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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5397  of  1997

PETITIONER: C/M. ST. JOHN INTER COLLEGE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GIRDHARI SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       30/03/2001

BENCH: G.B. Pattanaik & D.P. Mohapatra

JUDGMENT:

PATTANAIK,J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   This  appeal  is  directed against the Judgment  of  the Allahabad  High  Court, allowing the writ petition filed  by the  private  respondents.   The respondents  who  were  the employees  of  the  appellant institution,  filed  the  writ petition,  challenging  the  orders   of  termination  dated 13.1.1989  passed  by  the Management.  The sole  ground  of attack  was  that  the  prior   approval  of  the  competent authority,  as required under Section 16G(3)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh  Intermediate  Education   Act,  1921  (herein-after referred  to as the Act), not having been taken, the order of termination, is invalid and inoperative.  The High Court, following  the  majority judgment of the said Court  in  the case  of J.K.  Kalra vs.  R.I.G.S.  and Ors.  set aside  the order of termination of services of the private respondents, passed  by  the  Managing Committee.  The institution  is  a minority  institution within the ambit of Article 30 of  the Constitution,  is  not disputed.  In the circumstances,  the question  that  arises  for  consideration  is  whether  the provisions  of  Section  16G(3)(a)  of the  Act  would  have application to the minority institutions.  The Full Bench of Allahabad  High  Court  in Kalra in its  majority  judgment, after considering the provisions of Section 16G(3)(a) of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, came to hold that there  are sufficient guidelines available to the  authority under  the  said  provision for according  or  refusing  the approval  to  the decision of the Committee  of  Management, and,  therefore,  there  is  no  reason  to  hold  that  the provisions   will  have  no   application  to  the  minority institution.

   Mr.   P.P.   Rao, the learned senior counsel,  appearing for the appellant, contended that the conclusion of the High Court  that  Regulation  44 provides enough  guidelines  for exercise  of  the powers for approval or disapproval of  the decision   of  the  Management,  is  on  the  face   of   it unsustainable  inasmuch  as  the said Regulation  44  merely prescribes  the  time  period within which  the  appropriate

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authority is required to communicate his/her decision to the Management and further provides that if complete papers have not been received, then the approving officer may require it to  resubmit its proposal in complete form.  But there is no whisper,  indicating  the  criteria on which  the  approving officer  is  required to take his decision, and,  therefore, the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid Regulation,  as the guidelines for exercise of power by  the approving  authority.   Mr.   Rao   further  contended  that provisions of Section 16G(3) of the Act, conferring power of approval  on the District Inspector of schools, having  been found  to  be  inadequate,  the  Uttar  Pradesh  legislature enacted   Uttar   Pradesh   Secondary   Education   Services Commission  and Selection Board Act, 1982 (U.P.Act No.  5 of 1982).   Under the 1982 Act, the power of approval has  been conferred on the Commission that is to say the U.P.Secondary Education  Services Commission, established under Section  3 of the said Act and no teacher would be dismissed or removed from the service or reduced in rank unless prior approval of the  Commission  had  been  obtained.   Section  30  of  the aforesaid Act of 1982, exempts the applicability of the said Act  to the minority institutions.  The legislative  intent, therefore,  is  crystal clear that the provisions  regarding the  prior  approval  of any competent authority in  a  case where  teacher  of an institution is dismissed,  removed  or reduced  in rank, will not apply to a minority  institution. This  being the position, the impugned judgment of the  High Court,  interfering  with  the order of termination  of  the employee of the minority institution, passed by the Board of Management, is wholly unsustainable and, therefore, the said judgment is liable to be interfered with by this Court.

   Mr.  O.P.  Sharma, the learned senior counsel, appearing for  the  respondents, on the other hand contended that  the provisions  of  Section  16 G(3)(a) of the Act is  merely  a provision  to check the arbitrary and capricious acts of the Management  in  interfering with the service  conditions  of employees  of the institution.  Such regulatory measure does not  in  any  way  affect  the rights  of  the  minority  to establish  and  administer educational institution of  their choice,  engrafted  under  Article 30 of  the  Constitution. Since  the Regulation provides the criteria for exercise  of power  by  the  approving   authority,  the  said  provision contained  in  Section 16 G(3)(a) can neither be held to  be contravening  Article  30 nor does it contravene Article  14 and as such the majority judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kalras  case correctly lays down the law and the same  does not require any interference.  According to Mr.  Sharma, the Regulation provides an elaborate procedure to be followed by the  punishing  authority and the fact that  the  regulation further  provides that the approving authority can call  for all the necessary papers which is obviously intended for the purpose  of  satisfying  that the  punishing  authority  has followed the prescribed procedure and, therefore, it must be held  that sufficient guidelines are available for  exercise of power under Section 16 G(3)(a) of the Act.  Consequently, the  Division  Bench  of  the High  Court  in  the  impugned judgment, has rightly followed the majority view in the Full Bench  decision in Kalras case and there is no infirmity in the  same.  Mr.  Sharma further urged that Section 32 of the U.P.   Act  5  of  1982, unequivocally  indicates  that  the provisions  of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and  the regulations  made  thereunder,  in so far as  they  are  not inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of   this  Act  or  the

