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PETITIONER: C.   L. SUBRAMANIAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COCHIN

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1972

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1972 AIR 2178            1972 SCR  (3) 485  1972 SCC  (3) 542  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC1686  (22)  F          1983 SC 109  (12)  D          1983 SC 454  (5)  RF         1991 SC1221  (3)

ACT: Art.  311  of  the  Constitution  read  with  Central  Civil Services  (Conduct)  Rules,  1955---Rule   12(1)--Preventive officer,  Customs, purchased taxis in the name of  his  wife after  informing  higher authorities--Whether  violation  of rule  12(1)  Central Civil Services (Conduct)  Rules  1955-- -Whether  denial of the assistance of a lawyer is  violation of  the Rule of the Central Civil Services  (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957.

HEADNOTE: The appellant, a preventive officer, applied for  permission to  allow his wife to run a taxi service.  He  was  informed that  no  permission was necessary.   Thereafter,  appellant acting  on  behalf of his wife, purchased a few  cars  which were  used  as taxis.  Later several  complaints  were  made against  him to the effect that he was  canvassing  business for his wife.  Enquiry was made and the appellant was served with   a  memorandum  stating  that  while  functioning   as Preventive Officer he had contravened the provisions of Rule 12(1)  of the Central Civil Services (Conduct)  Rules  1955. The  factual  allegation  made  against  him  was  that   he canvassed  business  for his wife.  An Enquiry  Officer  was appointed.   On  enquiry the appellant was found  guilty  of contravening  rule  12(1)  of  the  Central  Civil   Service (Conduct)  Rules  1955,  and his removal  from  service  was recommended.   On  the  basis of  that  recommendation,  the Disciplinary  Authority served on the appellant a notice  to show  cause why he should not be removed from service.   The appellant  submitted his explanation; but  the  Disciplinary was  not  satisfied  and consequently,  the  appellant.  was removed from service. The appellant challenged the order by a writ petition  which was  dismissed  both  by  a single judge as  well  as  by  a Division Bench of the High Court.  On appeal to this  Court, it  was contended by the appellant that he was not  given  a reasonable  opportunity  of being heard in  respect  of  the

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charge  levelled  against him and there was a  violation  of rule  15  of ,the Central  Civil  Services  (Classification, Control   &  Appeal)  Rules  1957  and  Art.  311   of   the Constitution.  Hence the order of removal was bad in law One trained  police prosecutor, was appointed as the officer  to present  the case before the Enquiry Officer in  support  of the allegations made against the appellant.  Therefore,  the appellant wrote to the Disciplinary Authority for permission to  engage  a counsel to defend his case, but even  after  a number of written requests, he was not given the  permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend himself.   Further, the  appellant  was denied the assistance  of  a  government servant.  Allowing  the appeal, HELD:(i) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it was  clear  that  the  appellant had  not  been  afforded  a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.  The grievance  of the   appellant  that  he  was  pitted  against  a   trained prosecutor was not considered by the Disciplinary authority. The fact that the case against the appellant was being  hand led  by a trained prosecutor was a good ground for  allowing the  appellant to engage a legal practitioner to defend  him lest the scales should be weighted against 3--L1031SupCI/72 486 him.   The  disciplinary authority completely  ignored  that circumstance.   Therefore, that authority clearly failed  to exercise the power conferred on it under the rule. [490 G] (ii)There  had been a clear violation of rule 15(5) of  the Central  Civil Service (Classification, Control  &  Appeal). Rules  1957  which provides for the engagement  of  a  legal practitioner  in  certain circumstances.  The  present  case required  that  the appellant be given a  chance  to  defend himself  by a legal practitioner.  Since he was denied  such an  opportunity, the order was bad and therefore, it  should be struct down. 1495 HI Pet. v. Greyhound Racing Assn.  Ltd., [1968] 2 All E.R. 545; Kalindi  Ors.  v.  Tata Locomotive &  Engineering  Co.  Ltd, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 407; Brooke Bond India Private Ltd. v. Subba Ramman  (S)  & another, [1961] 2 L.L.J. 417,  discussed  and distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1971. Appeal  by Special Leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  26, 1970 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal  No. 197 of 1968. Appellant appeared in person. Gobind Dass and S. P. Nayar, for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hedge,  J.,  This  is  an  appeal  by  special  leave.   The appellant  was  a  Preventive Officer,  Grade,  11,  Customs Office,  Cochin from June 16, 1962 to January 31, 1963.   In April  1962,  he  applied  to  the  Assistant  Collector  of Customs, seeking permission to allow his wife to run a  taxi service.   He was informed that no permission was  necessary for  his wife to operate a taxi service but he  should  not canvass  any business for his wife.  Thereafter, it is  said that  the appellant acting on behalf of his  wife  purchased some  cars which were used as taxis.  It appears that  there were several ,complaints against the appellant to the effect that  he  was  canvassing  business  for  his  wife.   Those complaints were enquired into.  Thereafter on March 25, 1963 the  appellant  was served with’ a memorandum  stating  that

