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PETITIONER: CENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT SERVICES LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/1956

BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, S.K. MENON, P. GOVINDA

CITATION:  1957 AIR  104            1956 SCR  956

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Dismissal  of  Employee  for  misconduct Criminal prosecution-Acquittal-Application for reinstatement and compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Employee, Meaning of  Dispute  between employer and  an  individual  employee- Whether  an industrial dispute-Central Provinces  and  Berar Industrial  Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (C.  P. and  Berar XXIII  of 1947), ss. 2(10), (12) and 16-Industrial  Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).

HEADNOTE: In June, 1950, goods belonging to the appellant company were stolen  and as the result of an enquiry the  respondent  was dismissed on the ground of gross negligence and  misconduct. He was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted  in March, 1952, and thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner 957 for  reinstatement  and compensation under s. 16(2)  of  the Central  Provinces and Barar Industrial Disputes  Settlement Act,  1947.   It was contended for the  appellant  that  the application was not main tainable because (1) the respondent was  not an employee on the date of the application,  having been dismissed long prior thereto and (2) his dispute was an individual and not an industrial dispute Held,  (1) that the definition of "employee" in s. 2(10)  of the  Act includes one who has been dismissed and has  ceased to be in service, and that the inclusive clause therein  was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that  employees  discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of  the  Act would  not  fall  with  Ins. 2(10) and  cannot  be  read  as importing  an  intention  generally  to  exclude   dismissed employees from that definition. Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial  Tribunal Bombay ([1949] F.C.R. 321), relied on. (2)  that a dispute between an employer and an employee  who has  been dismissed and who makes a claim for  reinstatement and compensation, would be an industrial dispute within  the meaning  of  s.  2(12) of the Act, and  s.  16  enables  the employee  to enforce his individual rights against an  order

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of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension. Quaere,  whether a dispute simpliciter between  an  employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within s.  2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947).

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No 320 of 1955. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  19, 1954 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of  India at Bombay in Appeal No. 76 of 1954. H.   J.  Umrigar, E. J. Muharir and Rameshwar Nath, for  the appellant. S.   W. Dhabe and R. A. Govind, for the respondent. 1956.   November 6. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by VENKATARAMA   AYYAR  J.-The  Central   Provinces   Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was, at the material dates, a  public limited  company,  and  the respondent  was  employed  as  a mechanic  therein.   In June 1950, goods  belonging  to  the Company were stolen, 958 and suspicion fell on the respondent.  There was an  enquiry into the matter, and that resulted in his dismissal on  June 28, 1950, on the ground of gross negligence and  misconduct. He was then prosecuted on a charge of theft, but that  ended in  his acquittal on March 3, 1952.  Thereafter, be  applied to the Company to be reinstated, and failing to get redress, filed  on October 1, 1952, an application before the  Labour Commissioner  under section 16(2) of the  Central  Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of  1947, hereinafter  referred to as the Act, for  reinstatement  and compensation.  The Company resisted the-claim on the ground, inter alia, that as the applicant had been dismissed on June 28, 1950, he was not an employee on the date of the applica- tion,  that  accordingly there was  no  "industrial  dispute touching the dismissal of an employee" as required by s. 16, sub-ss.  (1) and (2) of the Act, and that,  in  consequence, the  proceedings under that section were  incompetent.   The Assistant  Labour Commissioner, before whom the matter  came up  for hearing, agreed with this contention, and  dismissed the  application.   The  respondent  preferred  a   revision against this order to the Provincial Industrial Court ,under a.  16(5)  of the Act, and by its order  dated  February  5, 1954,  that  Court  held that a dismissed  employee  was  an employee  as defined in s. 2(10) of the Act, that a  dispute by  such  an employee was an industrial  dispute  within  s. 2(12)  of the Act,. and that the application under s.  16(2) of  the Act was therefore maintainable.  In the result,  the order of dismissal was set aside and the matter remanded for enquiry  on  the merits.  Against that  order,  the  Company appealed  to  the Labour Appellate Tribunal,  which  by  its order  dated October 19, 1954, affirmed the decision of  the Provincial Industrial Court, and dismissed the appeal.   The Company has preferred the present appeal against this  order under  Art.  136.   Pending the appeal to  this  Court,  the Company went into liquidation and has been taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh, and is now being run under the name of Central Provinces Transport Services (under 959 Government  ownership), Nagpur.  On the application  of  the respondent, the record has been suitably amended. The  point  for  decision  in  this  appeal  is  whether  an application   for  reinstatement  and  compensation   by   a

