13 March 1956
Supreme Court
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BIMBADHAR PRADHAN Vs THE STATE OF ORISSA.

Bench: SINHA,BHUVNESHWAR P.
Case number: Appeal Criminal 49 of 1954


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PETITIONER: BIMBADHAR PRADHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ORISSA.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/1956

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA

CITATION:  1956 AIR  469            1956 SCR  206

ACT:        Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), s. 120-B-Criminal        conspiracy-Case where the only persons alleged to have  been        guilty of the offence of conspiracy were the persons  placed        on  trial and only one person was concerned with  the  crime        after the acquittal of the rest of the accused and the  case        where  on the findings apart from the persons placed on  the        trial  there was the approver who implicated himself  and  a        number  of other prosecution witnesses as having been  privy        to  the  conspiracy-Distinction  between-Criminal  Procedure        Code,  1898  (Act V of 1898), ss. 225  and  537-Omission  to        mention   the  name  of  approver  in   the   charge-Whether        occasioned  failure  of justice-Repugnancy on  the  face  of        record in convicting only one person for  conspiracy-English        and Indian Law-Difference between.

HEADNOTE:        The  appellant  and four others were placed on  their  trial        before  the  Assistant  Sessions  Judge  of  Sambalpur   for        offences  under ss. 120-B, 409, 477-A and 109,  I.P.C.  with        having  committed  the  offences  of  criminal   conspiracy,        criminal  breach of trust in respect of Government  property        and  falsification  of accounts with a view to  defraud  the        Government.  The appellant was the District Food  Production        Officer and the other four accused persons were agricultural        sub-overseers  under the appellant and another  agricultural        sub-overseer  namely  P.  was examined at the  trial  as  an        approver.   The  Assistant  Sessions  Judge  convicted   the        appellant under all the three charges but acquitted the four        sub-overseers giving them the benefit of doubt.        The High Court in appeal allowed the appeal of the appellant        in  respect of charges under ss. 409 and 477-A,  I.P.C.  but        upheld his conviction and sentence in respect of the  charge        of  conspiracy  under  s. 120-B, I.P.C.  observing  that  in        respect  of that charge the evidence given by  the  approver        got  corroboration  from  other  independent  evidence.   On        appeal  by  special  leave to the  Supreme  Court  the  main        question  for  consideration was whether the ruling  of  the        Supreme  Court  in  the case of Topan Das v.  The  State  of        Bombay  ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 881), governed the present case  in        view of the fact that the appellant was the only person  out

