REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 127-130 OF 2008

C. Muniappan & Ors. … Appellants

Vs. State of Tamil Nadu …Respondents

WITH  

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1632-1634    OF 2010      (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 1482-1484 of 2008)

D.K. Rajendran & Ors. etc.etc. …Appellants

Vs.  

State of Tamil Nadu ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted in Special  Leave Petition (Criminal)  Nos.  

1482-1484 of 2008.

2. These appeals have been preferred against the Judgment  

and Order  dated 6.12.2007 of the High Court of Madras in

Crl.  Appeal  Nos.  226,  266  and  267  of  2007,  and   Death  

Sentence Reference in Trial No. 1 of 2007.  

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are  

that  on 22.1.2000,  the  students  of  the  Horticulture  College  

and Research Centre, Periakulam, affiliated to the Tamil Nadu  

Agricultural  University,  Coimbatore  (hereinafter  called  the  

‘University’), left for an educational tour in two buses.   One  

bus  was  carrying  male  students  and  the  other  bus  was  

carrying 47 female students.  After completing the educational  

tour,  the  students  came  to  Paiyur,  near  Dharmapuri,  on  

1.2.2000, at about 12.00 midnight, and stayed in the Regional  

Agricultural Research Centre.  On the next day, after visiting  

the research centre, they left for a tour to Hogenakkal from  

Dharmapuri, which was the last leg of their tour as per their  

revised  tour  programme.  They  visited  a  nursery  garden  on  

2.2.2000 and reached Dharmapuri at 12.30 p.m. and parked  

their buses in front of Saravanabhavan Hotel.  The students  

and  the  two  teachers  accompanying  them  went  to  the  

Saravanabhavan Hotel  to  take their  meals  and to  purchase  

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parcels of food.  Some of the students remained in the bus  

itself.

4. In  view  of  naxalite  movement  and  activities  around  

Dharmapuri,  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  at  

Dharmapuri   had  promulgated  a  prohibitory  order  under  

Sections 30-A and 61 of the Indian Police Act,  1861, which  

expired on 31.1.2000, and thus, a fresh prohibitory order was  

issued on  31.1.2000, for fifteen days.  On 2.2.2000, former  

Chief  Minister of  Tamil Nadu, Ms. J. Jayalalitha, along with  

four others was convicted and sentenced to undergo one year  

imprisonment  in the Pleasant Stay Hotel, Kodailkanal, case.  

According to the prosecution, when the news of her conviction  

spread, the AIADMK party members resorted to dharnas and  

took out processions in Dharmapuri and compelled the shop  

keepers to close their  shops by pelting stones.  The news of  

conviction and sentence of the former Chief Minister of Tamil  

Nadu  was  being  broadcast  on  T.V.  and  radio,  thus,  the  

students and teachers also came to know about it.

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5. According to the prosecution, a procession of 100 to 150  

party workers having flags of AIADMK party, armed with sticks  

and  stones  passed  on  the  roads  nearby  the  buses,  raising  

slogans.  The  girl  students  witnessed  the  procession  but  

remained  in  the  bus.   Dr.  Latha  (PW.1),  the  teacher  

accompanying the students, contacted the Vice-Chancellor of  

the University and told the students that the Vice-Chancellor  

had  instructed  them to  stay  at  a  safe  place  and  return  to  

Coimbatore  after  the  situation  becomes  normal.   On  this  

advice, the drivers of both the buses made an attempt to take  

the buses to the District Collector’s office.  However, the buses  

could not reach there because of the obstruction of the traffic  

on the way, as the political workers staging dharna came on  

the road.  Mr. P. Kandasamy (PW.4), driver of bus no. TN-38-

C-5550, which was carrying the girl students, moved the bus  

to some distance and parked it in a vacant place near an old  

petrol bunk.  The bus carrying the boys was also moved there.  

The accused,   along with other  political  workers  formed an  

unlawful assembly indulging in a ‘road roko agitation’, under  

the  leadership  of  D.K.  Rajendran  (A.1),  violating  the  

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prohibitory order at Illakkiampatti,  near the MGR statue on  

the  Salem-Bangalore  National  Highway,  prevented  the  free  

flow of traffic and caused nuisance to general public at large.  

They damaged the government buses having registration nos.  

TN-29-N-1094, TN-29-N-0543 and TN-29-N-1011 by breaking  

their glasses and also set fire to the three seats of one of the  

buses (being a town bus with Route No. 7-B).

6. As  per  the  Prosecution,  Nedu  @  Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  

Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) having the  

common  object  to  cause  damage  to  the  buses,  left  the  

aforesaid place and went to the motor workshop of B. Kamal  

(PW.86), namely “Majestic Auto Garage”, and procured petrol  

in two plastic cans and came to the place where the bus in  

which  the  girl  students  were  travelling  was  parked.   It  is  

alleged  that  Nedu  (A.2)  and  Madhu  (A.3)  sprinkled  petrol  

inside the bus through the first two shutters on the left-side  

and Nedu (A.2) lit a match stick and threw it inside the bus.  

Nedu  (A.2)  and  Madhu  (A.3)  went  towards  the  motor  bike  

which was already kept ready for running by C. Muniappan  

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(A.4) and escaped from the scene. The fire lit at the front-side  

of  the  bus  spread  backwards.  Dr.  Latha  (PW.1)  and  Akila  

(PW.2) (both teachers) managed to get down from the bus from  

the front door along with some students.  Some girl students  

stretched their heads and hands through the shutters and the  

boy  students  pulled  them  out.    However,  three  students,  

namely, Kokilavani, Hemalatha and Gayathri could not escape  

from the burning bus.  They were burnt alive inside the bus.  

Some of the girl students got burn injuries while getting down  

from the bus and some were injured while they were being  

pulled out through the shutters.  The injured students were  

taken to the Government Hospital,  Dharmapuri,  where they  

were treated by Dr. K.S. Sampath (PW.30).  

7. On the same day, an FIR was lodged at about 1.30 p.m.  

in the police station regarding the occurrence of the incident  

involving the Town Bus with route no.7-B.  In respect of the  

other  incident,  i.e.  the  Bus  burning,  an FIR was  lodged at  

about  3.30  p.m.  vide  written  complaint  (Exh.  P.120)  and a  

case under  Sections 147,  148,  149,  436 and 302 of  Indian  

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Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and under Sections 3 and  

4 of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage & Loss)  

Act, 1992 (in short as “TNP (PDL) Act”) was registered.  In the  

said FIR, the name of C. Muniappan (A.4) was not mentioned.  

A general statement was made that “some persons shouting  

slogans  surrounded  the  bus  and  broke  down  the  window  

panes” and Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) poured the petrol from  

the front entrance of the bus and set it on fire.  As far as the  

damage caused to the government buses at Illakkiampatti is  

concerned,  on  2.2.2000,  Elangovan  (PW.60),  a  Senior  

Assistant Engineer in the Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation,  

Dharmapuri, at 8.00 p.m. submitted a written complaint (Exh.  

P.82) under Sections 147, 148, 341, 436 and 506(ii) IPC and  

Sections 3 and 4 of the TNP (PDL) Act.

8. On these complaints, investigations were carried out by  

Ayyasamy, Inspector of Police (PW.81), and he inspected the  

place  of  occurrence at  about 10.30 p.m.  in the presence of  

witnesses  Velayutham  (PW.67)  and  Vetrivel  (PW.68)  and  

prepared  an  Observation  Mahazar  (Ex.  P.107).   He  also  

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prepared a rough sketch and recovered broken glass and brick  

pieces from the place under the Seizure Mahazar (Ex. P.109).  

The buses were inspected on the next day by Motor Vehicles  

Inspector and he prepared reports in respect of the same (Exs.  

P.116 to P.119).   

9. Dr.  A.C. Natarajan (PW.31) conducted an autopsy on the  

body of Kokilavani, Dr. N. Govindaraj (PW.35) conducted an  

autopsy on the body of Gayathri  and Dr. Rajkumar (PW.38)  

conducted an autopsy on the body of Hemalatha and issued  

Exs.  P.23,  P.33  and  P.28,  Post  mortem  certificates,  

respectively.

10. In respect of the second incident, regarding bus no. TN-

38-C-5550, Crime No. 188 of 2000 was registered on the basis  

of  the  complaint  given  by  Village  Administrative  Officer,  C.  

Ramasundaram (PW.87).  Since the officer-in-charge of police  

station was on court duty, Shanmugaiah, Inspector of Police  

(PW.116) took up the investigation.  However, after two days,  

i.e.  on  4.2.2000,  Vilvaranimurugan,  Inspector  of  Police  

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(PW.119)  took  over  the  investigation  from  Shanmugaiah  

(PW.116).  On 6.2.2000,  investigation  was transferred to  the  

CBCID and R. Samuthirapandi, Additional Superintendent of  

Police (PW.123), became the Investigating Officer.   