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dismissed  employee is maintainable under s. 16 of the  Act. That section, so far as is material to the Present question, runs as follows: "(1) Where the State Government by notification so  directs, the  Labour  Commissioner  shall have  power  to  decide  an industrial   dispute  touching  the  dismissal,   discharge, removal or suspension of an employee working in any industry in  general or in any local area as may be specified in  the notification. "(2)  Any  employee,  working in an industry  to  which  the notification  under sub-section (1) applied may  within  six months  from the date of such dismissal, discharge,  removal or   suspension,  apply  to  the  Labour  Commissioner   for reinstatement  and  payment  of  compensation  for  loss  of wages". The argument of Mr. Umrigar for the Appellant is  that it is a   condition  prerequisite  to  the  entertainment  of   an application for reinstatement under this section that  there should be an industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee, that there was none such in this case, because the respondent   was  not  an  employee  on  the  date  of   the application,  having been dismissed long prior  thereto  and further  because  his dispute was an individual and  not  an industrial dispute. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, as they stood on the material  dates. Section 2(10) defines an employee as follows: "employee" - means any person employed by an employer to  do any  skilled  or  unskilled  manual  or  clerical  work  for contract  or hire or reward in any industry and includes  an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to  a change  in respect of which a notice is given under  section 31  or  32 whether before or after the  discharge".      Section 2(12) defines "industrial dispute" as meaning 960 "any  dispute  or difference connected  with  an  industrial matter  arising  between employer and  employee  or  between employers  or  employees".   Under  s.  2(13),   "industrial matter"  means  "any matter relating to  work,  pay,  wages, reward, hours, privileges, rights or duties of employers  or employees,  or the mode, terms and conditions of  employment or  refusal to employ and includes questions  pertaining  to (a)  the relationship between employer and employee,  or  to the dismissal or non-employment of any person....’) It  is not disputed that a question of reinstatement  is  an industrial  matter as defined in s. 2(13) of the  Act.   The controversy  relates  to  the  question  whether  it  is  an industrial  dispute as defined in s. 2(12) of the  Act’  The contention of the appellant is that it does not fall  within that  definition., because the further condition  prescribed by s. 2(12) that it must be between an employer and employee is  not satisfied.  It was argued by Mr. Umrigar  that  when the   respondent  was  dismissed  on  June  28,  1950,   his employment came to an end, and that he could not  thereafter be   termed  an  employee,  as  that  word   is   ordinarily understood, that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to include in the definition of an employee even those  who had ceased to be in service., as otherwise  there was  no  need  for the further provision in  s.  2(10)  that discharged  employees would in certain cases  be  employees; and  that,  in  any  event, the  inclusive  portion  of  the definition  would,  on  the principle  Expressio  unius  est exclusive  alterius,  operate to  exclude  all  exemployees, other than those mentioned therein. The question whether a dismissed employee is an employee  as