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      of  the accused persons on trial who had been  convicted  of        the offence of conspiracy under s. 120-B, I.P.C.        Held (i) that the case of Topan Das v. State of Bombay  was,        clearly  distinguishable  from the present case as  in  that        case  the  only persons alleged to have been guilty  of  the        offence  of  conspiracy ’Were the persons placed  on  trial.        There was no allegation nor any        207        evidence  forthcoming  that  any other  persons  though  not        placed  on  trial, were concerned with the  crime.   On  the        findings in that case, only one person, after the  acquittal        of the rest of the accused, was concerned with the crime and        stood  convicted of the charge of conspiracy.  As  a  person        cannot be convicted of conspiring with himself to commit  an        offence,  the Supreme Court gave effect to  the.  contention        that  on  the findings and on the evidence, as also  on  the        charge in that case, the conviction could not be  sustained.        But in the instant case on the findings of the courts below,        apart  from the persons placed on the trial, there  was  the        approver  who  implicated  himself equally  with  the  other        accused persons and a number of other prosecution  witnesses        as  having been privy to the conspiracy.  And therefore  the        present case was not on all fours with the case of Topan Das        v. State of Bombay.        (ii) The  provisions  of  s. 225,  Cr.   P.C.  were  clearly        applicable  to  the facts and circumstances of  the  present        case.  It had not been shown how the omission to mention the        name  of the approver in the charge under s.  120-B,  I.P.C.        had  misled  the appellant or had occasioned  a  failure  of        justice.        (iii)     The  provisions of s. 537 of the Code of  Criminal        Procedure were equally applicable to the facts of the  case.        As  the appellant did not raise the point with reference  to        the alleged illegality or irregularity in the charge  before        the High Court it must be held, applying the Explanation  to        that  section,  that  the omission in  the  charge  bad  not        occasioned a failure of justice.        The  contention  that  with the  acquittal  of  the  alleged        conspirators  no  verdict of guilty  against  the  appellant        could  be  given, because the verdict would be  regarded  as        repugnant in so far as it would amount to saying that  there        was  a  criminal  agreement between the  appellant  and  the        others and none between them and him, the conviction of  the        appellant  would amount to a similar repugnancy was  without        substance  because  the  rule  of  English  law  as  to  the        acquittal of an alleged conspirator when the conspiracy  was        said  to  be only between the two is based upon  a  rule  of        practice   and   procedure,  namely   that   repugnancy   or        contradiction  on  the face of the record is  a  ground  for        annulling  a  conviction.  But such a repugnancy is  not  by        itself  a  sufficient ground for quashing  a  conviction  in        India where the matter is governed by statutory law both  as        to  the offence and the procedure for bringing the  offender        to justice.  In India there is no provision in the statutory        law  justifying  an interference with a  conviction  on  the        ground of repugnancy in the record.        Topan  Das  v. State of Bombay ([1955] 2  S.C.R.  881),  The        Queen  v.  Manning  ([1883] 12 Q.B.D.  241),  The  Queen  v.        Thompson ([1851] 16 Q.B. 832), The King v. Plummer ([1902] 2        K.B.  339),  Kannangara  Aratchige Dharmasena  v.  The  King        ([1951] A.C. 1), I. G. Singleton v. The King-Emperor ([1924]        29  C.W.N.  260),  Dalip Singh v. State  of  Punjab  ([1954]        S.C.R. 145) and Kapildeo Singh v, The King ([1949-50] F.C.R.        834), referred to.        208

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JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 49  of        1954.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        the 7th October, 1953 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in        Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1952 arising out of the  judgment        and  order  dated  the 14th November 1952 of  the  Court  of        Assistant Sessions Judge at Sambalpur Sundergarh in Sessions        Trial No. 7/4 (5) of 1922.        S.   C.  Isaacs,  R.  Patnaik  and R.  C.  Prasad,  for  the        appellant.        Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent.        1956.  March 13.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        SINHA  J.-The  main  question canvassed in  this  appeal  by        special  leave  is whether the ruling of this Court  in  the        case  of  Topan Das v. The State of Bombay(1)  governs  this        case  also,  in view of the fact that the appellant  is  the        only person out of the accused persons placed on trial,  who        has  been  convicted  for the offence  of  conspiracy  under        section  120-B, Indian Penal Code.  The point arises in  the        following way:        The  appellant  and four others were placed on  their  trial        before  the  Assistant  Sessions  Judge  of  Sambalpur   for        offences  under  sections 120-B, 409,477-A and  109,  Indian        Penal  Code with having committed the offences  of  criminal        conspiracy,   criminal  breach  of  trust  in   respect   of        Government  property, and falsification of accounts  with  a        view  to  defraud  the Government.  The  appellant  was  the        District Food Production Officer in Sambalpur and the  other        four  accused  persons were  agricultural  sub-overseers  in        charge  of  their  respective  areas  under  the  appellant.        Another  such agricultural sub-overseer was Pitabas Sahu  at        Bargarh centre.  He was examined at the trial as P.W. 25 and        (1)  (1955) 2 S.C.R. 881.        209        shall  hereinafter  be  referred to as  the  approver.   The        prosecution  case  is that in furtherance of the  Grow  More        Food  Scheme  initiated  by Government  it  was  decided  to        subsidize  the supply of oil cake to agriculturists  with  a        view   to   augmenting  the  production   of   food   crops.        Cultivators  were to be supplied this variety of  manure  at        Rs. 4-4-0 per maund, though the Government had to spend  Rs.        7-12-0  per maund.  The appellant entered into a  conspiracy        with  his subordinate staff including the agricultural  sub-        overseers aforesaid to misappropriate the funds thus  placed        at their disposal for the procurement and supply of oil cake        to cultivators.  To bolster up the quantity of oil cakes  to        be procured, they showed false transactions of purchase  and        distribution thereof and falsified accounts, vouchers,  etc.        Thus  they were alleged to have misappropriated the  sum  of        Rs. 4,943-4-0 of Government money.        A large volume of oral and documentary evidence was  adduced        on  behalf  of  the prosecution.  The  three  assessors  who        assisted  at the trial were of the opinion that none of  the        accused was guilty.  The learned Assistant Sessions Judge in        agreement with the assessors acquitted the four agricultural        sub-overseers  aforesaid  of all charges,  giving  them  the        benefit  of  the  doubt.   But  in  disagreement  with   the        assessors  he convicted the appellant under all the  charges        and  sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for four  and  a        half years and a fine of Rs. 2,000 under section 409, Indian        Penal Code, and to rigorous imprisonment for two years  each