11. After completing the investigation, a report under Section  

173  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (hereinafter  

called as “Cr.PC”), was filed on 28.4.2000, arraying 31 persons  

as accused.  The case was committed to the Sessions Court,  

Krishnagiri, vide Order dated 25.7.2000.  The Sessions Court,  

Krishnagiri,  framed 21 charges  against  all  accused  persons  

vide  order  dated  8.10.2001  under  Sections  147,  148,  149,  

341, 342, 307 read with Sections 302, 114 IPC and Sections 3  

and 4 TNP (PDL) Act.  During the course of trial, 10 out of 11  

witnesses, who had been examined, turned hostile, including  

C. Ramasundaram (PW.87) who had lodged the complaint in  

respect of second incident.  Being dissatisfied and aggrieved,  

Veerasamy, father of one of the victims, namely, Kokilavani,  

approached the High Court of Madras by filing Cr. O.P. No.  

23520 of  2001  under Section 407 Cr.PC seeking  transfer of  

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the trial from Krishnagiri to Coimbatore on various grounds,  

inter-alia,   that all the accused were from the AIADMK party  

and were holding the party posts; most of the witnesses who  

had  been  examined  had  turned  hostile,  including  the  

complainant C. Ramasundaram; all the accused and most of  

the  witnesses  were  from the  Coimbatore  District  and  thus,  

they would be won over by the accused.  Therefore, conduct of  

an impartial trial was not possible at Krishnagiri.  The High  

Court  allowed  the  said  Transfer  Petition  vide  order  dated  

22.8.2003 issuing some directions, including the appointment  

of the Special Public Prosecutor and to have a  de-novo trial.  

The said order of transfer was challenged by D.K. Rajendran  

(A.1), by filing SLP(Crl.) No. 4678 of 2003.  However, the said  

SLP was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 17.11.2003.

12. The Special Public Prosecutor was appointed after filing  

of a contempt petition before the High Court for not complying  

with  its  order  dated  22.8.2003.   The  State  Government  

initiated  Departmental  Proceedings  against  the  Village  

Administrative  Officer,  C.  Ramasundaram  (PW.87),  the  

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complainant, who had been examined at Krishnagiri Court, for  

not supporting the case of the prosecution.  After a long delay,  

vide order dated 14.3.2005, the Sessions Court, Salem, framed  

22 charges against the 31 accused,  as the trial  was being  

conducted  de-novo.  During  the  trial,  123  witnesses  were  

examined and after assessing the facts and the legal issues,  

the  Trial  Court  delivered  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

16.2.2007.   

In  total,  31  accused  were  put  to  trial.  R.  Chellakutty  

(A.22) died during trial. S. Palanisamy (A.15) and A. Madesh @  

Madesh Mastheri  (A.27)  stood acquitted.   The remaining 28  

accused were convicted under Sections 188, 341 IPC and 3 &  

4  of  TNP (PDL)  Act  r/w 149 IPC.   In  addition,  all  of  them  

except accused No. 24, Mani @ Member Mani, were convicted  

for  offence  u/s  147  IPC,  whereas  accused  No.  24,  Mani  @  

Member  Mani  was  convicted,  for  an  offence  u/s  148  IPC.  

Apart from that accused No. 2, Nedu @ Nedunchezhian, and  

accused  No.  3,  Madhu  @  Ravindran,  were  convicted  for  

offences  u/s  302  IPC  (3  counts)  and  accused  No.  4,  C.  

Muniappan, u/s 302 r/w 114 IPC (3 counts) and the accused  

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Nos.2 and 3 were convicted also for offences u/s 307 IPC (46  

counts) and C. Muniappan (A4) for offences u/s 307 r/w 114  

IPC for 46 counts.  Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were sentenced to  

death.   

The sentences imposed on accused Nos. 1, 5 to 14, 16 to  

21, 23 to 26 and 28 to 31 were ordered to run consecutively  

which extended to 7 years and 3 months and sentence of 7  

years and 9 months to accused No. 24.

13.All the 28 convicts filed appeals before the High Court of  

Madras. The death sentence references in respect to Nedu  

(A.2), Madhu (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) were also made.  

Crl.  Revision  No.  777  of  2007  was  filed  by  R.  Kesava  

Chandran @ Moorthy,  the  father  of  one of  the  deceased,  

namely,  Hemalatha,  for  enhancement  of  punishment  

imposed on all the accused. As all the appeals, references  

and Crl.  Revision arose out of  a common judgment,  they  

were taken up jointly and disposed of by the High Court  

vide impugned judgment and order dated 6.12.2007.

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On hearing the aforesaid Crl. Revision and appeals, the  

High Court modified the conviction of accused No. 24 under  

section 148 IPC as being under section 147 IPC. Accused nos.  

1, 5 to 14, 16 to 21, 23 to 26 and 28 to 31 were awarded  

different  punishment  for  different  offences,  however,  

maximum  punishment  remained  two  years  as  all  the  

sentences were directed to run concurrently.   

Conviction and sentence of death against accused Nos. 2  

to  4 was confirmed by the High Court  along with all  other  

sentences under different heads.   

14. Hence, these seven appeals.  

15. Shri Sushil Kumar and Shri Udai U. Lalit, learned senior  

counsel  appearing  for  all  these  appellants,  have  submitted  

that the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant  

any  trial.  The  case  of  the  prosecution  had  been  inherently  

improbable.   There had been material  contradictions in the  

statements of witnesses in respect of the involvement of the  

accused and the nature of offences committed by them.  The  

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inquest  reports  were  not  consistent  with  the  charge-sheets.  

Confessional statements made by some of the accused before  

the police, could not be relied upon nor read as a whole in the  

court, as it is not permissible in law. The reading of the full  

text thereof, had materially prejudiced the mind of the court.  

Two separate FIRs, i.e., in respect of Crime No.188/2000 and  

190/2000 could not be clubbed, resulting in one consolidated  

charge sheet.  All the accused had been charged by the Salem  

Court  even for  the  offence  under  Section  188 IPC.   In this  

respect,  as  no  complaint  had  been  filed  by  the  competent  

officer whose prohibitory order had been violated, the charge  

could  not  have  been  framed.   In  any  case,  as  it  was  not  

permissible  for  the  trial  court  to  frame  any  charge  under  

Section 188 IPC in absence of any written complaint by the  

public servant concerned, the genesis of the prosecution case  

becomes doubtful and the appellants become entitled to the  

benefit of doubt.  Further, cases under Section 188 I.P.C. are  

triable by the Magistrate.  In this case, it has been tried by the  

Sessions Court.  Such a course has caused great prejudice to  

the  appellants.  The  statements  made  by  the  witnesses  

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particularly,  by  Dr.  Latha  (PW.1),   Akila  (PW.2),   P.  

Kandasamy, Driver (PW.4) and N. Jagannathan, Cleaner (PW.  

5), were full of contradictions and could not be relied upon.  

Identification  of  the  accused  was  on  the  basis  of  the  

photographs  taken  and  published  by  the  media.   C.  

Muniappan  (A.4)  was  arrested  on  3rd February,  2009,  in  

respect of some other case and, therefore, his arrest shown on  

7th February, 2009, was only an act of jugglery.    The Forensic  

Report  did  not  support  the  case  of  the  prosecution  that  

kerosene  oil  or  petrol  had  been put  to  set  the  bus  ablaze.  

Some of the most material witnesses of the prosecution, like B.  

Kamal (PW.86), turned hostile, thus could not be relied upon.

16. Four different versions have been given by the different  

witnesses disclosing the genesis of the main incident.

First,  as  revealed  by  the  complaint  lodged  by  C.  

Ramasundaram (PW.87), the incident occurred at 3.30 p.m. on  

2.2.2000.  According to the complaint, 20 persons named in  

the F.I.R. armed with wooden sticks and iron rods, shouted  

slogans and caused damage to the bus.  They threatened the  

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girl  students,  who  were  travelling  in  the  bus,  with  dire  

consequences.  Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) brought the petrol  

and  sprinkled  the  same  inside  the  bus  as  well  as  on  the  

platform.  D.K. Rajendran (A.1) ordered that no one should be  

allowed to get down from the bus and threatened that the bus  

will be set on fire along with the inmates.  Immediately, both  

Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) set the bus on fire with match  

sticks. Suddenly, the fire engulfed the entire bus and all the  

accused ran away from the scene.  Some girls were trapped  

inside the bus and charred to death.  C. Muniappan (A.4) was  

not named in the first version.

The  second  version  is  as  per  the  evidence  of  P.  

Kandasamy (PW.4), driver of the vehicle and N. Jagannathan  

(PW.5), Cleaner.  According to them, the incident occurred on  

2.2.2000,  wherein,  two persons  came on  a  motor  bike  and  

stopped in front of the bus.  One of them sprinkled the petrol  

through left  side window and set the bus on fire  and went  

away on the motorbike.

The  third  version  has  been as  revealed  by  the  Report  

(Ex.D.14)  submitted  by  P.  Kandasamy (PW.4),  Driver,  dated  

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7.2.2000, according to which, two persons came on a motor  

bike and stopped in front of the bus. One of them sprinkled  

petrol through the left side window and set the bus on fire.

The  fourth  version  is  based  on  the  Report  (Ex.D.12),  

dated 6.3.2000, by Dr. Latha (PW.1), according to which, when  

the bus was parked,  at about 2.25 p.m.,  after two minutes  

thereof, one person poured the petrol on the front seats and  

set the bus on fire.