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while  functioning as Preventive Officer, Grade  II,  Cochin Customs  House, during the period June 1962 to  January  31, 1963 he had contravened the provisions of rule 12(1) of  the Central  Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955.  The  factual allegation made against the appellant was that he  canvassed business for his wife.  He was told that an enquiry will  be held against him on the basis of that charge. Sri H. T. Soares, Assistant Collector, Customs House, Cochin was  appointed as the Enquiry Officer.  During the  pendency of the enquiry an additional ground in support of the charge was  487 served  on the appellant to the effect that he  himself  was running the taxi service.  After enquiry the Enquiry Officer came  to the, conclusion that the allegations  made  against the  appellant  were  established and  consequently  he  was guilty  of  contravening  rule 12(1) of  the  Central  Civil Service   (Conduct)  Rules,  1955.   The   Enquiry   Officer recommended appellant’s removal from service.  On the  basis of that recommendation the Disciplinary Authority served  on the  appellant a notice to show cause why he should  not  be removed from service.  The appellant submitted his  explana- tion.   But  the same was not accepted by  the  Disciplinary Authority.   In the result the appellant was ordered  to  be removed from service. The  appellant challenged that order by means of a  petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court  of Kerala.  His writ petition was first heard by a single judge who  dismissed the same and the order of the single  _judge- was affirmed by a Division Bench of that High Court.   Hence this appeal. The  appellant personally argued his appeal.  He  challenged the  validity  of  the order removing him  from  service  on various  grounds.   As  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the appellant  had not been afforded reasonable  opportunity  to present his case and consequently the impugned order has  to be  struck  down, we do not think it  necessary  to  examine other contentions advanced by the appellant. The  appellant who was a member of the civil service of  the Union of India was holding his office during the pleasure of the President; but in view of Art. 311 of the  Constitution, he  could  not have been removed from service  except  after enquiry in which he had been given a reasonable  opportunity of  being  heard in respect of the charge  levelled  against him.   This procedural guarantee is undoubtedly  a  valuable one.  Breach of that guarantee vitiates the enquiry. Removal  from  service is a major  penalty.   Procedure  for imposing  major  penalties is prescribed in rule 15  of  the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and  Appeal) Rules,   1957,  a  rule  framed  under  Art.  309   of   the Constitution.  Sub-rule (5) of that rule provides               "The Disciplinary Authority may nominate  any,               person  to present the case in support of  the               charges  before the authority  inquiring  into               the charges (herein-’ after referred to as the               Inquiring Authority).  The Government  servant               may  present his case with the  assistance  of               any   Government  servant  approved   by   the               Disciplinary  Authority, but may not engage  a               legal practitioner for the purpose unless  the               person nominated by               488               the  Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is  a               legal practitioner or unless the  Disciplinary               Authority, having regard to the  circumstances

