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PETITIONER: C.   K. SUBRAMONIA IYER & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T.   KUNHIKUTTAN NAIR AND 6 ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/1969

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  376            1970 SCR  (2) 688  1970 SCC  (3)  64

ACT: Fatal Accidents Act (13 of 1855), ss. 1A and 2-Assessment of damages-Principles for.

HEADNOTE: The appellants filed a suit claiming a sum of Rs. 30,000  as damages under ss. 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act,  1855 for the death of their son aged 8 years.  The boy had  stood first  in  Standard  III and his future was  claimed  to  be bright.   The trial court computed the damages under ss.  1A and 2 at Rs. 5,000.  In appeal the High Court determined the damages  under  s.  1A at Rs. 5,000 and under s.  2  at  Rs. 1,000.  In appeal by certificate before this Court.. HELD  :  Compulsory  damages  under s. IA  of  the  Act  for wrongful  death  must be limited strictly to  the  pecuniary loss  to  the beneficiaries and under s. 2  the  measure  of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate.  There can  be  no exact uniform rule for measuring  the  value  of human  life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived  at by   precise  mathematical  calculations  but   the   amount recoverable   depends   on   the   particular   facts    and circumstances  of  each case.  The life  expectancy  of  the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is  an important factor, Since the elements which go to make up the value  of  the  life  of the  deceased  to’  the  designated beneficiaries  are necessarily personal to each case in  the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for  measuring  the value of human life.  In  assessing  the damages the court must exclude all considerations of  matter which  rest  in speculations or fancy though  conjecture  to some  extent is inevitable.  As a general rule  parents  are entitled  to recover the present cash value of the  prospec- tive service of the deceased minor child.  In addition  they may  receive  compensation for loss  of  pecuniary  benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains  majority. In  the  matter of ascertainment of damages,  the  appellate court  should be slow in disturbing the findings reached  by the courts below, if they have taken all the relevant  facts into consideration. [695 F-696 A] Davies  and  Anr. v. Powell Dufleryn  Associated  Collieries Ltd.  [1942]  A.C.  601,  Franklin  v.  South  East  Railway

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Company,  157 E.R. 3 H. & N. 448, Taff Vale Railway  Company v. Jenkins, [1913] A.C. 1, Bartlett V. Cohen & Ors. [1921] 2 K.B. 461, Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly. Co.   Ltd. [1951]  A.C.  601 and Gobald Motor Service Ltd.  &  Anr.  v. R.M.K. Veluswami & Ors. [1962] 1 S.C.R. 929, applied. (ii) In the present case although the deceased was a  bright child,  it was uncertain how much assistance he  would  have given  after  growing up to his parents.  The father  was  a prosperous business man and hardly needed assistance.  There was  no material on record as to the age of the parents  and their  state  of health.  On the basis of  the  evidence  on record it could not be said that the damages ordered by  the High Court were inadequate. [696 C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2227 of 1966. 689 Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 10,  1963 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 1094 of 1959. S. V. Gupta and Lily Thomas, for the appellants. Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. 2. Sardar   Bahadur,  Vishnu  Bahadur  Saharya  and   Yougindra Khushalani, for respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J.  The  question for decision  in  this  appeal  by certificate is short but important and that question is what are the principles governing the assessment of damages under ss.  1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act (Act XIII of  1855) (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) ? One  Krishnamoorthy son of plaintiffs 1 and 2 aged  about  8 years was hit by a bus owned by the 1st defendant (who  died during  the pendency of this suit) and driven by the  second defendant  on  February  26,  1956.  As  a  result  of  that accident Krishnamoorthy sustained very severe injuries.   He became unconscious almost immediately after the accident and died  in the hospital on the early morning of  February  28, 1956.  Krishnamoorthy was the eldest son of plaintiffs 1 and 2. Both the courts have come to the conclusion that he was a bright  boy and was at the top of his class in  his  school. At  the  time  of his death he was  in  Standard  III.   His parents are affluent.  They could have afforded to give  him good  education.  Hence there was a bright future  for  him. The  plaintiffs  claimed a sum of Rs.   ’30,000  as  damages under ss.  IA and 2 of the Act.  The District Judge computed the damages under ss.  IA and 2 at Rs. 5,000.  In appeal the High  Court determined the damages under s. 1A at Rs.  5,000 and  under s. 2 at Rs. 1,000.  Aggrieved by  that  decision, the plaintiffs have brought this appeal. We  shall  first  read  s.  1A and  2  for  the  purpose  of ascertaining the principles governing the assessment of  the damages under those sections.  Section IA reads :               "Whenever  the  death  of a  person  shall  be               caused by wrongful act, neglect or default and               the  act, neglect or default is such as  would               (if  death had not ensued) have  entitled  the               party  injured  to  maintain  an  action   and               recover damages in respect thereof, the  party               who  would have been liable it death  had  not               ensued  shall be liable to an action  or  suit               for  damages notwithstanding the death of  the               person  injured, and although the death  shall               have  been caused under such circumstances  as               amount in law to felony or other crime.