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regulations or rules made thereunder shall continue to be in force  for the purpose of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal,  removal,  termination or reduction in rank of  a teacher.   In this view of the matter, Section 16G(3)(a)  of the  Act must be held to be continuing in force, which would govern  the  cases of dismissal, removal or  termination  or reduction  in rank of a teacher of those institutions, which do  not come within the purview of 1982 Act.   Consequently, the  minority institution being excluded from the purview of 1982  Act by virtue of Section 30, the provisions of Section 16G(3)(a)  must  apply and as such the order of  termination without  prior approval, as contained therein, must be  held to be invalid.

   The  correctness  of the rival submissions would  depend upon  the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Uttar Pradesh  Intermediate  Education Act, 1921, the  regulations framed  thereunder,  the Uttar Pradesh  Secondary  Education Services  Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982,  Article 30 of the Constitution of India and in this context relevant decisions  of this Court will have to be borne in mind.   It would,  therefore  be appropriate at this stage  to  extract some  of the relevant provisions.  Prior to the Intermediate Education  Act,  1921  came   into  force,  the  educational institutions  including  the High Schools  and  Intermediate education  were  all under the supervision of the  Allahabad University.   It was however felt that it would be expedient to  establish  a  Board  to  take  the  place  of  Allahabad University  in regulating and supervising the system of High School  and  Intermediate education in the united  provinces and  for that purpose, the Intermediate Education Act,  1921 was  enacted  which extended to whole of the Uttar  Pradesh. The  expression  institution has been defined  in  Section 2(b)  to  mean  a recognised  Intermediate  College,  Higher Secondary  School  or  High School and  includes  where  the context  so requires, a part of an institution, and Head of Institution means the Principal or Head Master, as the case may  be, of such institution.  The expression  Recognition has been defined in Section 2(d) to mean recognition for the purpose of preparing candidates for admission to the Boards examinations.   Section 15 of the Act empowers the Board  to make regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions  of the Act.  Under Section 16A, the authority to manage  and conduct the affairs of the institution vest with the  Committee  of  Management.  Section 16G  provides  that persons  employed  in  a  recognised  institution  shall  be governed by such conditions of service, as may be prescribed by Regulations.  Under Section 16G(3)(a) no teacher could be discharged  or removed or dismissed from service or  reduced in  rank  without  the  prior approval  in  writing  of  the Inspector  and  under  Section 16G(3)(b) the  Inspector  may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve  or  disapprove  of the notice  for  termination  of service  proposed by the management.  Sections 16G(3)(a) and 16G(3)(b) are extracted hereinbelow in extenso:

   Sec.16G(3)(a):  No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be  discharged or removed from service or reduced in rank or subjected  to  any diminution in emoluments, or served  with notice  of  termination  of service except  with  the  prior approval  in writing of the Inspector.  The decision of  the Inspector  shall  be  communicated within the period  to  be prescribed  by  regulations.  16G(3)(b):  The Inspector  may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or

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approve  or  disapprove  of the notice  for  termination  of service proposed by the management:

   Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders,  the  Inspector  shall give an  opportunity  to  the Principal,  the  Headmaster  or the teacher  to  show  cause within  a  fortnight  of the receipt of the notice  why  the proposed punishment should not be inflicted.

   In  exercise of powers conferred upon the Governor under the  provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate  Education Act  read  with the Amendment Act of 1958, the Governor  has framed a set of regulations in respect of matters covered by Sections 16A, 16B, 16C, 16E, 16F and 16G of the Intermediate Education  Act,  1921.   In the case in hand,  the  relevant regulation  for  our  purpose  is Regulation  44,  which  is extracted hereinbelow in extenso:

   Regulation  44:  The Inspector or Regional  Inspectress shall  communicate his/her decision to the management within six  weeks  of the receipt of its proposal in complete  form for action mentioned in sub-section (3)(a) of Section 16G of the  Act.   If  incomplete  papers  are  received  from  the management  the  approving  officer   shall  require  it  to resubmit its proposal in complete form within two weeks, and the  period of six weeks prescribed in this regulation shall be  reckoned  from  the date on which  complete  papers  are received  by  the  approving officer.   These  papers  shall either be sent by registered post or by special messanger.