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      under sections 120-B and 477-A of the Code, the sentences of        imprisonment  to run concurrently.  The learned trial  Judge        observed in the course of his judgment as follows:-        "Hence  on a consideration of all the evidence as  discussed        above,  I find that the prosecution have fully proved  their        case  that the accused Bimbadhar Pradhan, the  D.F.P.O.  has        conspired to embezzle the Government money.  They have  also        proved  that he has got an active hand and in assistance  of        Pitabas        210        Sahu  has  embezzled  Government  money  amounting  to   Rs.        4,943-4-0  and  in  that act he  has  also  actively  helped        Pitabas Sahu in falsifying the Government records by  making        false  entries.-  Hence all these three  charges  have  been        conclusively  proved  against him.  So far  as  regards  the        other  accused persons, I have already stated that they  are        considerably  inexperienced  and  the  doubtful  nature   of        evidence  against these accused persons and considering  the        position  between  the first accused and the  other  accused        persons,  I give these four accused persons the  benefit  of        doubt though I do not approve their conduct in this affair.        As  per my findings given above, I may state here that  this        is a case in which we find a person in charge of the  entire        administration  of agricultural and G.M.F. development of  a        district  has  not only soiled his own hands  by  embezzling        Government  money by corrupt means but has  also  introduced        corruption into the entire administration of that department        by  spoiling the career of young men who are entrusted  with        this work and employed under him".        The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa.        A  Division Bench of that Court allowed his appeal  and  set        aside  his convictions and sentences under sections 409  and        477-A,  Indian  Penal Code, but upheld  his  conviction  and        sentence  in  respect  of the  charge  of  conspiracy  under        section  120-B  of  the Code.  We need not  enter  into  the        correctness of the findings of the trial court in respect of        the  acquittal  of the other four accused, or  of  the  High        Court  with  regard  to the acquittal of  the  appellant  in        respect of the charges under sections 409 and 477-A,  Indian        Penal  Code.  The High Court held that though the  appellant        had  withdrawn  the sum of Rs. 27,000  from  the  Government        treasury  with a view to subsidizing the procurement of  oil        cake,  it had not been proved that there was an  entrustment        to  the  appellant.   Hence the  charge  against  him  under        section  409  failed.  As regards the charge  under  section        477-A, the High        211        Court acquitted him on the ground that the documents said to        have  been  falsified, which were large in number,  had  not        been  mentioned  in the charge and a  vague  statement  that        "accounts,   cash  books,  stock  books,  petty  cash   sale        register,   cash  memos,  applications   from   cultivators,        receipts,  bills,  vouchers,  papers,  documents,   letters,        correspondence, etc. had been falsified" was made.        As regards the charge of conspiracy under section 120-B, the        High Court observed that the most important witness to prove        the  charge  was the approver aforesaid (P.W.  25)  who  had        given  a full description of the conspiracy on the  23rd  or        25th  September  1947 between the appellant and  other  sub-        overseers including himself for the purpose of showing bogus        purchases and bogus distribution of large quantities of  oil        cake.  It also observed that "Most of the witnesses examined        by  the prosecution to corroborate the evidence  of  Pitabas        are  themselves  accomplices in the conspiracy".   The  High        Court found that in respect of that conspiracy the  evidence