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             of the case , so permits." This rule bears upon the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Art. 311. The validity of; this rule was not  challenged. Hence  all that we have to see is whether the rule had  been complied  with.  For deciding this question it is  necessary to refer to the relevant facts. In September 1963, one A. M. Shivaraman was appointed as the officer  to present the case before the Enquiry  Officer  in support of the allegations made against the appellant.   The said  Shivaraman was a trained police prosecutor.  After  he was  appointed  to  present  the  case  in  support  of  the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant  wrote to  the  Collector  of  Customs,  Cochin,  the  Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows :               "From : C. L. Subramanlam,               Preventive Officer,               Customs House, Cochin-3.               TO               The Collector of-Customs,               Customs House, Cochin-3.               Sir,               Sub : Sec. 1/63 Estt-Cus dated 30th  September               1963.               In  the  above  memorandum  it  is  stated  in               paragraph 4, that Shri A. M. Sivaraman as  the               officer to present the case in support of the-               allegations  against  me  before  the  Enquiry               Officer.                I  understand  that Shri A. M.  Sivaraman  is               legally trained to conduct such  prosecutions.               Under such circumstances I will be  prejudiced               in my defence- unless I am permitted to engage               a  counsel to appear and defend me during  the               enquiry.   Hence I request that permission  be               accorded  to engage a lawyer of my  choice  to               represent  and defend the charges  before  the               Enquiry Officer.               Cochin-3, 4-10-1963                                         Yours faithfully,                                  Sd/- C. L. Subramaniam".               He again reiterated his request for permission               to engage a               counsel  to  defend him in his letter  to  the               Assistant Collector on                489               October 9, 1963.  Thereafter he again wrote to               the  Collector of Customs on October 14,  1963               as follows               It may help me very much too, if you can grant               the  permission I have sought for  engaging  a               Counsel of my choice at an early date so (that               I  could get the Counsel’s assistance for  the               inspection of documents too."               On  October  17, 1963, Sri  Scares,  Assistant               Collector  of Customs wrote to  the  appellant               thus               "Secret 1/1/63 Est.  Cus               Custom House, Cochin-3               17th September 1963               From               The Assistant Collector of Customs,               Appraising Department,               Customs House, Cochin-3               TO               Shri C.L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer,

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             Custom House, Cochin-3.               Sub : Establishment-Inquiry into the work  and               conduct of Shri C. L. Subramaniam,  Preventive               Officer, Custom House, Cochin.               With  reference to your letter Sc.  1/63/Estt.               Cus   dated  14th  October  1963,   requesting               permission for engaging a counsel to  appear               and  defend  you,  during the  enquiry,  I  am               directed  by the Collector to inform you  that               although  Shri  A. M. Sivaraman  is  illegally               trained,  he is not a legal  practitioner  and               hence  there  is no necessity for  engaging  a               lawyer to defend you at the enquiry.               Sd/- H. T. Soares,               Assistant Collector of Customs". It is clear from that letter that the Disciplinary Authority had overlooked the fact that the appellant sought permission to  engage  counsel  not  because  Sivaraman  wag  a   legal practitioner but because he was trained prosecutor. On January 6, 1964, the appellant again wrote to the Collec- tor  of  Customs explaining his  difficulties  in  defending himself.   In  Paragraph  4 of that  letter,  the  appellant stated               "In the nature of accusations made against  me               and the nature of their widespread source  the               importance               490               of  the informants and their  intentions,  the               varying  types  of  witnesses  supporting  the               charge,   the   complicated  nature   of   the               evidence, the inexperience I have in assessing               the impact of such evidence and in sifting the               evidence  for  preparing an  effective  cross-               examination   and   above  all   the   lurking               conspiracy of a series of persons whom I  have               to deal with firmly in discharging my  duties               as  a Preventive Officer, all these when  con-               sidered  can lead you to the  only  conclusion               that  if  I  am denied the  assistance  of  an               experienced counsel at the enquiry it would be               tantamount  to  denial of  an  opportunity  to               defend  myself and prove my  innocence.   This                             ’would be particularly so in the conte xt of the               present enquiry where evidence have sought  to               be brought in by different stages and  alleged               incidents subsequent to the charges are sought               to  be  proved in support of  the  allegations               made before such incidents." Despite  these  communications, the appellant was  not  give permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend  himself Therefore the question arises whether the appellant was give reasonable opportunity to defend himself in accordance  with sub  rule  (5)  of rule 15 of  the  Central  Civil  Services (Classification  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1957.    The portion  of  that  rule that is  relevant  for  our  present purpose  is the last clause which say that  the  Government servant may not engage a legal practitioner for the  purpose mentioned in that clause "unless the Disciplinary  Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits". The grievance of the appellant was that he was pitted  again a  trained  prosecutor and not that Sivaraman  was  a  legal practitioner.   The Disciplinary Authority did not  consider that  grievance.   It  brushed  aside  the  request  of  the appellant  on  the  ground that Sivaraman was  not  a  legal

