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PETITIONER: BUDHAN CHOUDHRY AND OTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/1954

BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. JAGANNADHADAS, B. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA

CITATION:  1955 AIR  191            1955 SCR  (1)1045

ACT: Constitution of India, Article 14-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act  V  of  1898),  section  30--Whether  ultra  vires  the Constitution-Article    14-Reasonable     classification-Not forbidden-Test   of  permissible   classification-.Necessary conditions-Constitution- Whether 1046 assures  unanimity of decisions or immunity  from  erroneous action of courts or executive agencies of State.

HEADNOTE: It is well-settled that while Article 14 of the Constitution forbids  class  legislation, it does not  forbid  reasonable classification  for the purposes of legislation.  In  order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification  two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i)  the  classification must be founded on an  intelligible differentia  which distinguishes persons or things that  are grouped together from others left out of the group; and, (ii) that  differentia must have a rational relation to  the object  sought  to be achieved by the statute  in  question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely geographical, or according to objects or occupations or  the like.  What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act  under consideration.  Further Article 14 condemn,,; discrimination not  only  by  a  substantive  law but  also  by  a  law  of procedure. The  Constitution does not assure unanimity of decisions  or immunity from merely erroneous action, whether by the courts or the executive agencies of a State. Section  30  of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  does  not infringe  the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14  of the Constitution. Chiranjit  Lal  Chowdhuri  v. The Union of  India  (  [1950] S.C.R.  869),  The State of Bombay v. F.N.  Balsara  ([1951] S.C.R.  682), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali  Sarkar-

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([1952]  S.C.R.  284), Kathi Raning Rawat v.  The  State  of Saurashtra ([1952] S.C.R. 435), Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R. 710), Qasim Razvi v.  The State  of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 581), Habeeb  Mohamad  v. The  State  of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661), The  State  of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R. 254), Yick Wo v.  Peter Hopkins  ([1886]  118 U.S. 356; 29 L. Ed. 220)  and  Snowden v.Hughes ([1944] 321 U.S. 1; 88 L. Ed. 497), referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 83  of 1953. Appeal  under  article 132(1) of the Constitution  of  India from  the Judgment and Order dated the 25th August  1953  of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 410 of 1951. B.   K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the appellants. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General for  India  (R.C.prqsad, with him) for the respondent. 1047 1954.   December 2. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by DAS  J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High  Court of  Judicature at Patna which raises a substantial  question of  law  as  to the interpretation of  the  Constitution  of India. The  appeal  arises  out of a criminal  trial  held  in  the district  of  Hazaribagh in the State of  Bihar.   The  case against the appellants was investigated by the local  police and on the 4th June, 1951 a challan was submitted before the Sub-Divisional  Magistrate.  The  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate passed the following order in the order-sbeet:- "Let the record be sent to the Dy.  Commr., Hazaribagh  for. transferring  it  to the file of the  Spl.   Magistrate  for trial". On  the record being placed before the Deputy  Commissioner, the latter passed following order:- "Perused S.D.0’s order-sheet.  Withdrawn and transferred  to the  file of Mr. S. F. Azam, Magte. with powers u/s 30,  Cr. P. C. for favour of disposal". The appellants were then tried by Mr. S. F. Azam, Magistrate of the first class exercising powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on charges under sections 366 and 143 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them was  convicted under both the sections and sentenced to rigorous  imprison- ment for five years under section 366, Indian Penal Code, no separate  sentence having been passed under section  143.The appellants  preferred  an  appeal  to  the  High  Court   of Judicature  at  Patna.   The appeal was  heard  by  a  Bench consisting  of  S. K. Das and C. P. Sinha, JJ. There  was  a difference  of opinion between the two learned Judges as  to the constitutionality of section 30 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure.   S. K. Das, J., took the view that the  impugned section did not bring about any discrimination or inequality between persons similarly circumstanced and consequently did not offend the equal protection clause of the  Constitution, while C. P. Sinha, J., was of the opinion that 1048 the section was hit by article 14.  The appeal was thereupon placed  before  Reuben, C. J., who in agreement with  S.  K. Das, J., held that section 30 did not violate the inhibition of  article  14.   The  learned  Chief  Justice  upheld  the conviction but reduced the sentence.  On application by  the

