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PETITIONER: BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/05/1953

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) DAS, SUDHI RANJAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1954 AIR   10            1954 SCR 1169  CITATOR INFO :  C          1954 SC 743  (4)  E&F        1959 SC 102  (3)  R          1962 SC1172  (29)  R          1971 SC 221  (17)  RF         1971 SC1132  (53,58)  R          1972 SC 989  (8)  D          1974 SC 710  (51)  R          1978 SC 727  (42,44)  F          1978 SC 921  (12,16)  R          1992 SC 904  (23,54)

ACT: Contempt  of Courts Act, 1926, s. 3 Reflection on  condition character of Judicial Officers  When amounts to contempt  of court Contempt proceedings--Guiding principles Matters to be considered-Relevancy    of    surronuding     circumstances- Jurisdiction to be sparing exeercised.

HEADNOTE:   (1) Vide Vaghoji v. Camaji, I.I..R. 29 Bom. 249.  117O  The  object  of  contempt  proceedings  is  not  to   afford  protection  to judges personally from imputations  to  which  they  maybe exposed as individuals, but is intended to be  a  protection  to the public whose interest would be very  much  affected  if,  by  the  act or conduct  of  any  party,  the  authority  of  the  court  is  lowered  and  the  sense   of  confidence  which the people have in the  administration  of  justice by it is weakened.      When   the  court  itself  is  attacked,   the   summary  jurisdiction  by  way  of  contempt  ’proceedings  must   be  exercised  with  scrupulous care and only when the  case  is  clear and beyond reasonable doubt.      There are two primary considerations which should  weigh  with  the  court  in such cases,  viz.,  first  whether  the  reflection  on  the  conduct or character of  the  judge  is  within  the  limits of fair and  reasonable  criticism,  and  secondly,  whether it is a mere libel or defamation  of  the  judge  or  amounts to a contempt of the court.  If it  is  a

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mere defamatory attack on the judge and is not calculated to  interfere  with  the  due course of justice  or  the  proper  administration of the law by such court, it is not proper to  proceed by way of contempt.      Where the question arises whether a defamatory statement  directed  against  a judge is calculated  to  undermine  the  confidence  of the public in the competency or integrity  of  the  judge or is likely to deflect the court itself  from  a  strict  and  unhesitant performance of its duties,  all  the  surrounding   facts  and  circumstances  under   which   the  statement  was  made and the degree of  publicity  that  was  given  to it would be relevant circumstances.  The  question  is  not  to  be  determined solely  with  reference  to  the  language or contents of the statement made.  The  Executive  Committee  of  a  District  Bar  Association  received  several  complaints against the way in  which  the  Judicial Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the  District  disposed of cases and behaved towards litigants and lawyers,  and  passed  a resolution which stated that " it  was  their  considered  opinion  that the two  officers  are  thoroughly  incompetent  in  law,  do not inspire  confidence  in  their  judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing  orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the  litigant  public  and  lawyers  alike " and gave  a  list  of  various  complaints against the officers.  This resolution was passed  in camera, typed out by the President himself and  forwarded  confidentially  to the District Magistrate, Commissioner  of  the  Division,  and the Chief Secretary and Premier  of  the  State.   The  District Magistrate moved the  High  Court  of  Allahabad  to  take action against the appellants,  who  had  passed  the  resolution, for contempt of  court.   The  High  Court  held that the appellants were guilty of contempt  but  accepted their apology.  On appeal:     Held,  that in the light of all the circumstances of  the  case,  the  contempt,  if  any,  was  only  of  a  technical  character  and that after the affidavits bad been  filed  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  before  the  High  Court,   the  proceedings against them should have been dropped.  1171

JUDGMENT: CRMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  24  of 1951. Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on  the 2nd  April, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the  5th May,  1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad  in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 34 of 1949. M.   C.   Setalvad,  Attorney-General  for  India,   K.   S. Krishnaswamy  Aiyangar and S. P.Sinha (V.  N. Sethi,  K.  B. Asthana, N. C. Sen, K. N. Aggarwala, Shaukat Hussain, K.  P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. C. Mathur, with them) for  the appellants. Gopalji Mehrotra and Jagdish Chandra for the respondent. 1953.  May 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEA,  J.This  appeal  which has  come  before  us,  on special  leave,  is directed against a judgment  of  a  Full Bench  of the Allahabad High Court, dated 5th May, 1950,  by which  the  learned  judges held the  appellants  guilty  of contempt of court; and although the apology tendered by  the appellants was accepted, they were directed to pay the costs of the respondent State. The appellants, six in number, are members of the  Executive Committee  of the District Bar Association at  Muzaffarnagar

