who  is        not a member of the Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society".  The        Sugarcane Board is to consist of inter alia 15 members to be        appointed  by the State Government of whom 5 are to  be  the        representatives  of  canegrowers and  the  Canegrowers’  Co-        operative  Societies.   The  occupier of a  factory  has  to        maintain a register of all such canegrowers and Canegrowers’        Co-operative  Societies as shall sell cane to that  factory.        The payment of commission on purchase of cane is to be  made        by  the  occupier of a factory in both cases.,  whether  the        purchase is made through a Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society        or  the purchase is made direct from the  canegrowers.   The        U.P.  Sugarcane  Regulation of Supply  and  Purchase  Order,        1954, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16        of  the impugned Act also talks of cane growers as  well  as        Canegrowers’ Co-operative Societies and in        444        the  case  of reserved areas both the cane growers  and  the        Canegrowers’  Co-operative Societies are entitled within  14        days  of  the  issue of an order reserving. an  area  for  a        factory  to offer to supply cane grown in the reserved  area        to the occupier of the factory and Form B in Appendix II  of        that  Order provides the form of agreement between the  cane        grower  and the occupier of a factory.  The cane  grower  as        well  as  the  Canegrowers’ Co-operative  Society  are  both        within  the ken of the impugned Act and it cannot  be  urged        that  the  object of the Act is to  promote  Canegrowers’Co-        operative  Societies  to the prejudice of  the  cane  grower        himself.  The Canegrowers’ Co-operative Societies are to  be        fostered if at all for furthering the interests of the  cane        growers  and there is no conflict between the  interests  of        the  cane  growers on the one hand and those  of  the  Cane-        growers’  Co-operative  Societies on the  other.   Both  are        equally catered for by the impugned Act but it is only  when        the  State  Government feels that  there  are  circumstances        justifying the issue of an order under which the cane  grown        by  a  cane grower shall not be purchased except  through  a        Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society, the State Government,  in        exercise of the power reserved under section 16(2)(b)  would        issue an order accordingly.  The impugned notification dated        27th September, 1954 specifies the circumstances under which        such a prohibitory order can be made.  If the membership  of        a  particular Canegrowers’ Cooperative Society is  not  less        than 75 per cent. of the total number of cane growers within        the  particular  area, then and then only it  is  considered        expedient  and desirable that all the cane purchased  by  an        occupier  of  a factory from that area should  be  purchased        only  through the agency of the particular Canegrowers’  Co-        operative Society.  It is with a view to eliminate unhealthy        competition between the cane growers on the one hand and the        Canegrowers’ Cooperative Societies on the other and also  to        prevent  malpractices  indulged  in by  the  occupier  of  a        factory for the purpose of breaking up the Canegrowers’        445

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      Co-operative  Society  that such a provision is made  and  a        notification  issued prohibiting the occupier of  a  factory        from  making any purchases from the area except through  the        Canegrowers’  Co-operative  Society.   It  is  a  reasonable        provision  made  for  the benefit of  the  large  number  of        persons forming the members of the Canegrowers’ Co-operative        Society and cannot be impugned as in any manner violative of        any fundamental right of the petitioners.        There is also another fallacy in their argument and it  lies        in  ignoring that no canegrower is prevented from  resigning        his  membership  of  a  Canegrowers’  Co-operative  Society.        These  are  voluntary organisations which  a  canegrower  is        entitled  to  join  or not at his choice.  If  he  has  once        joined  it he is also entitled to resign his  membership  at        his   choice  and  the  only  obstacle  to  his   right   of        resignation,  as has been laid down in the bye-laws  of  the        Society,  is the fact of his being indebted to the  Society,        or  the fact of his being a surety for debt due  by  another        member of the Society.  Until these debts are discharged and        also until the crushing season during which the Canegrowers’        Co-operative Society has entered into an agreement with  the        occupier of a factory is over, a member of a Society  cannot        resign his membership.  These restrictions do not fetter his        right to resign his membership of the Society.  If be became        a  member of the Society he is bound by the bye-laws of  the        Society and can only resign his membership after  fulfilling        all  the conditions which are laid down in the  bye-laws  of        the Society.        The cane grower,, moreover, is not prevented absolutely from        selling  his sugarcane.  The only person to whom  he  cannot        sell  his sugarcane is the owner of a factory but that  does        not  prevent  him from selling his sugarcane  to  any  other        person  or  for any other purpose, e.g. the  manufacture  or        production  of  gur or rab or khandsari or  any  variety  of        product   other  than  sugar.   