07 October 2004
Supreme Court
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CEMENT CORPN. OF INDIA LTD. Vs PURYA

Bench: HEGDE, N. SANTOSH (J),VARIAVA, S.N. (J),SINGH, BISHESHWAR P. (J),SEMA, HOTOI KHETOHO (J),SINHA, S.B. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-006986-006986 / 1999
Diary number: 7223 / 1999


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6986 of 1999

PETITIONER: Cement Corporation of India Ltd.

RESPONDENT: Purya & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/2004

BENCH: N.Santosh Hegde  S.N.Variava  B.P.Singh, H.K.Sema & S.B.Sinha

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

With C.A. No. 3599/2003 C.A. No. 6987/1999 C.A. No. 9779/2003 C.A. No. 9781/2003 C.A. No. 9782/2003 C.A. Nos. 9783-9784/2003 C.A. No. 9785/2003 C.A. No. 9786/2003 C.A. Nos. 9787-9791/2003 C.A. Nos. 9792-9798/2003 C.A. No. 9799/2003 C.A. Nos. 9800-9801/2003 C.A. No. 9802/2003 C.A. No. 9803/2003 C.A. Nos. 9804-9805/2003 C.A. No. 9806-9807/2003 C.A. No. 9808/2003 C.A. Nos. 9809-9810/2003 C.A. Nos. 9811-9812/2003 C.A. Nos. 9813-9814/2003 C.A. Nos. 9815-9816/2003 C.A. No. 9817/2003 C.A. No. 9818/2003 C.A. No. 9820/2003 C.A. Nos. 9821-9822/2003 C.A. No. 9823/2003 C.A. No. 9824/2003 C.A. No. 9825/2003 C.A. No. 9826/2003 C.A. No. 9827/2003 C.A. No. 9828/2003 C.A. No. 9829/2003 C.A. No. 9830/2003

C.A. No. 9831/2003 C.A. No. 9832/2003 C.A. Nos. 9833-9834/2003 C.A. No. 9835/2003 C.A. Nos. 9836-9837/2003 C.A. No. 9838/2003 C.A. No. 9839/2003 C.A. No. 9840/2003 C.A. Nos. 9842-9843/2003 C.A. No. 9846/2003 C.A. No. 9847/2003 C.A. No. 9864/2003

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C.A. No. 9865/2003 C.A. No. 9866/2003 C.A. No. 9867/2003 C.A. No. 9868/2003 C.A. No. 9869/2003 C.A. No. 9870/2003 C.A. Nos. 9871-9872/2003 C.A. No. 9873/2003 C.A. No. 9874/2003 C.A. No. 9880/2003 C.A. No. 9881/2003 C.A. No. 9882/2003 C.A. No. 9883/2003 C.A. No. 9885/2003 C.A. No. 9886/2003 C.A. No. 9887/2003 C.A. No. 9888/2003 C.A. No. 9889/2003 C.A. Nos. 9891-9893/2003 C.A. No. 9894/2003 C.A. Nos. 9895-9896/2003 C.A. No. 9897/2003 C.A. No. 9899/2003 C.A. No. 9900/2003 C.A. No. 9901/2003 C.A. No. 9909/2003 C.A. No. 9911/2003 C.A. No. 9912/2003 C.A. No. 9916/2003 C.A. No. 9917/2003 C.A. No. 9918/2003 C.A. No. 10090/2003 C.A. No.  10103/2003 C.A. No. 10105/2003

SANTOSH HEGDE, J.

       Noticing a conflict between two 3-Judge Benches of this  Court in the case of Special Deputy Collector & Anr. vs. Kurra  Sambasiva Rao & Ors. (1997 (6) SCC 41) and Land Acquisition  Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer vs. V.Narasaiah (2001 (3)  SCC 530), another 3-Judge Bench of this Court on 31st of July,  2001 considered it appropriate to place C.A.No.6986/99 for  consideration by a larger Bench. It is in this background, the above  appeal and other connected appeals are now before us.

