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PETITIONER: BUDHAN SINGH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NABI BUX & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/08/1969

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1880            1970 SCR  (2)  10  1969 SCC  (2) 481  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC 893  (10)  RF         1973 SC1461  (328)  R          1977 SC2196  (10)

ACT: U.P.  Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act  1 1951),  s.  9-’Held’,  meaning  of-Whether  means  ’lawfully held’-Construction of statutes-General legislative intent is to advance justice and reason-Interpretation which will have harsh  or  ridiculous effect must  be  avoided-Ryot  leaving residential building during  communal  riots-In his  absence landlord  entering on land and constructing new building  in place  of tenants’ building-Tenant returning-Tenant  whether entitled to new building under s. 9.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents being Ryots of the appellants were  granted over sixty years ago a village site by the ancestors of  the appellants  on  which they built their  residential  houses. During  the  1947  riots the respondents in  order  to  seek safety  fled from the village temporarily and came  back  in 1949.   They found that their residential buildings  on  the aforesaid  site had been demolished and that in their  place the appellants had raised a cow-shed. The appellants refused to  give  back possession of the site and  building  to  the respondents  whereupon  on January 9, 1951  the  respondents filed  a  suit for possession.  The appellants  based  their defence  on the provisions of the U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition and  Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act 1 of 1951) which came  into force  on January 26, 1951.  According to s. 4 of  the  Act, with  effect from the notified date i.e. July 1,  1952,  all Estates  became  vested in the State of Uttar  Pradesh.  The lands and buildings enumerated’ in ss. 6 and 9 were  however settled  on the persons who ’held’ them. The  contention  of the  appellants  was that they ’held’ the buildings  on  the relevant date and therefore the buildings were deemed to  be settled  on them by the State Government.  In the  Allahabad High  Court there was conflict of opinion as to the  meaning of  the  word  ’held’ in s. 9.  In  Pheku  Chamar’s  case  a Division Bench of the Court held that the word ’held’ in  s. 9 connotes the existence of a right or title in the  holder.

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However in Bharat’s case another Division Bench of the Court declined  to  follow Phekhu Chamar’s case and  came  to  the conclusion  that the legislature used wide language in s.  9 and it covers the case of buildings belonging to persons who constructed  them whether lawfully or unlawfully.  When  the present case came up in second appeal before the High  Court it  was  referred to a Full Bench.  The majority  of  judges adopted  the view taken in Phekhu Chamar’s case and  decided against the appellants; the dissenting  judge took the  view that since the buildings constructed by the respondents  did not  exist on the date of vesting they were not entitled  to the   benefit  of  s.  9.   In  appeal  to  this  Court   by certificate,     HELD:  (1) Though in fact the vesting of the Estate  and the  deemed settlement of some rights in respect of  certain classes  of lands or buildings included in the  Estate  took place  simultaneously,  in law the two must  be  treated  as different  transactions;  first there was a vesting  of  the Estates   in   the  State  absolutely  and   free   of   all encumbrances.   Then followed  the deemed settlement by  the State of some rights with the persons mentioned in ss. 6 and 9.   Therefore  in law it would not be correct to  say  that what  vested  in  the State are only  those   interests  not coming  within ss. 6 or 9. [13 B---C] Rana  Sheo  Ambar Singh v. Allahabad  Bank  Ltd.  Allahabad, [1962]  2 S.C.R. 441 and Shivashankar Prasad Shah & Ors.  v. Vaikunth Nath Singh & Ors., C.A. No. 368/66 decided on  3-7- 1969, referred to.     (ii)   It  was unfortunate that the  Division  Bench  in Bharat’s   case  should  have thought it proper  to  sit  in judgment  over the correctness of a decision rendered  by  a Bench  of  co-ordinate  jurisdiction.   Judicial   propriety requires that if a bench of a High Court is unable to  agree with  the decision already rendered by  another  co-ordinate bench of the same High Court the question should be referred to  a larger bench. Otherwise the decisions of  High  Courts will  not  only lose respect in the eyes of the  public,  it will also make the task of the subordinate courts difficult. [15 E]     (iii)  Justice and reason constitute the  great  general legislative   intent   in   every  piece   of   legislation. Consequently  where  the  suggested  construction   operates harshly,  ridiculously or in any other manner  contrary   to prevailing   conception  of  justice  and  reason  in   most instances  it  would  seem that the  apparent  or  suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the law- makers. [16 B]     In  the  present case it was hard to  believe  that  the legislature  in enacting s. 9 intended to ignore the  rights of  persons having legal title to possession and  wanted  to make a Rift of any building to a trespasser howsoever recent the  trespass might have been if only he happened to  be  in physical possession of the buildings on the date of vesting. It is difficult to discern any legislative policy in support of that construction. [16 D]     According to Webster’s New Twentieth Century  Dictionary the word ’held’ is technically understood to mean to possess by  legal title.  Therefore by interpreting the word  ’held’ as ’lawfully held’ there was no addition of any word to  the section.  According to the words of s. 9 and in the  context of the scheme of the Act it is proper to  construe the  word ’held’  in the section as ’lawfully held’.   The  appellants contention in this regard must be rejected. [17 B--D]     Pheku  Chamar  & Ors. v. Harish Chandra &,  Ors.  A.I.R. 1953 All. 406, approved.