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defined  in  s.  2(10)  of  the  Act  must  be  held  to  be practically  concluded by the decision of the Federal  Court in  Western  India  Automobile  Association  v.   Industrial Tribunal, Bombay(1).  There, the point for determination was whether a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman was an  industrial  dispute  as  defined  in  s.  2(k)  of   the Industrial  Disputes Act XIV of 1947.  It was held that  the definition in s. 2(k) including as it did, all disputes or (1)  [1919] F.C.R. 321. 961 differences in connection with employment or  non-employment of  a  person was sufficiently wide to include a  claim  for reinstatement  by  a  dismissed workman.   Counsel  for  the appellant sought to distinguish that decision on the  ground firstly, that it was given on a. statute different from what we are concerned with in this appeal, and secondly, that the reference there, included other items of dispute, which  un- doubtedly   fell  within  the  Act,  and  the  question   of reinstatement  took its complexion from those items.  We  do not see any force in. either of these contentions.   Section 2(12)  and  s. 2(13) of the Act are  substantially  in  pari materia  with s. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947, and the  ratio  of the  decision  in Western India  Automobile  Association  v. Industrial   Tribunal,  Bombay  (supra)  will  be  as   much applicable  to the one enactment as to the other., Nor  does it  make  any difference that there were  comprised  in  the reference other items which fell within the definition under s. 2(k), because if the Government had no jurisdiction under the Act to refer the question of reinstatement of  dismissed employee  for  adjudication,’ then the to  that  extent,  be treated  as  a  nullity,reference  must,  and  it  would  be immaterial that it was intravires as regards the other items of dispute. We  are  also  unable to accede to  the  contention  of  the appellant that the inclusive clause in s. 2(10) of the  Act, is  an  indication that the legislature did  not  intend  to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service.   In  our  opinion, that  clause  Was  inserted  ex abuNdanti  cautela  to  repel  a  possible  contention  that employees  discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of the  Act  would not  fall within S. 2 (10), and cannot be read as  importing an  intention generally to exclude dismissed employees  from that  definition.   On  the other hand, s.  16  of  the  Act expressly provides for relief being granted to dismissed em- ployees by way of ’reinstatement and compensation, and  that provision must become useless and inoperative, if we are  to adopt  the construction which the appellant seeks to put  on the definition of employee in s. 2(10).  We must accordingly bold agreeing with 125 962 the  decision  in Western India  Automobile  Association  V. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay  (supra) that the definition  of "employee"  in  the  Act  would include  one  who  has  been dismissed and the respondent cannot be denied relief only by reason  of  the fact that he was iiot in employment  on  the date of the application. It was next contended that even assuming that the respondent was  an "employee" as defined in s. 2 (10) of the  Act,  his dimissal  could not be held to be an industrial  dispute  as defined  in s. 2(12), because that term properly meant  that the dispute was one between employer on the one hand and the industry represented by its workmen as a class on the other, and  that  a  dispute  between the  employer  and  a  single employee would be an individual dispute and    would therefore