       In Kurra Sambasiva Rao’s case (supra), this Court held that  by introducing Section 51A in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (hereinafter LA Act) the Legislature only facilitated the parties  concerned to produce a certified copy of a sale transaction  in  evidence and nothing more. This is what the Court observed in the  said case.  "Section 51-A only dispenses with the   production of the original sale deed and  directs to receive  certified copy for the  reason that parties  to the sale transaction   would be reluctant  to part with the original  sale deed since  acquisition  proceedings  would take long time  before award of the  compensation  attains finality and in the  meanwhile  the owner of the sale deed  is  precluded  from using the same for other  purposes vis-a-vis  this land.  The marking of

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the certified copy per se  is not admissible in  evidence  unless it is duly proved and the  witnesses, viz., the  vendor or the vendee, are  examined."  (Emphasis supplied)            According to the above judgment Section 51A only  dispenses with the production of the original sale deed and permits  the receiving of a certified copy of such document in evidence. It is  further held that the marking of certified copy per se does not make  the contents of such document  admissible in evidence unless it is  duly proved and witnessed, that is, by the examination of the  vendor or the vendee.  

In the subsequent case of V.Narasaiah (supra), though this  Court did not notice earlier judgment in Kurra Sambasiva Rao’s  case noticing certain other judgments which took similar view  disagreed with the said view and held that the object of the Act  was not only to permit the production of certified copy of the sale  transactions but was also to accept the same as evidence of the  transactions. This is what the courts had to say in V.Narasaiah’s  case in regard to the insertion of Section 51A in the LA Act. "If the only purpose served by Section 51A is to  enable the court to admit the  copy of the  document in evidence  there was no need for a   legislative  exercise because even otherwise the  certified copy of the document could have been  admitted in evidence.  Section 64 of the  Evidence Act says that "documents must be  proved by primary evidence except in the cases  hereinafter mentioned".  Section 65 mentions  the cases in which secondary evidence can be   given of the existence, condition or contents of a  document.  One of the cases included in the list  is detailed in clause (f) of the section which  reads thus :

   "65 (f) When the original  is a  document of which a certified copy is  permitted by this Act, or by any other  law in force in India, to be given in  evidence",

       Section 57 of the Registration Act, 1908  enables anyone to apply for a copy of the  entries in Book No. 1 (the said Book is meant  for keeping  the register of the documents as  well as non-testamentary  documents relating to  immovable property).  When any person applies  for a copy of it the same  shall be given to him.   Sub-section (5) of Section 57 of that Act says  that:

"57.(5) All copies  given under this  section shall be signed and sealed by  the registering officer and shall be  admissible for the purpose of proving   the contents  of the original  documents."

If the position regarding admissibility of the  contents of a document which is a certified  copy falling within the purview of Section  57(5) of the Registration Act was as  adumbrated above, even before the introduction  of Section 51A in the LA Act, could there be

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any legislative object in incorporating the said  new provision through Act 68 of 1984? It must  be remembered that the State has the burden to  prove the market value of the lands acquired by  it for which the State may have  to depend upon  the prices of lands similarly situated which  were transacted  or sold in the recent past,  particularly those lands situated in the  neighbouring areas. The practice had shown  that for the State officials  it was a burden to  trace out the persons connected with  such  transactions  mentioned in the sale deeds and  then to examine them in court for the purpose  of proving such transactions.  It was in the  wake of the aforesaid practical difficulties that  the new Section 51A was introduced  in the LA  Act."

From the above, we notice that in the latter judgment of  V.Narasaiah, this Court interpreted the scope of Section 51A to  include the production of certified copy of sale transaction and to  make the same admissible in evidence without having to examine  the vendor or the vendee of the said document to prove the  contents of the document.  In these appeals, Shri Sandeep Sethi, learned senior counsel  appearing for the appellant in CA No.6986-87/99 contended that  this Court in Kurra Sambasiva Rao’s case did not notice the words  "may be accepted as evidence" because of which it fell in error in  construing the scope of the Section very narrowly.  He submitted  that in V.Narasaiah’s case, this Court having noticed the said  words in  Section 51A, correctly came to the conclusion that the  object of inserting Section 51A was to do away with the formality  of examining oral evidence in support of the contents of the  documents in question.

