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PETITIONER: BIR SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PYARE SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/03/2000

BENCH: S.S.Ahmad, D.P.Mohapatro

JUDGMENT:

     D.P.MOHAPATRA,J.

     On  analysis  of  the  case of  the  parties  and  the contentions raised on their behalf the question which arises for  determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of  the  case  the appellants can be said  to  be  khatedar tenants  of  the  land  in dispute.  If  this  question  is answered  in  the affirmative then the further question  for consideration will be whether the right of the appellants in the land in dispute was extinguished under section 12 of the Rajasthan  Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short the Tenancy  Act). The  High  Court  of  Rajasthan having  answered  the  first question  in  the  negative  and dismissed the  suit  ,  the plaintiffs are in appeal against the judgment.

     The   factual   matrix  of   the  case  relevant   for appreciation  of  the  question for  determination,  may  be stated  thus  :  - Late Chet Singh held zamindari rights  in respect   of   the  disputed   land  situated   in   Village Mohammadpur,  of  Tehsil-Dholpur in the State of  Rajasthan. As he was serving in the army he had engaged Sohan Singh for cultivation  of  the land.  Since Sohan Singh got  his  name recorded  in  the revenue records as the owner of  the  land Chet  Singh  filed a suit, against him before the  Assistant Collector,  Dholpur.   In  the said suit  a  compromise  was entered  into  between  the parties and  possession  of  the property was delivered by Sohan Singh to Chet Singh.  In the said  compromise  it  was averred that Chet  Singh  was  the Khudkasht  Kashatkar  of the disputed land and that  Sohan Singh voluntarily handed over possession of the land to Chet Singh.

     Chet  Singh mortgaged the land with Charan Singh for a period  of ten years for satisfaction of the loan  amounting to   Rs.300/-  vide  the   registered  mortgage  deed  dated 22.9.1956.    Chet  Singh  expired  in  1965   leaving   the appellants as his legal heirs.  As Charan Singh did not hand over  possession of the land even after expiry of the period of mortgage the appellants filed a suit, under Section 43(3) read  with  Section  183 of the Tenancy Act  against  Charan Singh  seeking  recovery  of possession of  the  land.   The Additional  District Collector, by the order dated 12.5.1983 in  case  no.  142/82 decreed the suit and  directed  Charan

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Singh  to hand over vacant possession of the land in dispute to  the  appellants declaring them as  Khatedar  kashtkar. Charan Singh was further directed to pay to the appellants a sum  of  Rs.3400/- as penalty for illegal occupation of  the land during the seventeen agricultural years after expiry of the  mortgage period.  In the appeal, Appeal no.253 of 1983, filed  by  Charan  Singh the  Revenue  Appellate  Authority, Bharatpur  by the order dated 15.7.1985 dismissed the appeal and   confirmed  the  order  of  the   Additional   District Collector.   The  second  appeal, RTA  no.144/85,  filed  by Charan  Singh before the Rajasthan Revenue Appellate  Board, was  dismissed  by the order dated 22.6.1993.  Charan  Singh expired  on 25.2.1991 during pendency of the appeal and  the respondents herein were substituted as his legal heirs.  The respondents  challenged  the order of the Revenue  Appellate Board  in  CWP No.4159/93 before the Rajasthan  High  Court. The  High Court by the Jugdment dated 24.2.1994 allowed  the writ   petition,  quashed  the   concurrent  orders  of  the statutory  authorities  and  dismissed the suit.   The  said judgment is under challenge in the present appeal.

     The  thrust  of  the submissions made by  the  learned counsel  for the appellants is that the High Court erred  in reversing   the  concurrent  decisions   of  the   statutory authorities  on  the  erroneous finding that  they  are  not entitled  to  recover  possession of land in  dispute.   The learned  counsel  contends  that   after  abolition  of  the Zamindari  right  of  the  appellants  under  the  Rajasthan Zamindari  and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 [for short the Zamindari  Abolition  Act] the appellants were entitled  to retain  the  land  in  dispute which was  a  part  of  their khudkasht land as recorded in the revenue records.