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within  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  and  the   contempt proceedings  were started against them, because  of  certain resolutions  passed  by the Committee on 20th  April,  1949, copies  of which were forwarded to the  District  Magistrate and other officers by a covering letter signed by  appellant No.1 as President of the Bar Association. To appreciate the contentions that have been raised in  this appeal, it would be necessary to state a few relevant facts. The  resolutions  which  form  the  basis  of  the  contempt proceedings relate to the conduct of two judicial  officers, both of whom functioned At 1172 Muzafarnagarn  at  the  relevant time.  One  of  them  named Kanhaya Lal Mehra was a Judicial Magistrate while the  other named  Lalta Prasad was a Revenue Officer.  It is said  that the  first  appellant as President of  the  Bar  Association received  numerous  complaints regarding the  way  in  which these officers diposed of cases in their courts and  behaved towards the lawyers and the litigant public.  The  Executive Committee  of the Association took the matter in  hand  and, after satisfying themselves that the complaints were legiti- mate  and well-founded, they held a meeting on  20th  April, 1949, in which the following resolutions were passed:-     Rsolved that ----     "Whereas  the members of the Association have had  ample opportunity  of forming an opinion of the judicial  work  of Sri Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate, and Shri Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer,     It is now their considered opinion that the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in  their  judicial work, are given to stating  wrong  facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous  to the  litigant  public and the lawyers  alike.   Besides  the above-mentioned  defects  common  to  both  of  them,  other defects are separately catalogued as hereunder:-      *               *                 *           *     (The complaints against each of the officers  separately were then set out under specific heads).   Resolved further that copies of the resolution be sent  to the  Honourable  Premier, the Chief Secretary of  the  Uttar Pradesh  Government,  the  Commissioner  and  the   District Magistrate for suitable action;    Resolved  that the District Magistrate and  Collector  be requested  to  meet a deputation of the  following  in  this connection at an early date;"     (The names of 5 members who were to form the  deputation were then mentioned.) 1173 It  is  not  disputed that this  meeting  of  the  Executive Committee  of the Bar Association was held in camera and  no non-member   was  allowed  to  be  present’  at   it.    The resolutions were typed out by the President himself and  the proceedings  were  not recorded in the Minute  Book  of  the Association at all.  On the following day, that is, on  21st April,  1949, the President sent a copy of  the  resolutions with  a  covering  letter marked  "   confidential"  to  the District   Magistrate,   Muzaffarnagar.    Copies   of   the resolutions were similarly despatched to the Commissioner of the  Division, the Chief Secretary and the Premier of  Uttar Pradesh.   It is not disputed that the  District  Magistrate was  the immediate superior of the officers  concerned,  and the other three were the higher executive authorities in the official  hierarchy.  One paragraph of this covering  letter contained the following statement:-  "Complaints against these officers had been mounting and  a