Interestingly, Shri G.V.Chandrashekhar, learned counsel  appearing for the claimant-respondent in the said appeals  supported the argument of Shri Sandeep Sethi and went one step  further and contended that in view of the definition given to the  word "conclusive proof" in Section 4 of the Evidence Act read  with the beginning words of Section 79 of the Evidence Act which  starts with the words "the court shall presume" the Land  Acquisition Officer or the Court, as the case may be, will have to  start with the presumption that the contents of the documents  produced under Section 51A are proved and it must place reliance  on the same on the basis that the said transaction is a bona fide  transaction and the value stated therein reflected true value. He  submitted that Section 51A by the use of the words "may be  accepted as evidence" has mandated the authority empowered to  fix the market value of the property to proceed with the conclusive  presumption that the contents of the documents establish that fact.  

Shri V.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the State of  Haryana  in some of the connected appeals contended that  in view  of Sections 74, 76 and 77 of the Evidence Act a certified copy of   private document also can be  treated for  evidentiary  purpose as a  public document.   He submitted that the presumption  can be  drawn as to the correctness and the contents of the documents as  contemplated by Section 79 of the  Evidence Act.  In support of   his contention, he placed reliance  on judgment of this Court in  Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. vs.  Muthaluru Bojjappa AIR  1963 (Vol 50) SCC 1633.

The above three counsels thus  contended that the judgment

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of this Court in.  V. Narasaiah’s case  lays down the correct law.

Dr. Aman Hingorani and Shri A.K. Matta, learned counsel   appearing   for  the respective parties  in the connected appeals  submitted  that the interpretation given by the three Judge Bench in  the V. Narasaiah’s case goes far beyond the  object  of   introducing  Section 51A which according to them only provides   for acceptance of the certified copy in evidence as contemplated in  Section 3 of the Evidence Act and nothing beyond that.  

They also contended that the certified copy of the registered  document does not become  a public document  under Section 74  of the Evidence Act nor would it be  primary evidence  as argued   by the appellant under Section 62 of the Evidence Act.  The  learned counsel who opposed the view  in V. Narasaiah’s case  also brought to our notice certain other judgments of this Court  wherein this Court had taken a similar view as taken by the three  Judge Bench in Kurra Sambasiva Rao (supra) . In fairness , we  think it is necessary to refer  to those judgments also. In  Inder Singh & Ors.  vs. Union of India & Ors.  1993 (3)   SCC 240 two Judge Bench of this Court  speaking through K.  Ramaswamy, J. held :- " Under Section  51A of the Act as amended   in 1984 the certified copies  have been  permitted to be brought on record as  evidence  of sale transaction recorded  therein. The examination of the witnesses is  to find  that the sale transactions are bonafide  and genuine transactions between willing  vendor and willing vendee as reasonable  prudent men and the price mentioned  is not  throw away price at arms length or   depressed sales or brought into existence to  inflate market  value of the lands under  acquisition   and the sales  are  accommodating one will have to be  established de-hors and the contents of the  document by other evidence."    

In P. Ram Reddy & Ors.  vs.  Land Acquisition  Officer,  Hyderabad & Ors. 1995 (2) SCC 305  two Judge Bench  of this  Court held :- "Section 51A of the Land Acquisition Act,  as seen therefrom, is enacted  to enable the  parties in land acquisition  cases, to produce  certified copies  of documents to get over  the  difficulty  of parties, in that, persons in  possession of the original documents would  not be  ready to put them in courts.  However, the mere fact that a certified copy  of the document  is accepted as evidence  of  the transaction  recorded  in such document   does not dispense  with the need  for a party  relying upon the  certified copies of such  documents produced in court in examining   witnesses connected with the documents to  establish their genuineness and the truth of  their contents.  Therefore, the certified  copies of registered documents,  though  accepted  as evidence  of  transactions  recorded in such documents, the court is not  bound to act upon the contents of those  documents unless persons  connected with   such documents give evidence in court as

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regards  them and such evidence  is accepted  by the court as true."