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             Every such action or suit shall be for benefit               of  the  wife, husband, parent and  child,  if               any, of the person               690               whose  death  shall have been so  caused,  and               shall  be  brought by and in the name  of  the               executor,  administrator or representative  of               the person deceased;"               Section 2 reads thus :               "Provided always that not more than one action               or  suit shall be brought for, and in  respect               of  the  same  subject  matter  of  complaint.               Provided that, in any such action or suit, the               executor,  administrator or representative  of               the  deceased  may  insert  a  claim  for  and               recover  any pecuniary loss to the  estate  of               the deceased occasioned by such wrongful  act,               neglect or default, which sum, when recovered,               shall  be  deemed part of the  assets  of  the               estate of the deceased."               The rights under the two provisions are  quite               distinct  and independent.  Under  the  former               section the damages are made payable to one or               the other relations enumerated therein whereas               the latter section provides for the recoupment               of  any  pecuniary loss to the estate  of  the               deceased   occasioned  by  the  wrongful   act               complained  of.  Sometimes, the  beneficiaries               under  the  two- provisions may be  the  same.               Section  IA is in substance a reproduction  of               the  English  Fatal Accidents Acts  9  and  10               Vict.  ch.  93 known as  the  Lord  Campbell’s               Acts.   Section  2 corresponds to one  of  the               provisions   in   the   English   Law   Reform               (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934.               The  scope of s. 1 of the Campbell’s Acts  was               considered by the House of Lords in Davies and               Anr. v. Powell Dufferyn Associated  Collieries                             Ltd.(1), Dealing with the mode of asse ssment of               damages  under  that section  Lord  Russel  of               Killowen observed               "The  general rule which has always  prevailed               in  regard to the assessment of damages  under               the  Fatal  Accidents  Act  is   well-settled,               namely,   that  any  benefit  accruing  to   a               dependant by reason of the relevant death must               be  taken into account.  Under those Acts  the               balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the               death  must  be ascertained, the  position  of               each dependant being considered separately."               Lord Wright stated the law on the point thus               "The  general nature of the remedy  under  the               Fatal  Accidents general Acts has  often  been               explained.   These Acts provided a new  "cause               of  action  and  did not  merely  regulate  or               enlarge  an old one", as Lord Summer  observed               in Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S.               (1)   [1942] A. C. 601               691               America(1).   The  claim is, in the  words  of               Bowen  L.J., in The Vera Cruz (No.  2)(2)  for               injuriously   affecting  the  family  of   the               deceased.   It  is  not  a  claim  which   the               deceased  could have pursued in his  own  life