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stage  was  reached  when  the matter had  to  be  taken  up formally.   The resolution is not only  well-considered  and unanimous  but  represents  a consensus of  opinion  of  all practitioners in the Criminal and Revenue side."    The  post-script of the letter addressed to the  District Magistrate  contained  a  prayer  that  he  might  find   it convenient to fix an early date to meet the deputation of  5 members as indicated in the third resolution.     The  Divisional Commissioner, by his letter  dated  27th April,  1949,  addressed to appellant  No.  1,  acknowledged receipt  of  the copy of the resolutions and  requested  the addressee to supply specific details of cases tried by these officers  in  support of the allegations  contained  in  the resolution.  Without waiting for this information,  however, the Commissioner on the day following wrote a letter to  the Chief  Secretary of the U.P. Government suggesting that  the matter  should  be brought to the notice of the  High  Court inasmuch  as  instances  were  not  rare  where  influential members  of  the Bar got resolutions like  these  passed  by their associations with a view to put 152 1174 extra-judicial pressure upon the judicial officers so ,as to make  them  amenable  to  their  wishes  which  often   were questionable.  On 10th May, 1949, a deputation of 5  members waited  upon the District Magistrate and discussed with  the latter  the entire situation.  The Magistrate also told  the deputation that the details of complaints as required by the Commissioner  should be furnished at an early  date.   These details  were  sent  to  the  District  Magistrate  by   the appellant  No. I on 20th June, 1949, and specific  instances were cited, the accuracy of which was vouched by a number of senior lawyers who actually conducted those cases.  On  20th July,  1949, the District Magistrate through the  Divisional Commissioner  wrote  a letter to the Registrar of  the  High Court  of  Allahabad  requesting  the  latter  to  draw  the attention  of  the High Court to the resolutions  passed  on 20th  April, 1949, and other remarks made by the members  of the  Committee and suggesting that suitable action might  be taken against them under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act  of  1926.   On  16th November,  1949,  the  High  Court directed the issue of notices on 8 members of the  Committee to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of  court in respect of certain portions of  the  resolution which  were  set  out in the notice.   In  answer  to  these notices, the opposite parties appeared and filed affidavits. The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges who, by  their judgment  dated 5th May, 1950, came to the  conclusion  that with  the exception of two of the opposite parties who  were not members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date, the remaining six were guilty of contempt of’ court.  It was held  that  the opposite parties were not  actuated  by  any personal  or improper motives; the statement made  on  their behalf  that their object was not to interfere with  but  to improve  the administration of justice was accepted  by  the court, but nevertheless it was observed that the terms  used in  the resolution were little removed from  personal  abuse and  whatever might have been the motive, they clearly  were likely to bring the Magistrate into contempt and 1175 lower  their  authority.   The  concluding  portion  of  the judgment stands as follows:-     "We  think  that  the opposite  parties  acted  under  a misapprehension as to the position, but they have  expressed their  regrets and tendered an unqualified apology.  In  the

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circumstances,  we accept their apology, but we direct  that they  pay  the  costs of the Government  Advocate  which  we assess at Rs. 300."     It  is  the  propriety of this judgment  that  has  been assailed before us in this appeal.    According  to the learned judges of the High Court,,  the allegations  made  against  the  judicial  officers  in  the present  case come within the category of contempt which  is comniitted by "scandalising the court".  The learned  judges observed  on authority of the pronouncement of Lord  Russell in  Reg. v. Gray(1), that this class of contempt is  subject to  one important qualification.  The judges and courts  are alike  open  to  criticism and  if  reasonable  argument  or expostulation  is  offered  against  any  judicial  act   as contrary  to  law or the public good, no court  could  treat that  as contempt of court.  In the opinion of  the  learned judges, the complaint lodged by the appellants exceeded  the bounds of fair and legitimate criticism and in this  respect the  members  of  the Bar Association could  not  claim  any higher  privilege than ordinary citizens.   No  distinction, the  High  Court held, could also be made by reason  of  the fact  that the charges against the judicial officers in  the present  case  were  embodied in a  representation  made  to authorities who were the official superiors of the  officers concerned and under whose administrative control the  latter acted. The  learned Attorney-General who appeared in sup.  port  of the  appeal, characterised this way of approach of the  High Court as entirely wrong.  His contention is that any act  or publication  which is calculated to lower the  authority  or dignity  of  a judge does not per se amount to  contempt  of court.   The  test is whether the allegations  are  of  such character or are made in (1)  [1900] 2 Q.B 36. 1176 such  circumstances as would tend to obstruct  or  interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of law. Reliance  was placed by him in this connection upon  certain pronouncements   of  the  Judicial  Committee   which   held definitely  that an imputation  affecting the  character  or conduct  of a judge, even I though it could be the  subject- matter  of a libel proceeding, would not necessarily  amount to  a  contempt of court.  The  Attorney-General  laid  very great stress on the fact that the resolutions passed and the representations  made by the appellants in the present  case were  not for the purpose of exposing before the public  the alleged  shortcomings of the officers concerned ; the  whole object  was  to have the grievances of the lawyers  and  the litigating  public which were genuinely felt, removed by  an appeal to the authorities who alone were competent to remove them.   Such  conduct, it is argued, cannot in  any  way  be calculated  to interfere with the due administration of  law and  cannot  be held to be contempt of  court.   The  points raised are undoubtedly important and require to be  examined carefully.    It  admits  of no dispute that the  summary  jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of  their authority exists for the purpose of preventing  interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of  law as is administered in the courts.  It would be  only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the  object  of  contempt  proceedings  is  not  to   afford protection  to judges, personally from imputations to  which they  may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be  a protection to the public whose interests would be very  much