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   Bharat  and Anr. v. Ch. Khazan Singh & Anr. A.I.R.  1958 All.  332, disapproved.     K.K.  Handique  v.  The Member,  Board  of  Agricultural Income-tax  Assam,  A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1191 and Eramma  v.  V, Verrupanna & Ors. [1966] 2 S.C.R. 626, applied.     (iv)  When  the respondents left the  village  owing  to communal  disturbances  they  could  not  be  said  to  have abandoned   their  residential  buildings.  The   appellants unlawfully   demolished  them  and  entered  the   land   as trespassers.  The cow-shed they erected on the land was  not greater in value than the respondents residential buildings. On  equitable considerations  it must be held that when  the respondents  came back to their village  in 1949, they  were entitled to recover not only the site but also the  building constructed  on  it by the appellants.  Hence it  should  be held  that on the date of vesting, the respondents were  the owners  of  the building in question for in  law  they  were holding the same. [14 A--E]     [Question whether if a stranger constructs a building on the land of another, the true owner of the land is  entitled to recover the land with the building on it, left open.] [14 D] 12

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1789 of 1966.     Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated May 24,  1961 of  the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No..  1302  of 1952.     B.C. Misra, G.S. Chatterjee and M.M. Kshatriya, for  the appellants. J.P. Goyal and G.N. Wantoo, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde,  J.   The  scope of s. 9 of  the  U.P.  Zamindari Abolition  and and Reforms. Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1  of  1951) (to  be  hereinafter referred to as the Act)  comes  up  for decision in this appeal by certificate.     The facts relevant for deciding this  appeal are no more in dispute.  The respondents were Ryots under the appellants in village Nagli Abdulla, a hemlet of village Machhra.   The site  of  the building in dispute in this  appeal  had  been taken by the father of the respondents from the  appellant’s ancestors  over 60 years ago and thereafter the  respondents put  up  some buildings on that site for  their  residential purposes. During the communal disturbances in 1947 they left the  village  temporarily as a measure of  safety  and  took shelter  with some of their relations in some other  village at a distant place.  They came back to their village in  the year  1949 when the conditions improved. At that  time  they found the appellants occupying that site after putting up  a cow-shed  on the site in which their  residential  buildings stood.  Those residential  buildings had been demolished and the site in question included as a part of the house of  the appellants.  As the appellants refused to deliver possession of the suit property, the respondents instituted a suit  for possession of  the same on January 9, 1951.     On January 26, 1951, the Act came into force.  Section 4 of  the Act provided for the vesting of the Estates  in  the State.   It  prescribes  that as soon as may  be  after  the commencement  of  the  Act, the  State  Government  may,  by notification,  declare that as from a date to be  specified, all Estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified, all such