In  Kummari Veeraiah  & Ors.  vs.  State of A.P.  1995 (4)  SCC 136 another two Judge Bench  of this Court                        held ;

"it is true that  the certified copies of the sale  deeds are admissible  in evidence as secondary  evidence  under Section 51A of the Act since  owners would be reluctant  to part with their  original sale deeds.  But unless  either the  vendor or  the vendee has been examined as  witness to testify  not only the consideration  paid but  also their specific knowledge and the  circumstances  in which the sale deed  came to  be executed, nearness to the lands, etc.  the sale  deeds cannot be relied on to determine market  value of the acquired lands."

       In Indore Development Authority vs. Satyabhama Bai  (SMT) & Ors.  1996 (10) SCC 751, this Court following  the  earlier judgment of two Judge Bench in P. Ram Reddy  vs. Land  Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad & Ors.   held :  " that filing of the certified copies  of the  sale deeds  and marked thereof under  Section  51-A is only to enable the claimants  to dispense  with the obligation to produce  the original sale deed from the owners who  are disinclined to  part with their  valuable   title deed during long pendency of the  proceeding. However,  the claimants  are  enjoined  to call as  witnesses the vendor or  vendee to prove the transactions as genuine  in nature \005\005\005\005"

       In the case of Meharban & Ors.  vs.  State of U.P. and Ors.  1997 (6)  SCC 54,  a Bench of 3 Judges (which is not noticed  by  this Court in the case of V. Narasaiah (supra) ) this Court held :-  "Since none connected with the sale deeds was  examined, the sale deeds are inadmissible in  evidence though certified  copies marked under  Section 51A are available.  So, all  the sale   deeds stand  excluded.  It is the duty of the  Court  to take all the relevant  factors into  account before determination of the  compensation\005\005\005

       In A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad vs.   P. Venkaiah & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 128, this Court held :    "Acceptance  of certified copy of the sale deed  under Section 51A relates only to the  production of the  original  sale deeds  but it  does not  dispense with  proof of the contents of  the documents,  relative features vis-‘-vis  Section 193 (sic), the land  under acquisition.    All is needed to be proved  by examining the  persons connected with the same  and parties   to the document."

       From the above, it is seen that till the judgment of the  three  Judge Bench in V. Narasaiah’s case  (supra), the consensus of  judicial opinion was that Section 51A was enacted  for the limited

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purpose  of enabling  a party to produce certified copy of a  registered sale transaction in evidence only and for  proving the  contents of the said document the parties  had to  lead  oral  evidence  as contemplated  in the Evidence Act.    

       A careful perusal of the judgment in Kurra Sambasiva  Rao’s case and other cases which fall in line with the said view   discloses  that they proceeded on the  basis that prior to the  insertion of Section 51A in the LA Act, the Evidence Act did not  permit the production of a certified copy of the registered sale  transaction in evidence. Therefore, by the insertion of Section 51A  the legislature merely enabled a party to get over that problem.  Thereafter, according to the said judgments, the party concerned  had to prove the contents of the document by adducing oral  evidence separately to prove the contents of the document.

       The above view of the Court in Kurra Sambasiva Rao’s  case, in our opinion, is not the correct position in law. Even prior  to the insertion of Section 51A of the Act the provisions of the  Evidence Act and the Registration Act did permit the production of  a certified copy in evidence. This has been clearly noticed in the   judgment in Narsaiah’s case wherein the court relying on Sections  64 and 65(f) of the Evidence Act read with Section 57(5) of the  Registration Act held that production of a certified copy of a  registered sale document in evidence was permissible in law even  prior to insertion of Section 51A in the LA Act. We are in  agreement with the said view expressed by this Court in  Narasaiah’s case.