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practitioner, a consideration which was not relied on by the appellant.  The grounds urged by the appellant in support of his  request for permission to engage a  legal  practitioner were by no means irrelevant.  The fact that the case against the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor  was a  good ground for allowing the appellant to engage a  legal practitioner  to  defend  him  lest  the  scales  should  be weighted against him.  The Disciplinary Authority completely ignored that circumstance.  Therefore that authority clearly failed to exercise the power conferred on it under the rule. It is not unlikely that the Disciplinary Authority’s refusal to  permit the appellant to engage a legal  practitioner  in the  circumstances  mentioned  earlier  had  caused  serious prejudice  to the appellant and had amounted to a denial  of reasonable opportunity to defend him self. 491 The  appellant  contended that he had a right  to  engage  a legal  practitioner to defend him.  He sought to  spell  out that  right on, the basis that what he could himself do,  he could  get  it  done  by  an  agent  of  his  and  a   legal practitioner acting for him would only have been his  agent. In  support  of  his contention he placed  reliance  on  the decision in Pet v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd.(4). The facts of that case were as follows Track  stewards of a greyhound racing stadium owned  by  the defendants  proposed to hold an inquiry into the  withdrawal of a trainer’s dog from a race at a stadium licensed by  the National  Greyhound Racing Club.  The inquiry  involved  the question  whether  drugs had been administered to  the  dog. The  trainer  held  a licence from  the  National  Greyhound Racing Club entitling him to race dogs on tracks licensed by the  club, and thus the result of the inquiry might  involve the  trainer’s reputation and livelihood.  The rules of  the club,  to which the trainer had agreed when he obtained  his licence,  did not prescribe the procedure to be followed  by track stewards at their inquiries, and did not exclude legal representation.   The procedure in fact followed at such  an inquiry allowed the trainer to be present, to hear the  evi- dence and to have an opportunity to question witnesses.  The trainer sought to be represented by counsel and solicitor at the enquiry but the track stewards decided ultimately not to allow legal representation.  On appeal from the grant of  an interlocutory injunction restraining the inquiry from  being held unless the trainer were allowed to be represented,  the Court  of  Appeal  held that prima  facie  the  trainer  was entitled  to an oral hearing and, the inquiry being  one  of serious  importance  to  him, to be  represented  as  it  by counsel  and  solicitor,  for he was entitled  not  only  to appear  himself but also to appoint an agent on his  behalf, and  so  was entitled to appoint lawyers to  represent  him. Lord  Denning, M. R. who delivered the main judgment of  the court  in  the  course  of his  judgment  dealing  with  the decision  of  stewards  that  they  will  not  hear  lawyers observed               "I   cannot  accept  this   contention.    The               plaintiff is here facing a serious charge.  He               is charged either with giving the dog drugs or               with  not exercising proper control  over  the               dog so that someone else drugged it.  If he is               found  guilty,  he  may be  suspended  or  his               licence  may  not  be  renewed.,  The   charge               concerns  his reputation and  his  livelihood.               On such an inquiry I think that he is entitled               not  only  to appear by himself  but  also  to               appoint  an  agent  to act for  him.   Even  a