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Estates  shall  stand  transferred to and  vest,  except  as otherwise  provided in the Act, in the State free  from  all encumbrances.   Section   6  of  the  Act   enumerates   the consequences  of  the  vesting of an Estate  in  the  State. Section 9 deals with the buildings in the abadi. Reading ss. 4,  6 and 9 together, it follows that all  Estates  notified under s.4 vest in the State free from all encumbrances.  The quondam proprietors or  tenure-holders of those Estates lose all interests in those Estates.  As proprietors’ 13 or  tenure holders they retain no interest in   respect   of them  whatsoever.  But ’in respect of the land or  buildings enumerated in s. 6 and s. 9, the State settled on the person who  held  them certain rights.  Though in fact the  vesting of  the Estates and the deemed settlement of some rights  in respect of certain classes of land or buildings included  in the Estate took place simultaneously, in law the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of  the Estates in the State absolutely and free     of  all encumbrances.   Then followed the deemed settlement  by  the State of some rights with the persons mentioned in ss. 6 and 9.   Therefore in law it would not be  correct to  say  that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within ss. 6 or 9; see--Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v.   Allahabad Bank  Ltd., Allahabad(1).  In this connection reference  may also   usefully  be made to the  decision of this  Court  in Shivashankar  Prasad  Shah and Ors. v. Vaikunth  Nath  Singh and   Ors.(2),  a  decision rendered under  the  Bihar  Land Reforms  Act,  1950, the relevant provisions  of  which  are similar  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act.   In  this  case notification  under  s.4 of the Act was issued  on  July  1, 1952.  Hence the vesting contemplated under s. 4 took  place on that date.     Section  9  of the Act, the section with  which  we  are concerned in this case, reads thus:                     "All  wells,  trees in  abadi,  and  all               buildings  situated  within the limits  of  an               estate,   belonging   to   or   held   by   an               intermediary  or   tenant or  other   persons,               whether residing in the village or not,  shall               continue  to  belong  to or be  held  by  such               intermediary  or tenant or person as the  case               may  be,  and the site of the   wells  or  the               buildings within the area appurtenant  thereto               shall be deemed to be settled with him by  the               State Government on such terms and  conditions               as may be prescribed." In  view of that provision all buildings situate within  the limits  of an Estate held by an  intermediary or  tenant  or other  person,  whether  residing  in  the  village  or  not continues  to be held by him and the site: of the  buildings within  the  area appurtenant thereto should be   deemed  to have been  settled with him by the State Government on  such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.     As  seen earlier till about 1947, the  respondents  were lawfully  holding the buildings and the site with  which  we are  concerned  in this case as Ryots.  They never  gave  up their possession of (1) [1962] 2, S.C.R. 441. (2) Civil Appeal No. 368/66 decided on 3-7-1969. 14 the  buildings   voluntarily.  The fact that  they   vacated those buildings and took shelter with their relations during the  time of the communal disturbances cannot be  considered as  abandonment of the buildings.  In law they continued  to

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be  in possession of the buildings.  Hence  the  appellant’s entry into the suit site was an unlawful act.  In the eye of law  they  were  trespassers.  In demolishing the  buildings put  up  by  the  respondents,  they, committed the  offence of   mischief.   The  fact they had put  up  new  structures cannot  under the Transfer of Property  Act,  enhance  their rights  to the property. We have no material before us  from which we can find out the value of the buildings. demolished by  them  and  the value of the buildings put  up  by   them unlawfully.  From the description of the buildings given  in evidence, it appears that the newly put up building is  only cattle-shed.   We  are not satisfied that the newly  put  up building  is  worth more than the buildings  that  had  been demolished  by the appellants.  In the the circumstances  of the case all that can be said is that the old buildings have been substituted by the new building.  Therefore the  owners of  the old buildings continue to be the owners of  the  new building.  In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether if a stranger builds a building on the land of  another,  the  true owner of the  land  is  entitled  to recover  the  land  with  the  building  on  it.   Equitable considerations persuade us to hold that when the respondents came  back to their village in 1949, they were  entitled  to recover not only the site but also the building  constructed on  it by the appellants.  Hence it should be held  that  on the  date  of vesting, the respondents were the  owners  the building in question.  In law they were holding the same.  The controversy between the parties in this appeal is as to the meaning to be attached to the word "held" in s.9 of  the Act. Is the holding contemplated therein ’lawful holding" or a  mere    holding lawful or otherwise.  It is contended  on behalf  of the    appellants that the dictionary meaning  of the word "held" merely means ’to  have a  possession of s  9 merely  contemplates   Physical possession and nothing more; on the date of the vesting they were in physical  possession of the site as well as the building; therefore the  building must be deemed to have been settled with them.  On the other hand  it is contended on behalf of the respondent  that  the word  "held"  in s. 9 of the Act means "lawfully  held"  and that section does not confer any benefit on a trespasser.     The  meaning  of  the word "held" in  s.9  came  up  for consideration  before  a  Division Bench of  the   Allahabad High   Court consisting of Agarwala and Chaturvedi,  JJ.  in Pheku Chamar and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors.(1). In that case  the  learned 1) A.I.R. 1953 All.. 406. 15 judges held that the legislature has deliberately  used  the word "held" and that word connotes the existence of a  right or title in the holder.  They further opined that s. 9  does not  confer  a right on the persons having no title  to  the land.   The  settlement  contemplated  by  the  section   is confined  in its application to the case where the  building is  lawfully held by the person in possession.  The  learned judges  also observed that in enacting s.9, the  legislature never  meant to deprive the citizens of their lawful  rights over  the lands merely because a  trespasser has   succeeded in making some construction on it.  Section 9 does not  mean that if a person has made some construction whatsoever  over any  land  lying  within the limits of  an  estate,  however wrongful   or   recent  the  possession   might   be,   that construction   must be  deemed  to have been   settled  with him  by  the  State  Government.  The meaning  of  the  word "held" in s.9 again came up before another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Desai and Takru,  JJ.