     The learned counsel for the respondents supporting the impugned  judgment submitted that in view of the  undisputed factual  position that the appellants were not in occupation of  the land in dispute on the date the Zamindari  Abolition Act  came into force they could not retain possession of the land,  notwithstanding  the  entry in  the  revenue  records showing  the land as khudkasht.  He placed reliance on the decision  of  this  Court in the case of Budha  Vs.   Amilal [1991 Supp.(2) SCC 41].

     Undisputedly,  the plaintiff had lost possession  over the  land in dispute by 22 September, 1956 when the mortgage deed  was  registered.   It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the plaintiff  was  seeking  recovery  of  possession  from  the mortgagee Charan Singh in the suit filed in September, 1967. It is also an accepted position that the land in dispute was shown in the revenue record as khudkasht land.  It is also accepted  position  that Chet Singh, the predecessor in  the interest  of the appellants, held Zamindari right over  land in dispute.  In this backdrop the question for consideration is  whether after enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition Act the plaintiffs could claim right of possession over the land in  dispute.   From  the  orders  passed  by  the  statutory authorities   it   appears  that   this  question  was   not specifically adverted to by the authorities.  They proceeded to  determine the controversy on the basis of the provisions in Sections 10 and 12 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.

     In  section 2(3) of the Zamindari Abolition Act land means  every  class or category of land forming part  of  an estate and includes

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     (a) benefits to arise out of such land,

     (b)  things  attached  to  the  earth  or  permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth,

     (c) sites of villages or towns,

     (d)  beds  of  tanks, ponds, embankments,  rivers  and water channels, and

     (e) surface of hills

     Under  sub-section(5)  of  the said section  the  term Zamindar  has the meaning assigned to it by clause (46) of section   5  of  the  Tenancy   Act  and  includes  a  malik (landowner)  in  the  Gang Canal  area.   Sub-section(6)  of section 2 provides that words and expressions defined in the Tenancy  Act  and  in the Rajasthan Land Revenue  Act,  1956 (Rajasthan  Act  15  of 1956) but not defined  in  this  Act shall,  wherever  used  herein,  be construed  to  have  the meaning assigned to them by those Acts.

     In  sub-section(7)  of section 2 it is laid down  that the  words  and  expression  used to denote  the  person  in possession  of any right, title or interest shall be  deemed to  include the predecessors and successors in right,  title or interest of such person.

     Section  3 which is the provision regarding overriding effect  of  this Act over other laws provides that  save  as otherwise  expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of this  Act, and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained  in any other law and rules for the time being  in force  or any instrument having effect by virtue of any  law or  usage, agreement, settlement, grant sanad or any  decree or order of any court of other authority.

     Chapter  II  of  the Act comprises of  the  provisions regarding Abolition of Zamindari and Biswedari Estates.

     In  section  5 which is included in the  said  chapter provisions  are  made regarding consequences  of  abolition. The  relevant portions of the section are quoted hereunder : 5.  Consequences of abolition (1)

     XXX XXX XXX

     (2)  As  from the date of vesting of any Zamindari  or Biswedari  estate  in the State Government,  notwithstanding anything  contained in any contract, grant or other document or  in  any  law  for the time being in force  but  save  as otherwise provided in this Act-

     (a)such  estate  shall stand transferred to, and  vest in, the State Government free from all encumbrances.