There  may  be   of   course        difficulties  in  the matter of his being able to  sell  the        same in        446        that manner but that does not mean that there is an absolute        restriction on his power of disposal of his goods unless and        until  he  becomes a member of a  Canegrowers’  Co-operative        Society.  He is at perfect liberty not to become a member of        a Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society if he chooses not to  do        so  and  no power on earth can compel him to become  such  a        member.   Just  as he is not bound to become a member  of  a        Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society he is equally not bound to        offer  his sugarcane for sale to the occupier of  a  factory        even  if  he  happens to be a  canegrower  within  the  area        reserved  for that factory.  His freedom in that  behalf  is        absolutely  unrestricted  and we do not see how  it  can  be        urged  that  the  provisions of the  impugned  Act  and  the        notification dated 27th September,’1954 are violative of his        fundamental  right under article 19(1)(c) of  the  Constitu-        tion.        Be.  (6): It is further contended that the impugned Act  and        the notifications infringe the fundamental right  guaranteed        under  article  19(1)  (f) and (g) and  article  31  of  the        Constitution.  We may refer in this context to the following        passage  from  the  judgment  of  this  Court  delivered  by        Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) in Messrs Dwarka Prasad Laxmi        Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others (1):-        "Nobody can dispute that for ensuring equitable distribution        of  commodities  considered essential to the  community  and        their availability at fair prices, it is quite a  reasonable        thing to regulate sale of these commodities through licensed

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      vendors to whom quotas are allotted in specified  quantities        and  who  are not permitted to sell them beyond  the  prices        that are fixed by the controlling authorities.  The power of        granting or withholding licenses or of fixing the prices  of        the  goods  would necessarily have to be vested  in  certain        public  officers or bodies and they would certainly have  to        be left with some amount of discretion in these matters.  So        far no exception can be taken; but the mischief arises  when        the power con-        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 803, 811.        447        ferred on such officers is an arbitrary power unregulated by        any  rule  or  principle  and it is  left  entirely  to  the        discretion  of particular persons to do anything  they  like        without any check or control by any higher authority.  A law        or  order,  which confers arbitrary and  uncontrolled  power        upon  the  executive in the matter of  regulating  trade  or        business  in  normally available commodities cannot  but  be        held to be unreasonable.  As has been held by this court  in        Chintaman  v.  The  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  the  phrase        "reasonable   restriction"  connotes  that  the   limitation        imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right should not  be        arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is  required        in   the  interest  of  the  public.    Legislation,   which        arbitrarily or excessively invades the right, cannot be said        to  contain  the quality of reasonableness,  and  unless  it        strikes  a  proper balance between  the  freedom  guaranteed        under article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by        clause  (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting  in        reasonableness".        The  power  which is given to the  Cane  Commissioner  under        section  15  of the Act for declaring reserved  or  assigned        areas  is well defined and guided by the considerations  set        out  in  Rule  22  of  Chapter  6  of  the  U.P.   Sugarcane        (Regulation  of  Supply  and Purchase) Rules,  1954  and  is        further  conditioned that he has to consult the factory  and        the  Canegrowers’Co-operative Society, ,and his orders  made        thereunder are subject to an appeal to the State  Government        at the instance of the party aggrieved.  This cannot by  any        means  be treated as an uncontrolled or an unfettered  power        without recourse to any higher authority in the event of his        going  wrong.  The power is not absolute nor is it  unguided        and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of article        19(1)(f)  and (g) and the notification dated  9th  November,        1955  cannot  be impugned on that ground.  The same  is  the        position  with regard to notification dated 27th  September,        1954.   The  restriction  which is  imposed  upon  the  cane        growers  in  regard  to  sales of  their  sugarcane  to  the        occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the        448        Canegrowers’  Co-operative Society is not less than  75  per        cent.  of  the  total  cane growers within  the  area  is  a        reasonable  restriction in the public interest designed  for        safeguarding the interests of the large majority of  growers        of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good  of        the  greatest number.  That being so, it comes  well  within        the   protection   of  article  19(6)   and   the   impugned        notification  cannot  be  challenged  as  violative  of  the        fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g).        If  these impugned notifications are, therefore,  intravires        the State Legislature, they cannot be challenged also  under        article  31 as none of the petitioners is being deprived  of        his property, if any, save by authority of law.        Re. (7): It is next contended that the impugned Act is  void        in  that  it  confers  very wide  powers  on  the  executive

