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PETITIONER: CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT  CORPORATIONLTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE WORKMEN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/04/1974

BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1604            1975 SCR  (1) 153  1974 SCC  (4) 696

ACT: Industrial  Disputes Act. 1947--Section 33(C)(2)--Powers  of the  Labour Court under Sec. 33(C)(2)--What disputes can  be determined.

HEADNOTE: The  River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., used to  employ  about 9000  workmen.  The Company had been incurring heavy  losses for   several   years  and,  therefore,   retrenchment   was undertaken  on a large scale.  Thereafter, a settlement  was arrived at on 25-8-1965 between the Company and its workmen, inter  alia, providing that there would be  no  retrenchment for a period of 5 years.  Under a scheme of arrangement  and compromise  sanctioned  by  the High  Court  the  appellant, Corporation  took  over the said Company.   The  Corporation issued fresh letters of appointment in favour of about  5173 out  of  9000 employees.  The employees who were  not  taken over by the appellant Corporation moved the State Government and  the State Government made a reference on 27th  October, 1969 to the Second Labour Court. The  Corporation. thereupon, challenged this reference by  a Writ  Petition  under Article 226 of  the  Constitution  for setting  it aside on the ground that the questions  referred to the Labour Court did not fall within the jurisdiction  of the Labour Court , under section 33(C)(2) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act.  The learned single Judge, Ghose,  J.  struck down  issue no. 4 as not entertainable by the Labour  Court, but  as regards the other 3 issues he was of the  view  that the  Labour Court had jurisdiction.  The Union did not  file an appeal against the order by which issue no. 4 was  struck down.  But the Corporation went in appeal against the  order of  the  learned  Judge in so far as he had  held  that  the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon issues 1, 2 and  3. The Division Bench by its order dated  December  14, 1972  dismissed  the appeal. it was  contended  before  this Court   that  the  Labour  Court  had  no  jurisdiction   to adjudicate  on  the  issues referred  to  it  under  section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. HELD  :  A  proceeding  under  section 3  3  (C)  (2)  is  a proceeding in the nature of   an    execution     proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money  due to a workman from his employer or if the workman is entitled

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to   any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms  of money.  Since a proceeding under section  33(C)(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding, it would appear that  an  investigation  of  the  nature  mentioned  in  the reference  in  question is outside its  scope.   The  Labour Court  cannot  arrogate  to  itself  The  functions  of   an Industrial  Tribunal  which  alone is entitled  to  make  an adjudication  on a question such as the one referred to  the Labour  Court.   The workers in the present  case  virtually claimed reemployment or at least some benefits on the  basis of  their  alleged  right to be  reemployed.   The  problems raised  in  the above reference in effect  involve  a  major industrial  dispute,  investigation  into  which  is   quite outside  the scope of section 33(C)(2).  Only on a  detailed examination  it would be possible to determine  whether  the workmen  bad  any right to a benefit and if so  whether  the appellant  was  liable  to  satisfy  the  same.   The  other question  which would be necessary to decide is whether  the appellant  is a successor of the defunct Company.   Problems raised  are appropriate for determination in  an  Industrial Dispute  on  a  reference under section 10 of  the  Act  and cannot  be regarded as merely incidental to the  computation under section 33(C) (2). [158F; 159C-E; 163A & E] 154

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  Nos. 1779  and 1780 of 1973. Appeal  by special leave from, the judgment and order  dated the 14th December, 1972 and Order dt. 20th July, 1973 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 252 of 1971 and S.C.A. No. 262/71 respectively. Niren  De, Attorney General, B. Sen, M. K. Bannerjee, P.  C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain for the appellants. Sudhis K. Ray and Rathin Das, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PALEKAR,  J.   This  is an appeal by special  leave  by  the Central  Wand  Water Transport Corporation  Limited,  her-in after  called the Corporation, from a judgment and order  of the  Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 252 of 1971  disposed of  on  December 14 1972.  