31 December 1996
Supreme Court
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BLOOM DEKOR Vs ARVIND B. SHETH .

Bench: KULDIP SINGH,S. SAGHIR AHMAD
Case number: C.A. No.-001750-001750 / 1994
Diary number: 74877 / 1994
Advocates: Vs BIRAJ TIWARI


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PETITIONER: JAFFAR HUSSAIN EBRAHIM & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S. TAIYABALI DAWOODJI RANGWALA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       31/12/1996

BENCH: KULDIP  SINGH, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      Kuldip Singh, J.      This is  a landlord‘s  appeal.  He  filed  a  suit  for eviction of  the  respondent-tenant  from  the  premises  in dispute, inter alia, on the ground or sub-letting. The trial count came  to the  conclusion that  Mohsin Rangwalla-though the common  partner-was not  a  real  partner  in  the  firm respondent 2-defendant  2 and as such respondent 1-defendant 1 had  parted with  the possession  of the  suit premises by putting respondent 2 in exclusive possession. In view of the said finding,  the trial  count decreed the suit. The appeal filed by  the tenant was heard by a Bench of the small Cause Count.  The   appellate  count  on  re-appreciation  of  the evidence  on   record,  reversed   the  reasoning   and  the conclusions reached  by the  trial count  and dismissed  the suit. The  High Count  in its  writ jurisdiction  upheld the findings  of  the  appellate  count.  This  appeal,  by  the landlord, is  directed against the judgment of the appellate court and that of the High Court. We have  heard learned  counsel for  the parties.  We see no ground  to  interfere  with  the  findings  reached  by  the appellate count and upheld by the High Court. The High Court approved  the   findings  of  the  appellate  court  on  the following reasoning:-      The  orders   of  assessment   were      already  made  in  1962,  1963  and      1964. Return  forms were also filed      before  the   filing  of  the  suit      itself.  Therefore,  it  cannot  be      said that  they were manipulated or      the  orders   are  based   on  some      material which  could be  termed as      an after  thought.  In  my  opinion      these   assessment   orders   which      related to  the period prior to the      filing of  the suit  were not  only      relevant but  were also germane for      deciding the  controversy  involved      in   the    suit.   Further,    the      defendants have  also  produced  on

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    record the  municipal  licences  of      1964. Application  for this licence      was made  before the  filing of the      suit  itself   and  from  the  bare      reading of  these  licences  it  is      clear that  in  terms  it  makes  a      reference to the earlier decisions.      Defendants  No.1   firm  which  was      dealing in  paints  in  paints  and      colours had import licence and such      licences numbering 39 were produced      before the  court. They  relate  to      the period  from 1962  to 1971.  In      all  these   import  licences   the      address of  the suit  premises. The      defendants have  also produced  the      correspondence  received   at   the      address of  the  suit-premises  for      the years  1962  and  onwards.  The      correspondence of  the foreign firm      for import  of colour  and paid was      also produced. The extract from the      account books of the firm were also      produced.     The     weight     or      authenticity  of   these  documents      could not have been lightly brushed      aside. ...................Therefore      taking a  cumulative  view  of  the      whole evidene  in my  opinion,  the      appeal Bench was right in coming to      the conclusion  that Mohsinbhai was      a common partner of both the firms.      All though  he continued  to be  in      possession of  the  premises.  From      the material  placed on record viz.      import licences  etc. coupled  with      the oral  evidence, it  is  further      clear that  even  the  business  of      defendant  No.1   firm  was   being      carried out from the suit premises.      Admittedly,  tenancy  of  defendant      No.1 was  never  terminated  either      expressly or  by  implication.  The      partnership   which    came    into      existence on  30th  September  1960      was a  partnership in  which Mohsin      was a  partner. The  suit  premises      were never  treated  as  assets  of      defendant No.1  Mohsing was  acting      for and on behalf of defendant No.1      firm. Lalbhai  who was a partner of      the second  defendant was  managing      business of  the  second  defendant      firm  for  and  on  behalf  of  the      partners,      which       included      Mohsinbhai. In  substance therefore      defendant No.1  firm  which  was  a      tenant   was    all   through    in      possession of the suit premises and      the plaintiff never parted with the      possession more  so exclusively. In      this view  of the matter, I have no      hesitation   in    confirming   the      finding of  fact  recorded  by  the      appeal Bench  of  the  Small  Cause

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    Count."      We see  no ground  to interfere  with the  above quoted findings reached  by the  High  Court.  We  agree  with  the reasoning and the conclusions reached therein. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.