       In the above background the question for our consideration  would be, what then is the real object of inserting 51A in LA Act ?

       In the ordinary course a deed of sale is the  evidence of a  transaction by reason whereof for a consideration mentioned therein  the title and interest in an immovable property specified  therein is  transferred  by the vendor to the vendee.  Genuineness  of such  transaction may be in question. In a given situation the quantum  of  consideration or the adequacy  thereof may  also fall for adjudication.   The Courts, more often  than not, are called upon to consider the  nature of the transaction.  Whenever a transaction evidenced by a sale  deed is required to be brought on record,  the execution  thereof has  to be proved in accordance with law.  For proving such transaction,  the original sale deed  is required to be brought  on record by way of  primary evidence. Only when primary evidence is not available, a  certified copy of the sale deed can be taken on record. Such  certified  copies evidencing any transaction are admissible in evidence, if the  conditions precedent therefor in terms of Section 75 of the Indian  Evidence Act are fulfilled.  The transaction evidenced by the sale  deed must be proved in accordance  with law.          Evidences are of different types.  It may be direct, indirect or  real evidence.  The existence of a given thing or fact is proved either  by its actual production or by the testimony or admissible declaration  of someone who has himself perceived it. Such evidence would be  direct evidence.  Presumptive evidence which is an indirect  evidence  would mean that when other facts are, thus, proved, the existence of  the given fact may be logically inferred.  Although the factum  probandum  and the factum probantia connote direct evidence, the  former is superior in nature.  

       The terms ’primary and secondary evidence’ apply to the kinds  of proof that may be given to the contents of a document, irrespective  of the purpose  for which such contents,  when proved, may be  received.  Primary evidence  is an evidence which the law requires to  be given first; secondary evidence is evidence which  may be given  in the absence of that better evidence when a proper explanation of

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its absence has been given.  However, there are exceptions to the  aforementioned rule.  

       Section 51A of the Land Acquisition Act seeks to make an  exception to the aforementioned rule.

       In  the acquisition proceedings, sale deeds are required to be  brought on records for the purpose of determining market value  payable to the owner of the land when it is sought to be acquired.

       Although by reason of the aforementioned provision the parties  are free to produce original documents and prove the same in  accordance with the terms of the rules of evidence as envisaged under  the Indian Evidence Act, the L.A. Act  provides for an alternative  thereto by inserting the said provision in terms whereof the certified  copies which are otherwise secondary evidence may be brought on  record evidencing a transaction.  Such transactions in terms of the  aforementioned provision may be accepted  in evidence.  Acceptance  of an evidence is not a term of art.  It has an etymological meaning.   It envisages exercise of judicial mind to the materials  on record.   Acceptance of evidence by a court would be dependent upon the facts  of the case and other relevant factors.  A piece of evidence in a given  situation may be accepted by a court of law but in another it may not  be.

       Section 51 A of the L.A. Act may be read literally and having  regard to the ordinary meaning which can be attributed to the term   ’acceptance of evidence’ relating to transaction evidenced by a sale  deed, its admissibility in evidence would be beyond any question.   We are not oblivious of the fact that only by bringing a documentary  evidence in the record it is not automatically  brought on the record.   For bringing  a documentary evidence on the record, the same must  not only be admissible but the contents thereof must be proved in  accordance with law.  But when the statute enables a court to accept a  sale deed on the records evidencing a transaction, nothing further is  required to be done.  The admissibility  of a certified copy of sale  deed by itself could not be held  to be inadmissible  as thereby a  secondary evidence has been brought on record without proving the  absence of primary evidence.  Even the vendor or vendee thereof is  not  required to examine themselves for proving  the contents thereof.   This, however, would not mean that contents of the transaction as  evidenced by the registered sale deed would automatically be  accepted.  The legislature advisedly has used the word  ’may’.  A  discretion, therefore, has been conferred upon a court to be exercised  judicially, i.e., upon taking into consideration the relevant factors.                  In V.Narasaiah’s case, this Court correctly understood the  said scope and object of insertion of Section 51A in the LA Act  when it held thus :  

