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PETITIONER: BISHAN LAL GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/01/1978

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  363            1978 SCR  (2) 521  1978 SCC  (1) 202

ACT: Constitution  of India, Articles 136 and 311 Article  136  : Interference with, when warranted-Article 311 : Inquiry  for determining,  suitability  of  probationer  to  continue  in service,   whether  amounts  to  "punishment"-Removal   from service, probationer vis a vis confirmed Government servant.

HEADNOTE: Complaints   were   received  against  the   petitioner,   a probationer in the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial  Branch), and  the  High  Court  held  an  inquiry  to  determine  his suitability to continue in service.  Show cause notices were issued  and the petitioner was given reasonable  opportunity to  be  heard, but it was found that his  explanations  were belied   by   documentary  evidence  on   record,   On   the recommendation  of  the  High Court,  the  State  Government terminated  his  services by an  innocuously  worded  order, after considering his further explanations.  Three questions arose, before this Court. firstly, whether the inquiry  held by  the  High  Court amounted  to  "punishment"  within  the meaning  of Article 311, secondly whether  probationers  and confirmed Government servants stand at par in such cases and thirdly, whether on mere technical pleas, this Court  should interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court, HELD : 1. This Court would not interere under Article 136 of the Constitution on a merely technical plea.  It is only  if patent  facts disclose a serious enough infringement of  law as well as indubitably damaging and undeserved  consequences upon  a petitioner that the court’s conscience could  be  so moved as to induce it to interfere. [519 D-E] 2.If the enquiry conducted and notices given are intended only to determine whether a probationer, who has no fixed or fully  formed right to continue in service (treated  in  the eye of law as a case of "no right" to continue in  service), should   be  continued  and  more  serious  action  is   not contemplated it means that no stigma is intended to be cast, even if the reputation of the probationer is to some  degree affected,  if those facts can not reasonably be disputed  by him.  In the eye of law, it is not a case of punishment, but of termination of service simpliciter, unless the individual

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concerned  has  suffered a substantial  loss  of  reputation which may affect his future prospects. [519 A-C] Shainsher  Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975(1) SCR 814;  State of  Punjab  & Anr. v. Sukh Raj Bahadur 1968 II  SLR  701=AIR 1968  SC  1089;  Ram Gopal Chaturvedi  v.  State  of  Madhya Pradesh 1969 SLR 429; S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Haryana and Ors..  A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2292;.Champaklal v. Union  of  India A.I.R.  1964  S.C. 1854; State  of Bihar and Ors.  v.  Shiva Bhukshuk Mishra,    A.T.R.  1971  S.C.  1011:  Purshottamlal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R.1958      S.C.  38;   The State of Orissa & Anr. v. Ram Narayan Das, A.T.R. 1961S.C. 177; Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. The Union of India & Anr., A.T.R.1963      S.C.  1552;  State of Uttar  Pradesh  v. Akbar Ali Khan A.I.R. 1966 S.C.1842      referred to. 3.There  should be some difference, as to the nature  of, or  the  depth  of  the inquiry to be  held,  as  between  a probationer whose services can be terminated by a notice and a  confirmed Government servant who has a right to  continue in  service  until he reaches a certain  age.   A  confirmed Government servant’s dismissal or removal is a more  serious matter.   This difference must necessarily be  reflected  in the  nature  of inquiries for the  two  different  purposes. Neither  can  be ’.punished", without a  formal  charge  and inquiry. but a less formal 514 inquiry may be sufficient to determine whether a probationer should  be  continued  in service.  He  has  no  "right"  to continue to serve without justifying he continuance. [519 G- H, 520 A]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Petition for Special leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 3818 of 1976. From  the Judgment and Order dated the 12th August, 1976  of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular  First  Appeal No. 266/70. G.   L.    Sanghi    and   E.   C.    Agrawala    for    the Appellant/Petitioner R.   N. Sachthey for Respondents 1 and 3. Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, C.J.-The Special Leave Petition before us arises out of a  suit in which a point arose which had been  referred  for decision by a learned Judge of the High Court of Punjab  and Haryana to a larger Bench on the ground that it involved  an important  question of law of some difficulty.   This  Court issued notices to the State of Haryana and other parties and we  have  heard counsel for both sides.  Although  the  case does  not  deserve  grant of special leave,  we  propose  to dismiss the petition with a statement of the position  which may  clarify what seems to have troubled the Judges  of  the High Court. The  petitioner  before  us had  joined  the  Haryana  Civil Service (Judicial Branch) as a probationer on 8th  December, 1966.   He  was  served with a show  cause  notice  on  22nd October,  1968, asking him to explain  certain  allegations. He  was served with another show cause notice on 18th  June, 1969,  asking  him to explain probably the same, or  at  any rate,  similar allegations again.  He replied to  the  first show  cause notice on 15th November,1968, and to the  second on   4th  July,  1969.   The  High  Court   considered   his explanations and found that they were similar but belied  by documentary evidence on record.