Respondent No. 1  is  the  Inland Steam Navigation Workers Union representing the Workmen, and respondent  No. 2 is the State of West Bengal.  A  reference was  made by the State of West Bengal to the  Second  Labour Court  at  Calcutta under s. 33 (C) (2)  of  the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, and the point in issue is whether  that court had jurisdiction to entertain the reference. A few facts are necessary to be stated.  There was a Limited Company  known  as  the  River  Steam  Navigation  Co.  Ltd. (hereinafter  called  the Company) which used to  operate  a river  service  from West Bengal to Assam through  what  was formerly  East Pakistan.  It had employed for  its  business about  8,000  workmen,  including clerical  staff.   Due  to conflict with Pakistan in 1965 the Company came to grief and had to suspend a major part of its operations.  Retrenchment was undertaken on a large scale because the Company had been incurring  heavy  losses for several years  inspite  of  the Government  of India acquiring a controlling interest in  it to  prevent   its voluntary liquidation.  In the  course  of conciliation  proceedings  the  Management  of  the  Company arrived at a settlement with the respondent Union on  August

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25,  1965  whereby  it  was agreed,  inter  alia,  that  the settlement was valid for 5 years till the end of 1969,  that the  retiring age of the workmen would be 57 years and  that there  would be no retrenchment for 5 years.  The  Company’s fortunes  did not improve, and, therefore, in 1966 owing  to its  indebtedness to various creditors, including the  Union of  India, the State Bank of India, the Chartered Bank  etc. to  the  tune  of several chores of  rupees,  a  winding  up petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court.  The Company, thereupon, made an application under Sections 391 to 394  of the  Companies Act for sanctioning a scheme  of  arrangement and  compromise  between  the  Company  and  the   appellant Corporation  which was incorrupt on February 22, 1967  as  a wholly owned Central Government Company. The scheme was sanctioned by a learned Judge of the Calcutta High  Court  by his order dated May 3, 1967.  It  is  to  be noted that when the proceeding was before the learned Judge, the  respondent Union had appeared before the court  with  a view to safeguard the  155 interests  of  the workers.  Aggrieved by  the  order  which sanctioned  the  scheme, the Union went in appeal  before  a Division Bench of the High Court.  The Division Bench by its judgment  and order dated July 14, 1967 upheld the order  of the single Judge sanctioning the scheme. It is not necessary to quote the scheme extensively.  It  is enough  to point out that it provided, inter alia, that  all the  properties and assets but only some of the  liabilities of the Company would vest in the appellant Corporation.   It was  further agreed that the Corporation would take over  as many of the staff and labour of the Company as was  possible under  the  circumstances,  but  as to  how  many  would  be employed  by  the  Corporation  was  entirely  left  to  the discretion  of the Corporation.  It was further agreed  that those  employees who were not taken over by the  Corporation would. be paid compensation by the Company out of funds  the Government of India agreed to supply.  It was further agreed that  upon the approval of the scheme, the Company would  be closed  and on payment of all creditors it would stand  dis- solved  without winding up.  All these terms of  the  scheme were  confirmed in appeal but with a view to  safeguard  the rights  of workers, if any, the following observations  were made:               "I  am of opinion, that the questions,  first,               whether  there  is a closure  of  the  company               within the meaning of the Industrial  Disputes               Act,  secondly,  whether the  agreement  dated               25th August, 1965, is capable of  enforcement,               thirdly,  whether the workers or  workmen  are               entitled to prefer and assert their claims  on               the  agreement  dated  25th  August  1965  and               fourthly, whether the Rivers Navigator Company               Limited  and  the new transferee  company  are               entitled  to  assert  that there  has  been  a               closure and further that the agreement is  not               capable  of  enforcement, should all  be  left               open  for the rival contentions to be  pursued               in  the proper forum and on  proper  materials               and  in  the  proper jurisdiction.   I  am  of               opinion  that  if  any claim be  made  in  the               proper  jurisdiction it will be a  matter  for               enforcement   of   That  claim   in   properly               constituted  proceedings.  It is  needless  to               say  that unless there is  adjudication  there               cannot  be  any enforcement of the  claim  and