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      given by the approver got adequate corroboration from  other        independent  witnesses.  After setting out the evidence  the        High Court recorded the following finding:-        "This  would be strongest corroboration of the  evidence  of        the  approver about the appellant being the prime mover  and        the brain behind the entire fraud.  It was he who wanted  to        misuse  his official position and persuade his  subordinates        to   join  with  him  in  showing  false   procurement   and        distribution figures of oilcakes".        And   finally   the  High  Court  came  to   the   following        conclusion:-        "I  am therefore of the opinion that the approver’s  version        about  the  leading  part in the conspiracy  played  by  the        appellant  in persuading all his subordinates to  join  with        him  for the purpose of committing criminal breach of  trust        of  the  sums withdrawn from the treasury by  showing  false        procurement  and distribution of oilcake is true.  There  is        independent corro-        212        boration  of  his evidence which is  inconsistent  with  the        appellant  being a mere negligent superior officer  who  was        deceived  and defrauded by his dishonest  subordinates.   It        was then urged that in the charge under section 120-B of the        Indian Penal Code, the date of the commission of the offence        was  stated  to  be  the  month  of  October  1947,  whereas        according  to  the evidence of P.W. 5, the  conspiracy  took        place  at Bargarh between the 23rd and 25th September  1947.        This  discrepancy  in  the date is immaterial  and  has  not        prejudiced the appellant in any way".        From the concurrent orders of conviction and sentence of the        appellant  under  section 120-B, Indian Penal Code,  he  was        granted special leave to appeal to this Court.  The  learned        counsel for the appellant has raised the following points in        support of the appeal:-        1.   That  all  the  persons charged  with  the  offence  of        conspiracy  except the appellant having been acquitted,  his        conviction and sentence in respect of that charge could  not        in law be maintained;        2.   That the appellant himself having been acquitted of the        substantive  charges  under sections 409 and  477-A  of  the        Code,  he  could not be convicted for conspiracy  to  commit        those very offences;        3.   That  the evidence of the prosecution witnesses  having        been  disbelieved  as against the other  accused,  the  same        evidence should not have been relied upon for convicting the        appellant of the charge of conspiracy;        4.   That  the provisions of section 342, Code  of  Criminal        Procedure,  had  not been fully complied with in so  far  as        important circumstances in the prosecution evidence had  not        been  put to the appellant in his examination by  the  court        under that section.        In  our opinion, there is no substance in any one  of  these        contentions  and  we  proceed to give our  reasons  for  our        conclusions.        In  support of the first contention raised on behalf of  the        appellant strong reliance was placed on the        213        recent  decision  of  this Court in Topan Das  v.  State  of        Bombay(1)  and  the rulings relied upon in that  case.   The        cases, The Queen v. Manning(2), The Queen v. Thompson(3) and        The  King  v.  Plummer(4)  were  cited  in  support  of  the        contention that where all the accused persons except one are        acquitted  on a charge of conspiracy, the conviction of  one        only on that charge cannot be sustained.  In this connection        the  recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the  Privy