   The  Uttar Pradesh legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Seconday  Education Services Commission and Selection  Board Act,  1982  essentially  for  the  purpose  of  establishing Secondary Education Services Commission as well as Selection Board   for  selection  of   teachers  in  the  institutions recognised  under  the Intermediate Education Act  of  1921. The  statement  of  objects  and  reasons  appended  to  the relevant Bill is extracted hereunder:

   The  appointment of teachers in secondary  institutions recognised  by  the  Board of High School  and  Intermediate Education  was  governed by the Intermediate Education  Act, 1921  and regulations made thereunder.  It was felt that the selection  of teachers under the provisions of the said  Act and  the  regulations  was  sometimes  not  free  and  fair. Besides,  the  field  of  selection   was  also  very   much restricted.   This  adversely affected the  availability  of suitable  teachers  and the standard of education.  It  was, therefore,  considered  necessary  to  constitute  Secondary Education  Service Commission at the State level, to  select Principals,  Lecturers, Headmasters and L.T.  Grade teachers and  Secondary  Education Selection Boards at  the  regional level,  to select and make available suitable candidates for comparatively  lower posts in C.T./J.T.C./B.T.C.  grade  for such institutions.

   (2).Under  Section 16-G(3) of the Intermediate Education Act,  1921, Managements were authorised to impose punishment with  the  approval  of District Inspectors  of  Schools  in matters  pertaining to disciplinary action.  This  provision was  found  to be inadequate in cases where  the  management proposed  to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal  or reduction  in  rank and so it was considered necessary  that this power should be exercised subject to the prior approval of  the Commission or the Selection Boards, as the case  may

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be,  which  would function as an independent  and  impartial body.

   (3).Since  the State Legislature was not in session  and immediate  action  was considered necessary with a  view  to setting  up  the  Commission and the Selection  Boards,  the Uttar  Pradesh  Secondary Education Services Commission  and Selection  Boards  Ordinance, 1981 (Uttar Pradesh  Ordinance No.   8 of 1981) was promulgated by the Governor on July 10, 1980.

   Section   21  of  the  aforesaid   Act  of   1982   puts restrictions  on dismissal, removal or reduction in rank  of teachers  and the aforesaid provision has a vital bearing in the present case, which is therefore quoted in extenso:

   Section  21:   Restriction  on  dismissal,  removal  or reduction  in rank of teachers:  (1)No teacher specified  in the  Schedule shall be dismissed or removed from service  or reduced  in  rank and neither his employment may be  reduced nor  he  may be given notice of removal from service by  the management  unless prior approval of the Commission has been obtained.

   Provided that, where reference for prior approval of the Inspector  was  made in accordance with sub-section  (3)  of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, before January  1, 1984, no prior approval of the Commission  shall be  necessary  and  such reference shall be  dealt  with  in accordance  with  the provisions of that Act as if this  Act had  not  come  into  force.  (2).No teacher  other  than  a teacher  specified  in  the Schedule shall be  dismissed  or removed  from  service  or reduced in rank and  neither  his emoluments  may  be  reduced nor he may be given  notice  of removal from service by the management unless prior approval of the Board has been obtained.

   Provided  that where reference for prior approval of the Inspector  was  made in accordance with sub-section  (3)  of Section  16G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921  before the  commencement of this sub-section, no prior approval  of the  Board  shall be necessary and such reference  shall  be dealt  with in accordance with the provisions of that Act as if this Act had not come into force.

   (3)Every  order  of dismissal, removal or  reduction  in rank or removal from service or reduction in emoluments of a teacher  in  contravention of the provisions of  sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be void.

   Date of enforcement  Sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 21 come into force on 1.1.1984 vide Noti. No. 6895/XV-7-2(25)83 dated 27-12-83.