All the aforesaid versions are contradictory to each other.  

Thus, the case of prosecution is not trustworthy.   

Thus, in view of the above, appeals deserve to be allowed.

17. Per  contra,  Shri  Altaf  Ahmad,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the State, has tried to defend the prosecution’s  

case submitting that the contradictions were trivial in nature.  

He has submitted that framing of charges under Section 188  

IPC  in  absence  of  written  complaint  of  the  public  servant  

concerned, could not be fatal to the prosecution’s case.  The  

entire  prosecution  case  cannot  be  discarded  merely  on  the  

grounds of improperly framing the charges under Section 188  

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I.P.C.  Clubbing the two crimes, i.e., 188/2000 and 190/2000  

did not cause any prejudice to any of the accused.  Both the  

crimes were found to be parts of the same incident.  The court  

has to examine the facts in a proper perspective where the  

said ghastly crime had been committed, where three university  

girl students stood roasted and 18 girl students suffered burn  

injuries. At the initial stage, the investigation was conducted  

by  Shri  Shanmugaiah  (PW.116),  as  the  Inspector,  Shri  

Vilvaranimurugan (PW.119) was on court duty on 2.2.2000.  

Thus, PW.119 took over the investigation after being free from  

the court duty.  Considering the gravity of the offences, the  

investigation was handed over to the CBCID, thus, the change  

of Investigating Officer was inevitable. The Test Identification  

Parade was conducted by the experienced Judicial Officer in  

accordance with law and there was no haste in conducting the  

same.   There  is  no  rule  of  law that  deposition  of  a  hostile  

witness is to be discarded in toto. The appeals lack merit and  

are liable to be dismissed.

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18. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  

learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.   

Charges under Section 188 IPC:

19. Section 195 Cr.PC reads as under :

“195.  Prosecution  for  contempt  of  lawful  authority  of  public  servants,  for  offences  against public justice and for offences relating  to documents given in evidence – (1) No Court   shall take cognizance –

(a)(i)  of any offence punishable under Sections  172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal   Code (45 of 1860), or

…….. except on the complaint in writing of the public  servant  concerned  or  of  some  other  public  servant  to  whom  he  is  administratively   subordinate;”

20. Section  195(a)(i)  Cr.PC  bars  the  court  from  taking  

cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC  

or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a  

written  complaint  by   the  public  servant  concerned   for  

contempt of  his lawful order.  The object of this provision is to  

provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the  

lawful  authority  of  the  public  servant.   The  court  lacks  

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competence  to  take  cognizance  in  certain  types  of  offences  

enumerated  therein.    The  legislative  intent  behind such a  

provision has been that an individual should not face criminal  

prosecution instituted  upon insufficient  grounds by persons  

actuated  by  malice,  ill-will  or  frivolity  of  disposition  and to  

save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless  

prosecutions.   This  provision  has  been  carved  out  as  an  

exception  to  the  general  rule  contained  under  Section  190  

Cr.PC that any person can set the law in motion by making a  

complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of  

certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made  

by some particular authority or person.  Other provisions in  

the Cr.PC like sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule  

of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some  

requirements  are  complied  with,  the  court  shall  not  take  

cognizance  of  an  offence  described  in  those  Sections.  (vide  

Govind Mehta  v. The State of  Bihar, AIR  1971 SC 1708;  

Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1971  

SC 1935; Surjit Singh & Ors. v.  Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC  

533;  State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr., (1998) 2 SCC 391;  

2

K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC  

352; and  Iqbal  Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah  

& Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119).

21. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance of  

Section  195  Cr.PC  or  not,  is  whether  the  facts  disclose  

primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of  

the court or of a public servant is required.  In Basir-ul-Haq &  

Ors. v.  The State of  West Bengal,  AIR 1953 SC 293; and  

Durgacharan Naik & Ors v.  State of Orissa,  AIR 1966 SC  

1775,  this  Court  held  that  the  provisions  of  this  Section  

cannot  be  evaded  by  describing   the  offence  as  one  being  

punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth  

and substance,  the offence falls  in a category mentioned in  

Section  195  Cr.PC.   Thus,  cognizance  of  such  an  offence  

cannot be taken by mis-describing it  or by putting a wrong  

label on it.

2

22. In  M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 2000  

SC 168, this Court considered the matter at length and held  

as under :

“….Provisions  of  Section  195  CrPC  are  mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to  take  cognizance  of  any  of  the  offences  mentioned therein unless there is a complaint   in  writing  as  required  under  that  section.”   (Emphasis added)

23. In Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr.,  

(1998)  2 SCC 493,  this  Court  while  dealing with this issue  

observed as under :

“7. ..Section 190 of the Code empowers  “any  magistrate  of  the  first  class”  to  take   cognizance  of  “any  offence”  upon  receiving  a  complaint,  or  police  report  or  information  or  upon his own knowledge.  Section 195 restricts   such general powers of the magistrate, and the  general right of a person to move the court with   a complaint to that extent curtailed.  It is a well- recognised  canon  of   interpretation  that   provision curbing the general jurisdiction  of  the court  must  normally  receive  strict  interpretation unless  the  statute  or  the  context  requires  otherwise.”  (Emphasis   supplied)

2

24. In  Daulat  Ram v. State of  Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206,  

this Court considered the nature of the provisions of Section  

195 Cr.PC.  In the said case, cognizance had been taken on  

the police report by the Magistrate and the appellant therein  

had been tried  and convicted,  though the concerned public  

servant, the Tahsildar had not filed any complaint.  This Court  

held as under :

“The  cognizance of the case was therefore  wrongly  assumed  by  the  court  without  the  complaint  in   writing  of  the  public  servant,   namely, the Tahsildar in this case.  The trial  was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and  the conviction cannot be maintained.  The  appeal is, therefore, allowed and the conviction  of  the  appellant  and  the  sentence  passed  on  him are set aside.” (Emphasis added)

25 Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized to  

the effect that there must be a complaint by the pubic servant  

whose  lawful  order  has  not  been  complied  with.   The  

complaint must be in writing.  The provisions of Section 195  

Cr.PC are mandatory.  Non-compliance of it would vitiate the  

prosecution  and all  other  consequential  orders.   The  Court  

cannot  assume  the  cognizance  of  the  case  without  such  

2

complaint.  In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and  

conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction.

26. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that  

no charge could have been framed under Section 188 IPC in  

the absence of a written complaint by the officer authorised for  

that  purpose,  the  conviction  under  Section  188  IPC  is  not  

sustainable.  More so, it falsifies the very genesis of the case of  

the  prosecution  as  the  prohibitory  orders  had  not  been  

violated, no subsequent incident could occur.  Thus,  entire  

prosecution case falls.   

27. Undoubtedly, the law does not permit taking cognizance  

of  any  offence  under  Section  188  IPC,  unless  there  is  a  

complaint in writing by the competent Public Servant. In the  

instant case, no such complaint had ever been filed. In such  

an  eventuality  and  taking  into  account  the  settled  legal  

principles in this regard, we are of the view that it was not  

permissible for the trial Court to frame a charge under Section  

188  IPC.   However,  we  do  not  agree  with  the  further  

2

submission that  absence  of  a  complaint  under  Section  195  

Cr.PC falsifies the genesis of the prosecution’s case and  is  

fatal to the entire prosecution case.  There is ample evidence  

on record to show that there was a prohibitory order; which  

had been issued by the competent officer one day before; it  

had been given due publicity  and had been brought  to the  

notice of the public at large; it has been violated as there is no  

denial even by the accused persons that there was no ‘Rasta  

Roko  Andolan’.  Unfortunately,  the  agitation  which  initially  

started  peacefully  turned  ugly  and  violent  when  the  public  

transport vehicles were subjected to attack and damage.  In  

such an eventuality, we hold that in case the charges under  

Section 188 IPC are quashed, it would by no means have any  

bearing on the case of the prosecution, so far as the charges  

for other offences are concerned.  

28. The  submission  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  two  

crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed  

together, has also no merit for the simple reason that if the  

cases  are  considered,  keeping  in  view  the  totality  of  the  

2

circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents  

occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers and  

conductors/cleaners  of  the  vehicles  involved  in  the  first  

incident  and  the  evidence  of  C.  Ramasundaram  V.A.O.,  

(PW.87), we reach the inescapable conclusion that the second  

occurrence was nothing but a fall out of the first occurrence.  

The damage caused to the public transport vehicles and the  

consequential burning of the University bus remained part of  

one  and  the  same  incident.  Merely  because  two  separate  

complaints had been lodged, did not mean that they could not  

be clubbed together and one charge sheet could not be filed  

(See : T.T. Antony v.  State of Kerala & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC  

181).   

Test Identification Parade :

29. In Lal Singh & Ors v.  State of U.P., AIR 2004 SC 299,  

this Court held that the court must be conscious of the fact  

that the witnesses should have sufficient opportunity to see  

the accused at the time of occurrence of the incident.  In case  

the witness has ample opportunity to see the accused before  

2

the identification parade is held,  it  may adversely affect the  

trial  and  in  that  case,  the  evidence  as  a  whole  is  to  be  

considered.  The  prosecution  should  take  precautions  and  

should establish before the Court that right from the day of his  

arrest, the accused was kept “baparda” so as to  rule out the  

possibility of his face being seen while in police custody.