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appellants  the High Court granted them a certificate  under article  132(1)  and  the  present  appeal  has  been  filed accordingly. The  learned  Advocate appearing in support  of  the  appeal contends before us, as was done before the High Court,  that there  had  been  an infraction of  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed  to  the  appellants  under  article  14  of  the Constitution of India.  The complaint is that the appellants had been tried by a section 30 Magistrate and not by a Court of  Session.   A section 30 Magistrate is enjoined  by  that section  to try the case brought before him as a  Magistrate and  accordingly  in  cases like the present  case  he  will follow  the  warrant procedure which is different  from  the procedure followed by a Court of Session.  The substance  of the  grievance is that a trial before the Sessions Judge  is much more advantageous to the accused person in that he gets the   benefit  of  the  commitment  proceedings   before   a Magistrate and then a trial  before the Sessions Judge  with the aid of the jury or assessors.  It has not been seriously questioned before us that in spite of the risk of imposition of  a punishment heavier than what a section  30  Magistrate can  inflict,  a  trial by a Sessions Judge  is  of  greater advantage  to the accused than a trial before  a  Magistrate under  the  warrant procedure.  We have, therefore,  to  see whether  this  apparent discrimination offends  against  the equal protection clause of our Constitution. The  provisions of article 14 of the Constitution have  come up  for discussion before this Court in a number of  cases., namely,  Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union  of  India(1), The  State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara(2), The State of  West Bengal  v.  Anwar Ali Sarkar(3), Kathi Raning Rawat  v.  The State of Sau- (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.      (2) [1951] S.C.R. 682. (3) [1952] S.c. R. 284. 1049 rashtra(1),  Lachmandas  Kewalram  Ahuja  v.  The  State  of Bombay(2)  and Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad(3)  and Habeeb  Mohamad  v.  The  State  of  Hyderabad(4).   It  is, therefore,   not  necessary  to  enter  upon   any   lengthy discussion  as  to  the meaning, scope  and  effect  of  the article in question.  It is now well-established that  while article  14  forbids class legislation, it does  not  forbid reasonable  classification for the purposes of  legislation. In   order,  however,  to  pass  the  test  of   permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that  the classification must be founded on an  intelligible differentia  which distinguishes persons or things that  are grouped togetber from others left out of the group and  (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought  to  be  achieved by the statute  in  question.   The classification  may be founded on different  bases;  namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or  the like.   What  is  necessary is that there must  be  a  nexus between  the basis of classification and the object  of  the Act under consideration.  It is also well established by the decisions   of   this  Court  that   article   14   condemns discrimination not only by a  substantive law but also by  a law of procedure.   The contention now put forward as to the invalidity     of the trial of the appellants has, therefore to be tested in the light of the principles so laid down  in the decisions of this Court. There are no less than four modes of trial prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely,(i)  trial  of   sessions cases, (ii) trial of warrant cases, (iii)summary trials  and (iv)  trials before a High Court and a Court of Session  and