   Section  30 of the said Act provides that nothing in the Act   shall   apply  to  an  institution   established   and administered  by  a  minority referred to  in  clause(1)  of Article  30  of the Constitution of India.  Section  32,  on which  Mr.   Sharma,  appearing for the  respondents  relied upon,  provides that those provisions of 1921 Act which  are not  inconsistent with the provisions of the 1982 Act or the rules  or  regulations  made   thereunder,  the  same  shall continue  to  be  in  force for the  purpose  of  selection, appointment,  promotion, dismissal, removal, termination  or reduction  in rank of a teacher.  The aforesaid provision is

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extracted hereinbelow in extenso:

   Section  32:   Applicability of U.P.Act 11 of 1921. The  provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921  and the  Regulations  made thereunder in so far as they are  not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations  made  thereunder shall continue to be in  force for  the  purpose  of   selection,  appointment,  promotion, dismissal,  removal,  termination or reduction in rank of  a teacher.

   The  very objects and reasons of the aforesaid Act which have been quoted earlier would indicate that the legislature thought  that the provisions contained in Section  16G(3)(a) of  1921  Act were inadequate.  Since power of approval  had been conferred upon a lower educational authority called the District Inspector of Schools, it was, therefore, considered that  said power could be conferred upon a Commission  which could  function  as  an independent and impartial  body  and thus,  the Secondary Education Services Commission came into existence.

   Article  30  of  the  Constitution confers  right  on  a minority  community to establish and administer  educational institutions  of  their  choice.  The rights  emanated  from Article  30  are the right to establish an  institution  and right  to administer it.  The right to administer  engrafted under  Article  30  would  not however  confer  a  right  to maladminister,  as  was  held by this Court in the  case  of Bihar  State Madarasa Board vs.  Madarasa Hanafia, AIR  1990 SC  695.   Even  though, Article 30 does not  lay  down  any limitation  upon  the right of a minority to administer  its educational  institutions, but that right cannot be said  to be  absolute,  as was held by this Court in the case of  St. Xaviers  College vs.  State of Gujarat, A.I.R.1974 SC  1389 and  further  the  rights  must  be  subject  to  reasonable regulations, as was held by this Court in All Saints College vs.   Govt.   of  Andhra  Pradesh,  A.I.R.   1980  SC  1042, consistent   with  the   national  interest.    Regulations, therefore  could  always  be made  to  maintain  educational character  and standard of institution and for that  purpose to  lay  down  qualifications or conditions of  service,  to ensure  orderly,  efficient and sound administration and  to prevent   mal-administration,  to   ensure  efficiency   and discipline   of  the  institution   and  for  several  other objectives,   which  would  be  for   the  benefit  of   the institution  and which would not offend the right  engrafted under  Article 30.  It would always be permissible to  frame regulations  so long as the regulations do not restrict  the right  of  administration  of  the  minority  community  but facilitate  and ensure better and more effective exercise of that  right for the benefit of the institution.  But such  a regulatory provision will cease to be regulation where power conferred  upon the appropriate authority is uncanalised  or unreasonable.   Regulations also cannot go to the extent  of annihilating  the  right guaranteed by Article  30(1).   The Regulation  made  for  achieving competence of  teachers  or maintenance  of  discipline in the conditions of service  or providing for an appeal against the order of termination and the  like would not be held to be violative of the right  to administer  enshrined  under Article 30 of the  Constitution but  nonetheless if the said provisions confer an  authority on  a body which is uncanalised or unreasonable or there  is no  guiding  principle, then the same cannot be upheld.   In this  view of the matter, the State could impose regulations

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even  upon  a  minority  institution,   which  would  be  in consonance  with  Article 30(1) and such regulation must  be reasonable  and  must  be   regulative  of  the  educational character  of  the institution and conducive to  making  the institution  an  effective  vehicle  of  education  for  the minority   community.   When  any   regulatory  measure   is assailed,  it would be obligatory for the Court to find  out as  to  whether the provision in fact secures  a  reasonable balance  between  ensuring a standard of excellence  of  the institution  and of preserving the right of the minority  to administer the institution as a minority institution, as was held  by this Court in the case of St.  Xaviers college vs. State  of  Gujarat,  A.I.R.   1974   S.C.   1389,  but  such regulatory   provision  if  found  to  have   offended   the provisions  of  Article 14, then the same has to  be  struck down,  as  was  indicated  in  the  case  of  Frank  Anthony Employees Association vs.  Union of India AIR 1987 SC 311.