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      officials  and  is a piece of  delegated  legislation.   Our        attention  has  not  been drawn to  any  provisions  of  the        impugned   Act  which  would  amount  to  a  delegation   of        legislative power to any officials of the State  Government.        The  only provisions alleged to contain such  delegation  of        legislative  power  are those contained in  section  15  and        section  16(1)(b)  read  with  section 16  (2)  (b)  of  the        impugned  Act  which  we have dealt with  above.   They  are        certainly no piece of delegated legislation and the vires of        the impugned Act is not affected thereby.        Re.  (8):  It is lastly contended that the impugned  Act  is        destructive  of  freedom of trade and commerce and  is  thus        violative  of article 301 of the Constitution.  Article  301        of  the Constitution does not occur in Part III which  deals        with  fundamental rights but it is urged that if a  law  was        enacted  in  violation of the provisions of article  301  it        will be no law at all and will certainly not avail the State        Government.  In effect this is an argument in furtherance of        the  contention in regard to article 19(1)(f) and (g)  dealt        with  above but we shall deal with it separately as  it  has        been urged as an independent ground of attack        449        against  the constitutionality of the impugned Act  and  the        notifications  issued  thereunder.   It is  urged  that  the        impugned  notifications  are  violative of  the  freedom  of        trade,  commerce and intercourse embodied in article 301  of        the  Constitution.   The petitioners are not  free  to  sell        their  sugarcane  to anybody other than the  occupier  of  a        factory  or  even  to him except through  the  agency  of  a        Canegrowers’  Co-operative  Society  and  are  not  at   all        entitled  to  sell  their sugarcane to  anyone  outside  the        State.   Assuming  this  is go, the  short  answer  to  this        contention is furnished by the provisions of article 304  of        the Constitution which provide:        "304.   Notwithstanding anything in article 301  or  article        303, the Legislature of a State may by law-        (a)....................................        (b)  impose  such reasonable restrictions on the freedom  of        trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State  as        may       be       required       in       the        public        interest:....................."        We  may-also refer in this context to the following  passage        from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in        Commonwealth  of  Australia v. Bank of  New  South  Wales(1)        which  was quoted with approval in the later  Privy  Council        decision in Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New        South Wales and Others(2):-        "Every  case must be judged on its own facts and in its  own        setting  of  time and circumstance, and it may  be  that  in        regard  -to  some economic activities and at some  stage  of        social  development it might be maintained that  prohibition        with  a  view to State monopoly was the only  practical  and        reasonable manner of regulation, and that inter-State trade,        commerce   and   intercourse  thus   prohibited   and   thus        monopolized remained absolutely free".        We have already stated in the earlier part of this  judgment        that  the restrictions imposed by the alleged  notifications        are reasonable restrictions imposed on        (1) [1950] A.C. 235, 311.        (2) [1955] A.C. 241.        450        the petitioners in the public interest.  We are,  therefore,        of  opinion that this contention also is of no avail to  the        petitioners.        The  result,  therefore, is that the impugned  Act  and  the

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      notifications  dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th  November,        1955 issued thereunder were intravires the State Legislature        and are binding on the petitioners.        The  Petitions must, therefore, stand dismissed.  In  regard        to  costs we feel that the proper order for costs should  be        that  Petitions Nos. 625 of 1954, 48 of 1955 and 47 of  1956        in which the President, the VicePresident and the  Secretary        respectively  of  the  anna Utpadak Sangh  are  amongst  the        petitioners  and  Petition No. 37 of 1956  in  which  Saraya        Sugar  Factory is the petitioner will stand  dismissed  with        costs, one set between all the petitions and between all the        Respondents in those petitions.  The parties in the rest  of        the  Petitions will bear and pay their own respective  costs        of those Petitions.        451