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      Council  in the case of Kannangara Aratchige  Dharmasena  v.        The King(5) may also be referred to, though it was not cited        at  the Bar.  In that case the Judicial Committee held  that        where  only  two  persons  are  involved  in  a  charge   of        conspiracy, if a new trial has to be directed in respect  of        one  it  should be ordered in respect of both,  because  the        only possible conclusion in such a case was either that both        were guilty or that neither was guilty of the offence.   The        recent decision of this Court so strongly relied upon by the        appellant   lays  down  a  similar  rule,  but  is   clearly        distinguishable  from the case in hand inasmuch as  in  that        case  the  only persons alleged to have been guilty  of  the        offence  of  conspiracy were the persons  placed  on  trial.        There  was no allegation nor any evidence  forthcoming  that        any  other  persons  were,  though  not  placed  on   trial,        concerned with the crime.  In those circumstances this Court        laid  it down that it was essential to bring the  charge  of        conspiracy  home to the accused person or persons  to  prove        that there was an agreement to commit an offence between two        or  more  persons.  On the findings in that  case  only  one        person,  after the acquittal of the rest of the accused  was        concerned  with the crime-and stood convicted of the  charge        of   conspiracy.   As  a  person  cannot  be  convicted   of        conspiring  with  himself to commit an offence,  this  Court        gave  effect to the contention that on the findings  and  on        the evidence,        (1)[1955] 2 S.C.R. 881. (2) [1883] 12 Q.B.D 241. (3)  [1851]        16        Q.B. 832. 117 E.R. 1100. (4) [1902] 2 K. B. 339.        (5)  [1951] A.C. 1.        28        214        as also on the charge in that case the conviction could  not        be   sustained.   But  in  the  instant  case,  as   already        indicated,  on the findings of the courts below, apart  from        the  persons  placed on trial, there was  the  approver  who        implicated  himself equally with the other  accused  persons        and  a number of other prosecution witnesses as having  been        privy  to the conspiracy.  The evidence of the approver  has        been  found  by  the courts below to  have  been  materially        corroborated both as to the unlawful agreement and as to the        persons  concerned  with  the  conspiracy.   In  the   first        information report lodged on the 28th June 1948 the approver        Pitabas  Sabu,  one of the agricultural  sub-overseers,  was        named  along  with  the other five accused  as  the  persons        concerned  with the conspiracy.  Subsequently  Pitabas  Sahu        aforesaid  was granted pardon on condition of his  making  a        full  and  true statement of the facts of the case  and  was        examined as an approver, on whose evidence mainly rested the        case against the accused.  His evidence, as indicated above,        was  supported  by the dealers in oilcake who  supplied  the        commodity  which was the subject matter of  the  conspiracy.        It  cannot therefore be said that this case is on all  fours        with the recent decision of this Court referred to above.        But  it  was argued on behalf of the appellant that  be  was        charged  only  with  a conspiracy  with  the  other  accused        persons and not with any conspiracy with the approver  along        with  those  others.  The charge under section 120-B  is  in        these terms:        "First, that you, on or about the month of October, 1947  in        the district of Sambalpur agreed with Hemchandra Acharya and        other accused persons to do or caused to be done an  illegal        act by illegal means and that you did some acts in pursuance        of the said agreement to wit, the offence of criminal breach        of trust under s. 409, I.P.C. and falsification of  accounts

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      under s. 477-A punishable with R. I. for more than two years        and thereby committed an offence punish-        215        able  under s. 120-B, I.P.C. , and within the cognizance  of        court of Sessions".        It  will thus appear from the words of the charge  that  the        approver  was not specifically named as having been  one  of        the  conspirators,  unless he could be  brought  within  the        category of "other accused persons".  Something will have to        be said as to what those words denote, whether the  approver        was also included within that description.  Counsel for  the        appellant  contended  that they did not.   Counsel  for  the        State  Government contended to the contrary.  In England  an        indictment  consists of three parts: (1)  the  commencement,        (2) the statement of the offence, and (3) the particulars of        the offence.  The English law of indictment from very  early        times  has been based on very technical rules.  Those  rules        have  now been codified by the Indictments Act, 1915 (5 &  6        George 5, Chapter 90).  In Rule 2 (Schedule 1) of the Act as        amended  by  the Administration  of  Justice  (Miscellaneous        Provisions)  Act of 1933, the form of "the  commencement  of        the indictment" has been prescribed.  The form of "Statement        of the offence" has been prescribed by Rule 4 of the Act and        below  that  has to follow "Particulars of offence"  as  re-        quired by Rule 5. Those rules more or less correspond to the        rules  laid  down  in Chapter XIX of the  Code  of  Criminal        Procedure.    Section  221,  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure,        requires that the charge shall state the offence with  which        the  accused  is charged, giving the specific  name  of  the        offence,  if  such a name has been given by  the  law  which        creates the offence, which in this case means the offence of        criminal conspiracy, defined by section 120-A, Indian  Penal        Code.   The naming of the section is, under sub-section  (5)        of section 221 , Code of Criminal Procedure, equivalent to a        statement  that  every legal condition required  by  law  to        constitute  the  offence  of  criminal  conspiracy   charged        against  the  appellant was fulfilled.  Section 222  of  the        Code requires that the particulars as to the time and  place        of the alleged offence, and        216        the  person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any)  in        respect  of  which,  the offence  was  committed,  shall  be        stated.   It is noteworthy that section which  requires  the        particulars  of the offence to be stated does not  in  terms        further require that in an offence,like conspiracy the names        of  the co-conspirators should also be mentioned.  Hence  in        England  it  is  enough if the indictment  states  that  the        accused  along with other persons unknown had committed  the        offence  of criminal conspiracy.  Though the statute law  in        India does not make it obligatory that the persons concerned        in  the crime of criminal conspiracy should be  specifically        named  along  with  the  person  or  persons  charged  in  a        particular  trial,  it  is always advisable  to  give  those        particulars also in order to give a reasonable notice to the        accused that he has been charged with having conspired  with        so  and  so  (persons named), as also  persons  unnamed,  to        commit  a certain offence.  In this case the charge  against        the  five accused persons with reference to  section  120-B,        Indian  Penal  Code, named only those five  persons  as  the        conspirators and omitted to name the approver also as having        been  privy to the conspiracy.  This is clearly brought  out        with  reference to the charge framed against the other  four        accused  (who  have  been acquitted by the  trial  court  as        aforesaid).  It states:-        "That  you,  on or about the month of October  1947  in  the