"It was in the wake of the aforesaid practical  difficulties that the new Section 51A was  introduced in the LA Act. When the section  says that certified copy of a registered  document "may be accepted as evidence of  the transaction recorded in such document"  it enables the court to treat what is recorded  in the document, in respect of the  transactions referred to therein, as  evidence."          While coming to the above conclusion in Narasaiah’s case,  this Court found support from similar provisions in the other  statutes like Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which  enables the court to use report of a Government Scientific Expert

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as evidence in any enquiry, trial or proceeding under the said  Code, even without examining any person as a witness in a court  for that purpose. Notice was also taken of Section 13(5) of the  Prevention of Food Adulteration Act pertaining to the report of a  Public Analyst which says that any document purporting                 to be a report signed by a Public Analyst may be                                       used as evidence of the fact stated therein in                                    any proceeding under the said Act. In Narasaiah’s case, this Court  also relied on a judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court  in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra  & Anr. (AIR 1966 SC 128) which held thus:  "that sub-section clearly makes the contents  of the report of Public Analyst admissible in  evidence and the prosecution cannot fail solely on  the ground that the Public Analyst had not been  examined in the case, but what value is to be  attached to such report must necessarily be for the  court to consider and decide."

Thus,  the reasoning of this Court in Narasaiah’s case  that  Section 51A enables the party producing the certified copy of a  sale transaction to rely on the contents of the document without  having to examine the vendee or the vendor of that document is the  correct position in law. This finding in Narasaiah’s case is also  supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Mangaldas  Raghavji Ruparel (supra). Therefore, we have no hesitation in accepting this view of  the court in the Narasaiah’s case as the correct view.

The submission of Mr. G. Chandrasekhar to the effect that  the contents of a sale deed should be a conclusive proof as regard  the transaction contained therein or the court must raise a  mandatory presumption in relation thereto  in terms of Section 51A  of the Act cannot be accepted as the Court may or may not receive   a certified copy of sale deed in evidence.  It is discretionary in  nature.  Only because a document is admissible  in evidence, as  would appear from the discussions made hereinbefore, the same by  itself would not mean that the contents thereof stand proved.   Secondly, having regard to the other materials  brought on record,  the court may not accept the evidence contained in a deed of sale.   When materials  are brought  on record by the parties to the lis, the  court is entitled  to appreciate the evidence brought on records for  determining the issues raised before it and in the said process, may  accept one piece of evidence and reject the other.

In   M.S. Madhusoodhanan and Anr.  vs.  Kerala  Kaumudi (P) Ltd. and Ors.   [(2004) 9 SCC 204], it is stated :

"119\005 They are rules of evidence which  attempt to assist the judicial mind in the matter  of weighing the probative or persuasive force of  certain facts proved in relation to other facts  presumed or inferred (ibid).  Sometimes a  discretion is left with the court either to raise a  presumption  or not as in Section 114 of the  Evidence Act.  On other occasions, no such  discretion is given to the court so that when a  certain set of facts is proved, the court is bound  to raise the prescribed presumption.  But that is  all.  The presumption may be rebutted."

       A registered document in terms of Section 51A of the Act  may carry therewith a presumption of genuineness.  Such a

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presumption, therefore, is rebuttable. Raising a presumption,  therefore, does not amount to proof; it only shifts the burden  of  proof  against whom the presumption operates  for disproving it.  Only if the presumption is not rebutted by discharging the burden,  the court may act on the basis of such presumption.  Even when in  terms of the Evidence Act, a provision has been made that the  court shall presume a fact, the same by itself would not be  irrebuttable or conclusive. The genuineness of a transaction can  always fall for adjudication, if any question is raised in this behalf.