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             prisoner can have his friend."               (1)   [1968] 2 All E.R. 545.               492               Proceeding   further  the  Master   of   Rolls               observed               "I should have thought, therefore, that when a               man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake, he               not  only  has  a right to speak  by  his  own               mouth.   He  has  also a  right  to  speak  by               counsel or solicitor." This  decision, in our opinion, does not bear on  the  point under   consideration.   Herein  we,  are  dealing  with   a statutory  rule, which prohibits the appointment of a  legal practitioner  excepting under certain circumstances.   Hence the  agency theory has no relevance nor are we  required  to consider   the  principles  of  natural  justice  as   those principles are only relevant when the concerned procedure is not  regulated by any statute or statutory rule.   The  rule laid down in Pet’s case(1) has not commended itself to  this Court.    In  Kalindi  and  ors.  v.  Tata  Locomotive   and Engineering  Co.   Ltd.(2), a question arose whether  in  an enquiry  by  management into misconduct of  a  workman,  the workman  was entitled to be represented by a  representative of  the Union.  Answering this question this Court  observed that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by  the management has no right to be represented at such an enquiry by a representative of the Union though the employer in  his discretion  can and may allow him to be so represented.   In such enquiries fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain  acts of misconduct were committed by a  workman  or not fall to be considered and the workman is best suited  to conduct the case.  Ordinarily, in enquiries before  domestic tribunals  a person accused of any misconduct  conducts  his own  case  and  so it cannot be said  that  in  any  enquiry against a workman natural justice demands that he should  be represented by a representative of his Union.  The same view was taken by this Court in Brooke Bond India (Private)  Ltd. v.  Subba  Raman (S) and anr.(3). That view  was  reiterated again in Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Workmen (4 ). The  learned counsel for the State relied on  the  decisions mentioned  above  in  support of  his  contention  that  the appellant was not entitled to have the assistance of a legal practitioner.   This contention is without force.  In  those cases  this  Court considered, whether  a  person  proceeded against in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal had a right to  be  represented  by someone else on  the  basis  of  the principles  of natural justice.  Therein this Court was  not called upon to consider either the limits of the  reasonable opportunity to defend oneself, guaranteed under Art. 311  or the scope of a statutory rule.  The question that falls  for decision  in this case did not arise for decision  in  those cases. (1)  [1968] 2 All E.R. 545. (3)  [1961] 2 L.L.J. 417. (2)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 407. (4)  [1965] 2 S.C.R. 139.  493 The  appellant supported his complaint of breach of rule  15 (5)  on yet another ground.  After the  appellant’s  request for  engaging  a  counsel was  rejected,  he  requested  the Disciplinary  Authority  to let him have the  assistance  of Abraham  Kurian, clerk, Cochin Head Post  Office,  Cochin-1. This request he appears to have made long before the date of enquiry  i.e. December 5, 1963.  He had also  requested  the Disciplinary  Authority  to move the  superiors  of  Abraham

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Kurian to grant permission to Abraham Kurian to assist him . But  it  appears  the Disciplinary Authority  wrote  to  the Superintendent  of Post Offices who is stationed at  Trichur only on the 28th of November, 1963 requesting him to  permit Abraham Kurian to assist the appellant.  That  communication was  not received by the Superintendent of Post  Offices  in time.   Hence  Abraham  Kurian did not  get  the  permission sought before the date of enquiry.  After learning that fact from  Abraham  Kurian,  the appellant  wrote  the  following letter to the Collector of Customs on December 4, 1963. "Sec.  1/1/63/Estt-Cus. No. 16 Customs Quarters Willingdon island, P.O. Cochin-3. 4th December 1963. From C. L., Subramaniam, Preventive Officer Gr. II, Customs House, Cochin-3. To The  Collector  of Customs & Central Excise,  Custom  House, Cochin-3. Sir, Sub-Enquiry  into  the  work  and  conduct  of  Shri  C.  L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, Custom House, Cochin-3. With reference to your letter dated 3rd December, 1963  wish to submit as follows Shri  Abraham Kurian, Clerk, Cochin Head Post Office who  is to  assist  me in the enquiry from 5-12-1963  in  connection with  certain  allegations pending against me  has  urgently applied  to  his superior yesterday itself and  is  awaiting permission. 494 As I cannot appear for the enquiry without assistance I  re- quest you Sir, to adjourn the hearing by 10 days.               Thanking you,               I remain Sir,               Yours faithfully,               Sd/- C. L. Subramaniam."               On  the  date  of  the  enquiry,  the  Enquiry               Officer  adjourned  the case  sine  die  after               obtaining  an undertaking from  the  appellant               that on the next date of the enquiry he  would               go  on with the case even if he was unable  to               get  the assistance of Abraham Kurian on  that               date.   On  December 9,  1963,  the  appellant               wrote to the Enquiry Officer as follows               "Sec.  No. 1/1/63 Estt.  Cus.                            9th December 1963 From               C. L. Subramaniam,               Preventive Officer,               Custom House, Cochin-3.               To :               The  Asstt.   Collector of  Customs  (Apprg.),               Enquiry Officer,               Custom House, Cochin-3.               Sir,               Sub  :  Enquiry into the work and  conduct  of               Shri  C. L. Subramaniam,  Preventive  Officer,               Custom House Cochin. I  understand  from a communication from the  Senior  Super- intendent   of  Post  Offices,  Trichur  addressed  to   the Assistant  Collector  of  Customs  (Apprg.),  Custom  House, Cochin with copy endorsed to Shri Abraham Kurian, that  your communication  informing that the enquiry was to  have  been held   from   5-12-1963   was   received   by   the   Senior