     (b)the  right,  title and interest of the Zamindar  or Biswedar  and of every person claiming through him, in  such estate,  including  land  (cultivable,   waste  or   barren) grove-land,  grass  land  or birs,  scrub  jungle,  forests, trees,  fisheries, hills, wells tanks, ponds, water  courses and channels, ferries, pathways, village sites, abadi sites, hats,  bazars,  means and mela grounds, and in all sub  soil

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therein,  including  rights, if any, in quarries  and  mines whether  being worked or not and in all mineral and  mineral products, shall cease and be vested in the State Government, free  from all encumbrances, for the purposes of the  State, and  every mortgage, debt or charge on any such right, title or  interest shall be a charge on the amount of compensation payable to the Zamindar or Biswedar under this Act;

     XXX XXX XXX

     (d)  every right, title or interest created in or over such   estate   by  the  Zamindar   or   Biswedar   or   his predecessor-in-interest   shall,   as   against  the   State Government,  cease  and determine;  all rents and cesses  in respect  of any holdings in such estate for any period after the date of vesting, which, but for such vesting, would have been  payable to the Zamindar or Biswedar, shall vest in and be  payable to the State Government, and any payment made in contravention  of this clause shall not be a valid discharge of the person liable to pay the same;

     XXX XXX XXX

     (j)  every  mortgage with possession existing on  such estate or part thereof on the date immediately preceding the date  of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount  secured on  such estate or part, be deemed, without prejudice to the rights  of the State Government under this section, to  have been substituted by a simple mortgage;

     (k)  no  claim  or liability enforceable  or  incurred before  the  date of vesting against or by the  Zamindar  or Biswedar  for any money which is charged on or in secured by a  mortgage of such estate or part thereof shall, except  as provided in section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central  Act IV of 1882), be enforceable against his right, title or interest in such estate or part;

     (l)  Subject  to  any rules made in this  behalf,  all suits  and  proceedings  affecting such  estate,  in  which, because  of the same having vesting in the State Government, the  latter  will be a neessary part, pending in any  court, civil  or revenue, at the date of vesting and all proceeding consequent upon any decree or orders passed in any such suit or  proceeding before such date, shall not be proceeded with till,  on  an  application made in that  behalf,  the  State Government is made a party thereto;

     XXX XXX XXX

     (4)Notwithstanding  anything contained in  sub-section (2)  the  Zamindar  or  Biswedar   shall,  subject  to   the provisions  of section 29, continue to retain the possession of  his Khudkasht, recorded as such in the annual  registers before the date of vesting.  (emphasis supplied)

     Section  29 of the Act which is included in Chapter V- Miscellaneous  contains provision regarding Khatedari rights in  Khudkasht  land.   In  sub-section  (1)  thereof  it  is provided  that as from the date of vesting of an estate, the Zamindar  or  Biswedar  thereof  shall be  a  Malik  of  any khudkasht  land in his occupation on such date and shall, as such  Malik, be entitled to all the rights conferred and  be subject  to all the liabilities imposed on a khatedar tenant by  or  under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.   Sub-section

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(2)  of the section is not relevant for the present purpose. (emphasis  supplied)  Section  30  contains  the  provisions regarding  rights  of  tenants  in  estate.   Sub-section(1) thereof  provides that subject to the provisions of sections 15,  15A,  15B  and 16 of the Rajasthan Tenancy  Act,  every tenant  in an estate, other than a tenant of Khudkasht or  a sub-tenant,  shall,  as  from the date of  vesting,  be  the khatedar tenant of the land comprised in his holding, unless he  has acquired Khatedari rights therein before such  date, and  shall,  as from the date of vesting, pay to  the  State Government,  until rents are settled in accordance with  the provisions   of  the  Rajasthan   Land  Revenue  Act,   1956 (Rajasthan  Act No.15 of 1956), by way of rent therefor  the same  amount  as  he  had been paying  to  the  Zamindar  or Biswedar  immediately  before  such date but  not  exceeding twice   the  land  revenue   payable  in  respect   thereof. Sub-section(2)  of  the said section lays down that  upon  a Zamindar  or Biswedar becoming a Malik of his Khudkasht land under  section  29, every tenant of such Khudkasht shall  be the  sub-tenant of the land in his occupation holding  under and from such Malik.