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be  outside  the  purview of a. 2(12).   It  was  argued  in support  of  this contention that the object of  all  tabour legislation  was not so much to deal with individual  rights of  workmen,  for  the enforcement of  which  there  was  an appropriate  forum in the ordinary courts of the land as  to regulate  the relation between capital and labour,  treating them  as distinct entities, so that public peace  and  order might not be disturbed and production might not suffer,  and for that end, to recognise the right of labour to speak  and act as a body for the protection of its common interests and to  provide  a machinery for speedy settlement  of  disputes which that body might raise; and that it could not have been the   intention   of  the  legislature,  where   the   above considerations did not operate, to interfere with the normal relations between employer and employee under the law and to provide an additional forum to the employee to vindicate his rights.   Reliance was placed in support of this  contention on  decisions of the Madras, Calcutta and Patna High  Courts and of Industrial Tribunals. The  question  whether a dispute by  an  individual  workman would  be an industrial dispute as defined i s. 2(k) of  the Act XIV of 1947, has evoked considerable conflict of opinion both  in  the High Courts and in Industrial  Tribunals,  and three  different  views have been expressed thereon:  (I)  A dispute which concerns 963 only the rights of individual workers, cannot be held to  be an  industrial dispute.  That was the opinion  expressed  in Kandan   Textiles   v.   Industrial   Tribunal(1).    There, Rajamannar  C. J. observed that though the language  of  the definition  in  s. 2(k) was wide enough to  include  such  a dispute,  the provisions of S. 18 suggested  that  something more  than  an individual dispute between a worker  and  the employer  was  meant by an industrial  dispute.   The  other learned  Judge, Mack J., was more emphatic in  his  opinion, and  observed that the Act was "never intended to provide  a machinery  for redress by a dismissed workman".  It  became, however, unnecessary to decide the point, as the court  came to the conclusion that the reference it self was bad for the reason  that there was no material on which  the  Government could  be  satisfied that there was a  dispute.   The  views expressed in Kandan Textiles v. Industrial Tribunal  (supra) were  approved  in Manager, United Commercial Bank  Ltd.  V. Commissioner of Labour(2); but here again, the  observations were  obiter, as the point for decision was whether a  right of  appeal  conferred  by  s. 41 of  the  Madras  Shops  and Establishments   Act  XXXVI  of  1947  was  taken  away   by implication  by  Act XIV of 1947.   The  question,  however, arose  directly  for  decision  in J.  Chowdhury  v.  M.  C. Banerjee(3), in which the order of the Government  referring the dispute of a dismissed employee to the adjudication of a Tribunal  was  attacked as incompetent, and it was  held  by Mitter J., following the observations in Kandan Textiles  V. Industrial Tribunal (supra) that the dispute in question was not  an industrial dispute, and that the reference  was,  in consequence, bad. (11)A dispute between an employer and a single employee  can be  an industrial dispute as defined in s. 2(k).   That  was the   decision  in  Newspapers  Ltd.,  Allahabad  v.   State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. (i).  In that case a reference  of a  dispute  by  a dismissed employee and the  award  of  the Tribunal passed on that refer- (1)  [1949] 2 M.L.J. 789: A.I.R. 1951 Had. 611. (2) A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 141.    (8) [1951] 55 C.W.N. 256. (4) A.I.R. 1954 All. 516,

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964 ence were attacked as bad on the ground that the dispute  in question was not an industrial dispute within s. 2(k) of Act XIV  of  1947,  and  it was held by  Bhargava  J.,  that  an industrial  dispute  could come into existence even  if  the parties thereto were only the employer and a single employee and  that the reference and the award were, in  consequence, valid.  A similar decision was given by a Full Bench of  the Labour  Appellate Tribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills  Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen(1). (III)     A  dispute  between  an  employer  and  a   single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it  may become  one  if it is taken up by the Union or a  number  of workmen.  That was held by Bose J., in Bilash Chandra  Mitra v.  Balmer Lawrie & Co.(2), by Ramaswami and  Sarjoo  Prosad JJ.,  in  New  India Assurance  Co.  v.  Central  Government Industrial  Tribunal(3)  and  by Balakrishna  Ayyar  J.,  in Lakshmi,  Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami and others(4) and  by the Industrial Tribunals in Gordon Woodroffe & Co. (Madras). Ltd.  v.   Appa  Rao(5) and Lynus &  Co.  v.  Hemanta  Kumar Samanta(6). The  preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in  favour of  the last of the three views stated above, and  there  is considerable  reason  behind it.  Notwithstanding  that  the -language  of  s.  2(k) is wide enough to  cover  a  dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that  the machinery  provided  therein  should be set  in  motion,  to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen  as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a  workman  was  not  intended  to  be  the  subject  of  an adjudication under the Act, when the same bad not been taken up  by the Union or a number of workmen.  If that  were  the correct  position, the respondent was not entitled to  apply under s. 16(2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute as their own and chosen to treat  it as (1)  [1953] 1 L.L.J. 757. (3)  A.I.R. 1953 Patna 321. (5)  [1955] 2 L.L J. 541. (2)  A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 613. (4)  [1955] 2 L.L.J. 477. (6)  [1956] 2 L.L.J. 89. 965 their’  casus  belli  with the Company.  But  then,  we  are directly  concerned in this appeal not with  the  Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 but with the Central Provinces  and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of 1947,  and in  the view which we take of the rights of  the  respondent under  that  statute, there is no Deed to  express  a  final opinion  on  the  question  whether  a  dispute  simpliciter between  an  employer and a workman would be  an  industrial dispute within 9. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947.  Now,  the Central Provinces and Berar  Industrial  Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of 1947 with which we are concerned, is not  in  pari  materia with Act XIV of 1947.   It  no  doubt covers  the  ground  occupied  by  that  Act,  and  contains provisions  relating to arbitration,  adjudication,  awards, strikes and lock-outs.  But it contains more.  It enacts  in Ch.   IV  provisions  which are  intended  to  regulate  the contract  of  employment  between employer  and  workmen,  a subject  which  is covered by a distinct  piece  of  Central legislation, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act  XX of  1946.  The object of that Act was, as appears  from  the preamble  thereto,  "to  require  employers  in   industrial