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The  High  Court  then made a recommendation  to  the  State Government  that  the  services  of  the  applicant  may  be terminated. On 18h June, 1969, still another notice was served upon  the applicant  by  the Chief Secretary to the  Government  which stated inter alia :               "It  may  be  noted  that  both  your  earlier               explanations and the one which you may  submit               now in pursuance of this revised notice,  will               be taken into consideration while  determining               your   suitability  for  being   retained   in               service.   The reply to this notice should  be               sent  through  the Registrar,  High  Court  of               Punjab  and  Haryana,  within  the  stipulated               period. After  considering his further explanation the  services  of the applicant were terminated by an innocuously worded order dated 11th September, 1969.  The submission on behalf of the petitioner was 515 that, although, the order of termination of his services was innocuous, he was entitled to a fuller enquiry  contemplated by Article 311 of the ,Constitution as he was, in substance, punished.   The  petitioner  relies  strongly  upon  certain observations  of this Court in Shamsher Singh  v.  Punjab(1) which was also the case of a probationer whose services  had ,been terminated. Reliance  is  placed on behalf of the, State on :  State  of Punjab  &  Anr.  v.  Sukh  Raj  Bahadur,(2)  and  Ram  Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh(3) and S. P.  Vasudeva v.  State of Haryana & Ors.(4) In the last  mentioned  case, Alagiriswami J., speaking for the Court, ,observed :               "We  may  in this connection  point  out  that               where an order of reversion as in the  present               case,  of  a person who had no  right  to  the               post, does not show ex facie that he was               being  reverted as a measure of punishment  or               does not cast any stigma on him. the  Courts               will not normally go behind that order to  see               if  there were any motivating  factors  behind               that order.  Certain cases of this Court  have               taken  that  view.  Certain other  cases  have               taken the view that it is open the Court to go               behind  the order and find out if it  was  in-               tended  as a measure of punishment and  if  so               whether  the  formalities necessary  have  not               been followed.  In cases where enquiries  have               been  held  before orders of  reversion  of  a               probationer  to  his  former  lower  post   or               discharge  of a probationer or discharge  from               service  of a temporary servant  were  passed,               certain  decisions  have taken the  view  that               where  the enquiry was held in order  to  find               out the suitability of the official  concerned               the  order would not be vitiated.  In  certain               other cases it has been held that the  enquiry               was  held  with a view to punish  and  as  the               enquiry  did not satisfy the  requirements  of               Article 311 the punishment was bad".               It was also pointed out               "After   all   no   Government   servant,    a               probationer  or temporary, will be  discharged               or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or               reason.   If the reason is to be  fathomed  in               all  cases of discharge or reversion, it  will