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affected  if  by  the  act or  conduct  of  any  party,  the authority  of  the  court  is  lowered  and  the  sense   of confidence  which  people  have  in  the  administration  of justice by it is weakened. There  are indeed innumerable ways by which attempts can  be made to hinder obstruct the due administration of justice in courts.  One type of such 1177 interference  is  found in cases where there is an  act  or, publication which "amounts to scandalising the court itself" an expression which is familiar to English lawyers since the days of Lord Hardwick(1).  This scandalising might  manifest itself in various ways but, in substance, it is an attack on individual  judges or the court as a whole with  or  without reference  to  particular  cases,  casting  unwarranted  and defamatory  aspersions upon the character or ability of  the judges.   Such  conduct, is punished as  contempt  for  this reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular  mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts  which are  of prime importance to the litigants in the  protection of their rights and liberties.   There  are  decisions of English courts from  early  times where  the courts assumed jurisdiction in  taking  committal proceedings  against persons who were guilty  of  publishing any  scandalous matter in respect of the court  itself.   In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in MacLeod v. St. Aubin(2) observed  that "committals  for contempt by scandalising the  court  itself have become obsolete in this country.  Courts are  satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous  to them." His Lordship said further: "The  power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice.  It is not to be  used for the vindication of a judge as a person.  He must  resort to action for libel or criminal information."     The observation of Lord Morris that contempt proceedings for scandalising the courts have become obsolete in  England is  not, strictly speaking, correct; for, in the  very  next year,  such proceedings were taken in Reg. v.  Gray(1).   In that  case,  there  was  a scandalous  attack  of  a  rather atrocious type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who  was indicted  intter  alia for selling  and  publishing  obscene literature. (1)  Vide In re Read and Huggonoson (1742) 2 Atk 469, 471. (2)  [1899] A. C. 549. (3)  (1900] 2 Q.B. 36. 1178 The  judge, in the course of the trial, gave a  warning  ,to the newspaper press that in reporting the proceedings of the court,  it  was  not proper for them to  give  publicity  to indecent  matters  that were revealed  during  trial.   Upon this, the defendant published an article ’in the  Birmingham Daily  Argus,  under the heading "An advocate  of  Decency", where  Darling  J. was abused in scurrilous  language.   The case  of  Wells  was then over but the  Assizes  were  still sitting.   There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  publication amounted to contempt of court and such attack was calculated to interfere directly with proper administration of justice. Lord  Russell in the course of his judgment,  however,  took care  to  observe that the summary jurisdiction  by  way  of contempt  proceedings in such cases where the  court  itself was  attacked has to be exercised with scrupulous  care  and only  ’when the case is clear and beyond  reasonable  doubt. "Because", as his Lordship said, "if it is not a case beyond