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             time,  because it is for damages suffered  not               by himself, but by his family after his death.               The Act of 1846, s. 2 provides that the action               is to be for the benefit of the wife or  other               member of the family, and the jury (or  judge)               are  to  give such damages as may  be  thought               proportioned  to the injury resulting to  such               parties from the death.  The damages are to be               based   on  the  reasonable   expectation   of               pecuniary  benefit  or benefit  reducible,  to               money  value.   In assessing the  damages  all               circumstances   which  may   be   legitimately               pleaded  in diminution of the damages must  be               considered : Grand Trunk Ry.  Co. of Canada v.               Jennings(4).   The  actual pecuniary  loss  of               each  individual entitled to sue can  only  be               ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the               loss  to him of the future pecuniary  benefit,               and,  on  the other, any  pecuniary  advantage               which  from  whatever source comes to  him  by               reason of the death."               In  ascertaining pecuniary loss caused to  the               relations mentioned in s. IA, it must be borne               in mind that these damages are not to be given               as solatium but are to be given with reference               to  a pecuniary loss.  The damages  should  be                             calculated  with  reference  to  a   r easonable               expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  from  the               continuance  of the life of  the  deceased-see               Franklin v. The South East Railway Company  (4               In that case Pollock, C.B. observed :               "We  do  not say that it  was  necessary  that               actual  benefit  should have been  derived,  a               reasonable  expectation  is  enough  and  such               reasonable   expectation  might  well   exist,               though from the father, not being in need, the               son  had never done anything for him.  On  the               other hand a jury certainly ought not to  make               a  guess  in  the  matter,  but  ought  to  be               satisfied  that  there  has  been  a  loss  of               sensible  and appreciable  pecuniary  benefit,               which might have been reasonably expected from               the continuance of the life."               In  Taff Vale Railway Company  v.  Jenkins(5),               the Judicial Committee observed that it is not               a condition precedent to the maintenance of an               action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846,               (1)   [1917] A. C. 38,52               (3)   13 Appeal Cases.800, 804.               (4)   157, English Reports 3 H & N.T. 448.               (5) [1913] A. C. 1.               (2) (1884) 9 P. D. 96, 101: 692 that the deceased should have been actually earning money or money’s  worth  or  contributing  to  the  support  of   the plaintiff  at or before the date of the death provided  that the  plaintiff  had a reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary benefit  from  the continuance of the  life.   Therein  Lord Atkinson stated the law thus :               "I  think  it  has been  well  established  by               authority that all that is necessary is that a               reasonable  expectation of  pecuniary  benefit               should be entertained by the person who  sues.               It  is quite true that the existence  of  this

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             expectation is an inference of fact-there must               be  a basis of fact from which  the  inference               can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express               my emphatic dissent from the proposition  that               it is necessary that two of the facts  without               which  the  inference  cannot  be  drawn  are,               first,  that the deceased earned money in  the               past,  and second, that he or she  contributed               to  the support of the plaintiff.  These  are,               no  doubt,  pregnant pieces of  evidence,  but               they  are  only pieces of  evidence;  and  the                             necessary  inference can I think be dr awn  from               circumstances  other than and  different  from               them."               in  an  action  under  the  Act,  it  is   not               sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that  he               lost  by  the  death of the  deceased  a  mere               speculative possibility of pecuniary  benefit.               In  order to succeed, it is necessary for  him               to  show that he has lost a reasonable  proba-               bility of pecuniary advantage.  In Barnett  v.               Cohen  and ors.(1), McCardie J.  speaking  for               the  Court quoted with approval the  following               observations  of Lord Haldane in his  judgment               in Taff Vale Ry.  Co. v. Jenkins(2) :               "  "The  basis  is not what  has  been  called               solatium,  that is to say, damages  given  for               injured   feelings   or  on  the   ground   of               sentiment,  but damages based on  compensation               for  a pecuniary loss.  But then loss  may  be               prospective,  and  it  is  quite  clear   that               prospective  loss may be taken  into  account.               It has been said that this is qualified by the               proposition  that the child must be  shown  to               have been earning something before any damages               can  be assessed.  I know of no foundation  in               principle  for that proposition either in  the               statute  or  in any doctrine of law  which  is               applicable;  nor  do  I  think  it  is  really               established   by  the  authorities  when   you               examine  them..............  I  have   already               indicated that in my view the real question is               that  which Willes, J. defines in one  of  the               cases quoted to us, Dalton v. South               (1) [1921] 2 K.B. 461               (2) [1913] A.C. 1.               693               Eastern  Rv.  Co.(1) ’Aye or No, was  there  a               reasonable expectation of pecuniary  advantage               ?"               Proceeding further the learned judge  referred               to the observations of Pollock, C. B. in  Taff               Vale Ry.  Co. v. Jenkins(2) :               "  "It appears to me that it was  intended  by               the  Act  to  give  compensation  for   damage               sustained, and not to enable persons to sue in               respect  of  some  imaginary  damage,  and  so               punish  those who are guilty of negligence  by               making them pay costs." "               Dealing with the facts of the case before  him               McCardie, J. observed :               "In  the present action the plaintiff has  not               satisfied   me  that  he  had   a   reasonable               expectation  of pecuniary benefit.   Ms  child