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             be difficult to distinguish as to which action               is  discharge  or  reversion  simpliciter  and               which  is  by way of  punishment.   The  whole               position in law is rather confusing.  We think               it  is  time  that  the  whole  question   was               considered de novo and it would be better  for               all  concerned  and avoid a lot  of  avoidable               litigation  if  it  should be  held  that  the               reversion of a probationer, from a higher to a               lower post, or the discharge of a probationer,               (1)   [1975] (1) S.C.R. 814.               (2) 1968 If SLR 701AIR 1968 S.C. 1089.               (3)   1969 SLR 429.               (4)   AIR 1975 SC 2292.               516               or  the discharge from service of a  temporary               servant  cannot  be questioned except  on  the               basis  of  mala  fides in the  making  of  the               order". In  our  opinion, the confusion, if it is  there,  could  be cleared up by considering what was exactly found, on  facts, by the Court in each case. It  appears  from the detailed findings given by  the  Trial Court  upon  issues of fact in the case before us  that  the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in reply  even assuming that his services had  been  terminated for  faults found with his conduct in the course  of  either performance  of  his  duties or relating  to  other  matters relevant  for assessing his suitability to serve as  a  Sub- Judge.   He  had  ample opportunity  to  answer  in  writing whatever  was alleged against him.  No rule was shown to  us to  support  the view that anything were was needed  if  the intention  was  not  to hold a full  departmental  trial  to punish  but a summary inquiry to determine only  suitability to  continue in service.  The High Court was  not  satisfied with his explanations.  It is difficult to see how a  fuller enquiry, as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution, which also Only requires a "reasonable opportunity of  being heard"  in’ respect of the charges made, could  improve  his position.  It may be that, if the petitioner had acquired  a right  to  the  post and was not a  mere  probationer  whose services were being terminated, lie could have,  technically speaking,  claimed  a  formally fuller  process  of  hearing before  be could be punished for a fault.  But, in the  case before  us,  the  petitioner had no  right  to  continue  in service   despite  adequate  reasons  for  terminating   his services.   He could, therefore, only claim a hearing  which was  reasonably sufficient and appropriate  for  determining whether  there  were  adequate reasons to  continue  him  in service,  even  if  he  could  not  be  removed  by  way  of punishment without a fuller inquiry. It  was observed in Champaklal v. Union of India(1)  in  the case of a temporary Government servant :               "The contention on behalf of the appellant  is               that  this  memorandum really  amounted  to  a               charge-sheet against the appellant and he  was               asked to give an explanation thereto and  also               to state why disciplinary action should not be               taken against him. Stress  is  laid  on  the               last sentence of the memorandum wherethe               appellant  was asked why  disciplinary  action               shouldnot    be   taken   against    him.               It  may be conceded that the way in which  the               memorandum  was drafted and the fact  that  in               the  last sentence he was asked to  state  why