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      district  of Sambalpur, agreed with Bimbadhar Pradhan to  do        or   caused   to  be  done  an  illegal   act   by   illegal        means.......................        We  find  with reference to the records of the  trial  court        that the trial has not been characterised by thoroughness or        circumspection.   The  date of the offence as given  in  the        charge  is  different  from the date  as  disclosed  in  the        evidence, as pointed out by the High Court, which found that        mistake  bad  not  caused  any  prejudice  to  the  accused.        Similarly,  the charge under section 477-A had not, as  held        by the High Court, been framed with sufficient parti-        217        cularity  as  a  result of which the  appellant  had  to  be        acquitted  of  that charge on appeal.  If the  charge  under        section 120-B had added the words "and other persons,  known        or unknown", there would have been no ground for a grievance        on the part of the appellant.        But even so, in our opinion, the provisions of section  225,        Code  of Criminal Procedure, are clearly applicable  to  the        facts  and  circumstances of the present case.  It  has  not        been shown to us how the omission to mention the name of the        approver  in  the charge under section 120-B,  Indian  Penal        Code,  has misled the appellant or has occasioned a  failure        of justice.  The prosecution case throughout has been, as is        clear with reference to the petition of complaint, that  the        appellant  with his subordinates in the Food Department  had        conspired  to  misappropriate  the funds  allocated  to  the        procurement   of   oil-cake   with   a   view   to   helping        agriculturists  with  manure to raise more food  crops.  The        approver has been very much in the picture   all  the   time        and, as a matter of fact, as found by the    courts   below,        his evidence is the main plank in the prosecution case.   Of        course,  there  is  the  other  corroborative  evidence,  as        pointed  out  in  the judgments of the  courts  below.   The        provisions  of  section 537 are equally  attracted  to  this        case.   With reference to the provisions of that section  it        is pertinent to note that though the other accused had  been        acquitted  by  the trial court and though he  was  the  only        appellant  in  the High Court, he did not raise  the  points        with reference to the alleged illegality or irregularity  in        the   charge,  before  that  court.   Hence   applying   the        Explanation to that section to this case, it cannot be urged        that the omission in the charge has occasioned a failure  of        justice.        But  the learned counsel for the appellant has  invited  our        pointed attention to the observations of Mr. Justice  Mathew        at  p. 243 of Queen v. Manning(1) that it is "an  imperative        rule of law" that "in a        (1)  [1883] 12 Q.B.D. 241.        218        charge  for conspiracy in a case like this where  there  are        two defendants, the issue raised is whether or not both  the        men are guilty, and if the jury are not satisfied as to  the        guilt  of  either, then both must be acquitted".   But  Lord        Coleridge,  C. J., whose direction to the jury in that  case        was  the subject matter of the judgment does not put  it  as        high  as  Mr. Justice Mathew, but understood it "to  be  the        established rule of practice".        Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant        on the case of The King v. Plummer(1), in which it has  been        observed  that  with  the  acquittal  of  the  only  alleged        conspirators  no  verdict of guilty  against  the  appellant        could  be  passed because the verdict would be  regarded  as        repugnant, in so far as it would amount to saying that there        was  a  criminal  agreement between the  appellant  and  the