30. In  Suresh Chandra Bahri v.  State of Bihar, AIR 1994  

SC 2420, this Court held that the object of conducting Test  

Identification  Parade  is  to  enable  witnesses  to  satisfy  

themselves that the accused whom they suspect is really one  

who was seen by them in connection with commission of crime  

and to satisfy investigating authorities that suspect is really  

the person whom witnesses had seen in connection with said  

occurrence.  It furnishes an assurance that the investigation is  

proceeding  on  right  lines,  in  addition  to  furnishing  

corroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness later  

in court at the trial.  Therefore, the Test Identification Parade  

is primarily meant for investigation purposes. (vide  Malkhan  

Singh  v. State of M.P.,  AIR 2003 SC 2669;  Ankush Maruti  

2

Shinde & Ors. v.  State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667;  

and  Jarnail Singh & Ors. v.  State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC  

719).  

But  the  position would be entirely  different when the  

accused or culprit who stands trial has been seen a number of  

times by the witness, as it may do away with the necessity of  

identification parade. Where  the  accused  has  been  

arrested in presence of the witness or accused has been shown  

to the witness or even his photograph has been shown by the  

Investigating Officer prior to Test Identification Parade, holding  

an  identification  parade  in  such  facts  and  circumstances  

remains inconsequential. (vide  Shaikh Umar Ahmed Shaikh  

& Anr. v.  State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 1922;  Lalli @  

Jagdeep Singh v.  State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 666;  

Dastagir Sab & Anr.  v.  State of Karnataka, (2004)  3 SCC  

106;  Maya  Kaur  Baldevsingh  Sardar  &  Anr.  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 654; and  Aslam @ Deewan v.  

State of Rajasthan, (2008) 9 SCC 227).

2

31. In  Yuvaraj  Ambar  Mohite v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  

(2006) 12 SCC 512, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier  

judgment in  D. Gopalakrishnan v.  Sadanand Naik & Ors.,  

AIR 2004 SC 4965,  and held that  if  the  photograph of  the  

accused  has  been  shown  to  the  witness  before  the  Test  

Identification  Parade,  the  identification  itself  looses  its  

purpose.   If  the suspect is available for  identification or for  

video identification, the photograph should never be shown to  

the witness.

32. Holding  the  Test  Identification  Parade  is  not  a  

substantive  piece  of  evidence,  yet  it  may  be  used  for  the  

purpose of corroboration; for believing that a person brought  

before the Court is the real person involved in the commission  

of the crime. However, the Test Identification Parade, even if  

held,  cannot  be  considered  in  all  the  cases  as  trustworthy  

evidence  on  which  the  conviction  of  the  accused  can  be  

sustained.  It is a rule of prudence which is required to be  

followed  in  cases  where  the  accused  is  not  known  to  the  

2

witness or the complainant. (Vide State of H.P. v.  Lekh Raj  

AIR 1999 SC 3916).

33. In  Mulla & Anr.  v.  State of Uttar Pradesh,  (2010) 3  

SCC  508,  this  Court  placed  reliance  on  Matru  @  Girish  

Chandra v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1050;  

and Santokh Singh v.  Izhar Hussain & Anr.,  AIR 1973 SC  

2190 and observed as under :-

“The  evidence  of  test  identification  is  admissible under Section  9 of  the Indian  Evidence  Act.  The  Identification  parade  belongs to the stage of investigation by the   police.  The  question  whether  a  witness  has  or  has  not  identified  the  accused  during the investigation is not one which   is in itself relevant at the trial. The actual   evidence  regarding  identification  is  that   which  is  given  by  witnesses  in  Court.   There  is  no  provision  in  the  Cr.P.C.   entitling  the  accused to  demand that  an  identification parade should be held at or  before the inquiry of the trial. The fact that   a  particular  witness  has  been  able  to   identify  the  accused  at  an  identification  parade  is  only  a  circumstance  corroborative  of  the  identification  in  Court.”

3

34. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, a  

Constitution Bench of this Court has  suo moto examined the  

validity  of  Section  22  of  Terrorist  and  Disruptive  Activities  

(Prevention) Act, 1987 and held that:

“If  the  evidence  regarding  the   identification on the basis of a photograph  is to be held to have the same value as the   evidence  of  a  test  identification  parade,   we  feel  that  gross  injustice  to  the  detriment  of  the  persons  suspected  may  result”.

This Court, thus, struck down the provision of Section 22 of  

the said Act.  

35. The said judgment was considered by this Court in Umar  

Abdul   Sakoor Sorathia  v.  Intelligence Officer,  Narcotic  

Control Bureau, AIR 1999 SC 2562, and the Court observed  

that  in  the  said  case,  the  evidence  of  a  witness  regarding  

identification of a proclaimed offender involved in a terrorist  

case was in issue.  The courts below had taken a view  that  

evidence by showing photographs must have the same value  

as  evidence  of  a  Test  Identification  Parade.  The  Court  

3

distinguished the aforesaid case on facts.  The Court further  

held that the court must bear in mind that in a case where the  

accused is not a proclaimed offender and the person who had  

taken the photographs was making deposition before the court  

was being examined by the prosecution as a witness, and he  

identified the accused in the court, that may be treated as a  

substantive evidence. However, courts should be conscious of  

the  fact  that  during  investigation,  the  photograph  of  the  

accused  was  shown  to  the  witness  and  he  identified  that  

person as a one whom he saw at the relevant time.  

36. Thus,  it  is  evident  from  the  above,  that  the  Test  

Identification  Parade is a part of the investigation and is very  

useful in a case where the accused are not known before-hand  

to the witnesses. It is used only to corroborate the evidence  

recorded in the court. Therefore, it is not substantive evidence.  

The actual evidence is what is given by the witnesses in the  

court.   The  Test  Identification  Parade  provides  for  an  

assurance  that  the  investigation  is  proceeding  in  the  right  

direction and it  enables  the witnesses to satisfy  themselves  

3

that the accused whom they suspect is really one who was  

seen  by  them  at  the  time  of  commission  of  offence.   The  

accused should not be shown to any of  the witnesses after  

arrest, and before holding the Test Identification Parade, he is  

required to be kept “baparda”.  

37. In the Test Identification Parades held in the Jail,  Nedu  

(A.2) was identified by P. Kandasamy (PW.4); N. Jagannathan  

(PW.5); G. Gayathiri (PW.11); N. Thilagavathi (PW.13);  and S.  

Anitha  (PW.14).   Madhu  (A.3)  was  identified  by  Dr.  Latha  

(PW.1); and  Akila (PW.2).  C. Muniappan (A.4) was identified  

by N. Jagannathan (PW.5);  S. Anitha (PW.14); and B. Kamal  

(PW.86).   

38. In the  court, Nedu (A.2) was identified by P. Kandasamy  

(PW.4); Jaganathan (PW.5); G. Gayathiri (PW.11); Thilagavathi  

(PW.13);  and Anitha (PW-14).  Madhu (A.3) was identified by  

Dr.  Latha  (PW.1);  Akila  (PW.2);  Jaganathan  (PW.5);  G.  

Gayathiri (PW.11); and Suganthi (PW.12).  C. Muniappan (A.4)  

3

was identified by Kandasamy (PW.4); Jaganathan (PW.5); and  

Anitha (PW.14).  

39. Thus,  it  is evident that all  the accused for  whom Test  

Identification Parades were conducted were identified by some  

of the witnesses in the jail.  They were also identified by some  

of the eye witnesses/injured witnesses in the court.   

Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellants  raised an objection that the entire proceedings  

of  identification  on 22.2.2000 had been concluded within a  

short span of 2 hours and 25 minutes.  Eighteen witnesses  

were there,  having three rounds each. Therefore,  one round  

was completed in three minutes,  i.e.,  the Test Identification  

Parade was conducted in full  haste and thus, could not be  

treated to be a proper identification.

40. It  is  evident  from  the  evidence  of  Shri  Kalaimathi,  

Judicial  Magistrate  (PW.89),  who  conducted  the  Test  

Identification Parade, that all the witnesses had reached the  

Central  Prison,  Salem,  before  10.30  a.m.  All  

3

preparations/arrangements had been made in advance by the  

Jail  authorities  as  per  direction  of  the  said  officer.  

Arrangements  of  standing  of  the  accused  along  with  other  

inmates in jail of the same height and complexion had already  

been made.  There had been no haste or hurry on the part of  

Shri Kalaimathi, Judicial Magistrate (PW.89) to conclude the  

proceedings. More so, for reasons best known to the defence,  

no question had been asked to the said Judicial  Magistrate  

(PW.89) in his cross-examination as to how he could conclude  

the said proceedings within such a short span of time.  Thus,  

the submission is not worth consideration.

41. In court, B. Kamal (PW.86) did not support the case of  

the prosecution as he deposed that during the identification he  

was  forced by  the  police  to  identify  C.  Muniappan (A.4)  by  

showing his photograph only.  He was declared hostile.    