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             disciplinary   action  should  not  be   taken               against him might give an impression that  the               intention  was to hold a  formal  departmental               enquiry  against him with a view to  punishing               him.   But, though, this may appear to be  so,               what  is  important to see  is  what  actually               happended after this memorandum for the courts               are not to go by the particular name given  by               aparty   to  a  certain  proceeding  but   are               concerned with,               (1)   A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854.               5 17               the spirit and substance of it in the light of               what  preceded and succeeded it.  It  is  true               that   in   the  written  statement   of   the               respondent  it  is stated that  from  December               1953 onwards a departmental enquiry was  being               conducted  against the appellant,  though  the               written  statement  went on to say  that  that               departmental  enquiry was not pursued  as  the               evidence was not considered to be  conclusive.               In actual fact however it is not even the case               of the appellant that any enquiry officer  was               appointed to hold what we have called a formal               departmental  enquiry  in which  evidence  was               tendered  from both sides in the  presence  of               the  appellant.  This is clear from para 8  of               the  plaint  in  which it is  said  that  some               enquiries appeared to have been held after the               memorandum  of  December  1953  but  were  not               pursued further.  It is however clear that  no               formal  departmental enquiry  as  contemplated               under  Art.  311(2)  read  with  the  relevant               Central Services Rules was ever held after the               notice of December 29, 1953, as otherwise  the               appellant  would  have taken part in  such  an               enquiry and would have been entitled to cross-               examine  witnesses  produced against  him  and               would   also  have  been  entitled   to   lead               evidence.   It  seems  therefore  clear   that               though  this  memorandum was  issued  and  the               appellant  was  asked  therein  to  state  why               disciplinary   action  should  not  be   taken               against him, no departmental enquiry  followed               that memorandum and the matter was dropped". We  think that the position before us also is very  similar. No full-fledged departmental inquiry followed any show cause notice.  Proceedings for punishment could be deemed to  have been  "dropped".   The only result of what happened  was  an innocuous  order of termination of service  without  stating any  ground  for  the  termination.   If  this,  in  itself, involved some reflection upon the petitioner’s  capabilities it  cannot  be helped.  It was not  undeserved.   Therefore, there could be no question of injustice. The  Division  Bench  to which the  case  was  referred  for hearing  considered the rules applicable to  termination  of services of a probationer and found that they hid been fully complied with.  It also examined cases which laid down  that the  form of the order is not decisive but the Court can  be go behind the ostensibly innocuous order and investigate the real nature of the proceedings.  The cases mentioned in this connection  were  : The State of Punjab & Ors. v.  Sukh  Raj Bahadur  (supra),  and the State of Bihar &  Ors.  v.  Shiva Bhukshuk  Mishra.(1)  It then relied on cases in  which  the position of a probationer had been considered.  These were :

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Parshotam  Lal Dhingra v. Union of Indica(2); the  State  of Orissa  & Anr. v. Rain Narayan Das(3); and Renendra  Chandra Banerjee v. the Union of India & A nr. (4), State (1)  A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1011. (2)  A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36. (3)  A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 177. (4)  A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1552. 518 of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan(1); the State of Punjab & Anr. v. Sukh Rai Bahadur (supra); Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab  &  Anr.  (supra); and S. P.  Yasudeva  v.  State  of Haryana (supra).  The decision in each of these case  turned upon  its  own facts.  It is only the  principle  laid  down which can be binding law. After considering the cases mentioned above, the High  Court reached the following conclusion :               "The  members of the State,  Judicial  Service               sometimes  do  incur the  displeasure  of  the               litigants  against  whom  they  decide  cases.               Such  litigants do not spare them and in  many               cases  send  a  large  number  of   complaints               against  them  to this Court.  If  this  Court               were   to   act   indiscriminately   on   such               complaints  without getting them  verified  by               the  District and Sessions Judges the  members               of  the  judicial service would be  left  with               little  or  no  security  of  tenure.   It  is               precisely  for  this reason  that  this  Court               usually  has an enquiry held into  the  matter               before getting the explanation of the judicial               officer  concerned.  Sometimes allegations  of               corruption are also levelled against  judicial               officers.  Preliminary enquiries are also held               to  verify  such allegations  before  deciding               whether a full fledged enquiry should be  held               against   the  judicial  officer  who   is   a               probationer  for awarding him a punishment  or               his   explanation  should  be   obtained   for               deciding  whether  he should be  continued  in               service or not.  In the latter class of  cases               the   notices  issued  usually  mention   that               explanation was being called for taking action               under  rule  7(2) appearing in part D  of  the               Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules,               1951,  read  with rule 9 of the  Punjab  Civil               Services  (Punishment and Appeal) Rules  1952.               Such  a  mention of the rules  gives  a  clear               indication  to the judicial officer  concerned               that  no action to impose a punishment on  him               was  envisaged.   This is precisely  what  was               done  in  the ins-ant case and  the  appellant               cannot contend with any  justification  that               his   rights  under  Article  311(2)  of   the               Constitution have been violated’.               In  Shamsher Singh’s case (supra)  this  Court               said               "No abstract proposition can be laid down that               where  the  services  of  a  probationer   are               terminated without saying anything more in the               order  of termination than that  the  services               are  terminated  it  can  never  amount  to  a               punishment  in the facts and circumstances  of               the  case.  If a probationer is discharged  on               the  ground of misconduct, or inefficiency  or               for a similar reason without a proper  enquiry