Similar is the view  taken by this Court in V. Narasaiah’s  case wherein this Court held thus :-

"the words "may be accepted as evidence"   in the  Section indicate  that there is no  compulsion on the court to accept such  transaction as evidence, but it is open to the  court to treat them as evidence. Merely  accepting them as evidence  does not mean   that the court is bound to treat them as  reliable  evidence. What is sought to be  achieved  is that the transactions  recorded   in the documents  may be treated as  evidence, just like any other evidence, and it  is for the court to weigh all the pros and  cons  to decide  whether such transaction  can be relied on for understanding the real  price of the land concerned".  

Having noticed the scope of Section 51A of the LA Act as  understood  by this Court in  V. Narasaiah’s case  to be the correct  interpretation, we will now consider whether such evidence is  mandatorly binding  on the authority or the court concerned or it is  only an enabling  provision.  In relation to the argument  pertaining to Section 13 (5) of  the Food Adulteration Act a Constitution Bench of this Court in  Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel & Anr.    vs.   State of  Maharashtra & Anr.  AIR 1966 SC 128 stated as follows :-

"that sub-Section  clearly makes the  contents of  the report of Public Analyst admissible in  evidence and the prosecution cannot fail solely   on the ground that the Public Analyst  had not  been examined in the case, but what value  is to  be attached  to such report must necessarily  be  for the court to consider and decide."    (Emphasis supplied)  

While it is clear that under  Section 51A of the LA Act a  presumption as to the genuineness  of the contents of the document is  permitted to be raised, the  same can be relied upon only if the said  presumption is not rebutted  by other evidence.  In the said view of the  matter we are of the opinion the decision of this Court in the case of   Land Acuisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer   vs. V.  Narasaiah   (supra) lays down the correct law.  

Having settled the scope of Section 51A of the LA Act as  stated herein above, we will consider the facts in Civil Appeal  No.6986 of 1999.  In this appeal originally  the Land Acquisition  Officer awarded Rs. 3707/- per acre for the acquired land. On  reference being made by the claimant, the Reference Court  enhanced the said compensation to Rs. 8,000/- per acre which was

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challenged by the beneficiary  of the acquisition before the High  Court in a writ petition which was allowed  and the matter was  remanded back for fresh disposal to the Reference Court. Before  the Reference Court, the respondent herein produced two certified  copies of two sale transactions which were marked as  Ex. P1 and  P2. The Reference Court, however, refused to place reliance on the  said documents on the ground that  the contents of the said  document were not proved. Hence, it rejected the reference. Being  aggrieved by the said order, the claimants-respondents preferred an  appeal before the High Court, the High Court disagreeing with the  reference court relied on the contents of Ex. P1 and P2 and  enhanced the compensation to Rs.15,000/- per acre. While doing  so, the High Court proceeded merely on the contents of Ex.P1 and  P2 and did not take into consideration the other evidence available  on record in regard to  the comparative nature of the land, location  of the land, the market potentiality of the land etc. and fixed the  compensation on an arithmetic calculation based on the value  found in Ex. P1 and P2. We do not think this is the correct  approach. While it is true the contents of Ex.P1 and P2 should be  looked into as evidence produced by a party the evaluation of such  evidence should be made taking into consideration other evidence  if available on record like other sale transactions that may be  produced, the comparative nature of the location, suitability,  marketability etc. to fix the market value of the land acquired.  Since such a comparative examination of the evidence has not been  made by the High Court in the above appeal, even though there  was material available on record, we think it proper that the  impugned judgment in the above appeal  be set aside and the  matter be remanded  to the High Court for consideration in  accordance with law laid down and the directions given in this  case. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds to the extent stated herein  above.

The facts of the other cases being different, we think it  appropriate that it is not necessary for a 5-Judge Bench to decide  the issues involved in these cases, because the question of law has  been decided  in C.A. 6986/1999. Therefore, these appeals should  be placed before an appropriate Bench of this Court for final  disposal. It is ordered accordingly.