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      others  and  none  between  them  and  him.   Hence  it  was        contended  that  in  a situation such as  the  present  case        presents, the conviction of the appellant would amount to  a        similar repugnancy.  This aspect of the matter has been well        discussed in a judgment of the Calcutta High Court delivered        by Mr. Justice Mukerji in the case of I. G. Singleton v. The        King-Emperor(2).   The learned Judge has there  pointed  out        the  difference between the position as it obtains in  India        and  that  in England.  The rule of English law  as  to  the        acquittal  of  an  alleged conspirator  following  from  the        acquittal  of the other when the conspiracy was said  to  be        only  between the two and in a joint trial of both is  based        upon  a  rule  of  practice  and  procedure,  namely,   that        repugnancy  or contradiction on the face of the record is  a        ground for annulling a conviction.  But such a repugnancy is        not by itself a sufficient ground for quashing a  conviction        in India where the matter is governed by statutory law  both        as  to  the  offence  and the  procedure  for  bringing  the        offender to justice.  In India there is no provision in  the        statutory  law justifying an interference with a  conviction        on the        (1) [1902] 2 K.B. 339.        (2) [1924] 29 C.W N. 260.        219        ground of repugnancy in the record.  That is not to say that        the  court  is  to shut its eyes  to  the  inconsistency  in        convicting  one person of the offence of conspiracy  on  the        same  evidence  on which the other alleged  conspirator  had        been  acquitted.   If  the  matter is  as  simple  as  that,        ordinarily  the  courts will have no difficulty  in  setting        aside  the conviction, when there was absolutely nothing  on        the record to distinguish the case against the one from that        against  the other.  Such was the case which was decided  by        this Court in Topan Das v. State of Bombay(1).        Learned  counsel  for  the appellant  pressed  upon  us  the        consideration  that notwithstanding the state of affairs  as        disclosed in the evidence, the appellant was entitled to  an        acquittal because in the charge as framed against him  there        was  no  reference to the approver.  He contended  that  the        rule upon which the accused was entitled to an acquittal was        not  a matter of practice but of principle.  In the  instant        case we are not sure that the acquittal of the co-accused by        the trial court was well founded in law or justified by  the        evidence  in the case.  The trial court has not  disbelieved        the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution.  It has  only        given  the  benefit  of the doubt to  the  accused  whom  it        acquitted  on grounds which may not bear scrutiny.   But  as        the  case against those acquitted persons is not before  us,        we need not go any further into the matter.        It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the        appellant  that  the  High Court  having  acquitted  him  in        respect of the two substantive charges of criminal breach of        trust  and of falsification of documents he should not  have        been convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy because        the conspiracy was alleged to have been for those very  pur-        poses.  It is a sufficient answer to this contention to  say        that the offence of criminal conspiracy consists in the very        agreement  between two or more persons to commit a  criminal        offence irrespective of the        (1)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 881.        220        further  consideration  whether or not those  offences  have        actually  been committed.  The very fact of  the  conspiracy        constitutes  the  offence  and  it  is  immaterial   whether        anything  has  been  done  in  pursuance  of  the   unlawful