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             and   without   his   getting   a   reasonable               opportunity  of  showing  cause  against   his               discharge  it  may in a given case  amount  to               removal  from  service within the  meaning  of               Article 311(2) of the Constitution".               (1)   A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1842. 519 These  observations must, we think, be meant to cover  those case., where, even though the probationer may have no  right to continue in service,yet,  the  order  terminating   his services casts a stigma on his name.    This means that  the individual concerned must suffer a substantialloss    of reputation   which   may  affect   his   future   prospects. In  that  case,  Justice requires  a  fuller  hearing.   If, however,   after  going  into  the  particular   facts   and circumstances of a case the Court finds, as seems to be  the position  in the case before us, that the enquiry  conducted and notices given were intended only to arrive at a  finding on  the desirability of continuing a person in service,  and more  serious action was not contemplated, it means that  no stigma  was  intended to be cast.  It may be that,  in  some cases, the mere form does not indicate the exact nature  and result  of  the  proceeding judged by  its  nature  and  its effects  upon a probationer. To some extent the  courts  are bound  to  take  into  account  what  the  incontrovertible- evidence  disclosed.   It  may conclude that,  even  if  the reputation  of a probationer was to some degree affected  by what took place, yet, if those facts could not reasonably be disputed  by  him,  it  provided  a  sufficient  ground  for termination  his  services.   There is, in  such  cases,  no injustice. This  Court would certainly not interfere under Article  136 of the Constitution on a merely technical plea that the case deserved a fuller enquiry. It must be shown that such  an enquiry could serve a useful purpose. The    facts    must indicate that if this fuller inquiry was held, the Govt.servant will  be found to be blameless.          Otherwise,  further prolongation of such litigation is pointless. It is impossible to lay down propositions which are so clear cut as to cover every conceivable case.  Indeed, an  attempt to  do so may make the law too rigid.  It is only if  patent facts disclose a serious enough infringement of law as  well as  indubitably damaging and undeserved consequences upon  a petitioner that the Court’s conscience could be so moved  as to  induce  it  to  interfere  under  Article  136  of   the Constitution.  We are quite certain that this is not one  of those  cases.  On this ground alone this case could  not  be one in which we could grant special leave to appeal. There  is,  however,  another point of  view  also,  already indicated  above, from which the case could  be  considered. It  is that the High Court held that this was not  really  a case  of punishment.  On this aspect of the case,  the  High Court rightly seems to us to have proceeded on the view that there should be atleast some difference, as to the nature of or the depth of the inquiry to be held, as between a  proba- tioner whoseservices can be terminated by a notice and  a confirmed Govt. servantwho  has  a right  to  continue  in service until he reaches a certain age. It is true that neither  can  be  "punished" without  a  formal  charge  and inquiry.   But, a less formal inquiry may be sufficient,  as it was here, to determine whether a probationer, who has  no fixed or fully formed right to continue in service  (treated in  the  eye of law as a case of "no right" to  continue  in service), should be continued.  A confirmed Govt.  servant’s dismissal or removal is a more serious matter.

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520 This difference must necessarily be reflected in the  nature of  the  inquiries for the two different purposes.   We  are satisfied that, on facts found, the findings on petitioner’s suitability  to  continue  in  service  were  rightly   ’not interfered  with, It was, in the eye of law, not a  case  of punishment  but of termination of service simpliciter.   The petitioner  should he thankful that a more serious view  was not taken of his shortcomings. Consequently, we dismiss this petition. M. R.                                   Petition dismissed, 5 2 1