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in Bharat and anr. v. Ch. Khazan Singh & ant.(1) The learned judges   declined to follow the  decision in Pheku  Chamar’s case(2).    They  came   to   the   conclusion   that    the legislature  used a wide language in s.9 and it  covers  the case of buildings belonging to persons who constructed  them lawfully or unlawfully.  It is unfortunate that  the latter. Division   Bench  should have thought it proper  to  sit  in judgment  over the correctness of a decision rendered  by  a Bench   of  co-ordinate  jurisdiction.  Judicial   propriety requires  that if a bench of High Court is unable  to  agree with  the decision already rendered by an  other  coordinate bench  of  the  same  High Court,  the  question  should  be referred to a larger bench.  Otherwise the decisions of High Courts will not only lose respect in the eyes of the public, it  will  also  make the task  of  the  sub-ordinate  courts difficult.       The  question  of law referred to  hereinbefore  again arose for decision in this case.  When this case came up  in the second appeal before Sahai, J. he referred it to a  Full Bench  in view of the conflict of opinion  noticed  earlier. The  Full Bench was presided over by Dasai, C.J. who  was  a party  to  the  decision in  Bharat’s  case(1).   The  other members   of   the  bench  were  Mukerji  and  Dwivedi,  JJ. Mukerji and Dwivedi, JJ. agreed with the view taken in Pheku Chamar’s   case(2).   Desai,   C.J.   in   his    dissenting judgment did not deal with the  meaning of  the  word "held" in  s. 9 but on the other hand opined that the  suit  should have  been dismissed because of the fact that the  buildings put  up  by the respondents were not there on  the  date  of vesting  and hence the respondents were not entitled to  the benefit of s.9.       Before  considering the meaning of the word "held"  in s.  9,  it is  necessary to mention that it   is  proper  to assume  that the lawmakers who are the   representatives  of the  people enact laws (1) A.I.R. 1958 All. 332.               (2) A.I.R.1953  All. 406 which  the society considers as honest, fair and  equitable. The  object  of  every legislation is   to   advance  public welfare.  In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on  Statutory Constructions the entire  legislative  process is   influenced   by considerations of justice  and  reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general  legislative intent  in every piece of  legislation.  Consequently  where the  suggested construction operates harshly,.  ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice  and reason, in most instances, it would  seem  that the  apparent or suggested meaning of the statute,  was  not the one intended by the law-makers.  In the absence of  some other  indication  that the harsh or ridiculous  effect  was actually  intended  by  the legislature,,  there  is  little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent.     We are unable to persuade ourselves to believe that  the legislature intended to ignore the rights of persons  having legal  title to possession and wanted to make a gift of  any building to a trespasser howsoever recent the trespass might have  been if only he happened to be in physical  possession of the building on the date of vesting.  We are also  unable to  discern  any  legislative  policy  in  support  of  that construction.   It  was  urged before us   by   the  learned Counsel for the appellants that the legislature with a  view to  put  a stop, to any controversy as to any rights  in  or over  any  building directed that whoever was  in   physical possession  of  a building on the date of vesting  shall  be deemed to be the settle of that building.  He further  urged