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establishments  formally to define conditions of  employment under  them", whereas the object of the Industrial  Disputes Act  XIV  of 1947 is, as set out in its preamble,  "to  make provision   for     the  investigation  and   settlement   of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes".   Thus, even though the two enactments are pieces of what is  termed labour  legislation,  their  objects and  their  vision  are different.   While  Act  XIV  of 1947  may  be  said  to  be primarily  concerned with disputes of labour as a class  Act XX of 1946 is directed to getting the rights of an  employee under a contract defined.  Now, as the Central Provinces and Berar  Industrial  Disputes  Settlement Act  XXIII  of  1947 covers  the ground occupied by both Act XX of 1946  and  Act XIV of 1947, it would be proper to interpret the  expression "industrial  dispute" therein in a sense wider than what  it bears  in Act XIV of 1947, so as to cover not only  disputes of workmen as a class but also their individual disputes. 966 And  this  view  receives considerable  support  from  other provisions  of  the  Act.  Section Al  enacts  that  an  ap- plication  under  that  section can be  made  either  by  an employer or employee-concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned.  Section 2(24) defines  "representative of employees" as meaning a union or where there is no union, persons elected by the employees not exceeding five.   Thus, there is a clear recognition of the rights of an  individual employee as distinguished from a class of employees, to move for  redress.   It is argued by Mr. Umrigar  that  this  re- cognition  is  only  for the purpose of s. 41  and  that  no inference  can  be drawn therefrom that the employee  has  a similar  right to apply under s. 16(2).  But the  importance of s. 41 consists in this that it indicates that the Act has in  contemplation  the enforcement-of individual  rights  of workmen also.  Then we have s.     53,    which   runs    as follows: "Save  with  the  permission of the  authority  holding  any proceeding  under this Act, no employee shall be allowed  to appear in such proceeding except -through the representative of employees: Provided  that where only a single employee is concerned  he may appear personally"., This  section  again recognises the rights of  employees  to agitate their individual rights under the provisions of  the Act.   Section 16 is intended, in our opinion, to enable  an employee  to enforce his individual rights when there is  an order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, and in the  context,  "industrial dispute" must be  interpreted  as including  the claim of an employee who has been  dismissed, for reinstatement and compensation. The  view  taken  by the Industrial  Court  and  the  Labour Appellate Tribunal as to the meaning of "industrial dispute" in  the  Central  Provinces and  Berar  Industrial  Disputes Settlement Apt XXIII of 1947" is therefore correct, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.                                         Appeal dismissed. APPENDIX Reference  to the memory of late Dr. Bijan Kumar  Mukherjea, Ex-Chief Justice of India, by the Judges and members of  the Bar of the Supreme Court of India assembled at a meeting  on February 23, 1956. S.   R.  DAS,  C.J.-Mr. Attorney-General we  have  met  here today under the shadow of death to mourn the passing away of one who only the other day was our Chief Justice and beloved leader.   He  had been ailing for some time but we  did  not anticipate  that his end was so near.  Therefore,  when  the