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             such  adjudication has to be made in a  proper               forum." The scheme, as already pointed out, was sanctioned by  Order dated  May 3, 1967 and, as envisaged in the  scheme  itself, the  Company  on that very day issued a notice  of  closure. Thereafter   the   Corporation  issued  fresh   letters   of appointment, and out of about 8,000 former employees of  the Company, the Corporation employed about 5173. This  left a larger body of employees of the former  Company unemployed.   On September 12, 1968 the Government  of  West Bengal  made two orders of reference purporting to be  under s.  33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.  By  the  first order of reference it asked the Labour Court to compute  the benefits  covered  by the settlement dated August  25,  1965 between the Union and the Company and by 156 the second order of reference, it asked for the  computation of   retrenchment  benefits  under  section  25FF   of   the Industrial  Disputes Act.  The Corporation challenged  those orders  in  a  Writ Petition in  the  Calcutta  High  Court, principally,  on  the ground that the  references  had  made several unjustified assumptions, which by the nature of  the frame  of the references had become non-justiciable.   In  a detailed  judgment B. C. Mittra, J. held that the  reference orders  were  misconceived and set them aside by  was  order dated July 15, 1969.  The learned Judge, however, observed : "The  respondent  No. 3 (State) will be at liberty  to  make fresh  order  or  orders of reference in the  light  of  the observations  made in this judgment and in  compliance  with the directions in the judgment of the Appellate Court and in accordance with law." There was no appeal from that order. Thereafter on October 27, 1969 the Government of West Bengal made the present consolidated reference to the Second Labour Court in the following terms :               "Whereas the workmen mentioned in the attached               Est  No.  1, represented by the  Inland  Steam               Navigation   Workers’  Union,  16/17   College               Street, Calcutta-12, (hereinafter referred  to               as the said Union), have preferred claims that               they are entitled, in terms of the  settlement               dated  the  25th  August,  1965   (hereinafter               referred  to  as  the  said  settlement),   to               receive  from  Messrs.  Central  Inland  Water               Transport  Corporation  Limited,  4,   Fairlie               Place, Calcutta-1, (hereinafter referred to as               the  said Company) benefits which are  capable               of being computed in terms of money;               And  whereas  the  workmen  mentioned  in  the               attached  list No. 11 represented by the  said               Union  have  preferred claims  that  they  are               entitled to get from said Company retrenchment               benefits under Section 25FF of the  Industrial               Disputes  Act,  (Act 14 of  1947),  which  are               capable of being computed in terms of money :               And  whereas the workmen in lists Nos.  1  and               II  have  requested the  State  Government  to               specifya Labour Court for determination of the               amount to whichsuch   benefits   should    be               computed;               Now   therefore  in  exercise  of  the   power               conferred  by sub-section(2) of Section  33(C)               of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act  14               of  1947), the Governor is pleased to  specify               the   Second  Labour  Court   constituted   by               notification No. 1727-1 B/IB/3A-1/58 dated the

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             28th April, 1958 as the Labour Court to  which               the   following   issues  are   referred   for               adjudication.               Issues               (1)   Whether the undertaking or the  business               of M/S Rivers Steam Navigation Company Limited               has  been  transferred  to  Messrs.    Central               Inland  Water Transport  Corporation  Limited.               If  so, whether the settlement dated the  25th               August, 1965 is binding on                                    157               Messrs.    Central  Inland   Water   Transport               Corporation Limited ?               (2)   Whether  the workmen mentioned  in  list               No. 1, bound by the Settlement, dated the 25th               August,  1965  are, entitled  to  continue  in               employment under Messrs.  Central Inland Water               Transport  Corporation Limited ? If  so,  what               amount of money are they entitled to ? Is that               money recoverable from Messrs.  