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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1088 of 2007

PETITIONER: C.B.I.

RESPONDENT: PRADEEP BHALCHANDRA SAWANT & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/08/2007

BENCH: CJI K.G. BALAKRISHNAN & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6044 of 2004)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

1.              Leave granted.

2.              This Appeal by Special Leave by the Central  Bureau of Investigation challenges the order of the High  Court granting bail to the respondent, at the relevant time,  the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mumbai.  The  respondent was arrested in connection with criminal cases  registered in what has come to be known as the \021stamp  scam\022.  The respondent is arrayed as accused No. 65 in  C.R. No. 135 of 2002 initially registered at Bund Garden  Police Station, Pune for different offences under the Indian  Penal Code as well as under Sections 3 and 24 read with  Section 2(1)(a)(d) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised  Crime Act (\021MCOCA\022) read with Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of  the Prevention of Corruption Act.  The charges against  him, inter alia, comprised of charges 58 to 70.  The  charges included the charge that the respondent had  conspired to commit, to abet, to knowingly facilitate the  commission of an organised crime, namely, the printing  and sale of fake stamp papers and thereby was guilty of  offences under the MCOCA, which carried a minimum  punishment of imprisonment for five years but which  could extend to life.   The respondent was arrested on  7.1.2004 and subsequently by the order under challenge,  he was enlarged on bail.  It is this order granting bail that  is the subject matter of this appeal at the instance of the  prosecution.   

3.              According to the learned counsel for the  appellant \026 C.B.I., as per the supplementary charge sheet,  the respondent was being charged with rendering help and  support on his own in the commission of an organised  crime to the members of a organised crime syndicate by  abstaining from taking the necessary action by himself  and through his subordinate officers and that he had  directed his subordinates that Telgi, the prime accused  should not be kept in any lock up.  This had facilitated the  continuing of illegal activity by Telgi including the disposal  of his ill-gotten properties even while he was in police  custody.  Telgi was also accorded special treatment by the  respondent.  According to learned counsel, in the

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circumstances, the High Court was clearly in error in  granting bail to the respondent on its misconception of the  scope of the relevant provisions of MCOCA and on its  erroneous approach that connivance or deliberate inaction  on the part of a police officer which facilitated the  organised crime to flourish would not amount to an  offence under Section 3 of the MCOCA.  Learned counsel  submitted that since a fundamental error had been made  by the High Court, it was a proper case for this Court to  interfere with the order.  

4.              Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other  hand, submitted that the alleged acts of commission and  omission of the respondent did not attract Section 3 of  MCOCA and at best even if the case is brought under  Section 24 of MCOCA, the punishment could extend only  to three years and on the materials available, the High  Court was justified in granting bail to the respondent.   Learned counsel submitted that on the materials, there  was no reason for this Court to interfere with an order  granting bail, a course that is not very readily adopted by  this Court.  

5.              We find some merit in the submission of learned  counsel for the appellant that the approach of the High  Court leaves a lot to be desired.  There may be some  substance in his argument that the High Court has not  properly understood the content of Section 3(2) and 3(3) of  MCOCA and it was in error in thinking that deliberate  inaction or studied negligence on the part of a responsible  police officer could not amount to abetting or knowingly  facilitating the commission of an organised crime.  But, we  do not think that it is proper for this Court to go into that  question in detail in this proceeding, which is only an  appeal against the grant of bail.  After all, whatever we  may say in this order will not even control the decision to  be taken after the conclusion of the trial and we think it  appropriate to leave it to the court trying the case to take  a final view on all the questions after the evidence has  been let in.  Learned counsel for the respondent, in this  connection, relied upon the decision in RanjitSing  Brahmajeetsing Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra &  Anr. [(2005) 5 S.C.C. 294] to support the argument that  the High Court was not wrong in proceeding on the basis  that no offence under Section 3 of MCOCA would be made  out.  On scrutiny of the decision, we find that it was only  an order on a bail application in the case of another police  officer who was the Commissioner of Police and as we  have noted earlier, the observations therein obviously may  not be considered an authoritative pronouncement on the  relevant aspects at the trial of the cause or as concluding  any question.  The reasons given in an order granting bail  can only be understood as supporting an order granting  bail with only the consequences that flow from it.  The  observations cannot control the decision to be taken after  trial by the concerned court.  

6.              It is true that counsel tried to highlight many  alleged commissions and omissions on the part of the  respondent and especially in his alleged treatment of Telgi,  the kingpin in the crime concerned.  Naturally, learned  counsel for the respondent attempted to controvert the

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stand adopted by the learned counsel for the appellant  and contended that there were no such acts of  commission or omission on the side of the respondent and  that it was a case where the respondent himself was only  a subordinate officer not in a position to take some of the  actions which are alleged to have been not taken by him.   Here again, we do not think that it is proper for us to go  into an analysis of the facts and circumstances.  Suffice it  to say that we do not think that it is necessary to interfere  with the order granting bail to the respondent in this  appeal against such grant.  We expect the trial court to try  the case in accordance with law untrammelled by the  observations in these orders.

7.              We therefore decline to interfere and dismiss this  appeal.