REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION NO.118 OF 2007

IN

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.19924 OF 2006

C. Elumalai & Ors. ….Petitioners

Versus

A.G.L. Irudayaraj & Anr. ….

Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Alleging  violation  of  the  order  passed  by  this  Court,  the  present

contempt petition has been filed.  Stand of the petitioners is that by order

dated 19.3.2007 in SLP(C ) No. 19924 of 2006, this court had directed that

the High Court which was considering CS No. 597 of 2006 in the original

side shall make an effort to dispose of the suit within a period of six months

from the date of receipt of the order.  It was also directed that till completion

of the suit the parties shall not create any third party right.  It is the case of

the petitioners that in clear violation of this court’s order, third party rights

have been created.   Several  affidavits  have been filed  by the respondent

No.1-alleged  contemnor  No.1.  But  no  response  has  been  filed  by  the

respondent No.2- alleged contemnor No.2.

2. Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  submitted  that  there  has  been

conscious violation of the orders passed by this court.  The unconditional

apologies offered at various stages are intended to cover up the violation.

Even  after  filing  of  the  first  affidavit  containing  alleged  unconditional

apology, the subsequent conduct shows continued violation.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1-contemnor No.1 submitted

that the factual scenario clearly shows that there was never any intention to

flout the orders of this court. Rather, the respondent No.1-contemnor No.1

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is a victim of circumstances and therefore the unconditional apology offered

should be accepted.

4. Apology  is  an  act  of  contrition.  Unless  apology  is  offered  at  the

earliest  opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shorn of penitence

and hence it is liable to be rejected.  If the apology is offered at the time

when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment it

ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward.

5. Apology  is  not  a  weapon  of  defence  to  purge  the  guilty  of  their

offence nor is it intended to operate as universal panacea, but it is intended

to be evidence of real contriteness.  As was noted in L.D. Jaikwal v. State of

U.P. [1984 (3) SCC 405]:

“We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the “slap-say sorry- and forget” school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence.  Saying “sorry” does not make the  slapper  taken  the  slap  smart  less  upon  the  said hypocritical  word being uttered.   Apology shall  not  be paper  apology  and  expression  of  sorrow  should  come from the heart and nor from the pen.  For it is one thing to “say” sorry – it is another to “feel” sorry.”

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6. The  above  position  was  highlighted  in  T.V.  Godavarman

Thirumalpad v. Ashok Khot and Another [2006(5) SCC 1]  

7. The next question is whether for disobedience of the order passed by

this  Court,  the  respondents/contemners  are  liable  to  punishment?  In  this

connection, we may refer to some of the legal provisions. Article 129 of the

Constitution declares this Court (Supreme Court) to be "a Court of Record

having all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for the

contempt of itself". Clause (c) of Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 enacts that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated,

the Court  may, commit the person guilty of  disobedience  of  an order  of

interim injunction  to civil  prison and direct  his  property be attached and

sold. Rule 2A of Order XXXIX as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) reads thus:

2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction-- (1) In  the case  of  disobedience  of  any injunction  granted  or other order made under Page 3178 rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made,  the Court  granting  the  injunction or  making the order,  or  any  Court  to  which  the  suit  or  proceeding  is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person  to  be  detained  in  the  civil  prison  for  a  term  not

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exceeding  three  months,  unless  in  the  meantime  the  Court directs his release.

(2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for  more  than  one  year,  at  the  end  of  which  time,  if  the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold  and  out  of  the  proceeds,  the  Court  may  award  such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.

8. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and Ors. (2003) 11

SCC  1,  this  Court  had  an  occasion  to  consider  the  concept  of  `wilful

disobedience' of an order of the Court. It was stated that `wilful' means an

act or omission which is done voluntarily and with the specific intent to do

something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something

the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey

or to disregard the law. According to the Court, it signifies the act done with

evil intent or with a bad motive for the purpose. It was observed that the act

or omission has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of

each case.

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9. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1999 (7)

SCC 569] it was held that for holding a person to have committed contempt,

it  must  be shown that  there  was wilful  disobedience of  the judgment  or

order  of  the  Court.  But  it  was  indicated  that  even  negligence  and

carelessness may amount to contempt. It was further observed that issuance

of notice for contempt of Court and power to punish are having far reaching

consequences,  and as such, they should be resorted to only when a clear

case of wilful disobedience of the court's order is made out. A petitioner

who  complains  breach  of  Court's  order  must  allege  deliberate  or

contumacious  disobedience of  the  Court's  order  and if  such allegation  is

proved, contempt can be said to have been made out, not otherwise. The

Court  noted  that  power  to  punish  for  contempt  is  intended  to  maintain

effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of

justice.

10. In the celebrated decision of  Attorney General v. Times Newspaper

Ltd. 1974 AC 273 : (1973) 3 All ER 54 : (1973) 3 WLR 298; Lord Diplock

stated:

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“There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt,  since the administration  of  justice  would  be undermined  if  the  order  of  any court  of  law could  be disregarded with impunity.”  

11. In  Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh and Ors.  (2002 (4)

SCC  21)  ,  this  Court  held  that  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act  has  been

introduced  in  the  statute-book  for  securing  confidence  of  people  in  the

administration of justice. If an order passed by a competent Court is clear

and  unambiguous  and  not  capable  of  more  than  one  interpretation,

disobedience or breach of such order would amount to contempt of Court.

There  can  be  no  laxity  in  such  a  situation  because  otherwise  the  Court

orders  would  become the  subject  of  mockery.  Misunderstanding  or  own

understanding of the Court's order would not be a permissible defence. It

was observed that power to punish a person for contempt is undoubtedly a

powerful weapon in the hands of Judiciary but that by itself operates as a

string of caution and cannot be used unless the Court is satisfied beyond

doubt that the person has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of

the Court. The power under the Act must be exercised with utmost care and

caution  and sparingly in  the  larger  interest  of  the society and for proper

administration of justice delivery system. Mere disobedience of an order is

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not  enough  to  hold  a  person  guilty  of  civil  contempt.  The  element  of

willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within

the meaning of the Act.

12. In  All  Bengal  Excise  Licensees  Association  v.  Raghabendra  Singh

and  Ors. (2007)  11  SCC  374,  this  Court  considered  several  cases  and

observed that wilful and deliberate act of violation of interim order passed

by a competent Court would amount to contempt of Court.

13. From the  above  decisions,  it  is  clear  that  punishing  a  person  for

contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should

not be taken. At the same time, however, it is not only the  power but the

duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty

of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of

justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court, it is

required to take strict  view, it  should not  hesitate in wielding the potent

weapon of contempt.

14. The above position was highlighted in Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai &

Anr. V. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai & Ors. [2008(10) SCALE 349].

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15. On consideration of various aspects,  we are satisfied that there has

been a wilful and deliberate violation of this Court’s order. We, therefore, in

exercise of the court’s jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution of

India impose exemplary cost of Rs.2,00,000/- on each of the contemnors to

be  deposited  to  the  registry  of  the  High  Court  within  a  period  of  eight

weeks.   On  deposit  being  made,  the  amount  shall  be  transferred  to  the

National Legal Services Authority. In case of non payment, the contemnors

shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months each.  Any third party

right created after order dated 19.3.2007 in SLP No. 19924 of 2006 is of no

consequence and stands set aside.

………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………………J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, March 20, 2009

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