     The expression Khudkasht is defined in section 5(23) of  the  Act  to  mean   land in  any  part  of  the  State cultivated  personally by an estate-holder and shall include   (i)  land recorded as khudkasht, sir, havala, niji-  jot, gharkhed  in settlement records at the commencement of  this Act  in  accordance with law in force at the time when  such record was made, and

     (ii)   land  allotted  after   such  commencement   as khudkasht  under any law for the time being in force in  any part of the State.

     In  Section  5(46)  Zamindar is defined  to  mean  a person on whom a village or portion of a village in any part of  the State is settled on the Zamindari system and who  is recorded as such in the record of rights and shall include a proprietor  as  defined  in clause(a) of section  2  of  the Madhya  Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, Samvat 2008  (Madhya Bharat Act of 1951), if any, in the Sunel area.

     Section 43 contains the provisions regarding mortgage. The portions of the said section relevant for the purpose of the case are extracted below :  43.  XXXXX XXXXX XXXX

     (3)A  usufructuary  mortgage   under  sub-  section(2) shall, upon the expiry of the period mentioned hereinbefore, be deemed to have been satisfied in full without any payment whatsoever  by the mortgagor, and the mortgage debt shall be deemed  to  have  been extinguished and the  mortgaged  land redeemed  and  the possession thereof shall be delivered  by the mortgagee to the mortgagor free from all encumbrances.

     (4)  A  usufructuary mortgage of any land made  before the  commencement of this Act shall, upon the expiry of  the period  mentioned in the mortgage deed or twenty years  from the  date of execution thereof, whichever period is less, be deemed  to  have been satisfied in full without any  payment whatsoever  by  the  mortgagor and the mortgage  debt  shall accordingly   be  deemed  to   have  been  extinguished  and thereupon   the  mortgaged  land   shall  be  redeemed   and possession  thereof shall be delivered to the mortgagor free from all encumbrances.

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     Section  183 of the Act under which the suit was filed reads as follows:  183.Ejectment of certain trespassers (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any provision of this Act, a tresspasser who has taken or retained possession of  any  land  without lawful authority shall be  liable  to ejectment,   subject   to  the    provision   contained   in sub-section(2),  on  the  suit  of  the  person  or  persons entitled to eject him, and shall be further liable to pay as penalty  for each agricultural year, during the whole or any part whereof he has been in such possession, a sum which may extend to fifteen times the annual rent.

     (2)  In  case of land which is held directly from  the State  Government  or to which the State  Government  acting through  the Tehsildar, is entitled to admit the  trespasser as  tenant,  the Tehsildar shall proceed in accordance  with the  provisions of section 91 of the Rajasthan Land  Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act 15 of 1956).

     On  a  reading  of  the provisions  of  the  Zamindari Abolition Act noted above it is clear that a Zamindar who is in  possession/occupation  of Khudkasht land on the date  of vesting of the estate becomes a Khatedar tenant on abolition of  the  Zamindari right under section 29 of  the  Zamindari Abolition  Act.  Under the said section a Zamindar becomes a Malik  of the Khudkasht land in his occupation and as  Malik he shall be entitled to all the rights conferred and all the liabilities  imposed  on a Khatedar tenant by or  under  the Act.   It follows as a corollary that if the Zamindar is not in  occupation of the Khudkasht land on the date of  vesting he  is  not entitled to claim Khatedari right in  the  land. The  scheme  behind this provision is that if a Zamindar  or Biswedar  is in actual occupation of cultivable land on  the date  of  abolition  of his Zamindari right then  he  should continue  to  be  in possession of such land.   This  is  in accordance  with  the  object  of  bringing  about  agrarian reforms  by  giving  the land to the person  in  cultivating possession  of  the  land.   If   the  Zamindar  is  not  in occupation of the Khudkasht land on the date of vesting then such  land vests in the State along with the other lands subject  to  the provisions in the Zamindari Abolition  Act. In  respect  of such land Zamindar is not entitled to  claim any  right of possession and consequentially is not entitled to  maintain  a suit for recovery of possession of the  land from  any  other person.  In the case of Budha  Vs.   Amilal (supra)  a  Division  Bench of this Court  interpreting  the provisions  of sections 29 , 5(2)(a), (b),(j), 5(4) and 2(6) of  the  Zamindari Abolition Act and sections  5(23)(I)  and (25)  of  the Rajasthan Tenancy Act held :  Even if  it  is assumed  that  the  lands in dispute have to be  treated  as Khudkasht  lands of the appellant by virtue of clause (I) of the   inclusive  part  of   the  definition  of  Khudkasht contained in Section 5(23) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the appellant  cannot succeed in his claim that he has  acquired Khatedari  rights in respect of those lands on the basis  of the  provisions  contained in sub- section (4) of Section  5 and  sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act.   Sub-section (4)  of  Section  5 provides that  notwithstanding  anything contained  in  sub-section (2) of Section 5 the Zamindar  or Biswedar  shall  subject  to the provisions of  Section  29, continue to retain the possession of his Khudkasht, recorded as  such in the annual registers before the date of vesting. The  words  continue to retain the possession, imply  that lands which are recorded as Khudkasht in the annual register