42. The trial Court and the High Court have considered the  

issue elaborately and discussed the statements made by the  

prosecution  witnesses  in  the  court,  along  with  the  fact  of  

3

identification  by  the  witnesses  in  the  Test  Identification  

Parades.   Both  the  Courts  came  to  the  conclusion  that  

identification of A.2 to A.4 by the witnesses, if examined, in  

conjunction with the evidence of  the Judicial  Magistrate,  R.  

Kalaimathi,  (PW.89)  and  his  reports,  particularly,  the  Exh.  

P.137  and  P.142,  leave  no  room  for  doubt  regarding  the  

involvement of A.2 to A.4 in the crime.  We do not find any  

cogent  reason  to  take  a  view  contrary  to  the  same.  Not  

supporting the prosecution’s case by B. Kamal (PW.86) would  

not tilt the balance of the case in favour of the appellants.   

43. Serious  issues  have  been  raised  by  learned  senior  

counsel appearing for the appellants, submitting that inquest  

report was defective as there has been  much irregularity in  

the  inquest  itself.  Undoubtedly,  three  Investigating  Officers,  

namely,  T.  Shanmugaiah,  Police  Inspector  (PW.116);  S.  

Palanimuthu  (PW.121);  and  John  Basha  (PW.122)  had  

conducted  the  investigation  at  the  initial  stage.  The  

occurrence  was  so  ugly  and  awful  that  the  I.Os.  had  

conducted the investigation under great anxiety and tension.  

3

The seizure memos were also prepared in the same state of  

affairs. Therefore, when the investigation had been conducted  

in  such  a  charged   atmosphere,  some  irregularities  were  

bound to occur. There is ample evidence on record to show  

that after burning of the University bus, when the students  

came  to  know that  three  girls  had been charred  and large  

number  of  girl  students  had  suffered  burn  injuries,  they  

became so violent  that they damaged the ambulance  which  

had  been  brought  to  take  bodies  of  the  deceased  girls  for  

conducting autopsy.  The State  Authorities,  after  keeping all  

these factors in mind and realizing that the investigation had  

not been conducted in proper manner, had taken a decision to  

transfer  the  investigation  to  the  CBCID.  Therefore,  the  

irregularities committed in the investigation by the earlier I.Os.  

has too little relevance on the merits of the case. The evidence  

collected by the said three I.Os. was not worth placing reliance  

on and has rightly been not relied upon by the subsequent  

Investigating Officer.  

3

44. There  may  be  highly  defective  investigation  in  a  case.  

However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse  

by the I.O. and whether due to such lapse any benefit should  

be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled  

that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground  

for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent  

investigations  or  to  the  omissions  or  lapses  by  perfunctory  

investigation,  the  faith  and confidence  of  the  people  in  the  

criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there  

has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or  

omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there  

is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the  

prosecution evidence de hors such lapses,  carefully,  to  find  

out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what  

extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the  

object of finding out the truth.  Therefore, the investigation is  

not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial.  

The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to  

depend solely on the probity of investigation.  (Vide  Chandra  

Kanth Lakshmi v.  State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 220;  

3

Karnel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 5 SCC 518;  

Ram Bihari Yadav v.  State of Bihar,  AIR 1998 SC 1850;  

Paras Yadav  v.  State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 644;  State of  

Karnataka v.  K. Yarappa Reddy,  AIR 2000 SC 185;  Amar  

Singh v.  Balwinder Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1164;  Allarakha K.  

Mansuri v.  State of Gujarat,  AIR 2002 SC 1051; and  Ram  

Bali v. State of U.P., AIR 2004 SC 2329).

Arrest of A-4

45. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel has raised the  

issue vehemently that arrest of C. Muniappan (A.4) is totally  

false.  However, the evidence on record reveals that he was  

arrested  at  1.30  a.m.  on  3.2.2000,  as  is  evident  from  the  

evidence  of  D.  Poongavanam  (PW.108),  according  to  which  

when he  was  attending  patrol  duty  along  with  other  police  

officials on the highway from Dharmapuri to Tirupathur, near  

P. Mottupatti  lake bridge, he got information that some one  

was present beneath the bridge. Thus, the said witness went  

to the place along with the other officers and he was taken into  

police  custody  in  Crime No.115/2000 of  Mathikonepalayam  

3

Police  Station  under  Section  151  Cr.P.C.  read  with  Section  

7(1)(A) of C.L. Act, and thus he was sent to jail.   He had been  

released on bail on 9.2.2000 and the I.O. had been searching  

for him and he was arrested at New Bus Stand, Salem, where  

the  Dharmapuri  bus  was  to  be  parked,  by  P.  Krishnaraj  

(PW.109).   He tendered a confessional  statement which was  

recorded  in  presence  of  Revenue  Inspector,  Manickam  and  

Village Administrative Officer, C.  Ramasundaram (PW.87).  

There has been no cross-examination independently on  

behalf  of   A.4  on this  issue.  Even in  cross-examination  on  

behalf  of  other  accused  nothing  has  been  elicited  qua  

irregularity or improbability of the arrest of A.4. Therefore, we  

do not see any reason to disbelieve the arrest of C. Muniappan  

(A.4) as shown by the I.O.

46. So far as the issue of damage to the buses and the main  

incident  of  setting  the  bus  on fire  are  concerned,  both the  

courts have proceeded on the finding, after appreciating the  

entire evidence on record, that there was no common object  

between  Nedu  @  Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  Madhu  @Ravindran  

4

(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) and the other accused regarding  

murder of the students and burning of the bus.  Therefore, all  

of them had been convicted under different sections. However,  

the High Court directed  the sentence to run concurrently so  

far as A.1, A.5 to A.14, A.16 to A.21, A.23 to  A.26 and A.28 to  

A.31  are  concerned.   There  has  been sufficient  material  to  

show participation in the “Rasto Roko Andolan” and indulging  

in the incident of damaging the local route bus. Both courts  

have recorded the concurrent findings of fact in this regard.  

We have also gone through the evidence.  Their presence is  

established  on  the  spot  and  we  do  not  see  any  reason  to  

interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded in that  

respect.  We do not find any material on record, which may  

warrant interference with the said findings.  

47. So far as A.2 to A.4  (Nedu, Madhu and C. Muniappan  

respectively)  are  concerned,  the  Trial  Court  recorded  the  

following findings of fact:-  

“Accused 2 and  3 had  poured petrol  into   the bus through the front door steps and set   fire  to  it  resulting  in  the  death  of  the  

4

abovesaid  three  students  and  causing   injuries to some of the students.  Knowing  that students are inside the bus, they had  set fire to the bus as stated above, knowing  fully well  that  some of the students or all   the  inmates  of  the  bus  would  meet  their   death inside the bus.  Nobody could deny  this fact.  There was clear intention on the   part of A2 and A3 to kill the inmates of the   bus and  thus  A2 and  A3 have  murdered  three  girl  students  with  the  intention  of   killing them.  Hence A2 and A3 are liable to   be punished u/s 302 IPC (3 counts)………… ….Presence  of  the  4th accused  in  the  occurrence  place  has been  amply  proved.  Though the fact that  he gave matchbox to  A2  to  set  fire  to  the  bus  had  not  been  established,  yet the fact that  he aided A2  and A3 to come to the occurrence place in  his motor cycle after the occurrence is over,   is  clearly  proved,  because  he  was  the   person who drove the motor cycle and thus  aided A2 and A3 in the commission of the   offence u/s 4 of the TNP (PDL) Act and 302  IPC and 114 IPC could be invoked in this   case since as per Section 107 IPC vide third   definition  whoever  intentionally  aids  by  any act or illegal omission the doing of the   thing is an offender as defined in 107 IPC.   Hence,  A4  Muniappan  has  committed  the   offences punishable u/s 4 of TNP (PDL) Act  r/w 114 IPC and 302 IPC r/w 114 IPC (3   counts).

Further, the High Court after appreciating the evidence  

on record found that :-

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“The identification  of  the  A2 to  A4 by the   witnesses coupled with the evidence of the  learned Magistrate  PW-89 and the reports   of PW89 produced in Exs. P-137 and P-142  would go a long way to show that A-2 to A- 4 were involved in the crime as spoken to  by the prosecution witnesses.”   

From the record, it is evident that so far as A2 to A4 are  

concerned,   their  involvement  in  the  incident  has  been  

substantiated  by  the  evidence  of  PWs.61,62,63,97&99  

(Santhamurthy, Madhaiyan, G. Manickam, Udayasuriyan and  

R. Karunanidhi respectively) as some of those said witnesses  

had identified  D.K. Rajendran, Nedu, Madhu, C. Muniappan,  

D.K.  Murugesan,  D.A.  Dowlath  Basha,  (A.1  to  A.6  

respectively),  K.  Ravi (A.9),  Sampath  (A.13),  K.  Chandran  

(A.21),  R.  Chellakutty  (A.22),  K.  Mani  (A.24),  K.  Veeramani  

(A.30)  &  Udayakumar  (A.31).   All  the  witnesses  have  also  

deposed  that  some  of  the  members  had  been  in  the  

demonstration while K. Mani (A.24) damaged the Hosur bus  

stand. M. Kaveri (A.23) prevented the people from dousing the  

fire.  