Central Inland                             Water Transport Corporation limited ?               (3)   Whether  the workmen mentioned  in  List               No.  11  are  entitled  to  get   retrenchment               compensation  under  Section  25F,  read  with               Section 25 FF of the Industrial Disputes  Act,               1947  ? If so, what amount of money  are  they               entitled to ?               (4)   Whether the undertaking or the  business               of  Messrs.  Rivers Steam  Navigation  Company               Limited has been closed within the meaning and               contemplation   of  Section  25  FFF  of   the               Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 ?  If so,  what               amount  of  money as compensation  are  If  so               workmen mentioned in Lists Nos.  I and II  en-               titled to?" List  No. 1 referred to above gives the names and  addresses of  420  employees.  list No. 11 contains the  names  of  92 employees.  The employees raising the dispute are  mentioned in two separate lists and in two separate issues because the employees  in List No. 1 who were parties to the  settlement dated  August  25, 1965 were supposed to have  rights  other than those which were claimed by employees mentioned in List No. 11 who were not parties to the settlement. It will be seen from the order of reference that four issues were  referred to the Labour- Court for  adjudication.   The first  issue raises the question whether the undertaking  of the Company had been transferred to the Corporation and,  if so,  whether the settlement- of August 25, 1965 between  the Company  and the Union was binding on the  Corporation.   By the  second  issue the question was raised whether  the  420 employees  who were parties to the settlement of August  25, 1965  were  entitled to continue in the  employment  of  the Corporation  and, if so, to what amount they were  entitled. The Labour Court was further asked to adjudicate whether the amount   so   computed  was  money  recoverable   from   the Corporation.   By  the third issue the question  was  raised whether  the 92 employees mentioned in Est No. 11  who  were not  parties  to,  the settlement  referred  to  above  were entitled  to  get compensation under Section 25  FF  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act and, if so, what was the amount  to which  they were entitled ? By the fourth issue  the  Labour Court  was invited to adjudicate whether the undertaking  of the  Company  had been closed within  the  contemplation  of section  25  FFF  of  the Act and  if  so,  what  amount  of compensation  the workmen mentioned in both the  lists  were

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entitled to ? 158 The  Corporation, thereupon, challenged this reference  also by a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for setting it aside ,on the ground that the questions  referred to the Labour Court did not fall within the jurisdiction  of the  Labour Court under section 33(C) (2) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act.   The learned single Judge, Ghose,  J  struck down  issue No. 4 as not entertainable by the Labour  Court, but  as regards the other 3 issues he was of the  view  that the Labour Court had jurisdiction. The Union did not file an appeal  against  the order by which issue No. 4  was  struck down.  But the Corporation went in appeal against the  order of  the  learned  Judge in so far as he had  held  that  the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon issues 1, 2 and  3. The court of appeal by its order dated December  14, 1972  dismissed  the appeal.  The Corporation  asked  for  a certificate  to appeal to this court, but on its  dismissal, this  court gave special leave and that is how  the  present appeal arises. The  only  question which arises for determination  in  this Court  is  whether  the Labour  Court  has  jurisdiction  to adjudicate  on the issues referred to it under section  3  3 (C)  (2)  of the Industrial Disputes  Act.   Sub-section(2), which  is part of section 33C dealing with "the recovery  of money due from an employer" reads as follows               "(2) Where any work-man is entitled to receive               from  the  employer any money or  any  benefit               which is capable of being computed in terms of               money  and  if any question arises as  to  the               amount  of  money due or as to the  amount  at               which  such benefit should be  computed,  then               the  question may, subject to any  rules  that               may be made under this Act, be decided by such               Labour  Court  as  may be  specified  in  this               behalf by the appropriate Government." It  is  now  well-settled that a  proceeding  under  section 33(C)(2)  is  a proceeding, generally, in the nature  of  an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount  of money due to a workman from his employer,  or  if the  workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable  of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court  proceeds to  compute the benefit in terms of money. This  calculation or  computation follows upon an existing right to the  money or  benefit, in view of its being previously  adjudged,  or, otherwise,  duly provided for.  