   Let  us now notice some of the decisions of this  Court. In Kerala Education Bill, 1957, (case 1959 S.C.R., 995) this Court had observed the Constitutional right to administer an educational institution by the minority of their choice does not  necessarily militate against the claim of the State  to insist  that  it  may prescribe  reasonable  regulations  to ensure  the  excellence of the institutions.  In  Sidhajbhai Sabhai  and Ors.  vs.  State of Bombay, 1963(3) S.C.R.837, a Constitution  Bench  observed that Regulations made  in  the true  interests  of efficiency of instructions,  discipline, health,  sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly   be  imposed  and   such  regulations  are  not restrictions  on  the  substance  of   the  right  which  is guaranteed;   they  secure  the proper  functioning  of  the institution, in the matters educational.  In State of Kerala vs.   Very Rev.  Mother Provincial, 1971(1) S.C.R., 734,  it had been stated that the right of management in respect of a minority  institution  cannot be taken away and vested  with somebody  else,  as  that  would be  encroachment  upon  the guaranteed  right but that right is not an absolute one  and it  is  open  to the State to regulate the syllabus  of  the examination  and  discipline  for   the  efficiency  of  the institution  and  the  right of the State  to  regulate  the education or educational standards and allied matters cannot be  denied.   In St.  Xaviers College Society & Anr.   etc. vs.   State  of Gujarat and Anr., 1975(1) S.C.R.  173,  this Court  had  observed:   Regulations which would  serve  the interest  of the students, regulations which would serve the interests  of  the teachers are of paramount  importance  in good  administration.   Regulations  in   the  interest   of efficiency   of  teachers,  discipline   and   fairness   in administration  are  necessary for preserving harmony  among affiliated  institutions. In Lilly Kurian vs.  Sr.   Lewine and  Ors.,  1979(1)  S.C.R.  820, the  Court  had  observed: Protection  of the minorities is an article of faith in the Constitution  of India.  The right to the administration  of institutions of minoritys choice enshrined in Article 30(1) means  management  of  affairs of the  institution.   This right  is,  however, subject to the regulatory power of  the State.     Article   30(1)   is     not   a   charter    for mal-administration;   regulation,  so  that   the  right  to administer  may  be better exercised for the benefit of  the institution  is permissible;  but the moment one goes beyond that  and  imposes, what is in truth, not a mere  regulation but  an  impairment of the right to administer, the  Article comes  into play and the interference cannot be justified by

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pleading  the interest of the general public;  the interests justifying  interference  can  only be the interest  of  the minority  concerned."    In  Frank  Anthony  Public  School Employees  Association vs.  Union of India & Ors.,  1987(1) S.C.R.  238, the Court was examining the validity of Section 12 of Delhi School Education Act.  Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and  8(5) were held not to have encroached upon any right of the  minority to administer their educational  institutions. But  Section  8(2)  which stipulated that no employee  of  a recognised  private  school shall be dismissed,  removed  or reduced  in rank nor his services will be terminated  except with  the  prior approval of the Director was held  to  have interfered  with  the right of the minority, and  therefore, the  said  provision  was  held to be  inapplicable  to  the minority  institutions.  The aforesaid dictum, no doubt, was in   respect  of  an   unaided  minority  institution.   The conspectus  of  the aforesaid decision would  indicate  that there  would be no bar for the Government to have regulatory measures  for  ensuring  a  standard of  excellence  of  the institutions  and such a measure would not in any way affect the  right  of the minority to administer  its  institutions engrafted   in   Article  30  of  the   Constitution.    But notwithstanding  the  same,  if  the  so  called  regulatory measures  conferring  power  on   any  specified  authority, without  indicating  any  guidelines for  exercise  of  that power,  then  exercise  of  such power  by  the  appropriate authority  would  offend  the provisions of Article  14  and would not be allowed to be retained, as that would amount to an  arbitrary inroad into the right of the minority, in  the matter of administering its institutions.  In another words, if   the  regulatory  provision   conferring  power  on  the educational  authority is uncanalised and unguided and  does not  indicate  any  guidelines under which  the  educational authority  could  exercise  the said power, then in  such  a case,  the conferment of a blanket power on the  educational authority  would interfere with the right of control of  the employer-minority  institution  in the matter of  exercising disciplinary  control over the employees of the institution. So  adjudged, we are unable to find any guideline in Section 16G(3)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act to be  followed by the Inspector in the matter of approving  or disapproving  the  order of termination of a service  of  an employee  of  the  aided educational  institution.   We  are unable  to accept the reasonings of the majority judgment of the  Full  Bench of Allahabad High Court that Regulation  44 provides  the  guidelines.   The said Regulation  44  merely prescribes the period within which the Inspector or Regional Inspectress  is required to communicate his/her decision  to the  Management  and further in a case where all the  papers have  not  been  received  from  the  Management,  the  said Inspector/Inspectress  could  call for the papers  from  the Management.   But  that by no stretch of imagination can  be held to be providing the guidelines for exercise of power in the  matter  of  approval  or disapproval of  the  order  of termination  passed by the Management.  Since no appropriate guidelines  have  been provided for exercise of power  under Section  16G(3)(a) of the Act, it must be held that such  an uncanalised  power on the Inspector or the Inspectress would tantamount  to  an  inroad into the  power  of  disciplinary control   of   the  Managing   Committee  of  the   minority institution  over  its  employees  and   as  such  the  said provision  would  not apply to the minority institution,  as was  held  by this Court in Frank Anthonys case.   In  this view  of  the  matter, the majority view in the  Full  Bench Judgment  of  Allahabad  High  Court  must  be  held  to  be