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      agreement.   But  in  this  case the  finding  is  not  that        Government  money had not been misappropriated or  that  the        accounts  had not been falsified.  The charge under  section        477-A  relating  to the falsification of the  documents  has        failed  because the High Court found that particular  charge        was   wanting  in  sufficient  particulars,   thus   causing        prejudice  to  the accused.  The charge under  section  409,        Indian  Penal Code, was set aside by the High Court  on  the        ground   that   there  was  "practically  no   evidence   of        entrustment  with the appellant of the price of 1500  maunds        of oil-cakes, a substantial portion of which he was said  to        have misappropriated".  How far this observation of the High        Court is well founded in law with reference to the  official        position  of  the  appellant who had  the  spending  of  the        Government  money in his hands is not a matter on  which  we        need  pronounce.  It is enough to point out that it has  not        been  found  by  the courts below that  the  object  of  the        criminal  conspiracy  had not been achieved.  On  the  other        hand, there is enough indication in those judgments that the        object  of  the  conspiracy  had  been  to  a  large  extent        fulfilled.  Hence it must be held that there is no substance        in this contention also.        Another  contention  raised on behalf of the  appellant  was        that  the other accused having been acquitted by  the  trial        court  the appellant should not have been convicted  because        the evidence against all of them was the same.  There  would        have  been a great deal of force in this argument, not as  a        question  of  principle but as a matter of prudence,  if  we        were satisfied that the acquittal of the other four  accused        persons  was  entirely  correct.   In  this  connection  the        observations of this Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. State        of Punjab(1), and of the Federal Court in        (1) [1954] S.C.R. 145, 156.        221        Kapildeo  Singh  v.  The King(1) are relevant.   It  is  not        essential  that more than one person should be convicted  of        the  offence  of criminal conspiracy.  It is enough  if  the        court is in a position to find that two or more persons were        actually  concerned  in  the criminal  conspiracy.   If  the        courts  below  had  come to the distinct  finding  that  the        evidence  led on behalf of the prosecution  was  unreliable,        then  certainly no conviction could have been based on  such        evidence  and  all  the  accused  would  have  been  equally        entitled to acquittal.  But that is not the position in this        case as we read the judgments of the courts below.        Lastly,  it  was  contended  that  the  examination  of  the        appellant  by  the  learned  trial Judge  was  not  in  full        compliance  with  the requirements of section 342,  Code  of        Criminal Procedure.  Two points have been sought to be  made        in  this  connection.  Firstly, it has been  contended  that        though  the  other accused who have been  acquitted  by  the        trial court were questioned with reference to the conspiracy        with the approver Pitabas Sahu, no such question was put  to        the  appellant.   It is true that the court  questioned  him        about  his  "conspiracy  with the  other  accused  persons".        Counsel  for the parties before us did not agree as  to  the        significance  of  the words "in conspiracy  with  the  other        accused persons".  The contention on behalf of the appellant        was that they referred only to the persons actually standing        trial  before the court, whereas counsel for the State  con-        tended  that they had reference to all the  accused  persons        named  in the petition of complaint including the  approver.        A number of rulings of the different High Courts as to  what        is  the position of an approver, whether he continues to  be        an accused person even after the grant of pardon or  whether

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      he  is  only in the position of a witness on behalf  of  the        prosecution,  were cited before us.  But we do not think  it        necessary  in  this case to pronounce upon that  because  we        have, as already indicated, come to our conclusions        (1)  [1949-50] F.C.R. 834, 837, 838.        29        222        on the assumption that there is an omission in the charge in        so  far as the approver has not been specifically  named  in        the   charge  under  section  120-B,  Indian   Penal   Code.        Secondly, it was contended that the evidence of P.W. 27  who        had  been  chiefly  relied  upon  in  the  courts  below  as        corroborating the approver had not been specifically put  to        the  appellant though the evidence of the  approver  Pitabas        Sahu  was pointedly put to him.  In our opinion, it  is  not        ordinarily necessary to put the evidence of each  individual        witness to the accused in his examination under section 342,        Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  The appellant  was  put  the        question  "Have you got anything to say on the  evidence  of        the  witnesses?" That, in our opinion, is sufficient in  the        circumstances of this case to show that the attention of the        accused was called to the prosecution evidence.  As to  what        is  or is not a full compliance with the provisions of  that        section  of the Code must depend upon the facts and  circum-        stances  of  each case.  In our opinion, it cannot  be  said        that  the accused has been in any way prejudiced by the  way        he has been questioned under that section.        As  all  the contentions raised on behalf of  the  appellant        fail, the appeal must stand dismissed.        223