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             was under four years old.  The boy was subject               to  all risks. of illness,  disease,  accident               and  death.   His education and  upkeep  would               have   been  a  substantial  burden   to   the               plaintiff for many years if he had lived.   He               might  or might not have turned out  a  useful               young man.  He would have earned nothing  till               about  sixteen years of age.  He  might  never               have  aided his father at all.  He might  have               proved  a mere expense.  I  cannot  adequately               speculate one way or the other.  In any  event               he  would  scarcely  have  been  expected   to               contribute  to  the father’s income,  for  the               plaintiff even now possesses 1,0001, a year by               his business and may increase it further,  nor               could  the  son have been expected to  aid  in               domestic  service.  The whole matter is  beset               with doubts, contingencies and  uncertainties.               Equally  uncertain,  too, is the life  of  the               plaintiff himself in view of his poor  health.               He  might or might not have survived his  son.               That is a point for consideration, for, as was               pointed  out by Bray J., when sitting  in  the               Court of Appeal in Price v. Glynea and  Castle               Coal Co.(3): "Where a claim is made under Lord               Campbell’s Acts, as it is here, it is not only               a  question of the expectation of the life  of               the  claimant".  Upon the facts of  this  case               the  plaintiff  has not proved  damage  either               actual  or prospective.  His claim is  pressed               to   extinction  by  the  weight  or   ht   or               multiplied    contingencies.     The    action               therefore fails."               The mode of assessment of damages is not  free               from   doubt.   It  is  beset   with   certain               difficulties.   It  depends  on  many   impon-               derables.  The English courts have  formulated               certain basis for               (1) (1858) 4, C. B. (N.S.) 296.                (2) [1913] A. C. 1.               (3) 9 B. W.     C. C. 188, 198.               694               calculating  damages  under  Lord   Campbell’s               Acts.   The rules ascertained by  the  English               courts  are set out in Winfield on  Torts  7th               Edn. at pp. 135 and 136 as follows :               "The  starting  point is the amount  of  wages               which   the   deceased   was   earning,    the                             ascertainment  of  which  to  some  ex tent  may               depend  on the regularity of  his  employment.               Then  there  is an estimate of  how  much  was               required or expended for his own personal  and               living  expenses.   The balance  will  give  a               datum or basic figure which will generally  be               turned  into a lump sum by taking a number  of               years’ purchase.  That sum, however, has to be               taxed   down   by   having   regard   to   the               uncertainties,  for instance, that  the  widow               might have again married and thus ceased to be               dependent,   and   other   like   matters   of               speculation and doubt".  The number of  years’               purchase is left flud, from twelve to  fifteen               has  been quite a common multiple in the  case               of a healthy man, and the number should not be