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the procedure in each of these trials is different.  Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is to be found in Chapter  III  which deals with "Powers of Courts"  reads  as follows:- "28.  Subject to the other provisions of this Code, any offence under the Indian Penal Code may be tried- (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 435. (3)  [1953] S.C.R. 581. (2)  [1952] S-C R. 710. (4)  [1953] S.C.R. 661. 1050 (a)  by the High Court, or (b)  by the Court of Session, or (c)  by any other Court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable". Section 30, as it now stands, provides:- "30.  In Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Oudh, Madhya Bharat, Hyderabad, Mysore, Patiala and East Punjab States Union  and Rajasthan,  in all Part C States and in those parts  of  the other  States  in which there are  Deputy  Commissioners  or Assistant  Commissioners  the  State  Government  may,  not- withstanding anything contained in section 28 or section 29, invest  the  District Magistrate or any  Magistrate  of  the first class, with power to try as a Magistrate all  offences not punishable with death". Section  34  puts a limit to the power of  punishment  of  a section 30 Magistrate in terms following:- "34.   The Court of a Magistrate, specially empowered  under section 30, may pass any sentence authorised by law,  except a  sentence  of  death  or  of  transportation  for  a  term exceeding  seven years or imprisonment for a term  exceeding seven years". It  will be noticed that section 28 begins with  the  clause "subject to the other provisions of this Code".  This  means that the section and the second schedule referred to therein are controlled by the other provisions of the Code including the  provisions of section 30. Further, the text of  section 30  itself  quite  clearly says  that  its  provisions  will operate "notwithstanding anything contained in section 28 or section  29".  Therefore, the provisions of section  28  and the  second  schedule  must give way to  the  provisions  of section  30.  It  is not, however, claimed  by  the  learned Attorney-General  that  section 30  abrogates  or  overrides altogether  the  provisions  of section 28  and  the  second schedule  in  the sense that in  the  specified  territories Magistrates  empowered  -under section 30  become  the  only tribunal  competent to try all offences not punishable  with death to the exclusion of all other Courts mentioned in  the 8th column of the second schedule. 1051 If  that  had  been the position, then  there  could  be  no question of discrimination, for, in that situation,  section 30  Magistrate’s Court would be the only Court in which  all offences not punishable with death would become triable.  As already  stated,  this  extreme claim is  not  made  by  the learned   Attorney-General.    The  effect  of   the   State Government   investing  the  District  Magistrate   or   any Magistrate of the first class with power under section 30 is to  bring  into  being  an additional  court  in  which  all offences not punishable with death become triable.  In other words, the effect of the exercise of authority by the  State Government  under section 30 is, as it were, to add  in  the 8th  column  of the second schedule the  Magistrate  so  em-

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powered  as a Court before whom all offences not  punishable with  death will also be triable.  The question  is  whether this  result brings about any inequality before the law  and militates against the guarantee of article 14. Section  30,  however,  empowers  the  State  Government  in certain  areas  to  invest the District  Magistrate  or  any Magistrate  of  the  first  class with power  to  try  as  a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death.  There is an  obvious classification on which this section  is  based, namely,  that  such  power may  be  conferred  on  specified Magistrates  in  certain localities only and in  respect  of some  offences only, namely, all offences other  than  those punishable  with  death.  The  Legislature  understands  and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people which  may vary   from  place  to  place.   As  already   observed,   a classification  may be based on geographical or  territorial considerations.     An   instance   of   such    territorial classification  is  to  be found  in  the  Abducted  Persons (Recovery  and  Restoration)  Act, 1949 which  came  up  for discussion before this Court and was upheld as valid in  The State  of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh(1).  S. K. Das, J., and  the learned  Chief  Justice have in their  respective  judgments referred to certain circumstances, e.g. the distance between the place of occurrence and the headquarters where (1)  [1953] S.C R. 254. 135 1052 the  Court of Session functions at  considerable  intervals, the   inconvenience  of  bringing  up  witnesses  from   the interior,  the difficulty of finding in the backward or  out of  the way places sufficient number of suitable persons  to act  as  jurors  or  assessors,  all  of  which  make   this classification  quite a reasonable one.  In this sense,  the section  itself  does  not bring  about  any  discrimination whatever.  The section only authorises the State  Government to  invest  certain  ’Magistrates  with  power  to  try  all offences  not punishable with death and this  authority  the State  can  exercise only in the specified places.   If  the State  invests any Magistrate with powers under  section  30 anybody  who commits any offence not punishable  with  death and triable by a Court of Session under section 28 read with the  second  schedule  is also liable to  be  tried  by  the section  30  Magistrate.  The risk of such  liability  falls alike   upon  all  persons  committing  such   an   offence. Therefore, there is no discrimination in the section itself. The  learned counsel for the appellants, however,  contends, on  the  strength of the decision of the  Supreme  Court  of America  in Yick, Wo v. Peter Hopkins(1) that "though a  law be  fair on its face and impartial in operation, yet, if  it is administered by public authority with an evil eye and  an unequal   hand   so   as   practically   to   make   illegal discrimination  between  persons  in  similar  circumstances materially  to their rights, the denial of equal justice  is still  within  the prohibition of  the  Constitution".   The contention  is that although the section itself may  not  be discriminatory, it may lend itself to abuse bringing about a discrimination  between persons accused of offences  of  the same kind, for the police may send up a person accused of an offence under section 366 to a section 30 Magistrate and the police  may send another person accused of an offence  under the same section to a Magistrate who can commit the  accused to  the Court of Session.  It is necessary to  examine  this contention with close scrutiny. When a case under section 366, Indian Penal (1)[1886] 118 u.s. L.Ed. 220. 1053