4

48. In  view  of  the  fact  that  Udayasuriyan  (PW.97)  and  R.  

Karunanidhi (PW.99) had not been dis-believed by the court  

below and their evidence was found natural and trustworthy  

as they did not falsely implicate all  the accused for causing  

damages  to  the  bus  and  they  were  local  and  independent  

witnesses and knowing some of the accused persons; the High  

Court held as under:  

“Though, both the witnesses have spoken  about the demonstration and implicated most of  the accused, they have spoken only about Nedu  (A.2)  for  having  set  fire  to  the  Route  No.7-B  town bus and there is absolutely no material to  show as  to  why  both  PWs  97  &  99  should  falsely  implicate  Nedu  (A.2).  Equally,  for  the   same reason, the implication of M. Kaveri (A.23)   for having prevented the persons in and around  the  bus from dousing  the  fire  also  cannot  be  dis-believed. There is ample evidence to show  that Nedu (A.2) and M. Kaveri (A.23) were part   of  the  demonstrators  as  has  been  stated  by  some of  the  witnesses.  In  fact,  PW.62 stated   that  even  when  he  saw  the  demonstrators  sitting on the road, he also saw the damaged  buses  parked  nearby.  None  of  the  witnesses   have  implicated  any  of  the  accused  except  Nedu  (A.2)  and  M.  Kaveri  (A.23)  for  causing  damage  to  the  buses.  Though,  PW.97  implicated  K. Mani (A.24) as well  for causing  damage to the bus, A.24 was not spoken to by  PW.99. In the absence of any corroboration, it   cannot  be  held  that  K.  Mani  (A.24)  also  damaged the bus.  

4

49. Therefore,  the  presence  of  the  accused  had  also  been  

established by press and media persons who were present at  

the scene of the occurrence, as well  as by the complainant,  

and those persons had not named all the accused for setting  

the bus on fire and only few of them had been involved.  But  

as  the  said  persons  were  not  having  any arm/weapon,  the  

offence  of  Section  148  IPC was  not  found  sustainable  and  

thus, their conviction under Section 148 IPC has been rightly  

set  aside.  Some  of  the  accused  had  been  convicted  under  

Section 147 IPC.    

50. It has been submitted that the witnesses PWs. 1, 2 and 4  

have not disclosed the identities of the accused at the initial  

stage of investigation. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon  

for conviction of A.2 to A.4. However, it has been proved that  

there was no initial investigation and therefore the question of  

disclosing  identity  of  the  accused  to  Shri  Shanmugaiah  

(PW.116),  who  had  done  the  initial  investigation,  could  not  

arise.  More so, as has been mentioned hereinabove, the initial  

4

investigation was conducted in a panicked situation, therefore,  

the government thought it  proper to scrap it  out and hand  

over to a higher officer through the CBCID. The presence of  

A.2 to  A.4 with the other  accused at  the  place  of  agitation  

stands established.  

51. R. Karunanidhi (PW.99) had spoken about A.2 to A.4. He  

is an advocate and belongs to Dharamapuri.  He has deposed  

that Nedu (A.2) had set the fire to the Route No.7-B town bus.  

He  has  also  corroborated  the  evidence  of  Udayasuriyan  

(PW.97) that while the bus was in flames, some persons tried  

to douse the fire but they were prevented by M. Kaveri (A.23).  

Nedu (A.2) remained present in the earlier occurrence as well  

as the subsequent occurrence.

52.  We  cannot  ignore  one  more  fact,  namely,  that  C.  

Muniappan  (A.4)  had  kept  the  engine  of  the  motor  cycle  

(M.O.5) running only to escape from the scene of occurrence  

along with Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) after the occurrence.  

The said fact would also indicate the mind of the accused to  

4

commit the offence and to flee from the scene of occurrence to  

avoid the clutches of law. But for PWs 1, 2, 4 & 5 and some  

other  students  who became alert  immediately  after  the bus  

was set on fire, the consequence could have been disastrous  

and more deaths could have occurred.

53. P. Kandasamy, the bus driver (PW.4) has deposed that at  

the time of incident, a bike coming from the right side of the  

bus stopped near the left side headlight at a distance of about  

12 ft. Three persons were riding on the said motor cycle. Two  

persons who were sitting on the rear seat of the motor cycle  

came towards the bus and each of them was carrying a yellow  

coloured can.  One of them came to the left side of the bus and  

sprinkled liquid contained in the can inside the bus through  

the first window shutter. The other poured the liquid from the  

can through the second window.  From the smell,  he could  

understand that they had sprinkled petrol. Dr. Latha (PW.1)  

and Akila (PW.2) begged those persons and pleaded not to do  

any harm. At that time there was a shout “set fire on them,  

then only they will realise”.  Students started coming out of the  

4

bus  from  the  front  entrance.  The  bus  was  put  to  fire  

immediately.  The  persons  who poured  the  petrol  proceeded  

towards the motor cycle and escaped.   

54. P.  Kandasamy (PW.4)  has identified Nedu (A.2)  and C.  

Muniappan  (A.4)  in  the  court  and  pointed  out  that  C.  

Muniappan (A.4) was the person who was sitting on the motor  

cycle, keeping engine running at the time of occurrence. He  

also disclosed that the number of the maroon coloured motor  

cycle  was  TN-29-C-2487  and  identified  the  vehicle  parked  

outside the court.  In cross-examination again and again he  

was  asked  large  number  of  questions,  but  his  deposition  

remained trustworthy throughout.  

55. The  deposition  of  N.  Jagannathan,  cleaner  (PW.5)  

corroborated  the  evidence  of  P.  Kandasamy  (PW.4).  He  

identified A.2 to A.4.  He also identified the motor cycle but  

could not identify the colour and registration number.  He has  

identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade. He has  

denied  the  suggestion  that  he  had  ever  been  shown  any  

4

photograph of either of  A.2 to A.4. He deposed that A.2 to A.4  

were  the persons who sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and  

he  had  given  a  version  of  events  explaining  how  the  girl  

students  got  burn injuries  and some of  them died  because  

they  could  not  come  out  of  the  vehicle.   He  denied  the  

suggestion that he could identify A.2 to A.4 as he had been  

shown their photographs.  

56. Dr. Latha (PW.1) had deposed that she had seen the man  

who  was  pouring  the  petrol.  She  had  identified  A.3  in  the  

court as the man who sprinkled petrol in the bus. She deposed  

that it was A.3 who had shouted “set fire to all, then only they  

will realize” and at that time there was a fire from the front left  

side.  

57. Akila  (PW.2)  had given  same version and corroborated  

the evidence of Dr. Latha (PW.1),  P. Kandasamy (PW.4) and N.  

Jagannathan (PW.5)  and deposed  that  petrol  was  sprinkled  

near  the  seat  which  was  occupied  by  PW.5.  She  identified  

Madhu (A.3) as the person who sprinkled the petrol and stated  

4

that another person lit the match stick and threw it in the bus  

and the bus was burnt into flames. Three girl students were  

charred to death.

58. Preetha (PW.8), a B.Sc. 2nd year student, aged 19 years  

had  deposed  that  she  was  sitting  on  the  double  seat  just  

before the front entrance on the window side. A man sprinkled  

petrol from a yellow can which he was holding on the seat in  

front of her seat through the window shutter. At the same time  

another  person  came  and  poured  petrol  inside  the  bus  

through the  window shutter  which was  near  the  first  seat.  

PWs. 1 and 2 begged them not to harm students. However, in  

the meantime, the front side of the bus caught fire. She had  

suffered  some  burn  injuries  over  her  left  foot.  She  had  

identified  Madhu  (A.3)  in  the  court  as  a  person  who  had  

sprinkled  petrol.  She  denied  the  suggestion  that  she  was  

deposing falsely or identified the accused D.K. Rajendran (A.1)  

and Nedu (A.2) as she had been tutored by the police.  

5

59. Gayathri  G. (PW.11),  another injured witness identified  

Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) in the Court. She explained how  

the petrol was sprinkled by A.2 and A.3 and how PWs. 1 and 2  

begged them not to harm the girls. However, at the same time,  

there was fire at the place where the petrol had been poured.  

She denied any suggestion made by the defence that she was  

deposing falsely or she had identified any of the accused by  

showing their photographs.  

60. R. Suganthi (PW.12) another injured witness had given  

the same version. She had identified Madhu (A.3) in the court  

as a person who had sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and  

N. Thilagavathi (PW.12) another injured witness corroborated  

the genesis of the case as given by the other witnesses. She  

identified  Nedu  (A.2)  in  the  court  as  a  person  who  had  

sprinkled the petrol and denied all suggestions made by the  

defence.  

61. S.  Anitha  (PW.14)  supported  the  prosecution  version  

thoroughly and stated that two persons came to the front of  

5

the bus and sprinkled the petrol. She had identified A.2 to A.4  

in Test Identification Parade denying all suggestions made by  

the defence.  

62. A  large  number  of  injured  witnesses  (students)  were  

examined.  They supported the prosecution case but did not  

identify any person either in the Test Identification Parade or  

in the Court.  M. Kalaivani, M. Krithika, G. Gayathiri and R.  

Suganthi (PWs.9 to 12), R. Banuchitra, Chitra, C. Susma, S.  