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erroneous and cannot be sustained.

   The  second  submission of Mr.  Rao on the basis of  the coming  into force of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary  Education (Services  Selection  Boards)  Act, 1982 is  also  of  great force.   The  Statement  of  Objects   and  Reasons  of  the aforesaid  U.P.  Act No.  5/82, unequivocally indicates that the  earlier provisions contained under Section 16G(3)(a) of the  Intermediate  Education  Act,  1921 were  found  to  be inadequate,  where  the  Management proposed to  impose  the punishment  of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.   In other  words,  the  legislature thought that  the  power  of approval or disapproval to an order of punishment imposed by the management should not be vested with a lower educational authority  like District Inspector of Schools but should  be vested  with an independent Commission or Board which  could function  as  an independent and impartial body.   With  the aforesaid  objective in view, the legislature having enacted the  Uttar  Pradesh Secondary Education (Services  Selection Boards)  Act,  1982 and the Service Selection  Board  having brought  into existence in exercise of power under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act, the power of the Inspector/Inspectress under  Section 16G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education  Act, 1921   no  longer  could  be   exercised,  as  it  would  be inconsistent  with the provisions of U.P.  Act No.  5/82 and would  frustrate  the very object for which the  legislation has  been  enacted.   Section  32  of  the  U.P.   Act  5/82 provides:

   Sec.32.   Applicability  of  U.P.Act II of  1921.-  The provisions  of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and  the Regulations  made  thereunder  in  so far as  they  are  not inconsistent  with the provisions of this Act (or the  rules made  thereunder)  shall  continue to be in  force  for  the purposes  of  selection, appointment, promotion,  dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher.

   MR.   Sharma, appearing for the respondents,  vehemently urged  before us that though for all other institutions, the power  of  approval  or  disapproval  against  an  order  of termination   of  an  employee  of  an   aided   educational institution  had been vested with the selection board  under U.P.   Act 5/82, but in respect of the minority institution, it   must   be   held  to   have  been   vested   with   the Inspector/Inspectress and that power still vested with those authorities,  notwithstanding the coming into force the U.P. Act  5/1982.  We are unable to accept this submission, as in our  view,  there cannot be any rational for conferring  the power  of approval or disapproval of an order of termination of   an   employee  of  a  minority  institution  with   the Inspector/Inspectress  and with all other institutions  with the  Service Selection Board.  Having conferred the power of approval/disapproval  with  the Selection Board  under  U.P. Act 5/82, the legislature made it crystal clear by inserting Section 30 therein which states:  Nothing in this Act shall apply  to  an institution established and administered by  a minority  referred  to  in Clause (1) of Article 30  of  the Constitution  of  India.   The legislative  intent  is  thus apparent  that the legislature never intended to subject the order   of  termination  of  an   employee  of  a   minority institution  to  the approval/disapproval of  the  Selection Board.   In this view of the matter, it is difficult for  us to  hold  that an order of termination of an employee  of  a minority  institution  cannot  be given  effect  to,  unless

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approved by either the Inspector/Inspectress, as provided in Section  16G(3)(a)  or by the Selection Board,  as  provided under  U.P.   Act 5/82.  Under the provisions, as it  stand, the  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  question  of  prior approval  of the competent authority in case of an order  of termination  of  an employee of a minority institution  does not  arise.  In the aforesaid premises, the majority view in the Full Bench Judgment of Allahabad High Court is set aside and this appeal is allowed.  The writ petition filed, stands dismissed.

   J.  (G.B.  PATTANAIK)

   J.  (D.P.  MOHAPATRA)

   March 30, 2001.

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