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reasonable  doubt, the court should and ought to  leave  the Attorney-General  to proceed by criminal  information".   In 1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council  in Devi Prashad v. King Emperor(1),  observed  that cases  of contempt, which consist of scandalising the  court itself, are fortunately rare and require to be treated  with much  discretion.  Proceedings for this species of  contempt should  be used sparingly and always with reference  to  the administration of justice.  "If a judge is defamed in such a way  as not to affect the administration of justice, he  has the  ordinary  remedies  for defamation if  he  should  feel impelled to use them."    It  seems,  therefore, that there are  two  primary  con- siderations  which  should weigh with the court when  it  is called  upon  to  exercise the summary powers  in  cases  of contempt  committed by "scandalising" the court itself.   In the  first place, the rejection on the conduct or  character of  a  judge in reference to the discharge of  his  judicial duties  would not be contempt if such reflection is made  in the  exercise of the right of fair and reasonable  criticism which every citizen possesses in (1)  70 1, A. 216. 1179 respect  of public acts done in the seat of justice.  It  is not  by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can  be created.  "The path of criticism", said Lord Atkin(1), "is a public way.  The wrong-headed are permitted to err  therein; provided  that members of the public abstain, from  imputing motives  to  those  taking part  in  the  administration  of justice  and are genuinely exercising a right  of  criticism and  not  acting  in  malice,  or  attempt  to  impair   the administration of justice, they are immune."     In  the second place, when attacks or comments are  made on   a  judge  or  judges,  disparaging  in  character   and derogatory  to  their  dignity,  care  should  be  taken  to distinguish  between what is a libel on the judge  and  what amounts  really  to  contempt of court.   The  fact  that  a statement  is  defamatory so far as the judge  is  concerned does  not necessarily make it a contempt.   The  distinction between  a  libel  and  a contempt  was  pointed  out  by  a Committee  of  the Privy Council, to which a  reference  was made  by the Secretary of State in 1892 (2).  A man  in  the Bahama  Islands,  in  a  letter  published  in  a   colonial newspaper  criticized the Chief Justice of the Colony in  an extremely  ill-chosen  language  which  was  sarcastic   and pungent.   There  was a veiled insinuation that  he  was  an incompetent  judge  and  a shirker of work  and  the  writer suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing  if he  were to die.  A strong Board constituting of 11  members reported that the letter complained of. though it might have been made the subject of proceedings for libel, was not,  in the circumstances. calculated to obstruct or interfere  with the  course of justice or the due administration of the  law and  therefore did not constitute a contempt of court.   The same  principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case  of Devi Prashad v. King Emperor(,’) referred to above.  It  was followed  and approved of by the High Court of Australia  in King v. Nicholls(1), and has been accepted as sound by this (1)  Ambard  v.  Attney-General  for  Trinidad  and  Tobago, [1936] A.C 322 at P. 335. (2)  In  the  matter of a special referencefrom  the  Bahama Islands [1893] A. C. 138. (3) 70 I.A. 216.           (4) 12 Com.  L. R. 280 1180 Court  in  Reddy v. The State of Madras (1).   The  position

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therefore  is that a defamatory attack on a judge may  be  a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be  open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he  so  chooses.   If,  however,  the  publication  of   the disparaging  statement is calculated to interfere  with  the due  course  of justice or proper administration of  law  by such  court, it can be punished summarily as contempt.   One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong  done  to  the public.  It will be an  injury  to  the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the  people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness  of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants  from placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of justice,  or if it is likely to cause embarrassment  in  the mind  of the judge himself in the discharge of his  judicial duties.  It is well established that it is not necessary  to prove   affirmatively   that  there  has  been   an   actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely,  or tends  in  any  way,  to interfere  with  the  proper  admi- nistration of law (2). It is in the light of these principles that we will  proceed to examine the facts of the present case. It cannot be disputed that in regard to matters of contempt, the  members  of  a  Bar  Association  do  not  occupy   any privileged  or higher position than ordinary citizens.   The form in which the disparaging statement is made is also  not material, but one very important thing has to be noticed  in the  case  before  us, viz., that  even  assuming  that  the statement  was  derogatory to the dignity  of  the  judicial officers, very little publicity was given to this statement, and  in fact, the appellants made their best  endeavours  to keep  the  thing out of the knowledge of  the  public.   The representation was made to 4 specified persons who were  the official  superiors  of the officers concerned; and  it  has been found as a fact by the High Court that the appellants (1)  (1952] S. C. R. 452. (2)  Mr.   Mookerjea J. in In re Motilal Ghosh  and  Othera, I.L.R. 45 Cal. 269 at 283. 1181 acted  bona  fide with no intention to  interfere  with  the administration of justice though they might have been  under a misapprehension regarding the precise legal position.   No copies  of  the resolution were even sent  to  the  officers concerned.  Apart from the contents of the representation by the appellants and the language use therein, this fact would have  a bearing on the questio as to whether the conduct  of the appellants brought them within the purview of the law of contempt. The first question that requires consideration is whether in making  the  allegations  which they  did  against  the  two judicial  officers,  the appellants exceeded the  limits  of fair and legitimate criticism.  There were three resolutions passed at the meeting; the second, and third were of a  mere formal character and do not require any consideration.   The offending  statement is to be found in the first  resolution which  again is in two parts.  In the first part, there  are allegations  of a general nature against both the  officers, but  the  second part enumerates under  specific  heads  the complaints  which  the Committee had against  each  of  them separately.   With  regard to Kanhaya Lal, the a legations are  that  he does not record the evidence in cases tried by him properly, that in all criminal matters transferred to his court, where the accused are already on bail, he does not give them  time