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before  the  date of vesting should be in possession of  the Zamindar  or  Biswedar on the date of vesting.  If he is  in possession  of  such  lands he can continue  to  retain  the possession  of the same subject to the provisions of Section 29.   Sub-section(1)  of Section 29 prescribes that as  from the  date of vesting of an estate, the Zamindar or  Biswedar thereof  shall  be  a  malik of any Khudkasht  land  in  his occupation  on  such  date  and shall,  as  such  malik,  be entitled  to all rights conferred and the subject to all the liabilities  imposed  on a Khatedar tenant by or  under  the Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act.   Under  this  provision  Khatedari rights  have  been  statutorily conferred on a  Zamindar  or Biswedar  as  from the date of the vesting of the estate  in respect  of  Khudkasht  lands  in  the  occupation  of  such Zamindar  or  Biswedar  on  such date.  The  words  in  his occupation  on such date postulates that the lands,  though Khudkasht,  should  be in the occupation of the Zamindar  or Biswedar  on  the date of vesting of the estate.   It  would thus appear that in view of sub- section(4) of Section 5 and sub-section(1)  of  Section 29 of the Act the mere  fact  of recording of the land as Khudkasht in the settlement records on the date of vesting would not be enough for a Zamindar or Biswedar  to  acquire Khatedari rights over the said  lands; the Zamindar or Biswedar should be in possession/ occupation of the said lands on the date of vesting of the estate under the  Act.   The  possession/occupation   envisaged  by  sub- section(4)  of Section 5 and sub-section(1) of Section 29 of the  Act is actual possession/occupation and the  possession of a mortgagor through the mortgagee cannot be held to be in possession  or occupation as postulated in sub-section(4) of Section 5 and sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act.

     In  the  present case the appellant has come  forward with  a specific case in the plaint that the defendant is in possession  of the lands in dispute as a mortgagee from  the date  of  the two mortgagees.  In other words the  appellant was  not  in possession/occupation of the said lands on  the date  of  vesting of the estate of the appellant  under  the Act.   The  appellant  cannot,  therefore,  claim  Khatedari rights in respect of the lands in dispute.

     On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case  as  revealed  from  the materials on  record  and  the relevant provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act it is our considered  view  that  the  principles laid  down  and  the observations  made in Budha Vs.  Amilal (supra) apply in all force  to  the  present  case.  We are  also  in  respectful agreement  with  the  principles  laid   down  in  the  said decision.   Therefore,  the appellants cannot be said to  be khatedar  tenants  of  the  land in  dispute.   The  first question  formulated earlier is answered in the negative and in  view of that answer the further question does not  arise for  consideration.  The High Court was right in  dismissing the suit.  The appeal is dismissed.  No costs.