In (Thief  Mining  Engineer, East  India  Coal  Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar &  ors.(1)  it  was reiterated  that  proceedings  under  section  33(C)(2)  are analogous  to  execution proceedings and  the  Labour  Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the Position of an  executing court.  It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise  in the course of and in relation to the  relationship between an industrial workman and his ,,employer. (1)  [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140. 159 In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff  against the  defendant  involves an investigation  directed  to  the determination  of (i) the plaintiff’s right to relief;  (ii) the  corresponding  liability of the  defendant,  including, whether  the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and  (iii) the  extent  of  the defendant’s  liabiliey,  if  any.   The working out of such liability with a view to give relief  is

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generally   regarded  as  the  function  or   an   execution proceeding.  Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is  to  say,  the extent of the  defendant’s  liability  may sometimes  be  left  over  for  determination  in  execution proceedings.    But   that  is  not  the   case   with   the determinations under heads (i) and (ii).  They are  normally regarded  as  the functions of a suit and not  an  execution proceeding.  Since a proceeding under section 33(C)(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow  that an  investigation  of the nature of determinations  (i)  and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope.  It is true that in  a  proceeding  under  section 3 3  (C)  (2),  as  in  an execution  proceeding, it may be necessary to determine  the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim  is made  if  there is a challenge on that score.  But  that  is merely  ’Incidental’.  To call determinations (i)  and  (ii) ’Incidental’  to  an execution proceeding would  be  a  per- version,  because execution proceedings in which the  extent of  liability is worked out are just consequential upon  the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage  in a process leading to final relief.  Therefore, when a  claim is made before the Labour Court under section 33(C)(2)  that court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is  to function.  It cannot arrogate to itse the  functions- say  of  an Industrial Tribunal which alone is  entitled  to make  adjudications in the nature of determinations (i)  and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benfit  by dubbing  the former as ’Incidental’ to its main business  of computation.  In such cases determinations (i) and (ii)  are not ’Incidental’ to the computation.  The computation itself is  consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations  (i) and  (ii) as the last stage in the process  which  commenced with  a  reference  to the  Industrial  Tribunal.   It  was, therefore,  held in  State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v.  R. L.  Khandelwal(1) that a workman cannot put forward a  claim in  an  application under section 33(C)(2) in respect  of  a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject-matter of an industrial dispute which requires a reference under section 10 of the Act. The scope of section 33(C)(2) was illustrated by this  Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagapalan  etc. (2).   Under  the Shastri Award, Bank clerks  operating  the adding  machine  were declared to be entitled to  a  special allowance  of Rs. 10/- per month.  Four clerks made a  claim for  computation before the Labour Court.  The  Bank  denied the claim that the clerks came within the category  referred to in the award and further contended that the Labour Court (1) [1968]L.L.J.589.            (2) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. 160 under  Section  33(C)(2) had no  jurisdiction  to  determine whether  the  clerks  came  within  that  category  or  not. Rejecting  the contention, this Court held that the  enquiry as  to  whether the 4 clerks came within that  category  was purely "incidental’ and necessary to enable the Labour Court to, give the relief asked for and, therefore, the Court  had jurisdiction  to  enquire whether the  clerks  answered  the sescription of the category mentioned in the Shastri  Award, which not only declared the right but also the corresponding liability  of the employer bank.  This was purely a case  of establishing the identity of the claimants as coming  within a  distinct category of clerks in default of which it  would have  been impossible to give relief to anybody  falling  in the category.  When the Award mentioned the category it,  as good as, named every one who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which was necessary, became limited  only