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             materially reduced by reason of the  hazardous               nature of the occupation of the deceased  man.               These    principles   are,    however,    only               appropriate where the deceased was the  bread-               winner  of the family.  Obviously they  cannot               be applied, for example, where the claim is in               respect  of  a mere expectation  of  pecuniary               benefit   from  the  deceased  or  where   the               decased’s  contribution to the family  was  in               kind  and  not in cash.  In truth,  each  case               must depend upon its own facts.  In Dolbey  v.               Godwin(1),  the  plaintiff  was  the   widowed               mother  of the deceased, an unmarried  man  29               years   of   age,  and  he   had   contributed               substantially  to  her upkeep.  The  Court  of               Appeal  held that it would be wrong to  assess               the  damages  on  the same  basis  as  if  the               plaintiff  were  the widow  of  the  deceased,               principally  on the ground that it was  likely               that  he would have married in due course  and               that  then  his contributions  to  his  mother               would have been reduced." The  mode  and manner of ascertainment of damages  in  fatal accidents  cases  came  up for  consideration  in  Nance  v. British  Columbia Electric Rly.  Co. Ltd.(2). In  that  case Viscount   Simon,   formulated  the  following   tests   for ascertaining  the damages : (1) First estimate what was  the deceased man’s expectation of life if he had not been killed when he was; and (2) What sums during those years, he  would have  probably applied to the support of the dependant.   In fixing  the expectation of life of the deceased regard  must be had not only to his age and bodily (1)  [1955] 1, W. L. R. 553, 1103. (2) [1951], A. C. 601: 695 health  but  premature termination of his life  by  a  later accident.  In estimating future provision for his  dependant the amounts he usually applied in this way before his  death are  obviously  relevant,  and  often  the  best   evidence- available  though not conclusive, since if he had  survived, his means might have expanded or shrunk, and his  liberality might  have grown or wilted.  After making the  calculations on  the basis of the two tests, his Lordship  observed  that deduction  must further be made for the benefit accruing  to the  dependant from the acceleration of his interest in  his estate   and  further  allowance  must  be  made   for   the possibility  that  the  dependant himself  might  have  died before he died. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and anr. v. R. M. K.  Veluswami and  ors.(1), this Court held that the actual extent of  the pecuniary  loss to the aggrieved party may depend on a  data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must  necessarily be  an  estimate,  or even  partly  a  conjecture.   Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the  claimants  of the future pecuniary benefit and  on  the other  any pecuniary advantage which from  whatever  sources come  to them by reason of the death, that is, +the  balance of  loss  and  gain  to a dependant by  the  death  must  be ascertained.  Therein it was further observed that where the courts  below have on relevant material placed  before  them ascertained  the  amount  of  damages  under  the  head   of pecuniary  loss  to  the dependants of  the  deceased,  such findings  cannot be disturbed, in second appeal  except  for compelling reasons.

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The  law on the point arising for decision may be summed  up thus  :  Compulsory  damages  under s. IA  of  the  Act  for worngful  death  must be limited strictly to  the  pecuniary loss  to the beneficiaries and that under s. 2, the  measure of  damages  is the economic loss sustained by  the  estate. There  can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the  value of  the  human  life and the measure of  damages  cannot  be arrived  at  by precise mathematical  calculations  but  the amount  recoverable  depends  on the  particular  facts  and circumstances  of  each case.  The life  expectancy  of  the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is  an important  factor.  Since the elements which go to  make  up the  value  of the life of the deceased  to  the  designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in  the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for  measuring  the  value  of  human  life.   In  assessing damages, the court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent  is  inevitable.   As  a  general  rule  parents  are entitled   to  recover  the  present  cash  value   of   the prospective  service  of  the  deceased  minor  child.    In addition they may receive (1)  [1962] 1 S.C.R. 929 696 compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority.  In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate court should be slow in  disturbing the findings reached by the courts below,  if they have taken all the relevant facts into consideration. Now  applying  the above rules to the facts of  the  present case,  it is seen that the deceased child was only  8  years old at the time of his death.  How he would have turned  out in  life  later  is  at  best a  guess.   But  there  was  a reasonable  probability of his becoming a successful man  in life  as he was a bright boy in the school and  his  parents could have afforded him a good education.  It is not  likely that  he  would have given any financial assistance  to  his parents till he was at least 20 years old.  As seen from the evidence on record, his father was a substantial person.  He was  in business and his business was a prosperous one.   As things stood he needed no assistance from his son.  There is no  material  on record to find out as to how old  were  the parents  of the deceased at the time of his death.   Nor  is there  any  evidence about their state of  health.   On  the basis  of the evidence on record, we are unable to  come  to the  conclusion that the damages ordered by the  High  Court are inadequate. In  the result this appeal fails and the same is  dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as  to costs. G.C.                           Appeal dismissed. 697