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Code.,  which is a case triable by a Court of Session  under the  second  schedule,  is  put  up  before  a  section   30 Magistrate,  the  section 30 Magistrate is  not  necessarily bound to try the case himself.  Section 34 limits the  power of  the section 30 Magistrate in the matter  of  punishment. If  the section 30 Magistrate after recording  the  evidence and  -before  framing a charge feels that in the  facts  and circumstances of the case the maximum sentence which he  can inflict will not meet the ends of justice he may, instead of disposing  of  the case himself, act under section  347  and commit  the accused to the Court of Session.  Here,  whether the  accused  person  shall  be  tried  by  the  section  30 Magistrate or by the Court of Session is decided not by  the executive  but  is  decided  according  to  the   discretion judicially  exercised by the section 30 Magistrate  himself. Take the case of another person accused of an affence  under section  366 which is sent up by the police to a  Magistrate who  is  not empowered under section  30.   Such  Magistrate after perusing the challan and other relevant papers may, if he  thinks that the ends of justice will be met if the  case is tried by a section 30 Magistrate, submit the case to  the District  Magistrate with his own recommendations  for  such action as the latter may think fit to take under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  That is what was done in the  instant case.  On the other hand, he may take  evidence under  section  208 and after the evidence has  been  taken, make up his mind judicially whether he should proceed  under section  209  or section 210.  He may consider that  in  the facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  disclosed  in  the evidence the ends of justice require that the accused person should  be  committed to the Court of Session  and  in  that event  he  will  proceed to frame a charge  and  follow  the provisions  of  sections  210  to  213.   If,  however,  the Magistrate  is satisfied on the facts of the case  that  the ends  of justice will be sufficiently met if the accused  is tried by a section 30 Magistrate having jurisdiction in  the matter, the Magistrate may report to the District Magistrate and  the  latter may, in his discretion, withdraw  the  case under section 528 of the 1054 Code  of Criminal Procedure to himself and may enquire  into or try such case himself or refer it for enquiry or trial to any  other Magistrate competent to try the same.  In such  a case there is exercise of judicial discretion at two stages, namely, under section 209 by the Magistrate before whom  the accused  was  sent up for enquiry and also by  the  District Magistrate acting under section 528 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure.   It is thus clear that the ultimate decision  as to  whether  a person charged under section  366  should  be tried by the Court of Session or by a section 30  Magistrate does not depend merely on the whim or idiosyncrasies of  the police or the executive Government but depends ultimately on the   -proper  exercise  of  judicial  discretion   by   the Magistrate  concerned.  It is suggested that  discrimination may  be  brought  about either by  the  Legislature  or  the Executive  or  even  the Judiciary  and  the  inhibition  of article 14 extends to all actions of the State denying equal protection of the laws whether it be the action of anyone of the  three  limbs  of the State.  It  has,  however,  to  be remembered  that,  in the language of  Frankfurter,  J.,  in Snowden  v.  Hughes(1), "the Constitution  does  not  assure uniformity  of decisions or immunity from  merely  erroneous action, whether by the Courts or the executive agencies of a State".   The judicial decision must of necessity depend  on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what

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may superficially appear to be an unequal application of the law  may  not  necessarily  amount  to  a  denial  of  equal protection of law unless there is shown to be present in  it an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination (See per  Stone,  C.J., in Snowden v.Hughes (supra).  It  may  be mentioned  at  once  that in the present case  there  is  no suggestion  whatever  that there has been at any  stage  any intentional  or  purposeful discrimination  as  against  the appellants by the Sab-Divisional Magistrate or the  District Magistrate  or the section 30 Magistrate who actually  tried the  accused.  Further, the discretion of judicial  officers is not arbitrary and the law provides for revision by (1)  (1914) 321 U.S. 1; 88 L. Ed. 497. 1055 superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate  Courts. In such circumstances, there is hardly any ground for Apprehending  any  capricious  discrimination  by   judicial tribunals. On  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case  we  find ourselves  in agreement with S. K. Das, J., and  Reuben,  C. J.,  and  hold that no case of infringement  of  fundamental right   under  Article  14  has  been  made  out.   In   the circumstances, we dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.