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to  the clerks’ identity and did not extend either to a  new investigation as to their rights or the Bank’s liability  to them.  Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the  Award and the Labour Court did not have to  investigate the  same.  Essentially, therefore, the assay of the  Labour Court  was  in  the  nature of a  function  of  a  court  in execution proceedings and hence it was held that the  Labour Court  had  jurisdiction  to  determine,  by  an  incidental enquiry, whether the 4 clerks came in the category which was entitled to the special allowance. It  is, however, interesting to note that in the  same  case the court at page 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim  of a workman would fail outside the scope of  section 33(C)(2).   It  was  pointed  out  that  a  workman  who  is dismissed  by  his employer would not be  entitled  to  seek relief  under section 32(C)(2) by merely alleging that,  his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on  the basis  that  he had continued in service.  It  was  observed "His  dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may  be appropriately tried, but once it is shown  that  the employer  has  dismissed  him, a claim  that  the  dismissal is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits  due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under S. 33(C)(2)".   By merely making a claim in a loaded  form  the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under s. 3 3  (C)  (2).  The workman who has been  dismissed  would  no longer be in the employment of the employer.  It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances  of the dismissal that the dismissal  was  un- justified,  But when he comes before the Labour  Court  with his  claim  for  computation  of  his  wages  under  section 33(C)(2)  he  cannot ask the Labour Court to  disregard  his dismissal  as wrongful and on that basis compute his  wages. In  such cases, a determination as to whether the  dismissal was   unjustified   would  be  the  principal   matter   for adjudication,  and computation of wages  just  consequential upon  such adjudication.  It would be wrong to consider  the principal  adjudication as ’incidental’ to the  computation. Moreover, if we 161 assume  that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to  make  the investigation  into  the circumstances of the  dismissal,  a very  anomalous  situation would arise.   The  Labour  Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have  no jurisdiction  to direct reinstatement under section 3 3  (C) (2).  And yet if the jurisdiction to compute the benefit  is conceded  it  will be like conceding it  authority  to  pass orders  awarding wages as many time comes before it  without being  reinstated.  Therefore, the Labour  Court  exercising jurisdiction  under  section  33  (C)  (2)  has  got  to  be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself  that any investigation it undertakes is, in  a  real sense,  incidental to its computation of a benefit under  an existing right, which is its principal concern. Bearing  in  mind  these  limitations  of  a  Labour   Court functioning  under section 33(C)(2) we have to approach  the question  before us. The old Company closed its business  on May  3, 1967.  The Corporation, in due course,  appointed  a large number of the Company’s employees by fresh letters  of appointments,  but  it could not absorb all  of  them.   The reference  was made on behalf of the employees mentioned  in Lists  I  and 11.  They were in all 512.  Out of  these,  it appears,  24 were reemployed by the Corporation  later  can. The rest of them virtually claimed reemployment or at  least

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some benefits on the basis of their alleged right to be  re- employed.  In actual fact, however, the Corporation did  not employ  these  workmen after the Company’s  undertaking  was transferred  to it.  The scheme of transfer did  not  compel the  Corporation  to employ the workmen.  Nor is  there  any term  in the transfer-agreement or scheme which passed  over to  the  Corporation any responsibility in  respect  of  the workmen.   Section  25  FF-of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act declare what are the rights of the workmen of an undertaking which is transferred.  The right is to  receive-compensation as  if the workmen are retrenched under section 25 F and  is available  only against the owners of the undertaking,  that is to say, the transferor of the undertaking.  