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that it would have been  a hard and laborious. task for  the State  to  investigate into disputed questions  relating  to title   or   possession  before   making   the    settlement contemplated by s. 9 and therefore the legislature cut   the Gordian  Knot by conferring title on the person who  was  in possession  of  the  building.  We see  no   merit  in  this argument.  The settlement contemplated by s. 9 is a   deemed settlement.   That  settlement took  place  immediately  the vesting   took   place  No inquiry was  contemplated  before that  settlement.  If there is any dispute as to who is  the settle,  the same has to be  decided  by the  civil  courts. The State is not concerned with the same.  Section 9  merely settles the building on the person who was holding it on the date of vesting.     It is true that according to the dictionary  meaning the word  "held"  can  mean either a lawful holding  or  even  a holding without any semblance of a right such as  holding by a   trespasser. But the real question is as to what  is  the legislative  intent?  Did the legislature intend  to  settle the  concerned   building  with  a person who  was  lawfully holding  or with any person holding lawfully  or  otherwise? Mr. Misra contended that there is no justification for us to read  into the section the word "lawfully" before  the  word "held".  According to him, if the legislature  intended 17 that  the  holding  should be a lawful one,  it  would  have said"lawfully held". He wanted us to interpret the   section as  it stands.     It is true that the legislature could have used the word "lawfully  held" in place of the word "held" in s. 9 but  as mentioned  earlier one of the dictionary meanings  given  to the  word  "held" is, "lawfully held".   In  Webster’s   New Twentieth   Century   Dictionary  (Second  Edition),  it  is stated  that  in legal parlance  the word  "held"  means  to possess by "legal title". In other words the word "held"  is technically  understood to mean to possess by  legal  title. Therefore  by interpreting the  word  "held"  as   "lawfully held",  we are not adding any word to the section.   We  are merely  spelling  out  the meaning of  that  word.   It  may further    be    seen  that  the  section  speaks   of   all buildings   ....  within the limits of an Estate,  belonging to   or  held  by  an  intermediary  or  tenant   or   other person"   ....  The word "belonging" undoubtedly refers   to legal title.  The words "held by an intermediary" also refer to a possession by legal title.  The words "held by  tenant" also  refer  to  holding by legal title.   In  the  sequence mentioned above it is proper to construe the word "held"  in s.  9 when used in relation to the words "other  person"  as meaning "lawfully held" by that person.  That interpretation flows  from  the context in which the word "held"  has  been used.    We   have   earlier   mentioned   that   the   said interpretation accords with justice.     The  expression  "held"  has been used in  the   Act  in various  other sections--see ss. 2(1)(c), 13, 17,  18,   21, 144,  204, 240A, 298, 304, and 314 to connote possession  by legal  title. Mr. Misra, learned Counsel for the  appellants does  not deny that the expression "held" in those  sections means held lawfully. But according to him that is because of the  context in which the word is used.  Mr. Misra is  right in  saying so  but he  overlooks  the context in which  that expression is used in s. 9.  We have already made  reference to  that context.  He failed to point out to us any  section in the Act,  leaving aside s. 9 for the time being where the word "held" has been used as meaning mere holding, lawful or otherwise.   In  K.K. Handique v. The   Member,   Board   of

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Agricultural Income Tax, Assam(1) this Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the word "holds" in ss. 12 and 13 of’  the Assam Agricultural Income Tax Act.  Subba  Rao,  J. (as he then was ) speaking for the Court observed that   the expression  "holds" includes a two-fold idea of  the  actual possession   of  a thing and also of being invested  with  a legal  title  though   some times it is used  only  to  mean actual  possession.  After reading ss. 12 and 13 together he observed  that  the  word "holds" in  those  sections  means holding by legal title.  In Eramma v. Verrupanna &  Ors.(2), this Court considered  the  meaning  of  the  word (1) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1191.              (2) [1966] 2, S.C.R. 626. "possessed" in s. 14 (1 ) of the Hindu Succession Act  which laid  down  that "any property possessed by a  female  Hindu whether  acquired before or after the commencement  of  this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as  a limited  owner".  It held that the property possessed  by  a female widow, as  contemplated in the section, is clearly  a property  to  which  she has  acquired some  kind  of  title whether before or after the commencement of the Act.  It  is true that in arriving at that conclusion the Court took into consideration  the language of the provision as a whole  and also the explanation to the section.  The scheme of the  Act is to abolish all Estates and vest the concerned property in the State but at the same time certain rights were conferred on  persons  in  possession of lands or  buildings.   It  is reasonable  to  think that the persons who were  within  the contemplation  of  the Act are those who were in  possession of  lands  or buildings on the basis of  some  legal  title. Bearing  in mind the purpose with which     the  legislation was enacted, the scheme of the Act and the language used  in s.  9, we are of opinion that the word "held" in s. 9  means "lawfully  held".  In other words we accept the  correctness of  the  view  taken by Mukerji and Dwivedi,  JJ.   For  the reasons already mentioned we are unable to agree with Desai, C.J.  that the fact that the appellants had  demolished  the buildings  put up by the respondents and put up  some  other building  in  their place had conferred any rights  on  them under s. 9. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. G.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 19