Thilagam, P.T.  Sutha, M. Vasantha Gokilam, R.  Abirami,  P.  

Geetha  and  S.  Gayathiri  (PWs.15  to  23),  K.  Sumathi,  M.  

Deivani  and N.  Anbuselvi  (PWs.  26 to 28)  got  injuries,  and  

were treated in the hospital. They were examined in the court.  

Their  seating  position  in  the  bus  had  been such  that  they  

could  not  see  as  who had sprinkled the  petrol  in  the  bus.  

They could see the motorcycle or C. Muniappan (A.4) on the  

scene.  They did not depose anything in this regard.

63. R. Maruthu (PW.51),  photographer, deposed that he was  

contacted  by  Dowlat  Basha  (A.6)  to  cover  the  “Road  Roko  

Agitation”  at  Illakkiampatti  in  stills  and video.   He reached  

5

there on a motorcycle.  There he found D.K. Rajendran (A.1)  

engaged in an agitation with four or five persons.  They were  

raising slogans.  He photographed and videographed the spot  

of  the  agitation.   He  deposed  that  along  with  (A.1),  Muthu  

(A.8), Ravi (A.9), A.P. Murugan (A.11) and Vadivelu (A.12) were  

also  present  there.   Their  photographs  and  negatives  were  

exhibited in the court.  He also photographed the burning bus.  

He reached the spot  when the bus was burning.   Students  

were  shouting.   The  bus  was  full  of  black  smoke.   Some  

persons were trying to break open the rear side glass panes  

and some were dragging the girls from the rear side shutters.  

The fire spread from the front portion and engulfed the whole  

bus  to  the  rear  and  he  had  been  taking  photographs  

continuously.  These photographs were exhibited  as Ex.P.78  

and Ex.P.80.  He watched the video prepared by him in the  

court and identified the same. In the cross-examination,  he  

denied  knowing  the  accused  persons,  particularly,  Madhu  

(A.3),  Velayutham  (A.7),  Sampath   (A.13),  Selvam  (A.26),  

Selvaraj  (A.28)  and Veeramani  (A.30).    However,  they were  

shown in the photographs taken by him.   He was declared  

5

hostile.

64. The shirt (M.O.4), which was worn by Nedu (A.2) at the  

time  of  incident,  had  been   identified  by  most  of  the  eye-

witnesses in the court.  It is stated that this shirt belonged to  

A.2.

65. In  Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v.  State of  West Bengal,  

(2007) 12 SCC 230, this Court disapproved the exhibiting and  

reading of  confessional  statement of  the  accused before  the  

police as a whole before the court, as it had not been brought  

on record in a manner contemplated  by law.  The Court held  

as under :

“Law  does  not  envisage  taking  on  record  the   entire  confession  by  making  it  an  exhibit   incorporating both the admissible or inadmissible   part thereof together.  We  have to point out that   only that part of confession is  admissible, which   could be leading to  the  recovery of  dead body  and/or recovery of articles…………………………..;   the confession proceeded to state even the mode  and manner in which  they allegedly killed.  It   should not have been done.  It may influence the   mind of the Court.”

5

66. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance  

on the  judgments in  Pulukuri Kotayya v.  King-Emperor,  

AIR  1947  PC  67;  the  State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Damu  

Gopinath Shinde & Ors., AIR  2000  SC 1691;  and  Anter  

Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865.

67. Thus,  it  is  evident  from  the  above  that  only  the  

admissible part of extra-judicial confessional statement can be  

exhibited.  The statement as a whole, if exhibited and relied  

upon by the prosecution, leads to the possibility of the court  

getting prejudiced against  the  accused.   Thus,  it  has to  be  

avoided.

68. In the instant case, as has rightly been pointed out by  

Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel that confessional  

statement of  C.  Muniappan (A.4)  had been exhibited in the  

court in its full text.  It was neither required or warranted nor  

was permissible. However, in view of the fact that there had  

been  other  sufficient  material  on  record  to  show  his  

involvement  in  the  crime,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  full  

5

exhibition  of  the  statement  had  not  prejudiced  the  case  

against him.  

Hostile Witness:  

69. It  is  settled  legal  proposition  that  the  evidence  of  a  

prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because  

the  prosecution  chose  to  treat  him  as  hostile  and  cross  

examine  him.   The  evidence  of  such  witnesses  cannot  be  

treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the  

same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found  

to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (vide Bhagwan  

Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra  

Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170; Syad Akbar  

v.  State of   Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848;  and  Khujji  @  

Surendra Tiwari v.  State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC  

1853).

70. In  State of U.P. v.  Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR  

1996  SC  2766,  this  Court  held  that  evidence  of  a  hostile  

witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the  

prosecution or  the  accused but required  to be subjected to  

5

close  scrutiny  and  that  portion  of  the  evidence  which  is  

consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be  

relied upon.   A similar view has been reiterated by this Court  

in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC  

543;  Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v.  State of  Punjab, (2006) 13  

SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v.  State  

of  U.P., AIR  2006  SC  951;  Sarvesh  Naraian   Shukla v.  

Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320; and Subbu Singh v.  

State, (2009) 6 SCC 462.    

Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the  

evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole,  

and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be  

used by the prosecution or the defence.

In the instant case, some of the material witnesses i.e. B.  

Kamal (PW.86);  and R. Maruthu (PW.51) turned hostile.  Their  

evidence  has  been  taken  into  consideration  by  the  courts  

below strictly in accordance with law.   

Some  omissions,  improvements  in  the  evidence  of  the  

PWs have  been pointed  out  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants, but we find them to be  very trivial in nature.  

5

71. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some  

omissions,  contradictions  and  discrepancies,  the  entire  

evidence  cannot  be  disregarded.   After  exercising  care  and  

caution  and  sifting  through  the  evidence  to  separate  truth  

from  untruth,  exaggeration  and  improvements,  the  court  

comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is  

sufficient to convict the accused.  Thus, an undue importance  

should  not  be  attached  to  omissions,  contradictions  and  

discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and  

shake the basic version of the prosecution’s witness.  As the  

mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be  

attuned  to  absorb  all  the  details  of  the  incident,  minor  

discrepancies  are  bound  to  occur  in  the  statements  of  

witnesses. (vide  Sohrab & Anr.  v.  The State of M.P., AIR  

1972 SC 2020; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC  

48;  Bharwada Bhogini Bhai Hirji Bhai v.  State of Gujarat,  

AIR 1983 SC 753;  State of Rajasthan v.  Om Prakash AIR  

2007 SC 2257;  Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr.  v.  State of  

Himachal  Pradesh, (2009)  11  SCC 588;  State  of   U.P. v.  

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Santosh  Kumar  &  Ors., (2009)  9  SCC  626;  and  State v.  

Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151).

Death sentence  

72. The  guidelines  laid  down  by  this  Court  for  awarding  

death sentence  in  Bachan Singh v.  State  of   Punjab, AIR  

1980 SC 898, may be culled out as under:

(a)    The  extreme  penalty  of  death  may  be  inflicted  in  gravest  cases  of  extreme  culpability;

(b)While  imposing  death  sentence  the  circumstances of the offender also require to  be taken into consideration along with the  circumstances of the crime;

(c) Death sentence be imposed only when life  imprisonment  appears  to  be  an  altogether  inadequate  punishment  having regard  to  the  relevant circumstances of the crime; and  

(d) Extreme  penalty  can  be  imposed  after  striking the balance between aggravating and  mitigating circumstances found in the case.  

Aggravating circumstances include:

(a)  If  the  murder  has  been  committed  after  previous  planning  and  involves  extreme  brutality; or  

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(b)  If  the  murder  involves  exceptional  depravity.  

Mitigating circumstances include:

(a) That the offence was committed under the  influence  of  extreme  mental  or  emotional  disturbance;

(b)  The age of the accused. If  the accused is  young  or  old,  he  shall  not  be  sentenced  to  death;  

(c) The probability that the accused would not  commit criminal    acts    of   violence    as  would     constitute   a continuing threat to  society;

(d)  The  probability  that  the  accused  can  be  reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by  evidence  prove  that  the  accused  does  not  satisfy the conditions (c) and (d) above;

(e) That in the facts and circumstances of the  case the accused believed that he was morally  justified in committing the offence;     (f) That the accused acted under the duress or  domination of another person; and

(g) That the condition of the accused showed  that  he  was  mentally  defective  and  that  the  said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate  the criminality of his conduct.  

73. In Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of  Punjab,  AIR 1983  

SC 957, this Court expanded the “rarest of rare” formulation  

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beyond the aggravating factors listed in Bachan Singh (supra)  

to cases where the “collective conscience” of a community is so  

shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial powers to  

inflict the death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion  

as  regards  desirability  or  otherwise  of   retaining  the  death  

penalty, and stated that in these cases such a penalty should  

be inflicted.   But the Bench in this case underlined that full  

weightage must be accorded to the mitigating circumstances  

in  a  case  and  a  just  balance  had  to  be  struck  between  

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court further  

held that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration  

may be motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime,  

or the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as:-  

(i) Murder is in extremely brutal manner so  as  to  arouse  intense  and  extreme  indignation of the community.