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melancholy news came suddenly over the wires, my  colleagues and I felt a severe shook as all of you must also have done. We have assembled here today to pay our respectful homage to the memory of our departed leader. Bijan  Kumar  Mukherjea was born on August  15’  1891.   His father late R. D. Mukherjea was a Sanskrit’ scholar.  He was a  Vakil of the Calcutta High Court but used to practice  at Hooghly.   Mukherjea had his early education at Hooghly  and thereafter at Calcutta.  He obtained his Master’s Degree  in History.   In B.L. and M.L. examinations he topped the  list of successful candidates and secured University gold medals. He was Ananth Deb Research Prizeman. Bijan Kumar Mukherjea was enrolled as a Vakil o the Calcutta High  Court  on  the  Appellate Side  on  January  9,  1914. Shortly  thereafter Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, who had  an  eye for  discovering talents, offered him a lectureship  in  the University  Law  College.   This was a  great  help  to  the struggling  junior and indeed, changed the whole  course  of his  life  and career, for the stipend, meager  as  it  was, enabled  him  to struggle at the Bar of  the  Calcutta  High Court instead of moving to Patna where a new High Court  had recently been set up. His  rise at the Bar was not meteoric but was a steady  one. He   passed   through   the   hard   trial   but   momentary disappointments  or set backs did not dim his enthusiasm  or dishearten him.  While practising at the Bar, he 126 968 secured his Doctorate in Law.  His academic distinctions and studious  habit  stood  him in good  stead.   His  scholarly erudition,  good  grounding  in legal  principles  and  deep insight into human nature soon brought him to the  forefront of the profession.  To his legal learning and forensic skill was  added a graceful style of advocacy ,Which was  entirely his own.  His merit was soon recognised and in or about 1934 he  was appointed the junior Government Pleader  and  within two years the senior Government Pleader. True to tradition he was elevated to the High Court Bench in 1936  Distinguished  as an Advocate he became greater  as  a Judge.   His sweet temper and amiable  disposition  endeared him  to his colleagues as well as to the members of the  Bar and particularly to the junior members.  I am happy to  bear testimony  to his kindness, courtesy and  consideration  for his  colleagues for I had the privilege of sitting with  him on the Bench of the Calcutta High Court.  In 1947 he  served on the Boundary Commission. In  1948  Bijan Kumar Mukherjea along with Shri  Mehr  Chand Mahajan, who happily is with us, was called upon to serve as a  Judge of the Federal Court.  He readily responded to  the call  of duty and came all the way to New Delhi  leaving  at Calcutta his only son to whom he had been both a father  and a  mother.  In the midst of his work on the Bench, he  could find time to prepare and deliver his Tagore Law Lectures  on the  Hindu  Law of Endowments.  On the  retirement  of  Shri Mahajan  on  December 23, 1954, Mukherjen,  became  the  the fourth Chief Justice of this Court. He  brought with him here his profound legal scholarship,  a clear  thinking  and rational mind and a  burning  sense  of justice.   The Law Reports will bear testimony to his  sound erudition,  and  his  masterly  grasp  of  the   fundamental principles  which lie at the root of our legal system.   His judgments  had  a freshness and a compactness and  were  not mere  collections  of precedents.  He delved deep  into  the foundations   of  the  law  and  analysed   the   underlying principles with clarity and precision.  By his judgments  he