The liability of  the transferor to gay compensation does not  arise  only when  (i) there has been a change of employers by reason  of the transfer and (ii) the 3 sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)  of the  proviso of that section come into play.  It is  pointed out in South Arcot Electricity Company v. N. K. Khan(1) that each one of the 3 conditions in clauses (a), (b) and (c)  is to  be  satisfied  before  it can be  held  that  the  right conferred  by  the principal clause does not accrue  to  the workmen.   In the present case there is no actual change  of employers by reason of the transfer, nor do the 3 subclauses apply.   Therefore,  prima facie, the claim of  the  workmen would be for compensation under section 25 FF, directed, not against  the Corporation, but against the Company  of  which they  were formerly the employees.  As a matter of fact  the scheme  itself shows that the employees of the  Company  who were  not taken over by the Corporation were to be  paid  by the Company all money due to them under the law.  The scheme further shows that the Company (1)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902 at 908. 162 was, to ,be put in possession of funds by the Government  of India for satisfying the liabilities to the workers. The  effect  of section 25 FF. which is  explained  by  this Court  in Anakapalli Co-operative Agricultural &  Industrial Society Limited v. Workmen(1) is, so far as it is  relevant, as  follows : (i) the first part of the  section  postulates that  on  a transfer of the ownership or  management  of  an undertaking,  the employment of workmen engaged by the  said undertaking  comes  to  an end,  and  compensation  is  made payable  because of such termination (p. 745) ; (ii) in  all cases  to  which s 25-FF applies, the only claim  which  the employees  of the transferred concern can legitimately  make is  a  claim for compensation against their  employers.   No claim can be made against the transferee of the said concern (p. 746); (iii) By the present s. 25-FF the Legislature  has made   it  clear  that  if  industrial   undertakings   ;are transferred, the employees of such transferred  undertakings should  be entitled to compensation, unless, of course,  the continuity. in their service or employment is not  disturbed and  that  can happen if the transfer  satisfies  the  three requirements of the proviso (p. 746) and (iv) since  section 25-FF provides for payment of benefit on the basis that  the services  of the employees stand terminated,  neither  fair- play  nor  social  justice would justify the  claim  of  the employees that they ought to be reemployed by the transferee (p. 748).  That being the position in law under section  25- FF,  the  former  employees  of the  company  who  were  not absorbed  by  the Corporation can hardly make  out  a  claim against the transferee Corporation either for  compensation, on-  termination of their service following the transfer  or for reemployment.  The claim at any rate of the employees in List  II as against the Corporation under section 25-FF  was

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clearly misconceived. Mr.  Ray,  appearing  for  the  respondent  Union,  however, contended  that whatever may be the position of the  workers mentioned  in  List II, the case of the workers  in  List  I stood  on  a different footing because  these  workers  were parties to a settlement dated 25-8-1965 between the  Company and  its workers and under section 18(3)(C)  the  settlement was  binding not only on the Company but also its  successor or  assign the present Corporation.  Under that  settlement, it  was contended, the employees in List I were entitled  to continue  uninterrupted service, without retrenchment,  till at  least  December  31’ 1969 and this  stipulation  it  was claimed,  was  binding on the Corporation which  became  the successor  of the Company from the date of the  transfer  of the  undertaking , that is to say, May 3,1967.  The  further contention  was that the Corporation’s refusal  to  continue the employees in service as the Corporation’s employees from the  date  was wrongful and hence it must be held,  in  law, that   the  employees  continued  in  the  service  of   the transferee  Corporation and on that basis the  Labour  Court could compute the benefit under section 33 (C) (2). (1) [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 730.  163 The several problems raised by the above contentions involve in effect a major industrial dispute, an investigation in to which is quite outside the scope of section 33(C)(2).   Only on  a  detailed  investigation  would  it  be  possible   to determine  whether  the workmen had any right to  a  benefit and, if so, the, Corporation was liable to satisfy the same. The  other  question which would be necessary to  decide  is whether  the  Corporation  was a successor  of  the  defunct Company.  