(ii) Murder of a large number of persons of a  particular  caste,  community,  or  locality,  is committed.

(iii) Murder of an innocent child;  a helpless  woman, is committed.

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74. In  Devender Pal Singh  v.  State of NCT of Delhi, AIR  

2002 SC 1661,  this Court  referred to both these cases and  

held that death sentence may be warranted when the murder  

is committed in an extremely brutal manner; or for a motive  

which evinces total  depravity and meanness e.g.  murder by  

hired assassin for money or reward, or cold blooded murder  

for gains.  Death sentence may also be justified:  

“(i) When the crime is enormous in proportion.   For instance, when multiple murders, say of all   or almost all the members of a family or a large  number  of  persons  or  a  particular  caste,   community, or locality are committed.

(ii) When the victim of murder is an innocent  child or a helpless woman or old or infirm  person  or  a  person  vis-à-vis,  whom  the  murderer is in a dominating position, or a  public  figure  generally  loved  and  respected by the community.”

(See also  Atbir v.  Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi, JT 2010 (8) SC  372).

75. In  Mahesh v.  State  of  M.P., AIR 1987 SC 1346,  this  

court deprecated the practice of taking a lenient view and not  

imposing the appropriate punishment observing that it will be  

a  mockery  of  justice  to  permit  the  accused  to  escape  the  

extreme penalty  of  law when faced with such evidence and  

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such  cruel  acts.  The  court  held  that  “To  give  a  lesser  

punishment to the appellants would be to render the justice  

system of this country suspect.  The common man will lose  

faith  in  the  courts.   In  such  cases,  he  understands  and  

appreciates  the  language  of  deterrence  more  than  the  

reformative  jargon”.  (See  also  State  of  Punjab v.  Rakesh  

Kumar, AIR 2009 SC 391; and Sahdev v. Jaibar @ Jai Dev &  

Ors.,  (2009) 11 SCC 798).

In  Bantu v.  State  of   U.P., (2008)  11  SCC 113,  this  

Court placing reliance on  Sevaka Perumal v.  State of T.N.  

AIR 1991 SC 1463,  re-iterated the same view  observing as  

under :

“Therefore,  undue  sympathy  to  impose  inadequate  sentence  would  do  more  harm  to  the  justice  system  to  undermine  the  public  confidence  in  the  efficacy  of  law and  society   could  not  long  endure  under  such  serious  threats.  It is, therefore, the duty of every court   to award proper sentence having regard to the  nature of the offence and the manner in which  it was executed or committed etc.”   

Thus,  it  is  evident  that  Criminal  Law  requires  strict  

adherence  to  the  rule  of  proportionality  in  providing  

punishment  according  to  the  culpability  of  each  kind  of  

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criminal conduct keeping in mind the effect of not awarding  

just punishment on the society.   

The “Rarest of the rare case” comes when a convict would  

be a menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful co-

existence of the society. Where an accused does not act on any  

spur-of-the-moment provocation and he indulged himself in a  

deliberately planned crime and meticulously executed it, the  

death sentence may be the most appropriate punishment for  

such a ghastly crime.  

76. Life  imprisonment  is  the  rule  and  death  penalty  an  

exception. Therefore, the Court must satisfy itself that death  

penalty would be the only punishment which can be meted  

out to a convict. The Court has to consider whether any other  

punishment would be completely inadequate and what would  

be the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the case.  

Murder  is  always  foul,  however,  the  degree  of  brutality,  

depravity  and  diabolic  nature  differ  in  each  case.  

Circumstances  under  which  murders  take  place  also  differ  

from case to case and there cannot be a straitjacket formula  

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for deciding upon circumstances under which death penalty  

must be awarded.  In such matters, it is not only a nature of  

crime,  but  the  background  of  criminal,  his  psychology,  his  

social  conditions,  his  mindset  for  committing  offence  and  

effect of imposing alternative punishment on the society are  

also relevant factors.  

77. In the instant case, the girl  students of the University,  

while on tour had been the victims of a heinous crime at the  

tail end of their programme.  The appellants may have had a  

grievance  and  a  right  of  peaceful  demonstration,  but  they  

cannot  claim  a  right  to  cause  grave  inconvenience  and  

humiliation to others,  merely because a competent  criminal  

court has handed down a judicial pronouncement that is not  

to their liking.  A demonstration by the appellants which had  

started  peacefully,  took  an  ugly  turn  when  the  appellants  

started  damaging  public  transport  vehicles.   Damaging  the  

public  transport  vehicles  did  not  satisfy  them  and  the  

appellants became the law unto themselves.  There had been  

no provocation of any kind by any person whatsoever.  Some  

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of the appellants had evil designs to cause damage to a greater  

extent so that people may learn a “lesson”.  In order to succeed  

in  their  mission,  Nedu  @  Nedunchezhian  (A.2),   Madhu  @  

Ravindran(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) went to the extent of  

sprinkling petrol in a bus full of girl students and setting it on  

fire  with the  students still  inside the bus.   They were fully  

aware that the girls might not be able to escape, when they set  

the bus on fire.   As it  happened,  some of  the girls  did not  

escape the burning bus.  No provocation had been offered by  

any  of  the  girls.   Nedu  @  Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  Madhu  @  

Ravindran(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) did not pay any heed  

to the pleas made by Dr.  Latha (PW1) and Akila (PW2), the  

teacher, to spare the girls.  As a consequence of the actions of  

Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3)  and  

C. Muniappan (A.4), three girls stood to death and about 20  

girls  received burn injuries on several  parts of their  bodies.  

There can be absolutely no justification for the commission of  

such a brutal offence.  Causing the death of three innocent  

young girls and causing burn injuries to another twenty is an  

act that shows the highest degree of depravity and brutality on  

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the part of  Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran  

(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4).

The  aggravating  circumstances  in  the  case  of  Nedu @  

Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  Madhu  @  Ravindran  (A.3)  and  C.  

Muniappan  (A.4)  are  that  this  offence  had  been  committed  

after  previous  planning  and  with  extreme  brutality.   These  

murders involved exceptional depravity on the part of Nedu @  

Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  Madhu  @  Ravindran  (A.3)  and  C.  

Muniappan  (A.4).   These  were  the  murders  of  helpless,  

innocent,  unarmed,  young  girl  students  in  a  totally  

unprovoked situation.  No mitigating circumstances could be  

pointed to us,  which would convince us to impose a lesser  

sentence on them.  Their activities were not only barbaric but  

inhuman  of  the  highest  degree.   Thus,  the  manner  of  the  

commission  of  the  offence  in  the  present  case  is  extremely  

brutal, diabolical, grotesque and cruel.  It is shocking to the  

collective  conscience  of  society.   We  do not  see  any cogent  

reason  to  interfere  with  the  punishment  of  death  sentence  

awarded to Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran  

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(A.3)  and  C.  Muniappan  (A.4)  by  the  courts  below.   Their  

appeals are liable to be dismissed.   

So  far  as  the  other  appellants  are  concerned,  the  

maximum sentence to be served by them as per the Judgment  

of the High Court is two years.  Most of these appellants have  

already served more than 14 months of  their  sentence  and  

they are presently on bail.  The incident occurred on 2.2.2000,  

so more than ten and a half years have already elapsed since  

the  incident.   These appellants  have  already  suffered a  lot.  

Thus, their sentences deserve to be reduced.  

78. Before parting with this case, we would like to take note  

of the fact that this crime occurred right in the middle of a  

busy  city.   Innocent  girls  trapped  in  a  burning  bus  were  

shouting  for  help  and  only  the  male  students  from  their  

University came to their rescue and succeeded in saving some  

of  them.   There  were  large  number  of  people  including  the  

shopkeepers,  media  persons  and  on-duty  police  personnel,  

present at the place of the “Rasta Roko Andolan”, which was  

very close  to the  place  of  the  occurrence of  the  crime,  and  

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none  of  them considered  it  proper  to  help  in  their  rescue.  

Even if  the common man fails to respond to the call  of  his  

conscience, the police should not have remained inactive.  The  

so-called administration did not  bother  to find out why the  

police did not intervene and assist in the rescue of  the girl  

students.  It is clear that the so-called protectors of the society  

stood  there  and  witnessed  such  a  heinous  crime  being  

committed and allowed the burning of the bus and roasting of  

the innocent children without being reprimanded for failing in  

their duty. If the common citizens and public officials present  

at the scene of the crime had done their duty, the death of  

three innocent young girls could have been prevented.   

79. In view of the above, all the appeals are dismissed. So far  

as  Nedu @ Nedunchezhian  (A.2),  Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3)  

and  C.  Muniappan  (A.4)  are  concerned,  sentence  of  death  

imposed on them is confirmed and the same  be executed in  

accordance with law.  

However,  in  Criminal  Appeal  Nos.1632-1634  of  2010  

(arising  out  of  SLP  (Crl.)  Nos.  1482-1484  of  2008),  the  

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sentences are reduced as undergone. All of them are on bail,  

their  bail  bonds  stand  discharged.  These  criminal  appeals  

stand disposed of accordingly.

…………………………….J. (G. S. SINGHVI)

……………………..……..J. New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) August  30, 2010   

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