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Superintendent  of Post Offices only on 5th December,  1963, and  therefore the relief arrangement could not be  made  by him. Now  that the enquiry is adjourned it is requested that  you may  be good enough to inform the Senior  Superintendent  of Post  Offices, Trichur (Superior Officer of  the  Government who assists 495 me)  sufficiently early ’as to the date of the  enquiry,  so that he may relieve the Government servant in time. It  is  humbly pointed out that unless  your  goodself  take necessary  action  in  time in this regard  it  may  not  be possible to get me the assistance I have requested for.                                  Yours faithfully,                                   Sd/- 9-12-63                                 (C. L. Subramaniam)" Even after getting this letter, the Enquiry Officer did  not fix  the date of the enquiry.  It appears that  on  December 30,  1963 the Enquiry Officer fixed January 8, 1964  as  the date  of  enquiry.  It is only thereafter he  wrote  to  the Superintendent  of  Post Offices requesting  him  to  permit Abraham  Kurian  to assist the appellant.  It is  not  known when that letter was received by the Superintendent of  Post Offices  but  Abraham  Kurian did  not  get  the  permission sought, before the date of enquiry.  Therefore he was unable to  assist the appellant in the enquiry.  Hence the  enquiry went on without the appellant having anybody’s assistance. From  the facts set out above, it is clear that the  Enquiry Officer  did not afford the appellant necessary facility  to have  the  assistance  of  another  Government  servant   in defending him which assistance he was entitled to under  the rule.   He was deprived   of that assistance solely  because of the indifferent attitude adopted by the Enquiry  Officer. Therefore we have no hesitation in coming to the  conclusion that the Enquiry Officer had clearly breached rule 15(5). It  is  needless to say that rule 15 is  a  mandatory  rule. That  rule  regulates  the  guarantee  given  to  Government servants  under Art. 311. Government servants by  and  large have  no legal training.  At any rate, it is  nobody’s  case that the appellant had legal training.  Moreover when a  man is  charged  with  the breach of a  rule  entailing  serious consequences,  he  is  not likely to be  in  a  position  to present  his case as best as it should be.   The  accusation against  the appellant threatened his very livelihood.   Any adverse   verdict against him was bound to be disastrous  to him, as it has proved to be.  In such a situation he cannot be  expected to act calmly and with deliberation.   That  is why  rule  15(5)  has  provided  for  representation  of   a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or  with contravention  of the rule by another government servant  or in appropriate, cases by a legal practitioner. For  the reasons mentioned above, we think that  there  had’ been  a  contravention of rule 15(5).  We are  also  of  the opinion 496   that  the ’appellant had not been  afforded  a  reasonable opportunity to defend himself.  Hence the impugned order  is liable to be struck down and it is hereby struck down.   The facts  of  this case are not such as to  justify  any  fresh enquiry  against  the appellant.  Hence we  direct  that  no fresh enquiry shall be held against the appellant and he  be restored  to  the  position  to which  he  would  have  been entitled  to  but  for the impugned order.   The  appeal  is accordingly allowed.  The appellant is entitled to his costs from  the respondents both in this Court as well as  in  the

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High Court. S.C.                            Appeal allowed. 497