As  pointed out in Anakapalli  Co-operative  case, already referred to, the question whether a transferee of an undertaking is a successor or not involves consideration  of several  factors  as  set Out at pages 737  to  738  of  the report.   Such  an  investigation  would  clearly  be  quite outside  the,  speedy  individual  remedy  contemplated   by section   33  (C)  (2).   Assuming  further  that  on   such investigation,  the court comes to the conclusion  that  the Corporation  is a successor, that again will not settle  the matter  because,  as pointed out in that case,  in  view  of section  25-FF the transferee even as a ’successor would  be liable  neither to pay compensation to nor to  reemploy  the workmen  whose employment stood automatically terminated  on the  transfer.  Where the operation of the  law  viz.Section 25-FF the employment of workmen stands terminated, it may be difficult  to  sustain  it  on the basis  of  a  term  in  a settlement’  prohibiting  retrenchment,  though  statutorily binding  on the transferee as a successor.  It is  perfectly arguable that such an argument would not have been available even  against the transferor of the undertaking in  view  of Section 25-FF.  In any event, the question is not one  which the  Labour  Court  could  be expected to  deal  with  in  a proceeding u/s 33 (C) (2) the principal business where-under is just computation of a benefit demonstrably existing.   In short, the problems raised are appropriate for determination in  an Industrial Dispute on a reference u/s 10 of  the  Act and  cannot  be  regarded  as  merely  ’incidental’  to  the computation u/s. 33(C) (2). If  the  above  disputes  were  referred  to  an  Industrial Tribunal  u/s 10, the Tribunal would necessarily go  into  a detailed   investigation  ’of  the  alleged  right  of   the employees  to be continued in service by  the,  Corporation. After such investigation the Tribunal may have held they had no such right.  Or it may have come to the ’conclusion  that

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the   Corporation  had,wrongfully  refused  to  absorb   the employees,  in  which  case the Tribunal  could  have  given relief   in  several  forms  depending  on  the  facts   and circumstances of each case.  It could direct reemployment by the.  Corporation with or without continuity of service.  It could order reemployment from any particular date found just and  fair,  or  it could direct payment of  wages  fully  or partially.   Now,  none of these things can be done  by  the Labour Court u/s 33 (C) (2).  AR it can do is to compute the benefit  if there was already an adjudication in  favour  of the  workmen as against the Corporation or the said  benefit was otherwise provided for as payable by the Corporation.  A moment’s  reflection will show that it would  be  impossible for  the  Labour  Court to compute any  benefit  unless  the Court, after considering all the matters which an Industrial Tribunal has to consider, ultimately decides upon one or the other 164 of  the  several alternative reliefs  which  the  Industrial Tribunal alone has a right to determine.  BY saying that the Labour  Court-would  determine the  alternative  reliefs  as ’incidental’  to computation, one, cannot conceal  the  fact that it is actually exercising the function of an Industrial Tribunal.   The  investigation  is not  incidental  to  com- putation, but the computation’ itself is consequential  upon the main finding as to the nature of relief the workmen  are entitled to in an industrial dispute.  The situation is  the same  as when a workman who is discharged wants relief,.  as shown  in  the  case  of  the  Central  Bank  of  India   v. Rajagopalan-already referred to.  The discharged workman can obtain  relief  by  way of section 10 only  and  not  by  an application  to  the  Labour Court  u./s  33(C)(2)  claiming computation  of the benefit on the basis that the  discharge being unlawful, his services must be deemed to be continuous and uninterrupted. We,  are, therefore, unable to agree with the  High  Court’s view,  that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to  deal  with the questions referred to it u/s 33(C)(2).  The appeal must, therefore,  be allowed.  But there shall be no order  as  to costs. Civil Appeal No. 1780 of 1973. Palekar, J. This appeal is from the Order of the High  Court dated  July  20,  1973 refusing to grant  a  certificate  to appeal   to   this  Court  under  Article  133(1)   of   the Constitution.  Since this Court had granted leave to  appeal under  Article 136 in special leave petition No.  2543/1973, and Civil Appeal No. 1779 (NL) of 1973 resulting  therefrom, has  already  succeeded,  it is not necessary  to  pass  any orders  on  this appeal except to say that in  view  of  the orders  passed  in Civil Appeal No. 1779 (NL)  of  1973,  no orders are necessary on this appeal. Appeal allowed. 165