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to furnish fresh sureties with the result that they are sent to jail, and lastly, that he is not accommodating to lawyers at  all.   So  far as the other officer  is  concerned,  one serious  allegation  made  is, that he  follows  the  highly illegal  procedure of hearing two cases at one and the  same time, and while he records the evidence in one case himself, he allows the Court Reader to do the thing in the other.  It is  said  also  that he  is  short-tempered  and  frequently threatens  lawyers with proceedings for contempt.   Some  of these complaints are not at all serious and no judge, unless he  is hypersensitive, would at all feel aggrieved by  them. It  is undoubtedly a grave charge that the  Revenue  Officer hears  two cases simultaneously and allows the Court  Reader to do the work for him.  If true 153 1182 it  is a patent illegality and is precisely a  matter  which should  be brought to the notice of the District  Magistrate who is the administrative head of these officers.   As  regards  the first part of the resolution,  the  alle- gations  are made in general terms that’ these  officers  do not  state  facts correctly when they pass orders  and  that they are discourteous to the litigant public.  These do  not by  any  moans  amount  to  scandalising  the  court.   Such complaints   are  frequently  heard  in  respect   of   many subordinate  courts  and  if the appellants  had  a  genuine grievance,it  cannot  be  said that,  in  ventilating  their grievances they exceeded the limits affair criticism.   The  only portion of the resolution to which ’prima  facie objection  can  be  taken  is  that  which  describes  these officers as thoroughly incompetent in law and whose judicial work  does  not  inspire  confidence.   Those  remarks   are certainly   of  a  sweeping  nature  and  can  scarcely   be justified.   Assuming,  however, that this  portion  of  the resolution is defamatory, the question arises whether it can be  held  to amount to contempt of court.   To  answer  this question, we have to see whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice in these courts, or, in other words, whether such statement is likely to give rise to an apprehension in the minds of litigants as to  the  ability.  of  the two  judicial  officers  to  deal properly with cases-coming before them, or even to embarrass the officers themselves in the discharge of their duties. We  are  unable to agree with the learned  counsel  for  the respondent  that whether or not the representation  made  by the  appellants  in the present case is  calculated  produce these  results  is to be determined solely  and  exclusively with  reference  to  the  language  or  con  tents  of   the resolutions   themselves;   and  that-no   other   fact   or circumstance  can  be looked into for this  purpose,  except perhaps  as  matters which vate or mitigate the  offence  of content: offence is found to have been committed that  pleas of justification or privilege are speaking available to  the defendant in contempt 1183 proceedings.   The  question  of  publication  also  in  the technical  sense in which it is relevant in, a libel  action may  be inappropriate to the law of contempt.  But,  leaving out cases of ex facie contempt, where the question arises as to  whether a defamatory statement directed against a  judge is  calculated to undermine the confidence of the public  in the  capacity  or integrity. of the judge or  is  likely  to deflect  the  court  itself from  a  strict  and  unhesitant performance  of  its duties, all the surroundung  facts  and circumstances   under which the statement was  made  and the

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degree of publicity a was givine to it would undoubtedly  be relevant’ circumstances.  It is true as the learned  counsel for the respondent suggests that the matter was discussed in the present case among the members of the Bar, and it  might have  been  the  subject-matter of  discussion  amongst  the officers  also to whom copies of the resolutions were  sent. No  doubt, there was publication as, is required by the  law of  libel, but in contempt proceedings, that is not  by  any means  conclusive.   What  is material is  the  nature.  and extent  of the publication and whether or not it was  likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself and therefore to interference with  the administration of justice.  On the materials before us,,  it is  difficult to say that the circumstances under which  the representation was made by the appellants was calculated  to have  such  effect.   There  might  have  been  some  remote possibility but that cannot be taken note of. We are clearly of  the  opinion that the contempt, if any, was  only  of  a technical  character,  and that after  the  affidavits  were filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings  against  them should have  been  dropped.   The result,  therefore,  is that the appeal is allowed  and  the judgment  of the High Court is set aside.  There will be  no order for costs either here or in the court below in  favour of either party.                Appeal allowed..      Agent for the appellants: S. S. Shukla.      Agent for the respondents: C. P. Lal. 1184