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made                    969 priceless contributions to our legal literature.  As a Judge he  shed lustre on the High Court at Calcutta as well as  on this Court. His  energy  was not confined to law only.  He  was  closely associated  with  the Scout movement in Bengal.   He  was  a profound   Sanskrit  scholar  and  earned  the   degree   of Saraswati.  Perhaps he imbibed his Sanskrit scholarship from his  revered  father.   He became President  of  the  Bengal Sanskrit Association.  He was also a Fellow of the  Calcutta University.   He was also a good student of philosophy.   He had  sensitive and fine literary tastes and he could  recite from  memory  long passages from Tagore’s works as  well  as from  the  works of Sanskrit and English poets.  He  was  an essentially  religious  main  with  a  scrupulously   chaste character.    He  was  pure  in  thought,  word  and   deed. Mukherjea was loved and respected because of his deep  human sympathy, piety and the nobility of his character.  He  drew people  towards him and radiated a serenity on all who  came into  contact with him.  I have heard more than  one  person say  that  on returning home after a visit to  Mukherjea  he felt that he had returned as a better man. He  was ailing and undergoing suffering and pain  and  death must have brought relief and deliverance to him.  But by his premature  retirement and death our Court and  country  have lost  an  illustrious Chief Justice, an erudite  scholar,  a sound  jurist and above all, a great gentleman and  we,  who had  the privilege of working with him and sharing our  joys and  sorrows  with him, have lost a brilliant  colleague,  a respected  leader and a lovable friend.  We mourn his  death as  a  personal loss and we pay our  respectful  homage  and sincere tribute of appreciation and affection to the  memory of  the great departed soul.  May his soul rest  in  eternal peace.  We also offer our sincere sympathies to his son  who is an Advocate of this Court. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney General of India.-My Lords,  The Bar respectfully associates itself with all that has  fallen from my Lord the Chief Justice. 970 His ill health followed by his painful illness which led  to his premature retirement made us all feel that he would  not be with us for long.  Yet when the news of the end came,  so endearing  was his personality and so great his kindness  to everyone  who came it contact with him, that all of us  were deeply touched. Rarely  has  one the privilege of appearing before  a  Judge with such a deep knowledge of fundamental principles in  all branches  of  the law and an unfailing and  quick  grasp  of legal  issues.  Whether it was a question relating to  Hindu Religious  Endowments,  a  subject  in  which  he  had  made extensive  research,  or  a  constitutional  question  or  a question  of the law of contract his piercing intellect  and analytical mind immediately perceived the points that arose, the  Counsel  had to be prepared to deal with  a  series  of searching  questions on all the legal aspects  which  arose. His erudition in law is writ large in the numerous judgments delivered  by him scattered over the reports of  this  Court during  the last six years.  His masterly exposition of  the doctrine  of equality before the law in Cheranjitlal’s  case and his analysis of the law of frustration of contract  with a  view  to show that in India it had its roots not  in  the theory  of a term implied by the parties but in  a  positive statutory provision, are landmarks in the development of our law of the Constitution and our law of contract.  Truly  did

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Justice  Douglas of the United States speak in his  recently delivered  Tagore’  Law  Lectures of  the  march  of.  legal doctrine from Marshall to Mukherjea. Nor  were his interests confined to the sphere of  law.   He was  a  keen  student of philosophy and  literature,  had  a profound knowledge of Sanskrit and was deeply interested  in all  literary  and cultural problems.  He had  a  prodigious memory and even a few minutes with him gave one glimpses  of many  an  interesting event in the history and  politics  of Bengal. Great  as  a Judge and a learned scholar, he was,  I  think, even  greater as a man.  Simple and unassuming,  gentle  and kind, frank and outspoken, he won the affection of all  who. came to know him.  A few months 971 ago,  a  member of the Bar was brought before a  Bench  over which he presided to answer a charge of misconduct which  he admitted.  Considering the question of punishment, the  late Chief  Justice asked Counsel assisting the Court whether  it would  be  just  to  punish  the  Advocate  with  a   year’s suspension   when   he  had  a  family  dependent   on   his professional   earnings.    That  was   a   question   truly characteristic of him and showed his kindly heart. We  at the Bar voice our deep grief at the sad demise  of  a great  and distinguished Chief Justice and extend  our  warm sympathies to his bereaved family.